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ABSTRACT
Recent trends in theology have created an environment where the thought of John 
Macmurray, a twentieth-centuiy Scottish thinker and Professor of Moral Philosophy at 
the University of Edinburgh, is increasingly relevant. In particular the reemergence of a 
robust trinitarianism has raised issues surmunding relational concepts o îperson and the 
nature of the relationship between human and divine persons. Macmurray’s philosophy is 
cited as a contemporaiy example of persons in relation which paiallels certain 
Cappadocian and Athanasian notions of the Trinity.
The relationship between Macmimay’s anthr opology and his theology, however, 
is largely unexplored, due in part to confusion over the exact nature of Iris doctrine of 
God as well as the lack of a thorough exposition of his thought as a whole. Because of the 
highly integrated nature of Macmurray’s work one cannot properly understand the 
philosophical, antliropological, or theological dimensions in isolation horn each other. 
Therefore this thesis considers these tliree dimensions of Macmurray’s thought, providing 
a systematization and clarification of his philosophy, anthr opology, and theology.
Through the interaction between the philosophical, antluopological, and 
theological aspects of Macmurray’s thought the ontological and epistemological 
relationship between God and humanity surfaces. Ontologically Macmurray clearly 
differentiates between God and humanity. Yet epistemologically there is a necessary 
relation because all human knowing and reflection is conditioned and limited by hiunan 
' reality. Since MacmuiTay believes hiunans experience God, he believes all human 
knowledge of God must be expressed within the terms of human reality. This does not 
necessarily lead to anthropomorphism as long as one realizes one is speaking in a limited 
and theoretical fashion about God who is at least personal. Macrmmay’s thought is then 
used to critically engage the theology of Moltmami, Gunton, Torrance, Cumiingham, and 
Lampe particularly with respect to their understandings of the divine-human relationship.
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Ch a pter  1
JOHN MACMURRAY: AN INTRODUCTION
John Macmurray is the quiet giant of modem philosophy, the most original and 
creative of savants and social thinkers in the English speaking world. If Iris 
thought is revolutionary, as it certainly is, the kind of revolution he has in view is 
not revolt but the reconstruction of the foimdations of life and knowledge with a 
view to a genuinely open and creative society of the future. His impact has not 
been as spectacular as that of Ayer or Popper, but it is incomparably greater for it 
soalcs into philosophical, social and religious thought like sunlight upon the earth, 
with a similai' result in living finit. In what he has done tlirough this teaching and 
wilting there is a longer period between gennination and harvest, for his thought 
penetrates deeply and pervasively into the foundations of human existence; if, 
then, he has not yet been appreciated as he ought to be, it is because he is 
something like fifty years ahead of the rest of us.
-Thomas F. Toiiance^ 
Thomas F. Tomance attests to the paradox of John Macmurray: original, 
revolutionary, penetratmg, and yet strangely unsimg. Macmuiiay’s thought is radical, not 
in the sense of primaiily being novel, but in going to the root or core of the cultural 
assumptions of modernity. It is his conviction that many contemporaiy social, political, 
and religious problems can be tied directly to modernity’s underlying philosophy and its 
inadequate egocentric understanding of the person.^ Thus the pressing question for 
philosophy is the correct understanding of the person and the need to discover a logical 
foim appropriate to the expression of this concept.^ hi order to overcome the inadequacies 
of modem pliilosophy he makes two key substitutions at the foundation of philosophy. He 
replaces the Cartesian cogiio ergo sum (“I tliink therefore I am”) with ago ergo sum (“I 
act therefore I am”) and exchanges the egocentric /  with the heterocentric and mutually
‘ Cited by Kenneth Barnes, Foreword to Becoming Real: An Introduction to the Thought of John 
Macmurray, by Jeanne Wairen (York: Ebor Press, 1989), v.
^SA,31.
^SA,21.
constituting You and 1.  ^These modifications create a definition of person as the self-as- 
agent-in-relation-to-Other,^ or persons in relation, fonning the primaiy core of his 
thought where “All meaningful knowledge is for the salce of action, and all meaningfiil 
action for the sake of fiiendship.”^
1.1 B io g r a p h ic a l  S k e t c h
Jolm MacmiUTay (1891-1976) was raised in a deeply religious Scottish family/ 
His father, originally a member of the Chm ch of Scotland, was deeply influenced by the 
evangelical movement leading to an exodus from the Chuich of Scotland, fir st to Baptist 
congregations and finally to the Plymouth Brethren. MacmuiTay saw this not as a 
rejection of Ms father’s Calvinism but rather as an emotional augmentation. The young 
Macmurray was an enthusiastic Christian participating in teaching and even preaching. At 
both Glasgow University and Oxford Macmurray was an active member of the Student 
Christian Movement and served as the president of the Oxford Branch. He was also a 
member of the Student Volmiteer Missionary Union, as he originally planned to be a
“All this may be summed up by saying that the unit of personal existence is not the individual, but two 
persons in personal relation; and tliat we are persons not by individual right, but in virtue of our relation to 
one another. The personal is constituted by personal relatedness. The unit of the personal is not the T , but 
the ‘You and P.” PR, 61; see also SA, 38. Similar to Martin Buber’s “I-Thou”, Macmurray’s position was 
developed independently from Buber. “In a personal letter to the autlior [Berry] Macmurray admits being 
influenced by tire existentialists, especially Buber, but only as confirming a position he had already reached 
independently.” Cornelius Oliver Berry, “Hie Concept of tlie Self in John Dewey and Jolm Macmurray: A 
Summary Critique,” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1971), 217. When Buber was asked about 
Macmurray’s work in comparison to his own he commented that Macmiuray’s was more philosophical 
while his own was more poetic. A.R.C. Duncan, On the Nature of Persons (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 
78. For a more detailed discussion of the relation of Macmurray to Buber, see Thomas Patrick McGloin, 
“The Personalism of John Macmmray: A Study of the Implications of Jolm Macmurray’s Personalism for 
an Appreciation of tlie ‘Dialogical Principle’ of Martin Buber,” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1975). 
Altliougli McGloin wrongly attributes the dependence of Macmurray upon Buber, his conclusion is still 
valid: “One may go so far as to say that Macmurray’s careful, cautious, personalistic prose is the 
philosophical explication of Buber’s profoundly magnificent poetry of the personal.” McGloin, 251-52.
Macmurray capitalized tlie “o” in Other in order to emphasize and strengthen the personal (rather than tlie 
objective) dimension of tlie otlier. This practice is followed by this author.
 ^SA, 15.The following biographical sketch is diawn principally from two soiuces, tlie autobiographical material 
found in Macmurray’s last work, SRR, and the excellent biographical article by Jack Costello, "Tlie Life 
and Thought of John Macmurray,” hi The Life and Work of John Macmurray Conference Proceedings, 
(University of Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied).
missionaiy, acting as a substitute for his own father’s uiu'ealized call to China, but poor
health prevented him from going.
Macmurray later came to believe that his early evangelistic activity was not based
upon his own religious experience. Yet he simultaneously held to the reality of Ms
parent’s religious experience. The reality of religious experience and the absence of it in
his early life led him later to reflect that the religious question was not one of passion or
sincerity, nor was it primarily about trutlifiilness or satisfaction, but ultimately a question
of reality and umeality.
From this I learned, in the end, how easy it is for religious conviction, in spite of 
the sincerity and passion with which they are entertained and expressed, to be 
imitative and imaginary, the products of a romantic sentimentality, or the symbols 
of pressures in oneself which are not themselves religious.... The dichotomy 
winch governs religious experience is one between real and unreal. Tins is not 
identical with the intellectual distinction between true and false; nor with the 
aesthetic distinction between what satisfies or does not satisfy oui' emotions, even 
if it is related to these. For it is possible for us to have a real religious experience 
coupled with religious beliefs and practices which are fallacious and undesirable; 
or to hold sincerely and convincedly to religious beliefs and practices with no 
reality to sustain them.^
In addition to the crucial formative influence of Chiistianity in Macmunay’s life 
and thought one must also di*aw attention to his interest in science and the scientific 
metliod. Although liis headmaster and director of studies at Glasgow University insisted 
on a course in classics, he managed to wrangle an extra subject in science—chemistry (in 
school) and geology (at University), interests he maintained tliroughout his life. Of 
critical importance to Macmurray’s developing thought was the realization that the 
method of self-criticism employed in science is applicable to religion. “In the scientific 
field, I thought, one does not throw science overboard because a favourite theoiy has been 
shown to be invalid. Wliy should it be different in religion?”  ^This provided MacmuiTay 
with the means to critically engage liis faith without losing it as so many of his
 ^SRR, 9.
 ^SRR, 14.
contemporaiies did. In Costello’s words: “But even as faith in Chiist remained a fixed 
and indubitable star in his fimiameiit, it became clear to him that its fonnulations and 
interpretations can and must develop.” ®^ According to the words penned in his diary when 
he was 21 yeais old, Macmurray believed “It is my duty to find the faith which satisfies 
the [human] need.”
In recounting the eaily influences in Macmurray’s life one must certainly include
the impact of his falling in love (1911) and eventually marrying (1916) his wife Elizabeth
Hyde Campbell, or as the young John Macmurray called her “Hydie.” Elizabetli was an
artist and no doubt inspired, or at least contributed to, Macmurray’s interest in art and the
emotional aspects of personal reality.
Costello argues that the roots of Macmurray’s thinldng are observable taking form
during his university years.
I am suggesthig that these three featiues of acting, feeling and thinking—and their 
integral relationship to one another in Jolm Macmurray’s later philosophy—have 
their roots formed and firmly intertwined in the young man’s three-fold 
transformation during his university years: his intellectual conversion to the 
primacy of scientific method and its capacity to be fully reconciled with genuine 
faith, his falling in love with [Elizabeth] Hydie Campbell and the conversion in 
sensibility and perspective that being in love gave him with regard to the 
foundational place of love in personal-judgment and action, and his transformed 
sense of mission and liis call as a missionaiy, wherein he saw that action was the 
heart of the matter, but it must be constructive action for the building of the world.
And at its heart, is his faith in Jesus who leads him in his thinking, feeling 
and acting. Jesus was the source and goal of his vision of a world community. 
Jesus was the fire of love by which this community could be realized. And Jesus 
was the gyroscope for discernment by which he formed his judgments and 
convictions about what it means for human beings to be real.*^
The second phase of Macmurray’s life may be seen as the period of World War I. 
As with so many the experience of that war would hold special significance to 
MacmuiTay, coloring his perceptions and attitudes towards life, European civilization, 
and Christianity. Macmurray first enlisted in the Royal Army Medical Corps due to
Costello, 4. 
" Costello, 7.
pacifist concerns but later accepted a commission in the Cameron Highlanders/^ Due to 
constant exposure to death he came to lose his feai- of death and in so doing felt he had 
somehow come in better contact with reality. The feai* of deaüi fimctioned as a symbol to 
him of all feai* so that he deduced that fear somehow stands between the person and 
reality. “Without this knowledge of death, I came to believe, there can be no real 
knowledge of life and so no discovery of tlie reality of religion.
The wai* also led Macmurray to become suspicious of modem European 
civilization and traditional politics. Macmurray and men like him were shocked not only 
by the fact that Euiope could produce such an event but also by the general malice borne 
by the civilian populace towards the enemy—a malice which he did not find in die 
flenches. This was reflected infamously in the attitude he found in the churches. Wliile on 
sick-leave in London he was asked to preach, in miifoim, at a local church service. He 
chose to preach about the need to extend fair temis to Geimany and to reach out .in 
reconciliation towards the Germans once the war was over. After the service no one 
would spealc to him. As a result of this experience he refused to officially jom any 
institutional Christian church seeing them as being merely national religions. He still 
thought of himself as a Christian, still preached in churches, and defended Christianity; 
but he remained without formal membersliip in any church until after he retired from the 
University of Edinburgh and joined the Society of Friends (Quakers) in 1959.
Following the war Macmiuray returned to finish at Oxford and laimch his 
professional career. Macmurray’s academic career included appointments at Oxford (Jolm 
Locke lecturer in Mental Pliilosophy, 1919), University of Manchester (lecturer, 1919), 
University of Witswatersrand (professor, 1921), Balliol College, Oxford (Fellow of 
Balliol College, 1923), University of London (Grote Professor of Mind and Logic, 1928),
While attempting to lead his company to safety at Anas, Macmimay was seriously wounded by slirapnel. 
He later received die Military Cross. Costello, 9.
and the University of Edinburgh (Chair of Moral Philosophy, 1944). He retired from 
Edinbmgh University in 1958 after having served the last two years as both the Professor 
of Moral Philosophy and as Dean of the Faculty of Arts.^ "^
Throughout his life Macmurray was actively involved in social issues. Wliile in 
South Africa he was involved both in the successful defeat of a poll tax and in securing 
adequate housing for blacks. He had a great interest in education and was a member of 
the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies, helped establish 
Newbattle Abbey College, and was a boaid member of an experimental secondary school, 
Wemiington. He also served as a board member and frmdi aiser for the New Iona 
Coimnmiity. Perhaps his most visible activism was in what was laiown as the Cliristian 
Left. Macmurray was adamant in his opposition to fascism, yet was always one to chart 
liis own coiu'se. He appreciated certain aspects of Maixist thought but never was a 
commmiist (and therefore seen by some on the Left to lack commitment). Nevertheless he 
was considered too left wing for many others. He also distinguished himself by constantly 
championing the importance of religion over politics, a very impopular position in a time 
when totalitarian politics were everywhere on both the Left and the Right.
Despite Macmurray’s numerous successes (such as his popular BBC broadcasts 
on philosophy and religion, the Gifford lectures, numerous books, articles, pamphlets, and 
his populaiity with students as a lecturer) his philosophical ideas were engulfed by the 
tidal wave of analytic philosophy that swept over the border from England, hi later years 
he found he had more in common with the theologians of New College than with the 
analytic philosophers in his own department.
SRR, 18.
See Costello, 9-22. Also Paul Helm, “MacMiirray [sic], Jolm,” in Dictionaiy o f Scottish Church History 
and Theology, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, et al (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 534.
1,2 J o h n  M a c m u r r a y  a n d  C o n t e m p o r a r y  T h e o l o g y
In John Macmurray’s own lifetime his concerns and thoughts were clearly on the 
margins of mainstream philosophy^ ^  and foimd more acceptance among theologians and 
psychologists/^ In the contemporary context, however, one finds a niunber of 
Macmmray’s themes featuring prominently in philosophical and theological discussion. 
One may simply appeal to the near ubiquity of the temi postmodern in order to justify the 
contemporary relevance of Macmurray’s thought with its critique of modem philosophy 
and his proposal for the remaking of philosophy on a personal foundation. It is not 
smprising then that Macmiuray’s name is once again emerging in the midst of key 
theological discussions.
Broadly speaking one may classify recent literature regarding Macmmray within 
thi ee non-exclusive categories. These categories are not exclusive because of the inlierent 
integral nature of Macmurray’s thought which makes easy delimiting of topics nearly 
impossible. The first categoiy are those ti eatments of Macmmray which are primaiily 
concerned with his philosophy and overall thought. Codion’s comparison of Macmmray 
and Lonergan and Fairley’s comparison of Macmmray and Wittgenstein both fall witliin 
this category, as do more general introductions such as the works ofFergusson and 
Warren.
The second category are those wliich are paiticulaiiy concerned with 
Macmurray’s anthropology and its applications. Shutte’s and Aves’ presentations aie both
Although this is not to deny similarities found in work of otiiers such as Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and 
Ryle.
Among theologians one can particularly point to Thomas F. Torrance and Jolm Baillie as examples of 
theologians who appropriated several of Macmurray’s ideas. See for example the references to Macmurray 
in Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) and John Baillie, The 
Sense o f the Presence o f God (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). The influence of Macmurray is 
clearly visible in John Shotter, Images of Man in Psychological Research (London: Metliuen, 1975).
Patricia Annette Codron, “The Quest for Self-Integration hr the Tliought of Bernard Lonergan and Johrr 
Macmmray,” (Ph.D. diss.. Graduate Hreological Union, 1994); James Fairley, “Agency and MeÜrod: 
Macmurray and Wittgenstem,” in The Life and Work of John Macmurray Conference Proceedings, 
(University of Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied); David A.S. Fergusson, John Macmurray—the Idea of
broadly anthropological in their focus, while narrower antliropological considerations are 
demonstrated by the focus upon the emotions in both McIntosh and Morrissey/^
The third category is centered upon theological and religious aspects of 
Macmurray’s thought Zuber’s analysis of religious education, Creamer’s discussion of 
spiritual development, and Largo’s liturgical application of Macmunny all exliibit this 
theological perspective/^
The most prominent references to Macmmray in recent literature come from 
various trinitarian theologians who seek a non-individualistic, relational concept of 
persons for use within their trinitarian foimulations of the doctiine of the Trinity.
Typically this amounts to a description of MacmuiTay’s antliropological definition of 
persons in relation which is then used as a springboard to the relational discussions of 
God found in Athanasius or the Cappadocian Fathers.^® The use of Macmurray in this 
fashion raises an interesting question: what is the relation of antliropology to tlieology? 
The fact that these tiinitarian theologians do not immediately move fr om Macmurray to a 
description of God implies that they ai e wishing to avoid the perception that antlnopology 
in some way determines theology—defiising the common charge that theology is guilty of 
anthi'opomorphic projection. Yet for one reason or another he is still introduced mto the
ïhe Personal (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1992); Jeanne Wan en, Becoming Real: An Inti'oduction to the 
Thought o f John Macmurray, (York: Ebor Press, 1989).
Augustine Shutte, “What Makes Us Persons?” Afo/c/vj Theology 1, no. 1 (Oct. 1984): 67-79; John Aves, 
“Persons in Relation; John Macmurray,” in Persons, Divine and Human. Kings College Essays in 
Theological Anthropology, ed. CInistoph Schwobel and Colin E. Gunton, 120-37 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1991); Estlier McIntosh, “Educating the Emotions,” in The Life and Work o f John Macmurray Conference 
Proceedings, (University o f Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied); Michael P. Monissey, “Reason and 
Emotion: Modem and Classical Views on Religious Knowing,” Horizons 16, no. 2 (Fall 1989): 275-91.
Robert William Zuber, “John Macmurray and the Common Life: A Proposal for tlie Renewal of Religion 
in Pluralistic Educational Institutions,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1984; David G. Creamer, Guides 
for the Journey: John Macmurray, Bernard Lonergan, James Fowler (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1996); Gerald Andrew Largo, “The Concept of Community in the Writings of John Macmurray: 
A Study of tlie Implications of John Macmurray’s Concept of Community for Roman Catliolic Liturgy,” 
Ph.D. diss.. New York University, 1971.
See tlie following: British Coiuicil of Churches, The Forgotten Trinity. Vol. 1, Report o f the British 
Council of Churches Study Commission on Trinitarian Doctrine Today (London: British Council of 
Churches, 1989), 19; Catherme Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San 
Francisco: Harper, 1991), 255-60; John D. Zizioulas, “The Doctrine of The Holy Trinity: The Significance
discussion and must therefore provide some benefit to the discussion of the Trinity which 
a direct entry into Athanasius and the Cappadocians does not provide. Even while 
wishing to deny an anthropological determinism of theology the inextricable linlcage 
between one’s understanding of God and one’s understanding of humanity is reaffmned 
by the presence of Macmurray’s antlnopology. The nature of this linkage is the 
unresolved question.
In addition to the odd deployment of Macmurray’s anthr opology one finds only 
one sustained attempt at directly applying MacmuiTay’s anthr opology to the doctrine of 
the Trinity—Mooney’s application of MacmruTay’s understanding of love to Rahner’s 
doctrine of the Trinity.^^ So, in actuality, one has virtually no critical engagement 
between Macmurray and trinitarian theology. Why is this so? What is it about 
Macmurr ay’s thought which makes it attractive, and yet simultaneously repulsive, to 
trinitarian theologians? The answer appears to be Macmurr ay’s doctrine of God, for wliile 
there is broad agreement on the general outlines of MacmuiTay’s anthr opology, his 
doctrine of God resembles a theological Rorschach test which tells one almost as much 
about the mterpreter as it does about Macmurray’s theology.
On the one hand there are those such as Mooney who appear to interpret 
Macmurray as a trinitarian/^ on the otlier hand there are those, such as Kiriqratrick, who 
clearly portray Macmurray as unitarian.^^ There also exists a third group comprised of 
those who believe he did not care about the theological question.^"  ^This signals a primary 
lacima in current Macmmray studies regarding the actual shape of Macmuiray’s doctrine 
of God.
of tlie Cappadocian Contribution,” in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed, 
Christoph Schwobel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 59.
Philip Mooney, “John Macmurray’s Notion of Person for the Triune God,” Appraisal: A Journal of 
Constructive and Post-Critical Philosophy and Interdisciplinaiy Studies 1, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 168-78. 
Philip Mooney, “The Notion of Religion in Jolm Macmurray,” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1972).
In order to understand the relation between anthropology and theology in 
Macmurray’s thought it is necessary to have a fiim grasp upon Iris concept of God. Yet 
the plurality of opinions regarding Ms theology causes one to doubt if his antlu opology is 
being comprehended properly. Macmurray’s thought is so highly integrated that if there is 
a misunderstanding or confusion in a major aiea such as his theology then it raises 
suspicions about the overall assessment of his thinking. To arrive at a correct 
interpretation of both the antMopological and theological dimensions of his thought one 
must have a good grasp on the pMlosopliical dimension as well. None of these 
dimensions are imderstandable in isolation from the others.
In the search to discover how Macmiuxay’s anthropology relates to his theology 
one must not only imderstand his antMopology and theology, one must understand his 
philosophy as well. WMle the integrated nature of Macmurray’s thinking has often been 
acknowledged the consequences for understanding Macmruray have not been widely 
incorporated into the pMlosopMcal, anthropological, and theological tr eatments of his 
work. Therefore this thesis will undertake the task of providing a systematic and 
integrated understanding of thé pliilosophical, antMopological, and theological 
dimensions of MacmuiTay’s thought. From the understanding of the relationsMps gained 
in this process one may critically engage various theologians particularly regarding the 
relation of tlieology and antMopology.
Towar ds tMs end Chapter 2 will be an extensive and car eflil exposition of the 
philosopMcal dimension of Macmurray’s thought. This is necessitated by the exploratoiy 
nature of his reflection and the need to clarify it in the face of misinteipretations. Wliat 
will be offered is a coherent and systematic exposition which is not only faithfril to 
MacmuiTay’s intention, but is also of heuristic value, hr tins major effort at systematizing
Frank G. Kirkpatrick, “The Idea of God in the Thought of John Macmiirray; Its Basis and Some 
Implications,” Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1971.
10
MacmuiTay his approach to philosophy and the pliilosophical tradition will be detailed 
and in so doing the importance of Macmurray’s Personal logic will become apparent. It is 
Personal logic which allows him to speak of both unity and particulaiity simultaneously. 
Also shown in this chapter is his careful differentiation of knowledge and reflection so 
that one cannot know what one has not experienced, and one camiot think about what one 
does not laiow. Finally the importance of the connnunal, contemplative, and pragmatic 
apperceptions will be demonstrated as the heuristic and structural backbone of 
Macmun ay’s entire philosophy. The recognition of the significance of the apperceptions 
enables one to create a graphic representation of Macmuiray’s philosophy which is 
imique and heuristically valuable.
Chapter 3 will be an exploration of the anthropological dimension of 
Macmunay’s thought. Utilizing the insights gained in Chapter 2 the discussion revolves 
ar ound the loci of equality, freedom, and mutuality as means of clarifying his general 
imderstanding of persons in relation. Equality stresses the essential commonality of 
persons without ignoring the vital differences of particular individuals. Freedom is 
defined as the capacity to act through the integration of power and desire. Mutuality 
emphasizes knowledge, love, and communion with respect towar d other persons. Of 
particular importance in this chapter are the clarifications, based in the preliminary 
philosophical work of Chapter 2, regarding the concepts of personal and impersonal 
relations and Macmun ay’s concept of religion.
Chapter 4 will investigate the theological dimension of Macmurray’s thought 
through a consideration of his idea of God, his approach to the person of Jesus, and in the 
present interaction between God and humanity. Although this seems to have a trinitarian 
strncture (theology proper, clnistology, pneumatology) it is not trinitarian in content. This
24 See LaCugna, 259, for an example of this approach.
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chapter will demonstrate tliat Macmuixay does not believe human beings may have 
laiowledge of God ad intra, and therefore does not project his antMopology mto his 
theology. Yet he does see the necessary conceptual linlc between one’s ideas of God and 
one’s ideas of human persons because the human person is the fullest conceptuality 
available to humanity. This chapter will question Macmunay’s failure to exploit the 
incarnation more fully—in a manner called for by Macmuixay himself, and will 
ultimately classify Ms theology as a type of natiual pneumatology.
Chapter 5 will consist of a series of studies of recent theologians viewed critically 
from a Macmurrian perspective. Each theologian holds a relational miderstandmg of God, 
yet each one understands the relationality in a different way. The theologians engaged are 
G.W.H. Lampe, David S. Cunningham, Thomas F. Toixance, Colin E. Gimton, and 
Jtirgen Moltmann. TMs chapter will demonstrate the theological relevance and 
applicability of Macmurray’s thought to contemporary theology, particulai ly in the 
discerning of the relation of antMopology and theology in the various theologians 
considered.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION: 
THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL
Existentialism has discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the philosophical 
problem of the present lies in a crisis of the personal: logical empiricism 
recognizes it as a crisis of logical foim and method. Both are correct, and both are 
one-sided. The cultural crisis of the present is indeed a crisis of the personal. But 
the problem it presents to philosophy is a foimal one. It is to discover or to 
construct the intellectual form of the personal.^
The metaphor of discovery serves one well in considering Macmurray’s 
philosophy, the Forni of the Personal, for it captiues the exploratory and probing nature of 
his method as well as his desire to map new terrain and blaze new trails in philosophy. It 
also alerts all who accompany Macmurray on this journey to the fact one must be open 
not only to the new and novel but also to new ways of thinldng about the old and familiar.
This chapter is comprised primarily of a detailed exposition of Macmurray’s 
philosophy, for while simple in its broad outlines (such as provided in the introduction), it 
is easily misunderstood in its particulars. The rationale for this rather comprehensive 
overview of the Foim of the Personal is two-fold: immersion and systemization.
When one is hnmersed into a new culture one comes to understand it m a way that 
is not possible when one views it fi'om the relative cognitive safety of one’s familiar 
environs. Moreover, in the process of immersion one becomes acutely awai'e of the 
assumptions and habits of one’s own cultiue in the contrast between old and new. The 
same is broadly true for radically different pliilosophical frameworks. The habits and 
assumptions of doing philosophy from the theoretical standpoint of the cogito are deeply
* SA, 29.
ingrained in Western philosophy and so it is vitally important that one become quickly 
acculturated to the strange new ways of thinking encountered when one does philosophy 
from the practical standpoint of the agent and persons in relation. Macmiurray was quite 
aware of the difficulty of escaping the confines of the modem Western ti adition and was 
concerned about slippmg back into old patterns liimself.^ This extensive sui*vey of the 
Foiin of the Personal^ will foster quick acclimation to this new philosophical perspective 
and enable the reader better to discern between the experience of intellectual culture 
shock and bad pliilosophy.'^
Preexisting categorizations of schools of pliilosophy ai e among the most 
potentially insidious imports the reader may bring to the study of Macmurray’s thought. 
Categorizations are not inlierently insidious; they are often helpful. They become 
destructive when they function to obscirre rather than to enlighten. Even a cursory suiwey 
of the literature shows that Macmurray is categorized in terms of—or at least believed to 
share major affinities with—pragmatism, empiricism, idealism, realism, existentialism, 
and phenomenology. One may view this as testimony to the unique, not easily classifiable 
natiu'e of his work. To classify him as a philosopher is not wholly without difficulty, for 
by some estimations his concerns and methods lie outside the proper confines of
 ^“My confidence, however, is severely qualified by a knowledge of die inlierent difficulty of die task. It is 
one thing to discover die presuppositions underlying a historic tradition, and to recognize diat they are no 
longer tenable. It is quite another, if that tradition is one’s own, to track down all die effects of tiiose 
presuppositions upon die body of belief and opinion which one has inherited. The influence of the old 
assumptions is pervasive and unformulated. It is not possible, even if it were desirable, to empty one’s mind 
completely and start afresh in a condition of intellectual innocence. It is only to be expected, therefore, that 
I have carried over much from the old order that should have been left behind, and diat my tentative 
dieorizing will be found liable, at many points, to the objection that it still presupposes what it purports to 
reject.” SA, 15 (US edition; British, 14).
 ^For reasons of clarity, tiiis diesis will refer to Macmurray’s philosophy as the “Form of the Personal,” 
while the form, or logical grammar, of his philosophy will be designated as “Personal logic.” Macmurray 
uses die nomenclature “form of die personal” for both.
 ^Note here also Macmurray’s plea in “Some Reflections on the Analysis of Language” Philosophical 
Quarterly 1, no. 4 (July 1951): 319. “The originality of die pioneer consists in discovering and questioning 
the unconscious assumptions of current pliilosophy. He shakes himself free from habits of drought in which 
his contemporaries are bound. Yet he must use the same language as they, and lay himself open to 
inevitable misunderstanding. He is apt to find comprehension and support first among contemporary 
pioneers in odier fields. To contemporary students of philosophy he is more likely to seem guilty o f abusing
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philosophy.^ John McIntyre refers to liim variously as theologian, thinker, and only 
indirectly as a philosopher.^ In addition to his wide range of academic interests and his 
philosophical eclecticism,^ Macmuixay is also difficult to categorize because he does not 
provide a scholaiiy paper tiail. His writing style reflects an older scholarly tradition which 
rarely cites sources and influences, or provides bibliographies.
If forced to categorize Macmurray, the most appropriate category would be 
personalism. Coates, writing in 1949, describes Macmuixay as the exemplar of “essential 
Cliristianity,” one of foui' different streams of British personalism,^ Macquarrie places 
Macmuixay under die category of Philosophers o f Personal Being together with such 
thinkers as Buber, Heim, de Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, Berdyaev, and Bulgakov.^ One 
writer acclaims Macmurray as one of the “pioneers of the personalistic movement in 
philosophy.” ®^ Beveridge and Turnbull see Macmiuxay as the leading figure in what they 
refer to as the “Scottish Personalist School” wliich they believe was in step with
language and defying logic.” This is one of tlie reasons for tlie extensive citation in tliis thesis. To simply 
use Macmurray’s termmology outside of its context inevitably leads to misunderstanding.
 ^It is for this reason tliat Ayer is reputed to have refened to Macmurray as more of a missionary than a 
philosopher. Fergusson, John Macmurray, 24, n.3.
 ^Tire theologian reference is found m John McIntyre, The Shape of Christology (Philadephia: Westminster 
Press, 1966), 131. The drinker designation is foimd rnJolm.McIntyre, The Shape o f Pneumatology 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 27 and 169; and he is mentioned as a philosopher only indirectly when he is 
mentioned as one havhig a personalist philosophy, 208.
’ The term eclectic is meant here in a positive fashion. However die charge of eclecticism (taken negatively) 
is denied by Kirkpatrick. “He was not, for all that, an eclectic thinker. Rather, in Duncan’s phrase, he was a 
thinker of ‘strikhig originalhy’.” Frank G. Kirkpatrick, foreword to On the Nature of Persons, by A.R.C. 
Duncan (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), vii.
* J.B. Coates, The Crisis of the Human Person: Some Personalist Interpretations (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1949), 27. In addition to Macmurray’s brand of personalism Coates also lists the eastern 
inspired mysticism of Aldous Huxley, the embodied communitaiianism of die Adelphi group surrounding 
Jolm Middleton Murry, and die universal humanism of Julian Huxley.
 ^Yet Macquarrie also recognizes diis is not an exact fit for “whereas some of die writers expounded above 
might be best described as prophets, Macmurray is determhied to remam a philosopher.” Jolui Macquarrie, 
Twentieth-Century Religious Thought {London: SCM Press, 1963), 206.
It is interesting to note that when Moltmann lists various attempts to consider God as passionate 
(dieopathy) he considers Berdyaev, Unamuna, a Jewish selection includhig Heshel and Rosenzweig, and 
Anglican sources. Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine o f God, trans. Margaret 
Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 25-47. Macquanie’s section on the “Philosophies of Personal 
Being” (193-209) is comprised of 4 sub-sections. The Russian subsection includes Berdyaev. The Spanish 
deals widi Unamima. While there is no mention of Heshel or Rosenzweig, Macquarries interacts with Buber 
and Ebner which are often categorized with Rosenzweig. Macquarrie also does not have an Anglican 
section, but he does include, instead, John Macmurray. This leads one to believe that there might be a 
natural affinity between Moltmann and Macmurray at least m this area of dieopadiy.
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continental philosopMcal trends, but out of step with the emerging British Analytical 
School.^^ The Scottish dynamic demonstrated here is important. First, Scotland has 
historically been more open to the Continent than England. Second, philosophy in ancient 
Scottish umversities was inclusive of four ai*eas: logic, psychology (called 
pneumatology), moral pMlosophy, and physical science (natural philosophy).TMs 
ancient stream is more interdisciplinary and more conducive to a broadly conceived 
personalism.
However, even with the term personalism one must proceed with care, for 
personalism is often equated with the idealistic personalism of the Boston school. One 
cannot help but wonder whether some who label Macmuixay as an idealist are reading 
him with a preconceived notion of personalism as inlierently idealistic. Personalism, 
broadly construed, is philosophy which gives priority to the person and personal 
categories.
Personalism is a pMlosophy predicated upon the irreducibility and primacy of 
personal categories, that is, the land of categories that govern the meamngful 
interaction among personal beings—categories of meaning rather than cause, of 
respect rather than force, of moral value rather than efficacy, of understanding 
ratlier than explanation". While we recognize the legitimacy of materialistic
McGloin, 12.
See Craig Beveridge & Ronald Turnbull, The Eclipse of Scottish Culture: Inferiorism and the 
Intellectuals (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1989), 96. See also 75, 99,110.
See Vincent Hope, “Scottish Philosophy” in OCP, 815-16.
See Rufus Burrow, Personalism: A Critical Introduction (St Louis: Chalice Press, 1999) for a very recent 
intioduction to personalism, which is almost exclusively focused upon the North American idealistic 
personalism of tlie Boston and USC schools. It argues the Bowne-ian form of personalism is both die fount 
and the most typical form, but cites the varieties which exist witiiin the Nordi American scene. All but one 
of the tiiinkers he considers are idealists of one form or anotiier. Georgia Harkenss is the only realist, and 
her move away from idealism to realism (imder the influence of Hocking and Whitehead at Harvard) is 
described hi terms of dualism—she is presented as a major anomaly hi personalism (66-72). See also Jolm 
H. Lavely, “What is Personalism?” Personalist Forum 7, no. 2 (1991): 1-33, which is quite dismissive of 
non-idealistic forms of personalism.
For example, if  one’s primary exposure to personalism is from Copleston dien one might assume diat 
personalism is idealistic. Frederick Copleston, Histoiy of Philosophy, vol. VIII Bentham to Russell (London: 
Bums and Oates, 1966) chapter XIII “Personal Idealism and Other Tendencies” (289-303). Also note that 
die index entry for “personalism” also has a cross reference to “idealism, personal” (568). There is no entry 
for “realism, personal.” If one inspects the list of secondary literature in the diesis by Roy, one notices that 
diose citations that deal with personalism are drawn from the North American personalist stream, i.e., 
idealists. With the exception of Buber, there are no citations of die continental peisonalists, such as 
Mounier. Louis P. Roy, ‘“The Form of the Personal’: A Study of the Philosophy of John Macmurray widi 
Particular Reference to his Critique of Religious ‘Idealism’” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge, 1984).
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categories derived from the metaphor of need and satisfaction for certain 
pmposes, we regard them as derivative, special case theories legitimate within the 
basic framework of personal categories/^
Among the variants of personalism, Macmuixay is closest akin to realistic personalism 
wliich is often seen to include Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Maritain, Nicholas Berdyaev, 
and Georgia Harkness/®
Instead of attempting to classify Macmiuxay’s philosophy within existing 
paradigms and preconceived categories it is better to immerse oneself in the Form of the 
Personal and to develop an imderstanding of it from within. It is recognized that one can 
never completely disentangle oneself from one’s own milieu, however a concerted effort 
can be made to minimize imposing foreign conceptual grids.
The second rationale for the detailed overview presented in this chapter is to 
provide a systematization of Macmurray’s philosophy. This is not, however, a 
philosophical thesis, and therefore the tlirust of this systemization will not be to answer 
fundamental philosopliical challenges to Macmun ay, but rather to clarify the Foim of the 
Personal thi ough an exposition of its own internal logic. Furthermore, this 
systematization should not be Viewed in an analytic fashion for to do so would destroy the 
veiy nature of Macmurray’s philosophy. It is a systematization of orderly presentation 
and coixection of misrepresentations and misunderstandings of liis thought. This 
systemization, as well as the immersion, also necessitates extensive quotation of 
Macmuixay in the footnotes—demonsti ating the basis of the presentation in Macmuixay’s 
writings.
Erazim Kohak, cited by Shaun Gallagher, “Personalism: A Brief Account.” International Forum on 
Persons [Organization Website on-line] (Oxford, 1998, accessed 8 June 2001); available from 
http://www2.canisius.edu/~gallaghr/forum/index.html; Internet.
Paul Deats, "Eitroduction to Boston Personalism,” in The Boston Personalist Tradition in Philosophy, 
Social Ethics and Theology, ed. Paul Deats (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), 6. Deats, 
following Lavely classifies four types of personalism: Realistic, Absolute Idealism, Panpsychic Idealism, 
and Personalistic Idealism. The rationale being Macmurray’s concern witli objectivity.
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It is absolutely critical to understand the exploratory nature of Macmurray’s 
philosophy. While there is amazing continuity in his work, there are developments as 
well,^’ Moreover, anyone expecting a system of Hegelian proportions and structme will 
be sorely disappointed. Macmurray frilly recognized this when he wrote at the end of The 
Self as Agent,
No attempt has been made to achieve a systematic comprehensiveness. The design 
has been to justify, as the philosopliical need of the present time, the substitution 
of a practical for a theoretical point of view; and, thereafter, to indicate, in regard 
to a few selected issues, the modification of theory which seems to be required. 
None of these issues has been considered with the methodological thorouglmess 
which their separate importance demands, nor has there been any pretensions to 
anticipate and answer the many objections to which such conclusions as have been 
reached are certainly open. Anyone who looks for a philosopliical system, or 
demands a detailed and scholarly demonstiation will be disappointed. Systematic 
scholarship is of the highest importance in philosophy; but it belongs to a later 
stage of the process which is here only initiated.
Macmurray often paints with a very broad binsh. Being true to Macmuixay’s own 
presentation, one will no doubt find oneself in the course of the following exposition 
wisliing for more detail, qualification of a generalization, further development of a novel 
idea, raising objections, or questioning a definition. As will become quickly apparent 
there is simply insufficient room in one thesis to cover all the potential areas of scholarly 
interaction. This systematization will serve a theological purpose, for it provides the 
fundamental understanding of Macmuixay necessaiy for the consideration of his 
anthi'opology (including religion), his doctrine of God, and for the critical engagement 
with contemporaiy theology.
First, this chapter will consider philosophy as Macmurray envisions it. Here 
questions about the nature of philosophy, its tasks, the relation of philosophical traditions.
For example in the early epistemology of lU, Macmunay focuses primarily on the ontological orientation 
of tlie substantial, organic, and personal. By the time of tlie Gifford lectures the apperceptions, which are 
able to account for the insights of lU, are die primary heuristic tool. Most of diis chapter is based upon the 
mature thought found in the Gifford lectures and RAS supplemented by appropriate earlier works, 
particularly lU, with an eye to possible development in his philosophy.
SA, 203. See also SA 13-14.
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and formal expression shall be raised. Next Macmim*ay’s understanding of the 
epistemological process, comprised of experience, reflection, and veriflcation will be 
pursued. Finally religion, art, and science as various ways of encountering reality will be 
discussed. This will conclude with a general schematic presentation of the Form of the 
Personal.
2.1 N a tu r e , Ta sk s , a n d  M eth ods 
OF A Personal  P helosophy
The pressing question of contemporary philosophy, according to Macmurray, is 
the question of the personal. This question is simultaneously a single large question and 
shnultaneously a series of smaller interlocking questions about philosophy itself: 
questions regarding the nature of philosophy and its tasks; questions pertaining to the 
relationship between contemporaiy philosophy and the philosophical ti adition; questions 
about means for expressing the subject matter of philosophy. All these questions exist 
within the larger question and are oriented towaids it.
2.1.1 P h il o s o p h y  and  I ts  T a sks
Due to the radical nature of Macmurray’s pliilosophy one caimot simply assume a 
definition of philosophy and apply it to liis thought without risking extensive 
niisimderstanding. Rather than presuming one must therefore enquire, what does 
Macmurray mean by philosophy?
Philosophy, according to Macmuixay, is the attempt to express the reflective 
understanding of reality in its entirety.^® In short, philosophy is inteipreting the
“Philosophy, then, is the attempt to express tlie infinite in immediate experience Üirough reflection. It 
would be equally correct to say that it is tlie attempt to express reality. For reality is essentially tlie concrete 
wholeness which characterizes immediate experience. Whatever is abstract, whatever is isolated and 
separated out from tlie infinite in which it has its being, become to diat extent umeal. This, I think, is what 
Spmoza means when he talks of die unreality of the finite in so far as it is finite. To isolate anydiing firom 
the whole in which it has its being is to destroy its reality by deprivmg it of die possibility of completeness. 
It becomes essentially incomplete and meaningless when torn fiom its setting. Reality, therefore, is bound 
up widi die unity and completeness of die world in immediate experience of it. Wlien any element in diat
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universe/® As such, philosophy is an inclusive discipline which attempts to malce 
generalizations about reality^  ^in its totality/^ Finthermore, since the universe is 
experienced as a unity Macmurray believes that philosophy must likewise strive for unity. 
Therefore, rather than disparate philosophies, only various attempts at expressing the one 
philosophy or particular aspects of that one pliilosophy exist.^  ^Since pliilosophy is tied 
directly to reality, Macmurray sees the ideal of philosophy to be a complete objectivity or 
rationality.^"  ^This is not, however, to be equated with a sterile rationahsm or passionless- 
objectivism, but with self-transcendence.^^
Philosophy is not created ex nihilo, but develops within a specific historical 
context as a response to problems encountered in life.^ ® Accurate reflection requires a 
proper understanding of the difficulty; therefore, the right question is paramount for 
philosophical reflection.^’ The selection of the right question provides an excellent test 
case to demonsti ate the difference between the theoretical standpoint of the cogito and the 
practical standpoint of the agent. In light of MacmuiTay’s definition of philosophy as
experience is isolated by the process-of reflection, it becomes an idea, no longer a real thing; and every idea 
clamours to be referred to reality, to be replaced in the concrete world of existence from which it was 
derived. Ideas are unreal just because ttiey are ideas, abstr act and isolated. To add idea to idea, to organize 
ideas in systems and to expand these systems without end, brings us no nearer to reality. To reach reality we 
must overcome the abstraction of reflection itself.” lU, 33-34. In tlie Gifford Lectures Macmurray 
demonstrates continuity with tliis earlier definition when he states: “The function of a philosophical form is 
to exhibit the unity of human experience as a whole, in all its general aspects, both theoretical and 
practical.” SA, 14.
lU, 25. Hence the title of his work Interpreting the Universe, See also BS, 200.
SA, 207.
Not in a composite sense but in terms of wholeness: “The universe as a whole does not mean the 
aggregate or totality of all tliat is in it. Tliis, indeed, is a contradictory conception, since die luiiverse is 
infinite and camiot be a totality. By die universe as a whole, one means the universe in diat quality of 
completeness and wholeness which is given in immediate experience, the absence of limits and clear-cut 
boundaries, the qualitative infinity which characterizes all its parts.” lU, 25-26.
RAS, 7.
^ “Philosophy aims at a complete rationality.” SA, 21.
RAS, 18. For a discussion of die meaning of self-transcendence, rationality, and objectivity, see below 
§2.3.1.
Philosophy is a reflective activity and reflection is initiated by a breakdown in action. SA, 21-22. See 
below for a fiiller account of Macmurray’s epistemology and the epistemological process.
“Philosophy aims at a complete rationality. But the rationality of our conclusions does not depend alone 
upon the correctness of our diiiildng. It depends even more upon the propriety of die questions with which 
we concern ourselves. The primary and the critical task is die discovery of the problem. If we ask the wrong 
question the logical correctness of our answer is of little consequence.” SA, 21.
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interpreting the universe, one might suggest that the question of philosophy should be 
“How shall we interpret the universe?” This question, however, is based upon the 
primacy of the tliinker—the question revolves aromid the theoretical activity of 
interpretation or thinking—not the action of the agent/® It is a completely mental exercise 
which has no necessary coimection to any reality outside the realm of ideas. Instead of the 
pm ely theoretical question of how to think about (or interpret) the universe, Macmun ay 
begins with the practical question, “How can we know what we should do?”^^  Parsing 
tliis question reveals the existence of the epistemological dimension (thinldng or 
interpreting the universe)^® while simultaneously relativizing it within the larger 
framework of etliics and action. In Macmunay’s frequently quoted pluase, “All 
meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningfril action for the salce of 
friendship.”  ^^
Action is always particular and therefore always historical.^^ Disregarding the 
historical dimension leads to misunderstanding eaiiier pliilosophy and cripples any 
attempt at constructing contemporary philosophyReciprocally, one may look to 
philosophy in order to best understand the tenor of a particular historical period, including 
one’s own.^ "^  Macmmray believes he lives m a transitional age for he discerns in
It is important to recognize that when Macmurray refers to action it is inextricably linked with the agent. 
There is no action apart from a person. For a devastating critique of theories of action (abstracted from the 
agent) see Paul Riceour, Oneself as Another, trans. Katlileen Blarney (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 56-88. See esp. §2.2.2.3 below for a much expanded discussion of the difference between 
theoretical activity and practical action.
SA, 24.
It is important to note his second manuscript was primarily concerned witli epistemology, lU. His first 
was actually a collection of radio broadcasts so it may be argued that Macmunay’s first scholarly 
monograph was his epistemology.
SA, 16 (US edition, 15 British edition).
SA, 24. Marx was influential in Macmurray’s thought concerning die historicity of philosophy. See, Jolm 
Macmurray, “Dialectical Materialism as a Philosophy,” in Aspects o f Dialectical Materialism, H. Levy et 
al. (London: Watts & Co., 1934). Lam, however, questioned whether Macmurray fully imderstood Marx. 
Blizabetii P. Lam, “Does Macmurray Understand Marx?” Journal of Religion 12 (Jan. 1948); 47-65.
SA, 24-25.
Macmurray believes tiiat “The philosophy of any historical period reflects tiie life of die period even 
more evidently dian does its art.” SA, 25. The expression of social tradition is die raw material of 
philosophy; a way of life implies a philosophy. Philosophers spend much of their time making die implicit
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phenomenology, logical empiricism, and existentialism harbingers of a new period of 
histoiy/^
His final judgment of phenomenology, logical empiricism, and existentialism,
however, is that they are all inadequate to the philosophical task ahead.
Phenomenology’s^ ® retreat to the original Cartesian program with its goal of an innocent
immediate vision of the object^’ is able to malce contributions to the philosopliical
enteiprise, but is ultimately doomed to failure as a pliilosophical program.^® Logical
empiricism rejects all previous philosophy and metaphysics in favor of focusing narrowly
upon the question of language.^® By contr ast, existentialism chooses to broaden the
questions of modem philosophy and abandons philosophical method."*® In spite of the
obvious differences between logical empiricism and existentialism, Macmurray discerns
both as opposite reactions to the breakdown of modernity:
both rest upon the decision that the traditional method of philosophy is incapable 
of solving its tr aditional problems. But whereas the logical empiricists discard the 
problems in order to maintain the method, the existentialists relinquish the method
explicit and critiquing tlie tradition to overcome its inconsistency and incoherence. Therefore he concludes 
tliat two conditions for valid philosophy is consistency and comprehensiveness. SA, 24-25.
For an account of Macmurray’s philosophical milieu see Koy, Fomi of die Personal, 7-17.
CDF notes diat phenomenology is not so much system or school as it is a methodological conception, a 
mamier or style of diinkhig. As with all the philosophical categorizations in diis thesis, one would wish to 
emphasize the family resemblances of die particular categories and not insist on clearly demarcated borders. 
The basic themes of phenomenology include: (1) the difference between natural and philosophical attitude 
and hence science and philosophy; (2) die complex relation between science and philosophy, where 
philosophy is foundational and science provides most of die problematics; (3) the tirai fr om thhigs to their 
meaning; (4) intentionality (variously understood); (5) the basic question is die meaning and being of 
beings—constitutionally as opposed to causally understood; (6) intuitioiiism. Tliinlcers who would be 
considered withm the pheiiomenlogist camp (broadly construed) include Husserl, Scheler, N. Hartmann, 
Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Joseph J. Kockehnans, “Phenomenology” CDP, 664-66,
SA, 27. Grossman states that the phenomenological reflection includes looking at things without 
prejudice. Reinhardt Grossman, “Phenomenology”, OCP, 658-60. It is diis dimension of phenomenology in 
particular that Macmurray focuses upon in his evaluation of phenoniology.
“Phenomenological analysis is a useful device. We can be grateful for it, and use it when we find it 
helpful. But if it is taken as more than this; if  it means that we go back to Descartes and die modern 
staiting-point and do properly what we have so far done poorly, we must answer that there is no going 
back.” SA, 28.
SA, 27. Logical positivism, logical empiricism and analytic philosophy share a certain family 
resemblance and one may see comiectioiis to ordinary language philosophy. Representatives of Logical 
empiricism would include members of die Viemia Circle (Schlick, Bergman, Carnap, etc.) as well as A. J. 
Ayer, C. W. Morris, Ernest Nagel. Nicholas G. Potion, “Logical Positivism” OCP, 508-09.
SA, 27.
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in wi'estling with the problems. So the latter achieve a minimum of form; the 
former a minimmn of substance/*
Rather than embracing one school of thought and rejecting the other, Macmurray
characteristically opts to acknowledge the insights of each wliile attempting to move past
them with the development of a new philosophy—the Foim of the Personal.
Existentialism has discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the pliilosophical 
problem of the present lies in a crisis of the personal: logical empiricism 
recognizes it as a crisis of logical fomi and method. Both are correct, and both are 
one-sided. The cultural crisis of the present is indeed a crisis of the personal. But 
the problem it presents to philosophy is a formal one. It is to discover or to 
construct the intellectual fonn of the personal."*^
2.1.2 T h e  L e g a c y  o f  M o d e r n  P h il o s o p h y
Macmurray’s emphasis upon the inclusive and historical character of philosophy 
renders his reading of modem philosophy cmcial to the constmction and imderstanding of 
the Foim of the Personal/^ According to MacmuiTay, modem philosophy has two phases. 
The first, beginning with Descartes and extending to Hmne, Macmmray characterizes as 
substantial,^^ The second organic phase begins with Rousseau and extends through Hegel 
into the present."*® Cmcial to MacmuiTay’s reading is the placing of Kant ambiguously 
wiüiin this schema “stretching out a hand to both.”"*® In light of this Macmurray analyzes 
the pai allel developments of science and philosophy, as well as specifically focusing
SA, 27.
SA, 29. Macmurray points out modem philosophy’s contribution to tlie decline of religion and die 
apotlieosis of tiie state as further proof of the contemporary crisis of the personal. SA, 29-31.
Macmurray uses die temi modem philosophy for any post-Cartesian philosophy until the advent of 
existentialism and logical empiricism. For Macmurray the common denominator in all modem philosophy 
is its starting place in die cogito.
Macmurray also uses several odier terms alongside substantial, such as material, Cartesian, formal, and 
analytic.
Again Macmurray uses various temis in parallel with organic, e.g., biological, idealist, and dialectic.
SA, 32. Roy places Kant and Descartes (and Macmurray) within the idealist camp. However, it is clear 
that Macmurray does not consider Descartes to be an idealist, and certainly does not consider himself to be 
an idealist (a charge that Roy levels at Macmurray). See Roy, Form of the Personal, 25. D. W. Hamlyn 
defines an idealism as die belief that “what is real is in some way confined to, or at least related to, die 
contents of our own minds” and states explicitly that Descartes is outside diis boundary. D. W. Hamlyn, 
“idealism, philosophical” OCP, 386-88. Roy claims diat his definition of idealism is derived from 
Macmurray and diat it lies in “the practical, die emotional and die ethical aspects.” Roy, Fomi of the 
Personal, 31. His argument seems forced at best. It certainly is not a definition of idealism diat Macmurray 
would recognize.
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upon Kant as the crax of modem philosophy in order to provide insight into the 
constmction of the Form of the Personal.
2.1.2.1 Parallel of Scientific and
Philosophical Phases
If science moves from an established physics to the foundation of scientific 
biology, we find that philosophy moves from a mathematical to an organic form. 
We should expect, then, that the emergence of a scientific psychology would be 
paralleled by a transition from an organic to a personal philosophy. The form of 
the personal will be the emergent problem."*’
The relationship between science and philosophy is, for Macmurray, a reciprocal 
one, each mutually infomiing and benefiting from the other."*® The substantial first phase 
is commensurate with advances in the physical sciences and the study of the material 
world. However, the limitations of this philosopliical fonn ai*e manifest when one 
attempts to go beyond die simply material and deal with the biological. From this 
Macmunay posits that the mathematical natui e of analytic grammar undergirding the 
substantial philosophy is adequate for the detennination of the material world, but not the 
biological world."*^
The second phase of modem scientific discovery can be characterized by the rise
of the biological sciences and conesponds with organic philosophy.®®
Its key-concept is not substance, but organism, and its problem is tiie fonn of the 
organic. In contrast to the mathematical fonn, which is a combination of identical 
imits, the organism is conceived as a haimonious balancing of differences, and in 
its pure form, a tension of opposites; and since the time factor—as growth, 
development or becoming—is the essence of life, the full fonn of the organic is
SA, 37.
^ “Now tiie outstanding feature of tiie modem development of knowledge has been tiie creation of the 
positive sciences, and this has meant tiiat tiiere has been a detemiining relation between philosophy and 
science tiirougliout. The relationship has not been one-sided, but reciprocal. It has been the task of 
philosophy to create the conceptual fomis and systems of categories which provide the logical stmcture, 
and so determine the general attitude of mind favourable to the production of and the reception of scientific 
knowledge.” SA, 31-32. This is a similar position as is often found in Husserl-type phenomenology.
SA, 32-33.
It is interesting to note tiie relative historical relation of Hegel (d. 1831) and Darwin (d. 1882).
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represented as a dynamic equilibrium of functions maintained though a 
progressive differentiation of elements within the whole.®*
Aldiough one immediately thinks of the Hegelian dialectic, Macmunay’s understanding 
of this phase encompasses all philosophy based upon an organic analogy, including 
process philosophy.®^ To Macmunay’s mind a critical lesson from the organic phase is 
that the rise of biology did not spell the end of the physical sciences, but rather their 
incoiporation into a larger fr amework.®^
Yet, in MacmuiTay’s estimation, just as the substantial phase was superseded by 
the organic phase, now a new phase must emerge to supersede the organic. As 
justification for the emergence of this new phase MacmiuTay points to philosophical and 
scientific developments. Philosophically, the limits of the organic phase have been 
discovered in its inability to account for human persons in their individuality 
(Kierkegaard) or their sociality (Comte).®"* Scientifically, MacmuiTay points to the rise of
SA, 33.
Altliougli early in his career Macmurray stated that tliis logical form was expressed successfully by Hegel 
(lU, 115), it would appear tliat by the time of die Gifford Lectuies he wanted to insure that it was 
understood more broadly; "It is the dominance of the biological analogy in philosophy which is decisive, 
and tliis clearly will cover all organic and evolutionary types of philosophy down to those of Alexander and 
Whitehead, not to speak of dialectical materialism.” SA, 34. For an extended critique of die organic model’s 
trajectory into skepticism see SA, 34-36. For an examhiatioh of the superiority of Macmurray’s philosophy 
compared to process philosophy for theological usage see, R.J. Blaikie, “Being, Process, and Action in 
Modem Philosophy and Tlieology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 25 (May 1972): 129-54; and Culbert G. 
Rutenber, “Macmmray’s Metaphysics of Action: An Alternative to Process Tliinking,” mFrom Faith to 
Faith, ed. Dikran Y. Hadidian. Pittsbmgh Theological Monograph Series, no. 31,403-17, Pittsburgh: 
Pickwick, 1979. For an outstanding example of how Macmurray’s Fonn of the Personal can be used to 
critique a particular organic system see Amy Limpitlaw, “Tlie Kingdom of God as a Unity of Persons: 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s Organic Model and Jolm Macmurray’s Form of the Personal,” (Ph.D. diss.. 
University of Chicago, 2000).
It is crucial to note here that biology remains a science and is therefore not a part of die organic unity- 
pattern. Macmurray notes that in the competition between the vitalists and die biochemists, it was the 
chemists—reacthig critically and using the methodology of die physical sciences who carried the day, but 
that by placing these witiiin an evolutionary framework tiie mathematical nature was transfonned. 
Therefore, biology is a science and not an art because it maintams scientific methodology. SA, 34-35. 
Paralleling this in pliilosophy was the reaction of realism to idealism (which Macmunay sees as a form of 
organic philosophy) which denied tiie adequacy of die dialectical to describe all of reality: “Whitehead and 
Russell collaborated in P77'ncipza Mathematical but while the latter interprets their joint achievement as a 
refutation of the organic idea, die fonner interprets it as leading to a realistic philosophy of organisms. 
However firmly realists may reject Hegelianism and its offshoots, and go back behind Kant to link up with 
the earlier matiieniatical period, the result is not to reinstate the concept of substance on its throne.” SA, 35- 
36.
SA, 36-37. The connection of Kierkegaard to existentialism is common knowledge, but one should also 
be aware of tiie coimection of Comte to positivism. See Michael Ruse, “Comte, Auguste” OCP, 145.
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the psychological sciences as an indicator of the rise of a concomitant third phase in 
philosophy/®
Since philosophy must include the personal in its field of inquiry, this can only 
mean that we must abandon the organic foim as inadequate for the pliilosopliical 
purpose, and initiate a search for the form of the personal.®®
2.1.2.2 Kant as the Crux of Modern Philosophy
Kant is unique in the comprehensive unity of his thought. He does full justice to 
the first, Cartesian phase of modern philosophy. As to the second, it has been said 
with truth that all subsequent philosophies have been built out of the mins of the 
Critical philosophy. I should prefer to say that until we come to those new 
tendencies which have been generated by tlie breakdown of tradition in our own 
time, eveiy significant movement in pliilosophy since Kant can be derived firom 
the Critical philosophy by rejecting parts of it; and by reasserting what any of 
them has rejected, the premisses for its refutation can also be foimd.®’
Macmurray sees Kant’s Critical philosophy as the ciiix of modem philosophy, for 
it shows a clear break in the tiadition (Kant’s so-called Copemican Revolution) and is, by 
Macmurray’s reckoning, the most adequate of modem philosophies: “so that in discussing 
Kant we discuss, in principle, all modem philosophy.”®® Furthemiore, not only is it the 
cmx of modem philosophy, but in concluding reason is primaiily practical, it points the 
way foi*ward.®^
Nephew notes that Macmurray’s project has certain similarities with Kierkegaard, yet arrived at 
independently and with an interpersonal ratlier than the individualistic emphasis found in Kierkegaard. 
Albert Henry Nephew, II. “Philosophy is Tlieology; The Nature and Function of Philosophy According to 
John Macmurray” (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1970), 7-8. Macmmray also notes the similarities and 
claims to have arrived at tlie insights independently. SRR, 24.
Macmurray was acutely interested in psychology and tlie challenges it posed for science and philosophy. 
His book length treatment of this is BS. Included in Macmurray’s usage of the term psychological sciences 
one should probably include tlie social and behavioral sciences.
SA, 37.
SA, 39.
SA, 39. “The organized wealth of original and profound conceptions and of subtle analyses which is the 
Critique o f Pure Reason contains, of course, the seeds of many triodern philosophies. Concentration on die 
positive doctrine of tlie Dialectic to tire exclusion of most odier theses of die Kantian system leads, as we 
have seen, to pragmatism. Concentration on die doctrine of the Transcendental Logic as a whole to the 
exclusion of Kant’s ediical works leads to a non-plienomenalist (non-Berkeleian) empiricism or 
positivism—provided die table of the Categories is not taken too literally. Twisting die Dialectic into a 
logic of truth leads to metaphysical systems of the Hegelian type. Even phenomenology and existentialism 
contain many recognizably Kantian elements. They certainly at least abound with Kantian terms.” S. 
Korner, Kanf (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1977), 125-26.
See Kant’s Critique o f Practical Reason, 5:119-22. Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, trans. 
and ed. Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Andrews Reatii (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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The immediate context of the Critical philosophy is, according to Macmurray, the
Romantic Movement,®® which preceded Kant and to which Kant may be seen as a
sympathetically critical.®* The primaiy distinction between Romantic and Cartesian
philosophy revolves around the function of imagination in knowledge.®^ In sympathy with
the Romantics, Kant holds that the imagination undergirds all cognition and that
perceptual experience presupposes a transcendental synthesis.®® Yet it is tliis very fact that
creates the huge dilemma for Kant:
The discovery that the productive synthesis of the imagination is the root of all 
laiowledge makes knowledge itself problematical. For it means that we invent our 
laiowledge; that knowledge, in some sense, is fictional.®'*
In order to resolve tliis enigma, Kant developed his Critical philosophy and its 
central doctrine of transcendental idealism with its dualism of the world of apprehension 
(phenomena) and the world of the thing-in-itself (iioumena).®® Kant denies human 
knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Knowledge is the detennination of an object by means of 
concepts, which are rules for manipulating elements of sensory perceptions.®® Concepts 
may be eiÜier empirical or pure.®’ The pure concepts—also known as categories of the 
imderstanding—form an interlocking pattern fonning the laws governing thought and
1997). “The effect of seeing Kant through Hegelian spectacles is to shift tlie centre of gravity of Kant’s 
tliinking so tliat it falls within the Analytic of the Critique o f Pure Reason. For Kant himself it falls witiiin 
the Critique o f Practical Reason: while the most important section of tlie first Critique is the Dialectic. 
Indeed the vital conclusion of the Critical philosophy as a whole—and it is one which pomts beyond Kant’s 
own achievement—is tliat reason is primarily practical.” SA, 40. For die importance of tliis conclusion see 
also Hemy E. Allison, “Kant, Immanuel” OCP, 437.
Hamann, a romantic and proponent of Faith Philosophy lived contemporaneously with Kant in 
Konigsberg and it was Hamann and Herder who first used Hume against Kant, tlius waking Kant from his 
dogmatic slumber. SA, 41.
SA, 43. Macmurray points out that because the Romantics were younger die clnonological relationship is 
often misunderstood.
SA, 44.
SA, 44-45.
SA, 45. When Ricoeur explains the narrative self as true fiction, he is mmg fiction in the synthetic, 
constructive, manner. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 140-68. See also Paul Ricoem, Figuring the 
Sacred. Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer, ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis; 
Fortress Press, 1995), 42, 58; Mark I. Wallace, introduction to Figuring the Sacred, by Paul Ricoeur 
(Miimeapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 11-13.
SA, 46.
SA, 49.
SA, 49.
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make the empirical concepts possible/® The cogito is the transcendental unity of 
apperception®^—an objective unity so that “To know is to apprehend an object. Truth is 
objectivity.”’® But the hilierent dualism in Kant’s thought between the thing-as-known 
(phenomenal) and the tliing-in-itself (noimienal)’* is unacceptable to many, for example 
causing the Romantics to reject Kant and leading to Hegel’s development of dialectical 
idealism.’^
Kant’s investigation into the nature of reason and its conclusion that practical 
reason has primacy over pure (or theoretical) reason is of the utmost significance to 
MacmuiTay. Reason is constituted by unconditioned ideas concerning the ultimate natine 
of things, while understanding determines objects by discovery of their conditions. The 
metaphysical temptation is to use ideas from reason, which ai*e purely fonnal concepts, to 
provide knowledge of that which is beyond conditioned existence.’® Reason simply acts 
as a guide to the understanding in the production of knowledge and is thus primarily 
practical, not theoretical:
It is only when we turn to consider our practical experience as agents, and 
not oui* theoretical experience as thinkers, that we discover the tine character of 
reason. Tliis is the final and quite revolutionaiy conclusion of the Critical 
philosophy. Reason is pi*imai*ily practical, i t  is not a faculty of cognition, but a 
faculty of rules. If it has a secondary, theoretical function that is because tliinking 
is something that we do; so that Reason is necessaiy to provide the rules that
SA, 50.
For a general discussion of Kant’s formulation of apperception, see Komer, 61-67. “If we tried to express 
Kant’s distinctions roughly in more ordinary terms we might say that a manifold of presentations may or 
may not be an it which can carry the burden of properties and relations.... Tliere can be no it imless there is 
an I  which could be aware of it and thereby of itself. (Hie possibility of tliis relation between /  and it is tlie 
pme or origmal apperception.)” Komer, 62.
SA, 51. The roots of Macmurray’s philosophy in Kant are apparent here, in tliat Macmurray uses tlie 
nomenclature of apperceptions and holds strongly to the idea of objectivity. Apperception is not so much 
what is tliought as a way of thinking. SRR, 56.
SA, 52.
SA 52-53. Macmurray notes that Hegel’s rejection of the two worlds makes his philosophy more 
coherent, but less adequate. For a discussion of tlie lingering effects of the dualism of subject and object in 
theology see James Brown, Subject and Object in Modem Theology: The Croall Lectures 1953. Library of 
Philosophy and Theology, ed. R. Gregor Smiüi (London: SCM Press, 1955).
One recognizes that Romanticism is a complex phenomenon and here the term Romantics is being 
applied rather broadly. See Isaiah Berlin, The Roots o f Romanticism, Henry Hardy ed. (Prmceton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999).
SA, 53.
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guide our search for laiowledge. The understanding, which is theoretical, is, as it 
were, the viceroy of reason in the theoretical field. Reason itself is the ultimate 
legislator. This is the dignity of reason. For Kant—and as a philosopher—action is 
more important than knowledge. If it was important to distinguish science from 
art, it is much more important to distinguish morality from art. The major danger 
which Kant saw was this confusion—the danger of substituting aesthetic for moral 
standards in the determination of conduct. Indeed science itself, as a human 
activity, depends upon practical rationality.’"*
Even so, the fundamental problem of practical reason remains; laiowledge is unable to tell 
someone what he or she should do.’®
Kant’s third critique, The Critique o f (Aesthetic) Judg?nent, was directly aimed at 
the Romantic philosophy. One of Kant’s targets is the organic determination of tmth, for 
“The fatal error is the assumption that truth is what satisfies the mind. Truth is what is 
determined in accordance with a law, and can be guaranteed only by reference to the 
law.”’® Another target is the Romantic’s confusion of teleology and pmpose; pmpose 
denotes conscious awareness or intention whereas teleology simply denotes a description 
of final form.”  Finally, Kant notes the difficulty of applying a finite concept (organism) 
to an infinite object (Nature).’® Macmurray smnmarizes Kant’s response to the 
Romantics: “All knowledge of Nature is empirical; and all empirical laiowledge must be 
verifiable. If it is not verifiable it is illusory.’/® -
SA, 54.
SA, 56. Kant distinguishes between three types of beliefs: necessaiy, reasonable, unreasonable. SA, 57. 
According to Kant we cannot know that we are free, but it is a necessary belief; and stemming from this 
necessary belief are two reasonable beliefs, God and immortality.
SA, 59.
See Komer, 181-82.
SA, 59-61.
SA, 61.
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2,1.2.3 Transcending Kant and the 
Critical Philosophy
Most personalists have tried to get beyond the Kantian compromise by repudiating 
the separation between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Most personalists, 
however, have not been veiy good at showing how they have this right to go 
beyond Kant in this respect/®
In Macmurray’s opinion, the truly astounding accomplishment of the Critical 
philosophy is its ability to hold togetlier science, aesthetics, and morality—in short, its 
adequacy/* This adequacy is built upon the foundation of the doctiine of the tliing-in- 
itself (transcendental idealism) without wliich science and morality fragment. However, 
Macmurray believes if one wishes to move beyond the Kantian impasse of modem 
philosophy, one must find a replacement for the thing-in-itself. Wlien Macmurray 
analyzes the Critical philosophy he discovers two areas of incoherence and one area of 
inadequacy which suggests to him a way beyond tlie transcendental idealism of the 
Critical philosophy.
The first incoherence in the Critical philosophy revolves around the question of 
how one can imderstand morality in light of the dualism inherent in transcendental 
idealism’s separation of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. In short, Kant creates a 
breach between reality (the noumenal or the thing-in-itself) and one’s perception of it (the 
phenomenal or the fiiing-as-known).®^ Yet if one is even to consider the question of 
coirect action (morality or practical reason) then one must not only view the Other as real 
but also one’s perception of the Other as real; ontology and epistemology must be united.
John H. Lavely, “Personalism’s Debt to Kant.” in The Boston Personalist Tradition in Philosophy, Social 
Ethics and Theology, ed. Paul Deats (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), 28.
SA, 62-63.
“We can think their unity only by taking the noumenal world as the real world, and die phenomenal as its 
appearance to us in tlie guise that our spatio-temporal form of intuition imposes upon it. Such language is 
necessarily analogical, for tlie relation between the known and the unknown camiot be formulated 
otherwise.” SA, 64.
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If the moral struggle is to be real, the opponents, sensibility and the rational will, 
must be equally real. If one belongs to the world of appearance and the other to 
the world of reality then tlie contest is between a man and his shadow.®®
Macmurray believes this is a formal error in Kant’s system created by the doctrine 
of the thing-in-itself, which must therefore be eliminated. Yet this move will destroy the 
adequacy of the Critical philosophy requiring another means of uniting science and 
morality.®"*
The second incoherence Macmmray finds in Kant is the maimer in which he 
relates theory and practice. For while Kant’s starting premise is the transcendental miity 
of apperception—I  think—the conclusion of the Critical philosophy is that reason is 
primarily practical, thus the conclusion contradicts its major premise.®® The determination 
of the primacy of the practical over the theoretical indicates a way beyond the Critical 
philosophy suggesting to Macmurray that the staiting point of philosophical reflection 
should be practical rather than theoretical. Moreover, tlie dialectic methodology employed 
by Kant reveals that the theoretical must somehow be incorporated within the practical by 
means of a cmnulative synthesis,®®
SA, 66. Emphasis in the original.
^  “If Kant’s solution fails, tlien another solution must be found if philosophical adequacy is to be achieved. 
For it is essential to philosophy that a means should be discovered of thinking coherently die unity of 
experience as a whole.” SA, 66.
SA, 67. Macmurray also notes that Fichte, who starts with “die act” in reality begins widi a dieoretical 
act, not a practical one.
SA, 68-69. The idea of a cumulative synthesis is demonstrated specifically by MacmiuTay in his 
discussion of Kant’s differing accounts of time in the Analytic and Aesthetic: “But Kant does not rewrite 
the aesthetic in the light of the analytic, nor the analytic in the light of die dialectic. He proceeds from stage 
to stage by including elements of experience which have so far been left out of consideration; and 
consequently at each stage a more comprehensive synthesis is made possible, in which die contents of die 
earlier stages appear as elements. Yet die modification which diey must undergo when so qualified by new 
considerations is left to the reader.” SA, 69.
Furdiermore, it should be acknowledge diat Macmmray was aware diat Kant’s Critical Philosophy 
disallowed a move to the practical: “Nevertheless, die Critical Philosophy points the way, even if it forbids 
die attempt, to a formal reconstruction which would start from the primacy of the practical, and take up into 
itself die theoretical as an element widiin die practical.” SA, 69.
The influence of Kant upon Macmurray cannot be doubted. Marx, however, also plays an 
important flmction within Macmurray’s philosophical development, although it followed the earlier 
foundational role of Kant. See e.g., CS, PC, and Macmurray’s article “New Materialism,” in Marxisjn, by 
Jolm Middleton Murry, et al. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1935), 43-58, for Macmurray’s work on Marx. It 
is interesting to note that there is only one significant reference to Marx in SA and that deals with the 
emphasis upon praxis (97). See also Lam who seriously questions Macmunay’s interpretation of Marx, or
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MacmiuTay’s third major criticism of the Critical philosophy is the inadequacy of
its treatment of religion. He notes that Religion within the Bounds o f Mere Reason is not
an integial part of the Critical philosophy hut only an addendum to the Critique o f
Practical Reason. In Kant’s thought, religion is not a unique aspect of experience hut
only a pragmatically helpful mythology, a mere by-product of morality.®’ This
understanding of religion, says Macmiuray, is one which no religious teacher would
recognize.®® Macmmray believes tliis luu ecognizable imderstanding of religion stems
from the formal starting point in the cogito which commits one to logical individualism.®^
An egocentric philosophy cannot adequately address religion or even morality because it
cannot deal directly with the question of interpersonal laiowledge, which is the essence of
religion and ethics.^®
We may then reformulate our criticism of the adequacy of the Critical philosophy 
by saying that it fails to do justice to, and even to allow for the possibility of our 
knowledge of one another; and this failure aiises because its fonnal conception of 
knowledge excludes tins possibility by postulating the T think’ as the primary 
presupposition of all experience.^*
Is there a common link between the dualism of the noumenal and phenomenal 
worlds, the contradictory relationship between pme and practical reason, and the question 
of religion? Macmurray believes all thr ee errors How from the incorrect starting point in
at least Üie totality of that understanding. Lam, 47-65. Macmurray was definitely influenced by the Marxist 
attack on idealism and the importance of die unity of thought and practice. For additional discussion of 
Marx’s influence on Macmurray see the historical discussion in Costello, 15-16, 25. Also Nephew, 48-85. 
Berry holds tiiat Macmurray’s pliilosophy is essentially Scottish realism “modified by his acceptance of 
Marx’s principle of the unity of thought and practice” as well as some Kantian modifications. Berry, 157.
SA, 70.
^ SA, 70. Macmunay cites St. Paul as being tiie closest to Kant but Paul’s conclusion is tiie polar opposite 
of Kant: Law can only judge persons not set tiieni free. SA, 70-71. It is somewhat ironic that Langford 
accuses Macmunay of the same error: creating a definition of rehgion which tiie religious would not 
recognize due to his minimal discussion o f worship, doctrine, and God. Tliomas A. Langford, “The Natural 
Theology of John Macmmray,” Canadian Journal o f Theology 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1966): 18.
SA, 71.
SA, 72-73. “We may restate our criticism by saying, tiierefore, that any philosophy which takes the T 
think’ as its first principle, must remain formally a philosophy without a second person; a philosophy which 
is debarred from thinking the ‘You and I’.” SA, 72. Furtliemiore, Macmimay notes that tiie cogito replaces 
the second person You when addressing the question of God with an object of tliought—which is tlie best 
that it is able to do. SA, 72. Finally Macmurray states his understanding of tiie realization of religion in 
human experience: “What is generalized, legitimately or not, in tiie religious use of the term God, is a 
matter of empirical experience. It is our experience of personal relationship with one another.” SA, 72.
32
cogito ergo sum, which he traces back to its source in Descartes/® Macmurray refutes the 
necessity of Cartesian radical skepticism/® its equation of knowledge and thought/"* and 
its conclusion, “I thinlc therefore I am.” ®^
Macmurray’s inteipretation of modem pliilosophy views Hegel’s dialectic 
springing from Hume’s criticism of analytic-fomial logic^ ® and expects a new logic to 
supercede Hegel’s Synthetic dialectic in light of Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel/’ Wliat 
follows should be a third and final phase of philosophy, tlie forni of the personal, with a 
new logical form and its starting point in the /  Jo not the I  think. Macmurray has no 
illusions about the difficulty of switching orientations from the self that thinlcs (the Self- 
as-subject) to the self that acts (the Self-as-agent)/® He is adamant that he is not replacing 
a theoretical philosophy with a practical philosophy, for pliilosophy is inherently 
theoretical. Yet this does not require that one must theorize from the standpoint of the
SA, 73.
“These two criticisms of Kant’s philosophy—of its formal coherence and its formal adequacy—have a 
common root. It is that any philosophy which takes the ‘Cogito’ as its starting point and centre of reference 
institutes a formal dualism of tlieory and practice SA, 73. Macmurray sees confirmation of his 
suspicions about the cogito within logical positivism’s and existentialism’s focus upon the second person. 
Within logical empiricism this is seen in the substitution of Isay iox I  think which necessitates the second 
person. Existentialism focuses on this personal other with the slogan; “God or Nothing”. SA, 74.
“The metliod of doubt rests upon an assumption, which should be made explicit, that a reason is required 
for believmg but none for doubting. The negative, however, must always be grounded in the positive; doubt 
is only possible through belief.” SA, 76.
“Knowledge, m this [the modem-Cartesian] strict sense of tlie term, is the product of tliought and lies at 
the end of a process which begins in doubt.” SA, 78. “Belief—not tlieoretical assent—is a necessary 
element in knowledge. A logical system of true propositions does not of itself constitute a body of 
knowledge. To constitute knowledge it must also be believed by someone. For laiowledge cannot exist in 
the void; it must be somebody's knowledge. A proposition may be true even tliough no one believes it; but 
it cannot; until it is believed, be an element m knowledge!^ SA, 78.
Macmurray’s basic criticism is that it cannot account for action or even for the existence of otliers. SA, 
80-81.
“The answer to Hume’s skepticism of the form of the material was the constmction of die form of the 
organic. To the contemporary skepticism of the organic, tlie answer will be, if we can achieve it, the 
construction of tlie form of the personal. Such an instmment of thought would have a finality denied to tlie 
otlier two, for we should no longer be attempting to miderstand our human experience on the analogy of our 
knowledge of organisms or of physical substances, but directly, hi temis of die personal character which is 
its own unique distinction.” SA, 82-83.
Macmurray follows Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel diat “die dialect of the personal life ... is a dialectic 
without synthesis” and inevitably produces a philosophical dualism of eitiier idealism or materialism. SA, 
97; see also 36. Macmurray sees this basic reliance upon the organic analogy as extending into our present 
period and believes that the madequacies of Hegel’s dialectic applies to all “organic and evolutionary types 
of philosophy.” SA, 34. For an extended critique of the organic model’s trajectory into skepticism see SA, 
34-36,
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theoretical. Instead Macmurray is suggesting theorizing from the perspective of the 
practical.^^ Analytical and dialectical logic simply will not suffice for the expression of 
the unity of the personal.*®® Therefore, Macmurray develops his own unique logic—a 
Personal logic—for the Form of the Personal.*®*
2.1.3 P e r s o n a l  L o g ic
The challenge facing Macmurray is as follows. He must find a way to describe the 
experiences of persons, fiinctioning at the personal level, including a way of accoimting 
for the unity of experience of the Self as both agent and subject, without imdeimining the 
appropriate advances of the previous phases of philosophy. He must find a Personal logic 
for personal reality that works as well as the dialectic does for organic reality and the 
analytic does for substantial reality. Because of his commitment to reality (in the face of 
idealism) he cannot simply hypothesize an idea. He must instead consider the concrete 
problem of the experience of the agent and subject (two realities which eveiy person 
experiences and wliich eveiy person intuitively integrates), hypothesize a working 
solution, and then proceed to test and refine this against the veiy reality which spawned 
the question in the first place—the integi ated experience of the self as both agent and 
subject.*®®
Macmunay’s initial observation about the integration of the Self-as-agent and the 
Self-as-subject is to observe that the self who acts is the same self who thinks; there is in
SA, 85-86. The self-as-subject and self-as-agent terminology is formalized on SA, 90.
SA, 85.
SA, 92. Komer notes how Kant understands the relationship of logical fomis and understanding in Kant: 
“The tliesis tliat to each of the different logical forms diere conesponds one Category, and conversely, to 
every different Category one logical form, is in tlie words of Kant, ‘die clue for tlie discovery of all pure 
concepts of tlie understanding.” Komer, 49-50. This same basic idea is present within Macmurray’s system.
Again, let us point out tiiat we are making a distinction simply for sake of clarity of exposition, between 
the Form of the Personal, as the name used for Macmurray’s philosophy and Personal logic which is the 
designation for the formal nature of that philosophy. In Macmurray’s usage botli meaiihigs are found in the 
teimhiology of tlie form of the personal.
While it would have been possible to simply provide a conclusive summary statement of Personal logic, 
its development is behig detailed in order to show why Macmurray camiot be accused of idealism. He 
begins with experience and eveiything flows from that, not from ideas.
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fact a unity of the experience of the Self. Second, in action the entirety of the Self is 
employed, including though t .T h is  is very important, for when one says someone acted 
without thinking, he or she is drawing attention to the fact that it is the norm for people to 
combine thought with a c t io n .Y e t ,  there is no such expectation when it comes to 
thought. There is no apparent degradation of tliought in the absence of action.
‘Acting’ and ‘thinldng’ then, are, in abstract conception, exclusive 
contiaries. In actuality they are ideal limits of personal experience; and ‘acting’ is 
the positive, while ‘thinking’ is the negative limit.
In this quotation, Macmurray uses several words which for him are programmatic 
and function as technical terms. In the Form of the Personal, the term positive connotes a 
vector toward wholeness and comprehensiveness, while negative implies a relative 
reduction and incompleteness. Action is the sole puiwiew of persons—only persons act.^ *^^  
Action is primary, holistic, and concrete while thought is “secondary, abstract and 
derivative.” ®^^ From the orientation of the agent, epistemology is contained within 
a g e n c y , f o r  the world in which the agent acts is the same world which the subject 
knows—thus overcoming the inherent dualism of Kant’s phenomenal and noumenal
For a more detailed exposition of Macmurray’s epistemological process see below §2.2,
“Action, then, is a full concrete activity of the self in which all our capacities are employed; while 
thought is constituted by tlie exclusion of some of our powers and a witlidrawal into an activity wliich is 
less concrete and less complete.” SA, 86.
SA, 87-88.
SA, 87. Macmurray is careful to clarify that these are abstractions which in reality do not exist in Üieir 
pure forms: “Indeed, when we consider tire contrast in tlris fashion, it tends to present itself as an abstract 
duality; in which action and thought are positive and negative poles of a personal experience, which moves, 
hr its actuality, between them.” SA, 86-87. As thought is an exclusive and negative concept at its ideal Ihnit 
it is actually coirtentless and merely formal. SA, 88.
Macmurray makes a distinction between action and activity (tire more generic term): “We are concerned 
with persoiral activities, with tire agency of the Self. In this coirtext, action and drought both imply 
rationality. We may, however, use dre term ‘activity’ without this implication, as a generic term with a 
wider significance, so drat we can distinguish bodr drought and action as modes of rational activity. As a 
furdrer aid to definition we may add that action is activity in tenns of the distinction between ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’, and that thought is activity in terms of tire distinction between ‘tme’ and ‘false’.” SA, 89.
SA, 89.
“In other words, a dreoiy of knowledge presupposes and must be derived from, and included within a 
dieoiy of action,” SA, 89.
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worlds. Similarly, loiowledge is not prior to action, for loiowing and doing are two 
aspects of the same experience.
When attempting to describe the exact relation between the Self-as-agent and tire 
Self-as-subject Macmurray uses his technical terms to define the agent as the positive-self 
(or self-affirmation, for it is more holistic) and the thinlcer as the negative-self (or self­
negation, due to the reduction of the self through exclusion). He believes that if  one was 
able to reach the absolute minimal limit of this self-negation of the Self-as-subject, one 
would cease to exist. To act requires engagement with the world, while thought requires 
disengagement fi'om the world. To completely disengage oneself from tire world is to no 
longer exist.
What is particularly interesting at this point is the fact that sonretlrhrg may cease to 
tliiirk (either permaneirtly or temporarily) and still exist (e.g., organic life) and somethmg 
may not live and still exist (substance).^ Yet there is nothing within hiunan experience 
which lives witlrout substairce or thinks without life and substairce. The existence of 
organic aird substantial reality, each with its owir correspoirding logical gr ammar or form 
(dialectic arrd arralytic, respectively) indicates to Macmurray that one is dealing with three 
basic experierrtial strata of reality: substance, orgarrism, arrd persorr.^^  ^A logical grammar- 
or logical form is a synthetic, theoretical, and formal expression of the proper 
relationships urrifyirrg various experiential elements withirr conceptual schemes or unity-
SA, 90.
To act implies being in the world; Subject is over-against world: “But to be part of tlie world is to exist, 
while to be excluded from tire world is to be non-existent. It follows that the Self exists as agent but not as 
subject.” SA, 91. “As agent, tiierefore, tlie Self is the body. Conversely tire Self, as subject, is tlie mind.”
SA, 91.
One should keep in mind here that substance, matter, may also be tliought of as energy, following 
Einstein’s famous formula, E=mc .^ In otlier words, when one says substance, one does not necessarily 
imply visible, etc.
The fact that substantial philosophy used a formal-realist logic and organic philosophy used a dialectical- 
idealist logic botii to great advantage suggests to Macmunay tliat “If so, it must mean tliat idealist and 
formal logicians are studying the forms of different tilings.” SA, 93. According to Jeffko, unity-pattems and 
logical forms have a metaphysical huiction in the Form of die Personal. Walter G. Jeffko, “Jolin 
Macmurray’s Logical Form of tlie Personal: A Critical Exposition,” (Ph.D. diss., Fordliam University, 
1970), 15.
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p a t t e r n s It is created by abstracting the content from the unity-pattem so that one is 
left only with the logical relations. In this way it is cleai* that the logical form is dependent 
upon the Icnowledge of the unity-pattem.
If one employs MacmuiTay’s paradigmatic case of the unity of the agent and 
subject imderstood as positive-self and negative-self the inadequacies of applying the 
analytical and dialectical logical structures to human persons becomes apparent. If one
employs the substantial analytic with its mathematical form the positive-self and the 
negative-self either cancel each other out or create a dualism. The organic dialectic 
requfres development, yet the agent and the subject are simultaneous;^therefore, the 
dialectic must focus upon one to the neglect of the other producing another dualism.^ 
Neither is able to express the unity of the agent and the subject without dualism or tlie 
annihilation of one of the aspects of the self: the agent, the subject, or both.
A philosophical form is like a blank form where tlie contents are removed leaving only the relationships 
between the terms to generate meaning. See SA, 92. Also see John Corcoran, “logical form” GDP, 511, and 
Wilfred A. Hodges, “form, logical” OOP, 285. Macmurray prefers unity-pattem over various alternatives 
(systems of categories, fomis of synthesis, schema of unity) because it carries fewer incorrect associations. 
SA, 94-95; lU, 61. Kant uses tlie term schemata, which Komer defines as “a rule for die syndiesis of die 
imagination.” Kômer, 70.
SA, 93-94. Macmurray notes tiiat drought, based on logical forms cannot lead to the discovery of what is 
not, in some way, aheady known.
Since the logical form is derived from the unity pattern, and the unity pattern comes out of 
experience, one clearly cannot mistake what MacmmTay is doing here in constructing Personal logic as 
evidence for idealism.
“The crux of the problem lies, as we have seen, in this, tiiat formally the Self as subject is die negation of 
the Self as agent, and since it is by its own activity that the Self withdraws from action into reflection, its 
subjecthood is its self-negation. Thus the unity of the Self is a unity of self-affkmation and self-negation.” 
SA, 96.
SA, 96. If they are the same diing. A; then one is left with +A-A=0; if diey are different diings (A and B) 
then the terms do not cancel, but one is left with a dualism A/B.
“If we represent action and drought as thesis and antithesis in a self -development, we must represent 
diem as successive phases hi the development of die Self. But then it must be impossible to represent the 
same Self as at one and the same time both Agent and Subject For when it is Agent it will not be Subject; 
and if diis were actually die case, then the Self could never know that it was Agent, nor could it ever act 
widi knowledge. The positive and negative phases would still exclude one anodier, and no synthesis would 
be possible. This, we may recall, is precisely Kierkegaard’s criticism of the Hegelian philosophy. The 
dialectic of die personal life, he maintains, is a dialectic without a syndiesis,” SA, 97.
Hie dieoretical organic is clearly reflected in Hegel. Marx, to Macmurray’s mind, represents die 
practical: “He [Marx] did this by substituting the Self as ‘worker’ for the Self as ‘drinker’, widiout changing 
the organic luiity-pattem. The result is a dialectic of die practical in place of the dialectic of the theoretical 
life.” SA, 97.
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The requirements for the new logical form are clear: it must be capable of
supporting the primacy of action (inlierited from Kant), as well as incoiporating
Kierkegaard’s insight that the human “is a dialectic without synthesis.”  ^ In other words
while the self is primarily agent it is also subject, which is the opposite of agent.
Macmunay concludes:
The unity of the Self is neither a material nor an organic, but a personal unity. The 
logical form of such a unity is one which represents a necessaiy unity of positive 
and negative modes. The Self is constituted by its capacity for self-negation. It 
must be represented as a positive which necessarily contains its own negative.
Macmurray uses Personal logic to express the par adigmatic case of the unity of 
the self and concludes: (1) The Self is agent and exists only as agent; (2) The Self is 
subject but cannot exist as subject. It can be subject only because it is agent; (3) The Self 
is subject in and for the Self as agent; (4) The Self can be agent only by being also 
subject.
Although MacmuiTay never provided a complete schematic of Personal logic it is 
possible to synthesize the basic grammar fr om what he states explicitly as well as from 
studying his usage. In a case study of 38 examples of Macminray’s use of Personal logic 
in The Self As Agent a more comprehensive understanding of the grammar of this logical 
form surfaces.
SA, 97. Macmuiïay accepts Kierkegaard’s statement of the problem, but he rejects tire paradoxical 
solution.
120 of the problem lies, as we have seen, in this, tliat formally the Self as subject is the negation of
the Self as agent, and since it is by its own activity that the Self withdraws from action into reflection, its 
subjecthood is its self-negation. Tlius tlie unity of the Self is a unity of self-affirmation and self-negation.” 
SA, 96.
SA, 98.
SA, 100-02. Haddox points out the controversial nature of Macmurray’s position, citing A. C. Ewing’s 
response to Macmurray tliat Ms distinction between agent and subject was inconsequential. “It is clear tiiat 
what Ewing (and many otliers) does is tacitly to rely on the conceptual framework of die agent to make 
sense of and explicate the framework of tlie subject. This is why Macmurray’s argument is dismissed quite 
often as being presumptuous, yet tiiis very meshing of incompatible conceptual frameworks produces the 
problems which many modem philosophers have been unwilling to solve. It is only by a radical analysis of 
our conceptual commitments, such as Macmurray acutely begins, tliat we can imderstand who we are as 
persons who are trying to understand who we are.” Michael Brace Haddox, “Action and Religious 
Knowledge: The Person as Agent in tlie Thought of Jolin Macmurray” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1970), 
125-26.
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AAction
(positive)
Knowledge
(negative) Knowledge(positive)
Consciousness
(negative) Consciousness(negative) Consciousness(positive)
A-Action
B-Knowledge
C-Consciousness
Figure 2.1 Positive & Negative in Personal Logic
First, negatives are derived fi'om the positive through a process of excluding one 
or more aspects of the positive. Or to state it another way, the positive is more tlian the 
aggregate of its constitutive negatives. A nmnber of implications stem from this 
important point. Taken in conjunction with the primacy of the practical, tins points to the 
fact that the negative exists for the sake of the positive. Rather than the analytic view 
which emphasizes the importance of the most basic part, Personal logic favors an 
integrated relational whole. This also means that one cannot simply take the difference 
between the positive and the negative and designate it the positive—the positive is 
inclusive of the negative or it is not the positive in the sense meant by Macmun ay. Using 
a giaphic representation (see Figure 2.1), action is not the aiea a-b, but a-o. It is either 
inclusive or it is not action in the full sense of the tenn. Therefore the use of negative
123 "YliG included concepts [organism and material body] can be derived from the concept of ‘a person’ by 
abstractions; by excluding from attention diose characteristics which belong to tlie higher category alone.” 
SA, 117. This is a logical priority of die person and should not be interpreted as temporal priority. 
Macmurray does not believe human persons existed chronologically before animals or tilings.
While tiiis sentence begs for a grammatical substantive similar to element or part, it is wise to avoid that 
terminology whenever possible for it adds an analytic feel to Personal logic. Aspect or dimension are better 
suited, but whenever possible positive and negative as substantives will be utilized.
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implies not so much the opposite of the positive, but rather the exclusion, negation, or 
reduction, which constitutes or in some way gives shape to the positive. As an example, 
consider the case of belief and doubt. Belief is positive; doubt is negative. One cannot 
doubt until one has at least minimally entertained the existence of the possibility of the 
thing—behef Doubt therefore cannot exist independently of belief.^^  ^Yet belief cannot 
exist independently of doubt, for doubt gives shape to belief because belief without the 
possibility of doubt is sometlnng other than belief—it is fact or reality, not belief. In 
the fonn of the personal the connotation is more mathematical, functioning almost like 
a gradient with positive being in the direction of wholeness and completion while 
negative is movement towards reduction and hagmentation. The mathematical 
tenninolpgy should not, however, be talcen as a merely quantitative difference, for it is 
not a question of merely more of tlie negative or adding various negatives together—the 
mistaken notion of Raphael. There exists a qualitative distinction wliich can only be
This is implicit in the example above of Macmunay’s four-part explication of tlie relation of the agent 
and subject (SA, 100-02) and is stated explicitly numerous otlier times, e.g., PR, 34.
SA, 76.
Thus ive see tlie definition of faitli (belief) employed in Hebrews 11:1. Some may want to argue that tliis 
violates the injimction against being double minded in Janies 1:5-8. It can be argued that tliis is an 
mjunction agamst dualism, or the primacy of doubt over faiüi, not tlie eradication of doubt or its proper 
subordination to belief.
Defending Macmurray’s matliematical usage, Duncan states: “Macmunay borrowed his terminology 
[positive and negative] firom mathematics and it is surely no more barbarous than talk of neustics and 
phrastics or illocutionary or perlocutionary acts.” Duncan, 54.
Several of Macmunay’s commentators are unconvinced of the success of Personal logic. Thus 
Beny, “die dubious logic of a unity of a positive (intentional, personal action) which subordinates and is 
constituted by its own negative (motive consciousness)” (262-63) and “dubious logic of positive and 
negative” (312). “ Also disturbing is tlie multiplicity of meanings given to ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in 
Macmurray’s discussions. These words are given so many functions that tliey become radically equivocal.” 
Frederick Ferré, review of Persons in Relation, by Jolni Macmuiray, Theology Today 19 (1962): 287. See 
also D. D. Raphael, “Critical Study: Review of The Self as Agent, by Jolm Macmurray” Philosophical 
Quarterly 9, no. 36 (July 1959): 275, who says: “All tiiis talk about ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ , and about a 
new logical form, seems to me unnecessarily mystifying and indeed confusing.” Even as sympatiietic an 
observer as Limpitlaw states: “This language [positive and negative] runs tlie risk of suggesting the 
dualistic opposition which Macmurray wanted to move beyond.” Limpitlaw, 192.
Raphael, 275.
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imderstood from the perspective of the positive/Positive and negative also should not
be interpreted along moral or judgmental lines/^^
Second, a single positive may have more than one negative depending upon what
has been excluded. Again, if one looks to Figiue 2.1, both knowledge and consciousness
are negatives of action. Each negative may also be constituted by its own negative.
Figure 2.1 also shows this relationship, for while loiowledge is the negative of action,
relative to consciousness it is positive.
The third grammatical characteristic of Personal logic is that when the personal is
actualized it exists in a continuum. Macmurray is not a dualist. This is a common
misinterpretation of Macmur ray, and one of which he was hilly aware.
Action, then, is a full concrete activity of the self in which all oui' capacities are 
employed; wliile thought is constituted by tlie exclusion of some of our powers 
and a withdrawal into an activity which is less concrete and less complete. Indeed, 
when we consider the contrast in this fashion, it tends to present itself as an 
abstract duality; in which action and thought are the positive and negative poles of 
a personal experience, which moves, in its actuality, between them.^^^
Here one is reminded of some of Polanyi’s concept of emergence. Michael Polaiiyi, Personal 
Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Roiitledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), 382-404. 
Michael Polaiiyi, Tacit Dimension (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 27-52.
Although it can obtain ediical importance. Case in point: to evaluate a person in tlieir entirety based 
solely on their productivity or beauty is immoral since it ignores the relational-personal level of morality.
Macmurray uses upwards of eleven negatives for tlie positive of action alone in SA: Subject, 87; 
cognition, 113; Movement, 118; knowledge, 127; tlieorizing, 134; reflection, 137; happening, 147; 
teleology, 150; causation, 160; habit, 161; physics and psychology, 163. Some of these are probably 
intended to be synonyms, such as thinking and reflecting, still the point is made tliat tliere can be more than 
one negative for each positive depending upon what is to be excluded.
Raphael misses tliis aspect of Personal logic when he questions how consciousness (which exists in 
annuals as well as human persons) can have a negative. If one excludes enough, the unconscious is simply 
tlie negative of cognition. Yet, since it is “more” negative (figuratively speaking) it is also tlie negative of 
the conscious. Raphael, 276.
Roy, Form of tlie Personal, 110; Dorothy Emmet, Rules, Roles and Relations (New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 1966), 171; Haddox, 102-05. Haddox believes that the mathematical character of positive and 
negative leads Raphael to a dualistic interpretation of Macmun ay (129-30), yet upon reading Raphael, this 
does not seem to be the case.
Roy reads Macmurray in a dualistic-idealist manner so that Personal logic (which he typifies as a 
“binomial negative/positive”) results hi a “logical absurdity”, yet he affinns Hie concomittant aspect he calls 
“binomial exclusive/inclusive.” Roy, Form of tlie Personal, 84. The proof of Roy’s misreadmg of 
Macmurray is his paraphrasing of the relationship between personal and impersonal attitudes as: “(1) Being 
acquainted with the other; (2) Not seeing the otlier as an object; (3) Respectmg the other as free and equal; 
(4) Not treating die odier as an object” Roy, Fonn of the Personal, 108-09. The correct understanding of 
Macmunay requires the modification of 2 and 4 by adding merely, a personal attitude does not see or treat 
die personal other as merely an object—but this does not eliminate the objective characteristics of the odier.
SA, 86-87.
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Fouith, the unity of a positive and a negative may be expressed either by the 
terminology of the positive pole or by a completely different term. MacmuiTay's habit of 
doing this can cause a considerable amount of confusion. Ho’wever, one must realize 
Macmurray is not writing from witliin the analytic tradition with its hypersensitivity to 
issues of definition. More importantly, the exploratory nature of the work encourages rich 
and varied expression to communicate the imderlying ideas. To define too quickly and 
too narrowly may lead to the exclusion of important aspects of Macmurray* s thought, a 
risk which this exposition also poses.
Fifth and finally, in actuality it is possible for the negative pole to dominate the 
positive pole. A classic example of tliis is when habit (the negative) escapes intention (the 
positive) to become a compulsion. Macmurray describes these states as unrealP^
Since Personal logic is so often confused with various forms of dialectical logic it 
is beneficial to contrast Personal logic with these dialectics in order to clarify the 
differences. Fox provides a useful schematic including the Synthetic, Decisional, 
Evaluative, and Paradoxical forms of dialectic, graphically represented in Figure 2.2.^^  ^
The most famous dialectic is the Synthetic and it is commonly associated with 
Hegel and Mai’x.^ '^ ® In the Synthetic dialectic the first element or pole (the thesis) 
combines tlirough conflict with the second pole (the antithesis) creating a totally new pole 
(the synthesis). Both the thesis and the antithesis ai e lost in the creation of the synthesis.
The Decisional dialectic decides either for one pole or the other. This unity is not 
so much a union as it is a vanquishing of one element from the field of contest.
See Macmurray, Analysis of Language, esp. 319 for discussion of this phenomenon. Roy warns of the 
danger of anaclironism, while still bemoaning Macmurray’s lack of exacting definition. Roy, Form of the 
Personal, 19.
SA, 162.
For example RE, 226.
Douglas A. Fox, “Personal Logic and Cliristology,” Encounter, 34 (summer 1973): 248.
Often called “The Hegelian Dialectic”, but scholarly consensus is that it is not Hegel’s method, but 
rather a stylization or systemization of Hegel by others. Robert B. Pippin locates the association of the
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Figure 2.2 Dialectical Forms
Striking a middle ground between the Decisional and the Synthetic is the 
Evaluative dialectic. Lilce the Synthetic, a totally new pole is created which is neither of 
the original elements. However, more in keeping with the Decisional fonn, the resulting 
Evaluative dialectic owes more to one pole than to the other. A priority is grmited to one 
of the elements over against the other in the cirçatign of a new element.
The Paradoxical dialectic, typified by Kierkegaard, occurs when both poles are 
perceived as equally important but logically incompatible and therefore exist in a 
necessaiy unity of tension or paradox. Neither is lost; neither is isolated from the other; 
neither has priority over the other. In the Paradoxical dialectic two equal and separate 
elements are intrinsically linlced together.
In Personal logic the positive is partially constituted by its negative. Unlike other 
dialectics Personal logic does not eliminate an element (Decisional), combine them into a 
totally new element (Synthetic and Evaluative), or see them as incompatible
temiinology of diesis, antithesis, and synthesis witli Hegel in the writings of the Hegelian expositor
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(Paradoxical). Personal logic is a hierarcliical polar integration of a positive that is 
constituted by its own negative without extinguishing or modifying the negative, but 
where the negative exists only for the sake of the positive (see Figiu*e 2.3).*'^ *
Synthetic
Decisional
Evaluative
Paradoxical
Personal
Figure 2.3 Personal Logic and Dialectical Forms
A particularly theological example is appropriate to demonsti'ate the need for and 
the power of Personal logic. Consider Jewett’s criticism of Brunner:
Heinrich Moritz Chalybaus in 1837. Robert B. Pippin, “Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich" CDP, 368.
PR, 34. This definition of Personal logic has certain similarities to Jeffko’s definition: “A positive which 
includes (or contains), subordinates, and is partially constituted by its own negative” (194). However, he 
sees tliis as an extension of Macmurray’s Personal logic, not as an accurate description of it in use by 
Macmim ay, while our definition is based upon his usage. Fox provides an alternative definition of Personal 
logic as “a proposition about personal reality consists of a ‘positive’ element which contains and is 
stmctured by its own ‘negative’ pole.” Douglas A. Fox, “The Principle of Contra-Action,” Faith and 
Philosophy, 2, no. 2 (April 1985): 169. Haddox criticizes this constituting or structuring aspect of Personal 
logic (as interpreted by Fox) because, following Marcel, he sees the unity of tlie self as being achieved and 
not formally structured, witli only the direction of unity being indicated. Haddox, 131-34. One finds Fox’s 
language geared too much to stmctme and form. Fox provides the following graphical model of Personal 
logic: “Let us imagine a wheel in which the two important elements are a rim and a hub. This presents little 
difficulty, but let us further imagine tliat tlie rim actually derives its shape from tlie hub, so that if  the latter 
were to change its shape becoming oval, irregular or even (incredibly) square, the rim would follow suit. 
Now, from the perspective of the road, the rim is tlie trutli being encountered, but tliat rim contains and is 
constituted by a hub. It can be distinguished from the hub, yet it would cease to exist if the hub were not
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Paul King Jewett, who studied with Brunner in Zurich, has argued that Brunner’s 
doctrine of revelation and Sciiptuie is fundamentally incoherent.... Jewett 
criticized Brunner’s absolute distinction between ‘it-truth’ and ‘Thou-truth’ as 
impossible to maintain. If divine revelation is to serve as a norm for Christian 
doctrine, as Brunner intended, then it camiot be entirely devoid of propositional 
content. Otherwise there is no way from revelation to confession, fr om personal 
encounter to doctrine.
Bnumer, influenced by Buber, yet following a paradoxical-existentialist dialectical fonn, 
was unable to integrate the factual and the personal. Grenz and Olson rightly conclude,
Bninner should have maintained his valuable distinction between Thou- 
truth and it-tnxth while providing greater insight into their mutual inter­
dependence, thereby doing greater justice to his own dialectical approach to 
theology.
Yet this is easier said than done, for if  Bmmier could have integrated the two while 
maintaining logical coherence, he would have.^ "^ "^  Macmunay’s Personal logic provides 
the necessary logical tools to enable such a tlieological construct without it lapsing into 
irrationality.
2.1.4 S u m m a ry
What is the question of contemporary philosophy? For Macmurray it is the 
question of the personal. To answer this question, MacmuiTay defines philosophy as the 
interpretation of the imiverse and situates the philosophical task within a historically 
conditioned context. In light of his historical context he believes a new philosophical 
form is necessaiy—the form of the personal. This new form will subsume both the 
material and organic forms, thereby demonstrating both continuity and discontinuity with 
the tradition. Similarly, he builds upon while undermining Kant’s Critical philosophy by 
altering the foundation of the cogito. By abandoning the egocentric, theoretical, and
there. Conversely, the hub has assumed the shape it has, and Urns has shaped the rim, in response to the 
knocks and jars which the run has met in its encounter witli the road.” Fox, Personal Logic, 247.
Stanley J. Grenz & Roger E. Olson, Twentieth-Century Theology (Downers Grove, XL: InterVarsity, 
1992), 83. Citing Paul King Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept o f Revelation (London; James Clarke, 1954), 
57-73.
Grenz & Olson, Twentieth-Centwy Theology, S3.
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isolated perspective of the Cartesian-self in favor of the Self-as-agent, one is allowed to 
re-conceptualize reality in terms of a Personal logic where the negative constitutes and 
exists for the sake of the positive. Just as logic is transformed by a change in 
philosophical viewpoint, so too is epistemology.
2.2 E pistem o lo g y  fr o m  the  
Sta nd po in t  of  th e  A gent
One of the results of Macmunay’s jettisoning of the cogito as a point of departure 
for philosophy is his rejection of the equation of loiowledge with thought.
Epistemology from the standpoint of the Agent is grounded in experience. In its primary 
fonn it is knowing-in-action and only secondarily Imowing-in-reflection. Macmurray 
details a three-phased epistemological process "^*^  beginning in e x p e r ie n c e When a 
problem is encountered, experience is intennpted. Pausing, the agent enters the second 
phase, reflection. In reflection a solution is hypothesized which remains merely 
theoretical imtil the agent enters the third phase, verification, which tests the hypothesis in 
action.
2.2.1 Experience _. _
‘Experience’ is a practical concept, refening to whatever is apprehended in action, 
in distmction from what is thought in reflection.
How is one to understand the meaning of experience! Macmunay is frilly aware 
of the difficulties surrounding the concept. In the Self as Agent, rather than expend vast
See Emil Bnumer, Truth as Encounter, trans. Amandus Loos, David Cairns, and T. H. L. Parker 
(Philadepliia: Westminster Press, 1964) for a detailed exposition of his epistemology.
SA, 78. Largo sees Macmurray’s position in keeping witli Aquinas who says tliat tliere is no knowledge 
in the intellect unless it is first in the phantasm (immediate experience). Largo, 217, n. 1.
The basic stnicture of lU is built around tliis tluee stage process, wliich Macmurray assumes in PR, e.g., 
PR, 148-49, 151.
lU actually uses the term immediate experience, but with reservations (lU, 12). SA does not use the term 
immediate experience. Macmunay goes to great lengdis to demarcate die difference between immediate 
experience and attempts to characterize immediate experience—which means it is no longer immediate, but 
mediated. lU, 12; see also Haddox, 45. Haddox notes tlie similar epistemological role of immediate 
experience in Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, and Polaiiyi (51).
'^®SA, 115.
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amoimts of energy in coiTecting misunderstandings he builds a theory of loiowledge-in- 
action from the ground up and only invokes the category of experience when he must. In 
doing so, Macmurray considers knowledge and movement from the perspective of the 
Agent and their unity as two dimensions of action.
As two dimensions of action, knowledge and movement are inseparable. 
Knowledge does not cause movement nor movement Icnowledge. But to act is to move
and to know: the in its two dimensions oîllm ow  and I  move 150
2.2.1.1 Personal Knowledge-in-Action
Macmurray wishes to come to grips with an epistemology which has its staifmg
point in the practical realm, not the mental-theoretical realm. Yet he recognizes that there
is a need for a way to imderstand the linkage between the empirical and the rational
approaches to epistemology.
If we presuppose the ‘Cogito’, then knowledge, if it is to be truly knowledge, must 
start from concepts and proceed through concepts. But since Locke, or at least 
since Kant, it has been recognized that this is impossible. Yet the problem 
remains, so long as the primacy of the theoretical is assumed. Attempts to make 
sense-perception the basis of knowledge, as in some sense it clearly is, must either 
assimilate the material fo the mental, or absorb the mental in the material.^^^
For Macmuiray, the question narrows down to how one understands the senses. 
Instead of following the traditional pattern and considering vision as the archetypal
“Wliat is distinguishable üieoretically is not necessarily separable in fact: for to distinguish elements in a 
whole Üieoretically is merely to limit attention to an aspect of what is presented. In order Üierefore to 
eliminate this tendency to misunderstand tiie definition I propose to call knowledge and movement 
dimensions of action.” SA, 128, Haddox disagrees sharply with this move on Macmurray’s part, seeing it as 
an inadequate model of action in so far as it does not represent the unity of action but merely asserts it, and 
hence is a refiitation of Üie starting pohit in action—the integrative function versus the integration of two 
basic elements. He further sees it as falling into both physical reductionism and pragmatism. This does not 
overly concern him because tiie error was detected using Macmurray’s own Üieory and method. Haddox, 
102-05. This criticism is due in part to Haddox’s tendency to read Macmurray too dualistically and 
idealistically,
"We might rephrase it tiius: ‘When there is an acting there is a moving and a loiowing, and the 
indivisible unity of these constitutes the acting.’” SA, 128-29.
SA, 104. Macmun ay cautions against an improper understanding of sense-perception: “Sense-perception 
is itself an abstract conception, and represents an ideal Imiit or zero of cognitional consciousness at which 
awareness remains, practical activity has ceased and no reflective activity begun. Such a conception,
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sense/^^ he focuses upon touch as the essential and cardinal sense of the Agent/^^ The 
basic feature of tactile perception is resistance—“the direct and immediate apprehension 
of the Other-than-myself.”^^ '^  This perceptual experience/as a personal activity, is 
constituted by its own negative, that is the knowledge or awai eness of the Self and the
however useful it may be for purposes of analysis, can represent no real experience. For whatever else is 
present in an experience, activity must be.” lU, 31.
Macmurray sees vision as a good model for the self as subject but not as agent. SA, 105-06. “In visual 
perception we do stand over against the object we see; it is set before us, and our seeing it has no causal 
effect upon it. Seeing is prima facie a pure receptivity; to exercise it attentively, we witlidraw from action 
all togetiier. We stop to look. In consequence, the visual model tends to instigate a strong contrast between 
knowing and acting, which in abstract Ûieory passes easily into a conceptual dualism.” SA, 106.
153 this is not so [that vision is tlie model for all sense-perception] can best be seen by contrasting 
visual with tactual perception. Tlie fundamental difference is tliat tactual perception involves physical 
contact between the organ of sense and the object perceived, while vision is incompatible witli this. Sight 
operates only at a distance, touch only in contact. But tliis must be stated otlierwise if its full significance is 
not to be missed. I can only become aware of anything tactually by doing sometlimg to it. Tactual 
perception is necessarily perception in action.... Visual perception, on tlie contrary, excludes any operation 
upon its object, and is a perception in passivity.” SA, 107. “The theoretical reason for Üiis is that a piuely 
visual experience would provide no gromid for distinguishing in practice between imagining and 
perceiving. The result would be a practical solipsism.” SA, 108.
Mark Johnson, whose work The Body in the Mind (Chicago: Chicago, 1987), argues for the bodily 
basis of all tliought. (Thanks to Dr. Steven Guthrie for pointing out this interesting and important work.) 
Yet in Joluison’s discussion of the vision metaphor as the basis of our understanding of Üie intellect (108- 
09), he fails to notice tliat all the “vision” metaphors he employs are themselves all based in tactile 
experience. His point is still the same, tliat metaphors move from the concrete to the more abstract, but he 
himself does not go back far enough to see die basis of the visual in die tactile—diereby supporting 
Macmurray’s contention diat touch has primacy over vision.
Raphael believes Macmurray overstates his case (269-72). Haddox is critical of this discussion of 
touch, seeing it as drawing away from the more important emphasis upon unity: “What Macmurray and 
those who make die same argument for the primacy of touch fail to see is that touch, like vision, cannot on 
its own credit, buy its way into the realm of personal action. Indeed, the distinction between vision and 
touch is die wrong one to make at diis point, not because it is an invalid one, but because both touch and 
vision are widiout meaning apart from the integrative intentionality of one’s body which is the whence and 
the where of all visual and tactual perceptions” (Haddox, 98). He continues, saying that Macmurray is “not 
radical enough in emphasizing personal action as the beghmmg point of all reflection.” On the one hand 
Haddox is correct, epistemology should focus on the holistic experience of the Agent, integrating intention, 
embodiment, and the rest. On the other hand, all these aspects are more apparent in the consideration of 
touch than in vision. One cannot imagine a touch which does not impact what it touched, or a disembodied 
touch! It is not possible to always deal with die totality and it is often more helpful to deal with an aspect to 
provide a usefiil focus for the discussion.
Moltmami, on the odier hand, believes diere is too much contemporary focus upon touch. Jürgen 
Moltmann, The Spirit o f Life: A Universal Affirmation, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1992), 201. This is consistent witii his preference for behig over doing and his long running battle with 
Mai-xist activism. See Moltmann, Spirit o f Life, 199-201. See also Jürgen Moltmami, The Coming of God: 
Christian Eschatology, trans. Margaret Kold (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 116. While he wishes to 
see a contemplatively informed practice, he does not see how diis can be accomplished as long as behig is 
not given preeminence. However, die question remains, how one moves from contemplation to action. 
Macmurray’s philosophy solves die latter problem, while simultaneously necessitating being within the 
doing.
SA, 109.
Macmmray is emphatic diat inmiediate experience not be confused with sense perception. He notes that 
die cognitive, wliile mainly perceptual, also involves the hiiagination so that, in point of fact, experience is 
the frision of imagination and perception. lU, 30-31.
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O ther/R esistance is absolutely necessary to action for to act is inherently to act upon 
som ething/W ithin  this experience of perceiving resistance there is a negative tactual 
discrimination, a theoretical activity based upon concepts from tlie material world such as 
hard, soft, rough, or smooth/^^
The sense of touch meshes easily with an epistemology of agency, but how does 
vision function within this perspective? Vision, according to Macmimay, is the guide to 
action—“anticipatory perception”^^ —^a symbolic representation of fritme tactile 
contact^between the Self and the Other which must be learned and coordinated with 
tactual experience/^^
In order to understand how these perceptual experiences aie related to knowledge, 
it is necessary to discuss the larger context of sense-perception within consciousness and 
experience. Macmimay defines experience, in its primaiy sense, as that which is 
apprehended in action, as opposed to reflection^^^—in short it is knowledge in its frillest 
sense. Consciousness is by contrast all sub-rational (or sub-cognitive) awareness.
SA, 109.
"^SA, 110.
^^®SA, 110-11.
'"^'8A,111. ' ^
160 «Yjgygj perception is therefore symbolic. The sense-datum is a present experience which represents and 
refers to a friture experience of a tactual order in which alone the Otlier is given.” SA, 111-12. Furthermore, 
Macmurray notes tlie traditional view that images are derived from percepts (at least visually) is the reverse 
of tiie truth: “Tlie capacity to fomi images is a prior condition of the possibility of visual perception.” SA, 
112. Macmurray uses an example from hunting, tiiat one cannot see what one is looking for unless you have 
an image in your mind of what you are looking for. lU, 41.
This is similar to Danger’s understanding of symbolic transformation as tiie basis of all rationality. 
Susanne K Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art (New 
York: Mentor Book, 1948). Additionally, Langer points out the difference between a sign (which 
announces the presence of an object) and a symbol (which leads to conception of the object in its absence). 
Langer, 49.
SA, 113-14. Alan Torrance relates: “W. Cliesseldent’s experiments on tiie removal of cataracts showed 
that a blind person given sight could not distinguish between a sphere and a cube until they could touch the 
objects presented before tiiem and learn to integrate sight and touch.” Alan J. Tonance, Persons in 
Communion: Trinitarian Description and Human Participation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 337-38, 
citing A.D. Ritchie, George Berkeley: A Reappraisal, ed. G.E. Davie (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1967), 14-18.
Conceptualizing knowledge primarily as knowledge-in-action is a controversial move. In an early 
Aristotelian Society discussion, A. C. Ewing responded to Macmurray: “Professor Macmurray, while 
certain that there are actions, denies that we can discover them in introspection. If so, then how do we 
discover tliem? Do we know? Is it only by inference from what we observe that we know when we act? Or 
does he mean that tliere is some peculiar mode of direct loiowledge distinct fr om introspection by which we
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There are methodological considerations in any discussion of the relation between 
consciousness and loiowledge. First, is loiowledge anthropomorphic and if so, what does 
this mean for human knowing? Macmurray believes loiowledge is antliropomorphic, but 
in a heterocentric sense. Knowledge-in-action is primarily knowledge of the Other with 
loiowledge of the Self as its negative. This may be understood as the experience of the 
Other creating a resistance to the Self and thereby knowledge of the Other. In tliis 
knowledge of the Other, one comes to recognize that which is also similar to the Other in 
the Self, thereby gaining self-loiowledge.^ '^^ Tliis self-knowledge, therefore is limited by
discover action? I can hardly think that he means to assert the former, and if he means the latter I cannot 
feel that he has asserted anything of much epistemological importance.” A.C. Ewing, "What is Action.” 
Action, Perception and Measurement, 99, cited by Haddox, 89. Responding to this, Haddox replies: “Tlius, 
a proper response to Ewing’s remarks might well have been; Did you know what you were saying just now 
m yoiur response to me, and tliat yoK were speaking those particular words to express the meaning tliey, in 
fact, did? If you did not know what you were saying and that you were saying it, how can I take you 
seriously? Surely, tliere must be some rational basis for debate. On the otlier hand, if you did know what 
you were saying and that you were saying it, how did you know? By introspection? Surely you did not look 
inside yourself while speaking, else you would not have been able to speak. By observation? Again, surely 
not. Then how? Surely you knew because to know you are doing sometiiing and tlie doing of it, at the level 
of action, are inseparable. It is tliis “knowledge in action,” tliis basic knowledge which I have and upon 
which I rely to achieve higher levels of knowledge, tliaf I am speaking of here.” Haddox, 90.
“ ‘Experience’ is a practical concept, referring to whatever is apprehended in action, in distinction from 
what is thought in reflection. ‘Consciousness’ on tiie otiier hand is a general term for all sub-rational 
awareness, which may be conceived either as all that remains when we abstract from tiie rationality of our 
awareness, or as an actual form of awareness in sub-rational creatures, or in rational beings under abnormal 
conditions. ‘Rational consciousness’ means ‘knowledge’. It is a legitimate teim only because knowledge, 
being personal, contains, and is constituted by, its own negation. Since knowledge is the negative aspect of 
action, and action may in consequence be termed ‘rational behaviour’, ‘consciousness’ is properly 
‘conscious behaviour’ and as such it is a temi which serves to isolate the subject matter of empirical 
psychology.” SA, 115.
Ferré is very critical of Macmurray at this point. He claims to see an inconsistency and uiuesolved 
tension between what is said hi SA “my knowledge of myself has priority over my knowledge of the Otiier” 
(SA, 116) and what is said in PR “the first knowledge ... is knowledge of tiie personal Other.... The 
knowledge of tlie Otiier is the absolute presupposition of all loiowledge, and as such is necessarily 
indemonstrable” (PR, 76-77). Ferré, 287. However, if Ferré had continued frirtiier down tiie page he would 
have found tiiis statement by Macmurray: “We found in our first volume that tiie primary certainty was the 
‘I do’. But we were tiien talking abstractly, from tiie point of view of the solitary self withdrawn, into itself 
in reflection. We now see how this must be completed in tiie concrete. The ‘I do’ is the correlate of the ‘the 
Other does’, and since knowledge is primarily ‘of tiie Otiier’, the ‘I do’ now appears as the negative which 
falls within the knowledge of the Other as agent, and is necessary to it.” PR, 77. McFadyen also states that 
the understanding of tiie Otiier is primaiy and only then secondarily applied to tiie self. Alistair I, 
McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theoiy of the Individual in Social Relationships 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 90.
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the quality of a person’s experiences/^^ Of course, the question then immediately arises,
how does knowledge of that wliich is not personal come about?
For sub-personal (organic and substantial) existence one may aixive at loiowledge
of the other tlu ough a process of negation.
The concept of ‘a person’ is inclusive of the concept of ‘an organism’, as the 
concept of ‘an organism’ is inclusive of that of ‘a material body’. The included 
concepts can be derived from the concept of ‘a person’ by abstractions; by 
excluding from attention those characters which belong to the higher category 
alone.
There is, however, an upper limit to one’s understanding. One cannot, except by 
analogy, understand what is beyond the personal. One may experience what is beyond the 
personal and therefore know it (in a limited and incomplete sense, including the 
knowledge that it is beyond the personal), but the understanding and expression is 
bounded by the human reality of the person who must therefore speak analogically.
The upper limit of understanding actually applies to all encoimters between a particular 
person and any another particular person who has had differing experiences. A child can 
only understand being an adult analogically, until that child becomes an adult. A male can 
never fully understand what it is lilce to give birth to a cliild. Therefore loiowledge of 
God, wliile more difficult tliaii knowledge of human persons, is of a similar character as 
loiowledge of human persons—it is a matter of difference of degree versus difference of 
kind. Areas of commonality are more easily understood, areas of difference ai e 
analogically understood.
The cognitive element of immediate experience is particular to tlie individual and tlie constellation of 
factors at any given moment in the person’s life. What one knows depends and changes according to who 
one is. And who one is, particularly the emotional and intentional interests, affects what one knows. The 
manner in which intentions and feelings affect knowledge are: (1) Interest in it; (2) Desirmg it; (3) 
Loving/hathig it; (4) Interacting with it. lU, 22.
SA, 117.
Or in Macmurray’s usage, mythologically. SRR, 45 n. 1. The use of tliis terra is uiifoitunate because of 
the negative comiotations which many associate with it.
This is tlie conclusion of Haddox’s tiiesis: “Thus, religious knowledge is no more logically problematic 
than any otlier type of knowledge.” Haddox, iv.
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A second methodological issue for Macmuiray is the lingering echo of mind-body 
dualism and the desire to separate consciousness from movement when they should be 
integrated/Consciousness integrated with movement is behavior, that is to say reaction 
to a stimulus occurring at the organic leve l/A ction , however, is more than the 
integration of consciousness and movement for it also includes knowledge. It is the result 
of intention—a reason, neither a cause nor a stimulus—and tiierefore by definition, occurs 
only at the level of the personal. At tlie level of the inorganic one is left with movement 
without the benefit of either knowledge or stimulus.
Third is Macmun ay’s concern with the lingering effects of tlie faculty 
psychology.
The psychological analysis of consciousness into cognitive, affective and conative 
aspects is misleading even when a faculty psychology is repudiated and the unity 
of consciousness is stressed. It is itself the lingering ghost of the faculty 
psychology, and it is high time that it was laid. Consciousness, as such, has no 
cognitive element. Only persons Imow, in any proper sense of the term, and act 
with knowledge. And they know and develop their loiowledge, as much tluough 
their capacity for feeling as by using their senses; perhaps even more so, since 
sense depends upon feeling in a manner in which feeling does not depend upon 
sense.
It is not until the distinctiôn is made between the Self and the Other, whether 
within the field of the senses or feelings, that one enters into the fully personal realm of 
rational knowledge. Keeping these concerns in mind, it is now possible to consider 
Macmimay’8 model of consciousness and its relation to laiowledge-in-action.
“When I act, therefore, my consciousness—my seeing, hearing, remembering, thinking—does not 
accompany but is integrated with my bodily movements and is a part-determinant of tliem. The body-mind 
problem is therefore fictitious. That it exists merely proves that there is an error in our representation of 
mind or body or botli.” SA, 118.
SA, 119.
SA, 119.
SA, 126. This seems to be a development in Macmmray’s thought. For example he was comfortable 
defining the basic elements of inunediate experience as the integration of cognition, conation, and feeling in 
lU (22). Furthermore, his entire work Reason and Emotion would seem to also fit this earlier terminology 
which he later rejects. The closest that Macmurray approaches in tlie Gifford Lectures is the use of 
“emotional” and “intellectual” in referencing tiie modes of reflection and tiie types of knowledge associated 
witli each.
SA, 124-25.
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Consciousness, as the exclusion of the cognitive from knowing may be seen 
primarily as motive, hi saying this, it must be reiterated that Macmurray does not equate 
thinking with knowledge. Cognition depends upon the awareness of the distinction 
between the Self and the Other. Consciousness frinctions at the organic level and must be 
considered in terms of teleological description.
Consciousness may be theoretically subdivided into a general hierarchical 
taxonomy which follows the basic layout of Personal logic where the lower levels 
constitute the higher levels. The lowest level of consciousness is the feeling or motive 
consciousness. At its lowest level it is the basic ability to distinguish pleasure and pain. 
It is not aware of anything but is merely aware of the feeling. Below this level any 
reaction is unconscious, b u t  it is still a teleological reaction to a stimulus rather than a 
cause. This implies to MacmuiTay that there is a reciprocity between the organism and its 
environment which is below consciousness and which all consciousness presupposes. 
Sense consciousness exists at a liigher level than the motive consciousness. Touch is the 
lower limit of sense consciousness and marks the lower limit of objective consciousness 
delineating it from a pinely subjective consciousness.Sense is always accompanied by 
feeling, even if is not given attention. Dream consciousness, as reaction to external 
stimulus, is the liighest form of organic consciousness, One must resist the temptation 
to confuse any form of consciousness with cognition. The consciousness, at whatever 
level: feeling, sense, or dream, is organic and sub-rational until it is taken up mto
SA, 120-21. For tlie use offeeling consciousness see PR, 57.
SA, 120. Macmurray points out that at its lowest limit, it is very difficult to distinguish between 
conscious and unconscious behavior (or some may prefer the term sub-conscious).
In odier words, “conscious adaptation to environment presupposes unconscious adaptation.” SA, 122.
SA, 122-24. Note Macmurray’s discussion that too much or too little stimulus results in feeling without 
sense (SA, 123). Tliere appears to be an inconsistency within Macmurray’s construct as feelings appear to 
exist botli below and above the subjective-objective line. Tlie motives of love, fear, and hatred are all 
objective—having a referent outside tlie person yet they are feelings. Perhaps Macmurray is making a 
distinction between motive consciousness and emotions. Or, it is possible the cardinal or apperceptive 
emotions (to coin a term) of love, hate, and fear, are objective, while other feelings (pleasure, pain) are 
lower and tlius subjective.
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cognition. This rationalizing of the consciousness occurs at the point where 
discrimination between the Self and the Other as Other-than-self is realized/
Within the logical form of the cogito it is impossible to distinguish between 
motive and intention, but from the perspective of the agent it is possible, for intentions ai e 
always conscious, while motives may be either conscious or luiconscious.^^^ Every action 
has a motive, but the motive does not determine the action, for it may be unconscious, or 
if conscious, it may not be the focus of attention. Motive is contained within the intention 
of action as its negative. Motive determines behavior (not action) and may be thought of 
as a type of potential energy responding to stimulus.^^  ^This exists witliin the life of the 
Agent as habit—a learned response to a particular stimulus lacking intention—and may 
be either conscious or unconscious. Conscious behavior governs the expenditure of 
energy including its own negation (inhibition of movement) so that all intentional 
action contains a multitude of habitually motivated movements which are not attended to 
but that function to serve the focus of the attention which contributes to the intention. 
Figure 2.4 provides a graphic summary of personal knowledge-in-action.
Several aspects and implications should be noted about personal knowledge-in- 
action. First, knowledge being personal is cognitive and intentional, and as such, 
knowledge is always objective.
SA, 124-25.
SA, 124, 125.
SA, 195.
SA, 195.
SA, 196.
“In the case of agents, however, motives do not determine action. Nevertheless, all action contains 
necessarily an element of reaction to stimulus, without which it would be impossible. We call this habit; 
and die system of habits in an individual agent we call his character .... In so far then as an agent acts 
habitually, he acts from a motive, but not witii intention. But in noraial action tliese motivated responses are 
aspects of an activity which is intentional; and because attention is concentrated upon the objective, the 
motives of these habitual aspects of action normally remain unconscious, unless tliey are brought into 
consciousness by reflection.” SA, 196.
Haddox, further clarifies MacmuiTay’s understanding of intention when he writes: “Indeed, to be 
precise, one does not ‘have’ an intention, one intends, and to intend is to act in hope, not to detennine 
tlieoretically what one wants to do.” Haddox, 112.
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Knowledge is that in my action which makes it an action and not a blind activity. 
It is ‘objective’ awareness; or rather awareness of the Other and the Self in 
relation. It is not ‘loiowing that’, neither is it ‘knowing how’; neither is it 
‘knowledge by acquaintance’, for it is acquaintance. We use the tenn ‘know’ in 
this primary sense when we say that we loiow our friends and aie known by 
them.^ "^^
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Figure 2.4 Personal Knowledge-in-Achon
Steimning from this familiarity is the fact that wliile reflective judgments are always 
hypothetical and hence uncertain, knowledge is always certain although it may be 
incomplete. This incompleteness is in part due to the fact that a person is only capable 
of focusing upon a limited aspect of reality. Macmunay calls this selectivity attention. 
Reacting to things outside of one’s attention constitutes a habitual response which is
Ricoeur makes similar comiections between habit, character, and the close comiections of these 
with idetn-sélf, the more substantial understandmg of personliood. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 118-22. 
SA, 129.
185 reflective judgments are hypothetical and have an element of logical uncertainty in tliem; but if I 
say that I know someone I caimot be mistaken. If the statement is false tlien I am lying.” SA, 129.SA, 129-30.
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conscious behavior in reaction to stimulus which must be leamed/^^ Knowledge, as 
cognitive consciousness, is constituted by its negative, the consciousness/^^ Finally, and 
importantly for understanding Macmurray’s epistemology, is the distmction he draws 
between primaiy knowledge which is gained in action and secondary loiowledge which is 
theoretical or reflective/®^ The importance of action necessitates addressing the topic of 
movement.
2.2.1,2 Personal Movement-in-Action:
Action and Event
While few would question the validity of considering loiowledge in a discussion 
of epistemology, the inclusion of movement may seem inappropriate. The mind-body 
duality which accompanied Descartes’ cogito created an entire network of associated 
beliefs; this is one of tliem. However, flom the standpoint of the Agent, one cannot 
separate knowledge from considerations of action and one cannot consider action without 
movement.
Personal movement, as one of the dimensions of action, has as its constitutive 
negative elements time and space; Space represents the possibility of movement, not its 
actuality. From the practical perspective, time has logical primacy over space for dohig is 
more comprehensive than being. Time, therefore, is positive and space is negative,
Macmurray notes that one often refers to being unconsciously aware of something which is outside one’s 
attention. SA, 130. He also notes that habit, although developed consciously, can become automatic and 
unconscious. BS, 189-96.
“We now see that knowledge—which is cognitive consciousness—depends for its possibility upon the 
inclusion within it of a non-cognitive or motive consciousness. This indeed is the basis of habit; and habit is 
a necessary constituent o f any actual action. Habit is conscious behaviour, or response to stnnulus which 
involves awareness.” SA, 130.
189 „ ‘jQio-yviedge’ here refers to primary knowledge or knowledge in action; not to secondary or reflective 
knowledge.” SA, 130, n.2. In lU, Macmurray draws a much stronger distinction between knowledge and 
reflection. However in SA there is an acknowledgement of tliis theoretical knowledge but its miportance is 
relativized unless it is verified in action.
Haddox sees tlie inclusion of movement as a serious mistake on Macmurray’s part—as being a Üuow 
back to tlie earher dualism. However, tliis is because he sees it as a symptom of Macmurray’s idealism and 
doesn’t take seriously enough the conceptual aspects as opposed to their mtegration in reality. Haddox, 135- 
37, developed out of an earlier accusation of dualism, 102-05.
SA, 131-32.
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We are now in a position to summarize these considerations by asserting 
that time is the form of action; while space is the form of reflection, and that time 
is prior to space because action is prior to reflection. The priority is that of the 
positive in respect of the negative which it includes. That time and space are mere 
forms, and in themselves nothing, needs no argument. They ar e negations of 
intuition; ideal lower limits of imaginai consciousness.
Using distinctions in time between past, present, and friture, Macmurray 
demarcates the past as the field of actuality, the future as the field of possibility, and the 
present as the point of action. In so doing one can say “to act is to detennine the 
future.”^^"^
Because of its temporal natur e, action is irTeversible.^^  ^For Macmunay action is 
choice, not the result of choice^^  ^and thus the determination of right and wrong action 
has priority over theoretical questions of truth. '
SA, 132. This is tlie exact opposite conclusion as anived at by Moltmann who privileges being over 
doing and space over time. For example, see Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of 
Creation and the Spirit of God, Gifford Lectures 1984-1985, üans. Margaret Kolil (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1985), 139, 286; Jürgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms o f Christian 
Theology, trans. Margaret Kohl (Miimeapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 314-20.; Moltmann, Spirit o f Life, 198- 
208. Tlie entire discussion of die relation of space-time has progressed since Macmurray was writing.
Suffice it to say, that the concept of space and time as merely forms, stemming from die Kantian 
understanding of each, is probably in need of updating.
SA, 133.
SA, 134. This naturally raises the issue of die classic argument over freewill and determinism. Because 
of its basis in the agent, Macmimay’s Foim of the Personal dissolves the dualism of freewill and 
determinism: “This analysis has certain important implication. The first concerns die conception 
traditionally termed ‘free-wilP, and its negation, ‘determinism’. To possess free-will is simply to be able to 
determine the indeterminate, that is, the future. We can now see that this is implied in die very conception 
of action. The Agent is the determiner. To deny free-will is to deny the possibility of action. We have 
already established, as a negative criterion of txutii, diat any theory which denies die possibility of action is 
false. That I am free is an immediate implication of the ‘I do’; and to deny freedom is to assert tiiat no one 
ever does anytiiing, that no one is capable even of tiiinking or of observing.” SA, 134. “Knowledge, then, in 
its primary form, is the theoretical determination of the past in action. The freedom of tlie agent then, so far 
from being incompatible with the possibility of knowledge is the ground of that possibility. The Agent, in 
action, generates tiie determinate as the object of knowledge. The falseness of determmism lies simply in 
die dogma that the future is aheady determinate.” SA, 135. Note due to the limitations of tiie SA, tiiat tiie 
relational aspects of freedom will be delayed until Macmurray’s anthropology is discussed.
SA, 135. Macmurray has an extended discussion about how some reflection upon time results in its 
“spatialization” in the space-time continuum which is not real-time, but past time. SA, 137-38. He goes on 
to distinguish between prediction as tlie theoretical determination of tlie flititre (if groimded in knowledge of 
die past) or as prophecy (if grounded on a hunch). “Time as a determinate sequence of events is necessarily 
past time; it is indeed tiie conception of tiie past, and tlie distinction of the past and tlie future in it is tiie 
relative distinction which arises by a theoretical selection of a point in time as tiie present. This is clearly 
possible only theoretically; and if it is taken otiieiwise it implies that tlie Self exists as subject, but not as 
agent. Theoretically I can select any point in time I please as tlie present, and call what came before it the 
past and what came after it the future. But as agent the present is determined for me. It is the ‘here-and- 
now’, my only point of action, for I can act neitlier in the past nor in tlie future. And even in reflection, I can 
only think here and now; and my ability to place myself in thought at any point in time I please depends on
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Movement, in its aspects as time and space, has as its cmcial implication the 
necessity for there to be an Other; for at the very least the Other is necessary as a point of 
reference in order to judge relative time and location, and therefore movement/^® Since 
the Other is tlie necessary correlate of the Self,^^  ^if one conceives of the Other in sub­
personal teiins then one conceives the Self similarly. Doing so, one is unable to 
understand movement in terms of personal act and is limited to inorganic displacement 
and organic reaction and process.^^^
the fact tliat all points in time are represented here and now, for my reflection, simultaneously. Now an 
order of simultaneity is spatial.... The physicist’s time is not real tune; it is time represented as past, 
without a future.” SA, 138-39.
Moltmann makes some similar points in his discussion of time, its hxeversibility and the 
qualitative difference between past and future, as well as liis understanding of tlie past-fliture, future-past, 
and the present-future, etc. Moltmann, God in Creation, 124-39, also Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 
105-06.
“Action is thus tlie actualization of a possibility, and as such it is choice. It is important to notice that this 
means precisely what its says. It does not mean that an action is preceded by a choice; nor tliat a mysterious 
‘act of will’ somehow connects a tlieoretical selection with a physical movement.... The actual choice is the 
doing of the action; and action is choice whether or not tliis preliminary reflection takes place. There can, 
undoubtedly, be no choosing apart from reflection; but this need only be that primary reflection which is in 
action, as one of its dimensions.” SA, 139-40. Haddox comments: “Any otlier relation between acting and 
choosing falls into a dualistic conceptuality and usually conjures up some mediating force, such as the 
‘will’ to negotiate tlie mind’s deshe into bodily achievement.” Haddox, 116.
This has important consequences for the primary form of reflective activity is not about truth or beauty 
but about right and wrong action. “As an actual activity of the personal, thought, as a spontaneity of tiie 
Self, must include a negative aspect or receptivity, which we call sense-perception. But ‘thinking’ is an 
ambiguous term, often restricted to that form of reflective activity which intends knowledge, and so to tlie 
process of inference. There are other forms of reflectiVd activity; diat for instance which proceeds m terms 
of the disthiction between beautiful and ugly. Botli of these are forms of secondary reflection. The primary 
reflection is tlie reflective element in action, which proceeds in terms of tlie distinction between right and 
wrong [not specifically moral, cf. n .l].” SA, 135-36. “Consequently, if we may say diat a proposition is that 
which can be true or false, we may also say tliat an action is what can be right or wrong.” SA, 140. “The 
discrinihiation of right and wrong in action must be prior to and not dependent upon the theoretical 
discrimination of the truth or falsity of a judgement.” SA, 141.
“An action is that which can be right and wrong. This really signifies tiiat without an otlier no action is 
possible. Tlie scientific analogue of this is tiie relativity of motion. No movement in space can be 
determined, and therefore no position in space, except by reference to a fixed point independently 
determined. Our hypotiietical agent in empty space could not discriminate possible dhections of movement 
outside hhnself. Any one movement would then be identical with any otiier.” SA, 143.
PR, 76-77; SA, 142.
200 «Yhe resistance of tiie continuant is a negative resistance, and the support it provides is a negative 
support. It provides for the possibility of movement, but not of action. For tiiough tiie resistance limits the 
possibilities for the agent it still provides no ground for discriminathig between the possibilities wliich 
remain open.... He has the means of action, but no ground of action; for tiie material environment as such 
does not serve to discrhninate between possible objectives.” SA, 144. “If we say that natural teleology 
prescribes an objective, the preservation of his life and the avoidance of deatli, we are brought up short by 
the fact that the agent knows tiiat this is an impossible objective. Death is unavoidable; consequently any 
choice of self-preservation as objective of action is inherently irrational. The biblical story of tiie Fall is 
quite correct in linking the knowledge of good and evil witii the knowledge ‘Thou shall surely die’. The 
solitary agent for whom the Otlier is an organic enviromiient can only behave as an organism, responding to
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Rather than viewing the primary elements in experience as material and mental 
objects as in modem philosophy, from the standpoint of the Agent, the primary 
distinction lies in change. All changes are either acts {doings with an accompanying 
reason) or events {happenings with a cause)/^^ This does not inti'oduce another dualism 
in the place of the modernist mental/material dichotomy because in the fonn of the 
personal the positive practical includes and is constituted by the negative—what happens 
constitutes and gives fonn to the doing/®^ Yet a conceptual or theoretical dualism arises 
by the absolute distinction between cause and reason/^^
Human reaction may be suggested as an apparent middle ground between action 
and event. However, if one considers the teleological natuie of reaction it is possible to 
discern two types of teleology: one where the end is determined by a knowledge of the 
end (for example, an intentional habituation) and the other where knowledge has no part 
in determining the end. The first is intentional and therefore constitutes an act, while the 
second is not and therefore fits within the category of an event.^ "^^
If  one takes an action and removes knowledge one is left with an event.^ ®^  A 
person’s movement may be either an action or it may he an event. It is an event, for
environmental stimuli.” SA, 145. Note how SA, 45, n. 1 connects futility of life with Existentialism’s 
organic stmctme.
SA, 146-47.
SA, 147.
“For every event tliere is a cause; for every act there is a reason. And since the distinction of ‘act’ and 
‘event’ is a principle of ultimate or metaphysical classification, and institutes a conceptual dualism, we 
must recognize that the distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ is an absolute distinction; so that no act 
can have a cause; and no event a reason.” SA, 149.
SA, 149-51. “In principle, tiierefore, action in general cannot be defined teleologically, even if tliere is 
always a teleological element contained in it. It can be defined only as an activity informed by knowledge. 
Since time is the form of action tiiis knowledge has a necessary reference to the fixture.... The reference to 
die future must be sufficient to determine a direction of advance; it need not determine an end. And since 
even tlie ends which we do detemiine in action are only relative, since they are also starting-points of 
further action, we always know to some extent, and never know witli full finality, what we are doing.” SA, 
150-51.
205 idea of an event is tlie idea of an action, fioni which tlie element of knowledge has been excluded.’ 
SA, 151. Yet one should not view this as an aggregate or matliematical addition. Reason is always 
cognitive, but in saying this, one must not equate reason witli intellection.
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example, when it is simply a reaction or an accident?^^ An action may directly cause an 
event, but an event can never directly create an action because it lacks intention/^^ Unless 
affected by actions or other events an event will continue indefinitely in time and is 
therefore hilly determined. Actions, by contrast, depend upon sustained intention for 
continuation^®  ^and consequently action may be seen as the intention to determine the 
future.^ ®® Cause in isolation is problematic, but when it is considered within a personal 
integration as the negative of action the difficulties (such as the need for a first cause) are 
overcome.^^®
This schema of action and event, however, does not only apply to the human 
person.^ Macmurray seeks to show that the entire universe is an action using an 
argimient from the nature of histoiy^^^ for a metaphysic of action.^^  ^MacmuiTay’s 
understanding of the unity of experience forces one to consider the unity of the universe 
as either an event or an action.^ Since actions may cause events, but events cannot cause
Both accidents and reactions have causes, but not intentions. (SA, 151-53)
An event may create a new situation in light of which a person may change or modify intentions but the 
event itself is not die direct cause.
SA, 155-64. An action may, however, create events which are continuous. For example: If one walks 
across the street the intention must be maintained for the duration of the action until the goal is reached 
otherwise one stops in the middle of the street. This is ah action because die intention must be maintained. 
If, however, one begins to slide down die hill (whether begun intentionally or not), dien diis event will 
continue until intermpted by other events (such as the force of impact from a tree) or actions (such as 
reaching out and grabbing a passing tree stopping the slide).
SA, 134. The distinction between an event and an act is always circumstantial—it must be inferred (but 
not in a formal sense). SA, 152.
“The concept of ‘cause’ is inherently self-contradictory. It is the conception of an agent that is not an 
agent, the negation of agency. Hie negative, we know, cannot exist independently, but only as the negative 
aspect of a positive in the form of the personal. Widiin action, which is a personal concept, diere not merely 
can, but must be a negation of action; but diis negation is in die last analysis self-negation. If die negative 
aspect is thought as existing independently of the positive, the result is a contradiction.... In consequence, 
whatever we assign as the cause of an event is something which is not in itself capable of producing an 
effect, but only, as it were, of transmitting it. It is a means dirough which something else produces the 
occurrence. In odier words, die ‘cause’ turns out to be merely anodier event which must be itself refened to 
another cause. An infinite regress of causes faces us in every case.” SA, 152-53. “So long as the use of the 
notion of cause falls within action and so has a practical reference, it is meaningfal and indispensable.” SA, 
153. Macmurray observes continuance at die natural level, biological level, and even in die personal level 
as habits which are intentionally learned but dien become automata. SA, 154-63.
For what follows see SA, chapter 10 “The World as One Action”, 203-22.
SA, 204-14, especially 211-14.
Macmurray defends the verifiability of this metaphysic due to its basis in action and discounts Kant’s 
attack on metaphysics due to its formal relation to Cartesian dualism. SA, 214-18.
SA, 217-19. Accounts which rely on the idea of events also include process ideas.
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actions, the only conclusion is to view the world as a singular action requiring the
hypothesis of an absolute agent, a personal God.^^^
It may, indeed, prove possible to tliink the process of the world as intentional 
without tliinking a supreme Agent whose act the world is. But prima facie, at 
least, it is not possible to do so. The conflict between religion and atlieism turns, 
in large part at least, on the issue whether the process of the world is intentional or 
not. We noticed, in our first chapter, that contemporary existentialism, in its 
division into theist and atheist wings, poses the substantial problem of philosophy 
in our day in the alternatives, ‘God or Notliing’. We may now add to this, as a 
pointer to the direction of a verification, that the theistic alternative issues in the 
hope of an ultimate unity of persons in fellowship, which gives meaning to hiunan 
effort; while atheist existentialism finds human relationship an insoluble problem 
and all human projects doomed to frustration and ultimate meaninglessness. As 
Sartre says in Huis clos, X 'enfer, c ’est les autres
Ignoring for the time being the complexities of a fully relational understanding of 
persons in relation, action (as personal movement) is intention executed in time and in the 
freedom of space^^  ^by persons to determine the future, leading to the logical conclusion 
of a personal God. However, the integration of laiowledge and movement in action is not 
always successful, for in the course of interaction with the Other, one’s intentions are not 
always realized, signaling the inadequacy of knowledge.^^^ In order to overcome tliis 
failure, the person must step back from practical action and engage in theoretical 
reflection. -
2.2.2 R e f l e c t io n
Reflection occurs when the Self-as-agent negates self in order to become the Self- 
as-subject. This retreat from the practical into the theoretical raises issues as to the 
relationship between knowledge and reflection, the nature of reflection, and the 
distinction made between theoretical and practical witliin MacimuTay’s philosophy.
PR, chapter 10, “The Personal Universe,” 206-24, esp. 221. This is a classic example of Macmurray’s 
metliod. Instead of asking the typical question, does God exist?, he asks, is what exists, personal?
SA, 222. These are the final words of SA. 
SA, 134, 139.
218 As shown below, inadequacy of knowledge includes resistance of the Other. See Jolin Macmun ay, 
“Freedom in Personal Nexus,” in Freedom: Its Meaning, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1942), 510 for a broader construct of resistance.
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2.2.2.1 The Presupposition of
ICnowledge for Reflection
The relationship between knowledge and reflection requires a thorough
investigation of the objectivity and temporality of loiowledge-in-action. When starting
from the position of the agent rather than the subject, Macmunay replaces the 7 /^zm/c with
the I  do. However, the /  Jo is an incomplete statement for in reality it is I  do this, which
contains within it the notion of discrimination so that tliis statement becomes fully I  do
this and not that. When considered in its negative dimension as laiowledge this becomes I
ioiow that I  do this and not that?^^ Knowledge, in its primaiy foiin as laiowing-in-action,
is the knowledge of what one is able to do in conjunction with the Other and thus it is
primarily knowledge of the Other/^® The difference between action and behavior resides
in the location of the initiative; in behavior the impetus lies with the stimulus, while in
action it lies with the Agent who interacts with the Other objectively?^^ An agent then, is
one whose acts ai e “informed and directed by an awareness of the Other-than-self as
other; and the groimd of choice, that is the deteimination of the action, lies, therefore in
the agent’s knowledge of the O t h e r . T h i s  knowledge in action has a certainty to it
which is denied any theoretical constiucts: - -
So long as we do not generalize, or anticipate, or in any way go beyond its 
immediacy, om* laiowledge of the Other in action has a certainty that no reflective
SA, 165. Saying that, it is also possible that die particular knowledge of what one is doing may be more 
or less complete—the Agent may modify the course of the action at any point—but it is never complete 
until it is actualized, otherwise the action would cease to be an action and become a continuant, a process 
tliat continues on without change indefinitely. SA, 166.
220 «jjjç knowledge in action which makes action possible must therefore be a laiowledge of what is 
practically possible, and of a groimd of discrimination between alternative possibilities. In general, dien, it 
must be a knowledge of the Odier.” SA, 166. This does not preclude knowledge of self, but it is a 
knowledge of self in relation to Other.
“In any reaction, the initiative of behaviour lies widi die stimulus. The reaction involves no choice on the 
part of die organism.... Then we may say that die reaction is produced by the stimulus in terms of the 
nature of the organism at the moment. In the case of action, however, the initiative lies with the agent, who 
determines his activity in terms of the nature of the Other.” SA, 167.
“It is thus die natiue of tui agent to act not in terms of his own nature but in terms of die nature of die 
object, that is, of the Odier. However simple and immediate an action may be, so long as it is an action, and 
not merely a reaction to stimulus, then it is informed and directed by an awareness of die Odier-than-self as 
other, and die ground of choice, diat is, the determination of die action, lies therefore in die agent’s 
knowledge of die Other.” SA, 168.
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knowledge can ever attain. Indeed, if we limit the term knowledge, as some 
philosophers would do, to that ‘logical certainty’ wliich is the result of theoretical 
demonstration, we should have to confess that there is not and cannot be 
knowledge, and so relapse into a complete scepticism?^^
Knowledge has a temporal aspect to it. Awareness of the past is memory; 
awar eness of the futur e is anticipation. The difference being memory is an awareness of 
matter of fact (the past being fully detennined) while anticipation is an awareness of 
intention (the desire and possibility to determine the friture)? '^  ^Intention, being a personal 
activity, contains witliin it its own negative, attention.^^^ Practical intention, as the 
forward looking, anticipatory aspect of laiowledge, looks to modify the reality of the 
Other, while practical attention, as the backward-looking, remembering aspect of 
knowledge, looks to what is already determined so that how it was determined may be 
revealed.^^^ Attention is a negative activity because the object is already determined, 
attending to what the object is, rather than what it will be.^^^  In action one intends to 
modify the Other, which necessitates a focusing of attention upon what is deemed 
relevant and ignoring what is either irrelevant or continuant. The continuant elements are 
left to habit,^^^
SA, 168. Macmurray notes that mathematics does not refute tliis because it is simply formal: a rule for 
counting which cannot be true or false.
Knowledge in action “participates in the temporal form. ” To be aware of what I am doing hnplies a 
distinction between past and future. “Such knowledge is tiierefore, as awareness of the past, memory; and 
as awareness of tlie futme, anticipation. This reference to the futiue however is not to matter of fact, but to 
matter of intention.” SA, 169. Again an interesting parallel can be seen here witli Moltniaiui, if one 
understands anticipation as hope.
^  SA, 172.
226 intend a modification of the Other, to be determined by oiu agency. We attend to a mode of the 
other which is already determinate in order that it may reveal to us the structure of its determination. Thus 
‘intention’ and ‘attention’ refer respectively to the forward-looking and die backward-looking aspects of 
knowledge in action, to anticipation and memory. In reflective activity there can be no intention, since 
negative activity determines nothing in reality.” SA, 171-72.
“Thinking is then something tliat I do, since witiiout my attention nothing will follow; but it is a negative 
doing, because what follows when I attend is sometliing tliat I do not determine. The idealist is right in 
saying that tlie idea develops itself in my mind: but this is conditional upon the attention which makes die 
diinking mine. Apart from diis we have mere dreaming, in which die idea develops itself in my mind 
without any tension in me. Intention, on the other hand contams attention widiin itself as its negative 
aspect.” SA, 172.
SA, 173.
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Failure in integrated action causes a person to step back and reflect in order to 
overcome the problem?^® This failure raises questions about one’s knowledge—it creates 
doubt?^® The function of reflection, therefore, is to overcome doubt in order to resume 
action?^^ Any reflection which does not ultimately lead to action is umeal, merely a 
daydream?^^
Since reflection arises from a failure in knowledge, it is clear that reflection 
presupposes knowledge^^^ and is not an element within thought?^'^ In other words, “you 
must loiow something before you can thinlc about it.”^^  ^Macmurray sees this as a 
foundational and general epistemological principle: ‘WJ thought presupposes
lU, 36-37.
lU, 37. Roy notes tlie similarity of this “problem orientation” in both Macmurray and the pragmatists. 
Also note Roy’s preference for viewhig persons as “questioners”: “By contrast, we would argue that die 
idiom of question-raising, being more encompassmg, could do fuller justice to human reflection. A question 
may be triggered off not only by a practical problem but also by a scientific or moral puzzlement or by a 
desire to look at thmgs afresh. Question raising is a quest for understanding wliich integrates die organic 
level of problem-solving by situating it in a world of meaning and purpose. When somebody tries to solve a 
problem, he normally ascribes a meaning and a purpose to this activity, even when it is a matter of 
biological subsistence and of manual work. MacmmTay does not deny the desire to understand which 
operates for instance in the scientist’s mind. But he belittles "it as a motive in comparison with the scientist’s 
social function.” Roy, Form of die Personal, 63-64. Unfortunately, this position moves one back into the 
territory of the Cartesian tliinker, not the integrated “doer” encoimtering die odier. Roy’s examples are 
inadequate because he glosses over the “problematic” terminology with the language of emotion and desire. 
But if there is not a “problem” in these areas (a feeling of dissatisfaction, etc.) dien there is no cause to 
reflect. One does not simply wake up, consult a chart, and decide diat one must think diings afresh. One 
feels in a rut (the problem) and then reflects on the situation.
lU, 38. Hiis is similar to Dewey’s pragmatic or “radical empnical” conception of die epistemological 
process. “Inquiry, he [Dewey] holds, starts from a ‘problematic situation’ and, if successful, ends with a 
situation that is so ‘determinate’ and ‘unified’ diat hesitancy to act has been eliminated. Peter H. Hare, 
“Pragmatic Theory of Truth,” OOP, 710. For concerns about the similarity of Macmurray’s form of the 
personal and pragmatism see below §2.2.3.2.
Macmurray talks about die fact diat humans have learned that knowledge is useful so diat die seeming 
pine pursuit of knowledge ultimately has a utilitarian value aldiough its usage may be delayed. SA, 182-83. 
The concept of reality is very important to Macmurray’s entire philosophy and will be discussed in detail 
below. 
lU, 12,
rU, 13. Even though one is able to reflect on immediate experience one should not confuse diis reflection 
with immediate experience itself. lU, 15. Therefore, epistemology, as reflection on knowing, is part of 
philosophy but knowing itself is larger than philosophical reflection. This creates an interesting recursive 
aspect as one reflects on knowing and then reflects on reflection within die reflection on knowledge. 
lU, 15.
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Imowledge’’^ ^^  Macmurray cites the example that one Imows another person well before
one understands liini or her?^^
2,2.2.2 Reflection as Symbolic
Representation and Manipulation
When the agent reflects, that is to say becomes the Self-as-subject through a 
process of self-negation, a theoretical intention creates a foui* dimensional representation 
of the past as an object to laiow tlirough theoretical attention?^^ Since this representation 
is not a real object, but merely a symbolic re-creation and based upon memory it is 
necessarily fragmentary and incomplete. Reflection is the rational activity by which this 
symbolic knowledge of the past is extended and clarifred^^  ^yet it too is incomplete, 
abstiact, and fragmentary. '^^®
lU, 15. Emphasis is in the original.
lU, 17-18. This type of knowledge in immediate experience has its own developmental process (not 
exclusively Üuough refinements from reflection). “Tire tendency to tliink and die even simpler tendency to 
speak about what we have experienced is so early developed in us and becomes such an integral part of our 
consciousness, that it is hardly possible to be aware of anydiing or to engage in any activity without an 
element of reflection entering in. But this does not alter die fact diat hnmediate experience and reflective 
experience are different in kind, and diat in important respects dieh development is different and unrelated.” 
lU, 20. He continues shortly thereafter to state “In the normal case the present range and depth and 
character of our immediate experience is largely determined by past reflection upon the tilings we know.... 
Immediate experience is not, dierefore, primitive, raw experience, unaffected by thinking, nor is thinking 
the only instrument which we possess for the enrichment of bur capacity to experience.” lU, 21.
This resembles Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge and his maxim tiiat we know more than we 
can tell. Polaiiyi, Tacit Dimension, 4. Haddox provides an excellent discussion of how Polanyi and 
Macmurray are mutually instructive in diis respect. Haddox, 180-205. See Mullins, “More on Macmurray 
and Polanyi,” Appraisal: A Journal of Constructive and Post-Critical Philosophy and Interdisciplinaiy 
Studies 1, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 202-03 for possible connections dnough Oldliam. There is also the possibility 
of indirect contact dnough Michael’s brodier Karl Polanyi who participated in the Clnistian Left in Britain, 
of which Macmurray was a leading figine. See Costello, 15-16.
Furthermore, one should understand that what Macmurray is opposing with die term immediate is 
die idea that somehow die senses mediate experience to the person, because to do so raises die question, 
what are the senses mediating one’s experiences to? The typical answer is something roughly akin to the 
mind, and hence one observes die cogito attempting reentry. Macmurray would want to emphasize that the 
senses are part and parcel of the integration that is die human person.
238 «Yhe Agent constitutes himself subject by negating his own agency. He forms a theoretical intention. He 
is dien in reflection, turned back upon his own past. Tliis past then is presented in memory as the object of 
knowledge It appears as a four-dimensional system in which time is die fourdi dimension.” SA, 170. The 
intention is dieoretical because it is directed at modifying the representation of the Odier, not die actual 
modification of die Other. It would appear diat just as diere is a practical and theoretical intention, so too a 
practical and theoretical attention.
239 «Yhg object of knowledge dien is the past conceived as continuant, that is, as completely determinate and 
not to be modified by further action.... What is given for any particular agent in reflection is only die 
content of Ms own memory, which is necessarily fragmentary, and therefore, an indeterminate and very 
inadequate characterization of the past; or if you will, of what exists. The rational activities of reflection are
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Attention (whether practical or theoretical) is selective and varies according to 
intensity (tension in the self) and concentration (limiting the complexity of what is 
attended to)?'^* The reflective, or theoretical, intention deteraiines the methodological 
deployment of attention but it is still negative for it does not detemiine the end to be 
achieved?'^^ Successful reflection is largely dependent upon this methodological 
systematic ordering of attention, selected upon the basis of the theoretical intention’s 
connection to the practical intention of the interrupted action?'^^
Attention is always a form of abstraction and generalization—a taking away of 
what is considered irrelevant for the crurent purposes of the agent?'*'  ^Wliat is Imown in 
reflection is always an abstraction, a mere idea or mental construct, which does not exist 
in reality and which must be verified in practice?'^^ Generalization focuses upon the 
repetitive aspects of these abstractions?'^®
All reflective activity involves representations and is therefore symbolic, '^^  ^
reaching completion only in its expression?'^^ Images '^^  ^are reductive abstractions which
efforts to extend, and in extending, to conect where necessary the fragmentary content of immediate 
memory.” SA, 171. _
2“° lU, 23-25.
SA, 172. ■ '
SA, 172. Berry objects to the characterization of tiiought as negative (312-13). This objection appeals to 
stem from his incorrect equation of negative with egocentric and applying a moral connotation to tiie term 
negative.
SA, 173.
SA, 173.
SA, 173-74. “This is what is sometimes referred to as ‘mental construction’; it is a negative construction 
which consists merely in attending exclusively to a selected group of data; so including their relations to 
one another, and excluding their relations to anything else from the focus of consciousness.” SA, 174.
SA, 174.
247 "Yhe general principle is tliat any reference to past or future involves a present representation. Now a 
representation is a symbol: tliat is to say, it is sometliing present which takes the place of what is absent and 
is considered not for itself but for its reference to another.” SA, 185. “From tliis we must conclude that all 
reflection mvolves a withdrawal into the Self; a self-isolation from die Other: and that all reflective activity 
is symbolic.” SA, 185.
2*^8 “We call such extemalizations of a reflective activity ‘expressions’ and the process of producing them an 
‘activity of expression’, or ‘an expressive activity’. Now an activity of reflection is never complete until it 
is expressed.... Every reflective activity is therefore an activity of expression, which is completed only by 
an external embodiment. Wliatever precedes the external expression is a preparation for it.... Quite apart 
from this, however, die incompleteness o f tlie theoretical activity until it is externalized lies specially in 
this, that only so can it gain reality by becoming a deed, and take its place in history as an act. Publication is 
essential to the realization of reflection; and we do well to be sceptical of all ‘mute, inglorious Miltons’.” 
SA, 186-87. “One effect of this limitation [excluding tlie relational aspect of persons] is that we must treat
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allow a certain economy of effort^ ®® eventually leading to the generation of general 
abstract images or symbols?®  ^Language is “a particular form, and the most generally 
useful form, of imagery wliich has been reduced in such a way that it forms a set of 
symbols.” ®^^ The primary frmction of language is coimnunication^®  ^(itself an activity) 
and its use in reflection is derived from this primary communicative function?®'* 
Language has a natiual tendency towards stability wliich assists in clarity but impedes 
creativity?®® The particular application determines the symbol used so that different 
images or symbols may express the same idea?®®
Reflective activity is activity directed upon images. Thought is often conceived as 
covering all reflective activity but Macmurxay tends to define it more strictly as the 
description and manipulation of images.^®  ^Description, or analysis, is the substitution, 
representing, or mapping^ ®® of a pattern of symbols for reality.^®^  It is inherently 
fr agmentary because the system is designed for a particular pmpose which controls the 
types of abstractions and generalizations that are considered significant. The success of
Üie end of reflective activity as its expression, and not as its conimunication. Expression, indeed, is the 
negative aspect of communication, and so is included in and derivative from communication. SA, 187. Also 
lU, 48-62.
One recognizes the controversial history of tlie terfhi>«age in philosophy. Macmurray never clearly 
defines what he means by the term and it is probably best to leave it ambiguous, or to think of images in 
terms of what it is the imagination works with, whatever that may be.
^  IÜ, 43.
lU, 44. Macmurray states tliat in the wide sense all image are symbols but in a narrower sense symbols 
are representations without resemblance. lU, 44-45.
lU, 46. See Langer for a similar understanding of how symbolism is the essential act of thought (21) and 
is more general than thought as it acts as a starting point for all intellection (33). Langer goes on to propose 
that we understand symbolic transformation of experience as tlie key to thought, including discursive and 
presentational (non-discursive) forms of tiiought such as art (71-82). 
lU, 46. 
lU, 47. 
lU, 47.
lU, 50, Ideas and words are both symbolic, yet tliey differ in that words have a prmiary communicative 
function: words are public while ideas are private. Furthermore, ideas may be images of any kind. lU, 48- 
50.
lU, 51-52. Macmurray actually sees tiiought in its most pure form as primarily the manipulation of the 
images. lU, 52. He is not as clear here as one would like. On tiie one hand he seems to acknowledge the 
definition of thought as being roughly synonymous witii reflection, while on the otiier hand he seems to 
prefer a narrower definition. In considering tiie modes of reflection it is clear reflection is larger tiian 
thought, for religion is reflective action, and art is emotional reflection.
lU, 53.
^  lU, 54.
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the system depends on whether or not it meets the requirements of the piupose for which 
it was intended. Therefore ideas are not true or false, but rather adequate or inadequate.^®® 
Once analysis has created a symbolic pattern these symbols may be manipulated. 
Judgment and inference manipulate these symbols in an imaginative activity taking them 
beyond the data.^ ®* Therefore, it is seen that supposai, or the imagination, is the 
fundamental process of thought.^®  ^The uniting of premises is a creative activity and is not 
strictly rule govemed.^®  ^However, in order to economize effort, habits of manipulation 
are developed and these imaginative habits become enslnined in logic?^^ This use of the 
imagination becomes so routine that the imaginative foundation of all thought is forgotten 
and only the non-habitual use of the imagination is apparent.^ ®® Nevertheless, all thought 
is based in the imagination and upon the controlling conceptual unities (Macmurray’s 
unity-patterns) which the imagination constructs.^ ®®
lU, 53-54.
lU, 55. From this fact, Macmurray notes that tliere is no absolute starting point for all thought. In this 
way he may be considered to be somewhat postmodern, although some would challenge this because of his 
concept of reality. .. >
lU, 56. This agrees with the evaluation of Mark Johnson. “The conclusion ought to be, tiierefore, that 
imagination is absolutely central to human rationality,'that is, to our rational capacity to find significant 
connections, to draw inferences, and to solve problems.” Johnson, 168. “By taking imagination as central, I 
see its structure as a massive, embodied complex of meaning upon which conceptualization and 
propositional judgment depend. Meaning is broader and deeper tlian die mere surface of tlie entire 
experiential complex—a surface tliat we peel off (cognitively) as concepts and propositional contents.” 
Jolmson, 170. Johnson’s tiieory of imagination includes the following components: categorization, 
schemata, metaphorical projection, metonymy (including synecdoche), narrative stmcture (171). 
lU, 56.
lU, 57. Macmurray is quick to point out tliat tiiese habits cannot lead to true discovery of what is not 
aheady in some way Imown,
lU, 58. Some will reject the presence of imagination in all tiiought because tliey equate imagination witli 
fantasy. Macmiuray says tliat there are legitimate limitations imposed by reality upon the proper use of the 
imagination in thought. lU, 58 However, “A supposai which destroys any essential characteristic of reality 
as we know it, would destroy the basis for any conclusion about the nature of reality so far as we know it. 
And a supposai which contradicted the structure of the analytic description of sometliing in reality, which is 
tlie starting point of an activity of thought, could not yield a conclusion which we should have any 
justification for referring to the reality about which we are thinking. Even if, under such conditions, we 
could draw a conclusion at all, it would be a conclusion which contradicted its premisses. What is important 
here is to notice that what keeps the activity of the imagination within the Imiits of the necessary reference 
to reality is the retention throughout the process of thought of a stmctural basis which has itself been 
derived from reality by die process of analytic description. Within tliis fundamental stmcture we may 
simpose anytliing that seems usefiil, provided tliat the stmcture itself is not altered.” lU, 59-60.
lU, 133. For a fuller explication of modes of reflection, unity-patterns, and rationality see below §2.3.
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Because theoretical intention cannot determine the end it cannot determine a 
means to that end. Instead of an end, theoretical intention points to an ideal, and instead 
of a means it has a method of procedure.^®  ^There are two primaiy methods, logically 
correlated and cognitively exclusive,^®  ^for clarifying and extending laiowledge in 
reflection: generalization and particulaiization.^®®
Particulaiization fills in the details constituting a self-contained unity (the thing 
for its own salce) and its methodology is art.^ ^® Generalization focuses not upon the 
object’s uniqueness but its utility and is thus abstracted into a general idea that may be 
used in multiple contexts.^^* Particularization and generalization are polar opposites and 
any representation is more or less conceptual (general) or more or less intuitive
267 "Ymth, for example, is in this sense an ideal. An ideal might be defined as a negative end; as the bare 
form of an end. For it can be defined only negatively in relation to a starting-point. Tmtli, for instance, 
might be defined as the completely adequate detemiination of the object; yet what this might be we cannot 
tell; since if we could we should already possess it and reflective activity would be botli unnecessary and 
impossible. Hie definition has, however, a negative relation to our present knowledge: that is to say it 
expresses a recognition of its inadequacy and so of our ignorance. In diis way it defines a method of 
procedme from tlie inadequate given towards its fuller detemiination by tiiought.” SA, 176. Haddox refers 
to Macmurray’s conception of knowledge as dynamic and vectorial, moving from tlie known to the 
unknown (192).
SA, 176. ............
269 "Yhere are, however, two directions in which a fuller deteimination of data can be sought. The relative 
mdeterminateness of a representation can be made more adequate either by generalization or by 
particularization. The terms ‘general’ (or ‘universal’) and ‘particular’, it should be noted, are logical 
correlatives. Neither the one or the other has any reference to existence. Both refer to representations, and 
so to tlie tlieoretical activities which concern tlie production of adequate representations of the existent. 
What exists is die concrete individual, from which both the universal and the particular are ideal 
abstractions.” SA, 176. At least once, Macmurray protested against usmg the terms general and universal 
interchangeably (RE, 186), but apparently by die time of the Gifford Lectures diis was no longer an issue 
for him.
SA, 176-77. “Such a representation can only be produced as an image of intuition; and its production is 
the work of artistry. This is, of course, die ideal of particularization; and we particularize a representation 
when we develop it in die direction of such an ideal.” SA, 177.
SA, 177. “I can generalize all die elements which make up a representation in diis way. I have merely to 
exclude from consideration their relation to one another. On die otiier hand I can eliminate die elements and 
attend only to their relations in die representation, and so produce a representation which is purely 
schematic. This ‘form’ or ‘schema of relations’ is also general in the sense tiiat otiier elements could be 
arranged in tiiese relations. Hie pattern can again be analysed into die elementary relations of which it is 
composed, and which could be recombined in different ways to provide other relational patterns. The ideal 
of this type of reflective process is a complete generality—the idea of an infinite multiplicity of unit 
elements which can be related in an infinite number of different ways. It is essential to tiiis ideal tiiat all the 
elements should be represented as identical; since only in this way can all necessary connexion between 
diem, and so all particularization, be eliminated.” SA, 177-78.
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(particular). Scientific method seeks as its ideal complete generality and artistic complete 
particularization.^^^
2.2.2.3 Distinguishing Theoretical and 
Practical Activity
A major distinction exists between Macmurray’s philosophy and modem
philosophy based upon the cogito which is higlilighted by art and science. In the Foiin of
the Personal tlie primary distinction is not between the mental and material, but rather
between the practical and the theoretical:
A practical activity is one which intends a modification of the Other; a theoretical 
intention is one which intends a modification in the representation of the Other. In 
either case the means to the realization of the intention may involve a 
modification of the Other. The experiments that a scientist makes in his 
laboratoiy, and which involve the devising, erecting and manipulations of 
apparatus, aie elements in a theoretical activity. The thinking out—the calculating 
and planning—which a builder undertakes before he starts to erect a factory are 
elements in a practical activity. Whether what I do involves moving things about 
or not is immaterial.^^^
Therefore, science and ait as ends in themselves are reflective activities—they are ideals 
wliich can only be completed in reference beyond themselves. However, when they are 
referenced beyond themselves,, or up, into practical activity they exist also in an
intermediate form of praxis—the practical application of science and art.^ '^* Practical 
intention, being positive and mclusive, contains and is constituted by the theoretical.
SA, 178. IComer points out tliat for Kant, tliere are two uses for ideas, die dieoretical and die practical 
(31).
SA, 178-79. Roy, in dissenting from Macmurray’s understanding of science as visual and passive, 
appeals to the activity of experimental chemist, the use of data-gathering devices, and conective 
mathematics. Roy, Form of die Personal, 67-68. He fails to understand that Macmiuray is thinking in 
different categories seemg all these as dieoretical activities (passive) as opposed to practical ones. Roy 
consistently wishes to revert to die cogito and its “man as questioner” motif. Roy, Fomi of the Personal, 63- 
64. Fiutheimore, die example he provides of the madiematical corrections simply contradict his own 
point—these corrections are introduced because of die inability of the scientist to be perfectly passive in 
observing die data.
“We must distinguish three modes of reflection, hi their purest expression—by which I mean when they 
are determined by a purely reflective intention—they are religion, art and science. All of them, however, 
since diey are necessarily derived from practical experience, and refer symbolically to action, have 
intermediate forms in which die reference to practical experience is more specific or more limited.” SA, 
187-88.
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which is negative and exclusive and incomplete since it ends in an ideal, an ideal 
requirmg a reference beyond it in order for it to achieve reality?^®
In actual practice the relation between knowledge and reflection follows a pattern 
which Macmurray terms the rhythm o f withdrawal and return—an oscillation between 
practical and theoretical activity. Reflection arises when in the course of action an 
unforeseen difficulty arises and the Self-as-agent withdraws fiom action into thought in 
order to solve the problem at hand so that the agent may return to a c t i o n . I n  
Macmurray’s understanding, grave consequences follow whenever the priority of the 
positive and negative elements is inverted: reflection exists for the sake of laiowledge and 
knowledge for the sake of action.^^^
2.2.2.4 Summary
Reflection does not produce knowledge, it presupposes it. It is an imaginative, 
symbolic activity of analysis and manipulation done within a larger conceptual construct 
designed to extend and clarify knowledge through generalization and particularization. 
Reflection, however, is only theoretical and must tiierefore be completed outside itself in 
practical activity—verification.
2.2.3 V e r i f i c a t i o n
Verification is primarily a return from thought to action, in order to find in the 
immediate experience of concrete activity a justification for accepting the
SA, 179-80.
^^ ®SA, 181.
This situation is particularly demonstrated by the inversion of means and ends. There is not a one-to-one 
correspondence between ends and means, for there are several means for any particular end and various 
ends may be served by the same means. When one means serves multiple ends it is conceived of in terms of 
power and it exists in numerous forms, including wealth and laiowledge. This power may be accumulated 
and held in reserve witiiout any particular end in view. Yet in the amassing of power it is possible to invert 
tlie proper subordination of the means to the end and view tlie stockpiling of power as an end in itself, 
tliereby the means loses its referent and in so doing its meaning and ultimately becomes iixational. SA, 182- 
83. “But the important point in tliis is tliat just as the same end may be attained by various means, so the 
same means may serve die attaiimient of various ends. Because of diis it is possible to accumulate power— 
diat is, die means of attaining our ends—without deciding in advance between the alternative purposes to 
which the power shall be put when we have got it.” SA, 182. “For in die absence of all reference to die 
practical reflection becomes phaiitastic, incapable of either truth or falsity.” SA, 183. Also RAS, 21-23.
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conclusions wliich have been reached thi ough the manipulation of ideas in the 
thought-processes?^^
Verification is the ai*ena in which the imaginative reflective constiucts are tested 
in the real world to see if they are tine. This presupposes, however, that reflective 
constructs might not be true and that truthfulness is somehow dictated by reality. 
Macmiuray’s understanding of verification as the overcoming of enor through testing its 
correspondence in action has certain affinities with pragmatism and these similarities will 
require clarification.
2.2.3.1 Truth, Error, and Correspondence
Macmurray sees concerns regarding truth as actually being concerns over the 
problem of error.^^  ^Errors in the symbolic representation of reality may arise from poor 
description or through improper manipulation of the symbolic representation in 
reflection.^^® Imagination on its own may create either rational or irrational 
conclusions.^^*
Overgeneralization is another souice of eiror.^^  ^All thought involves 
generalization, but generalization requires homogeneity within the class. Errors occiu 
when the general symbol does not apply to all cases. Generalization is justified by the 
experience of the infinite in the finite and the relationship of the imiversal to the 
particular'; nonetheless, it caimot justify any particular generalization. All similarity is 
from a particular viewpoint for a particular' purpose^^  ^and therefore thought alone camiot
lU, 74.
rU, 65. See also SA 98-99 where MacmuiTay confronts tlie problems of self-negation, e.g., self- 
deception and morality.
lU, 66-67. It should be remembered that the descriptive/analytic function and the manipulative function 
interpenetrate one another. lU, 68. If reality is not referenced, then tliere is no criteria for choosing among 
the many possible manipulative procedures, and tiierefore tlie rules of logic may fail because Hie case 
exceeds the boimdary conditions of tlie logical form. Macmurray uses as an example the algebraic "proof* 
that 1=2. Let x=a. Then x^=ax, xLa^=ax-a ,^ (x-a)(x+a)=a(x-a), x+a=a, 2a=a, 2=1. lU, 69, n. 1.
lU, 70. Macmurray defines rationality as objective.
^^UU,71. 
lU, 72.
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stop overgeneralization. Thus, the tmth of any theoretical conclusion cannot be certain.^ '^* 
Without an external referent a symbol can only be correct or incoiTect, not true or false, 
and therefore it is seen that reflective laiowledge is incomplete without the return to 
immediate experience for verification.^^®
Macmurray spells out several implications of the need for verification of thought 
in experience. First, all conclusions must be considered as hypothetical.^^® Second, 
practical activity is the only way to verify reflection.^^^ Third, failure in practical activity 
disproves thought but success does not prove its tiuthfulness for the conclusion is general 
and the experiment is particular.^^^ Fourth, reflective laiowledge is not certain.^^  ^
Verification leads only to the development of more rational beliefs understood as a 
conviction that is reasonable to hold in light of the evidence.^^®
hi verification it is imperative that the correct symbol set is chosen. If the question 
is “what is in the glass?,” at home the correct answer may be “water”; but in the 
laboratory the same answer is false, unless the substance is pure Intention acts as
a guide to the level (set or unity-pattem) hi which one is tliinking and therefore acts as a
^  lU, 73.
lU, 74. “Verification breaks the closed circle of tiiought and substitutes for it a circle of tiiought and 
action, but tliis circle is virtuous instead of vicious because it is founded in reality.” Nephew, 32. Roy 
attempts to reassert the primacy of thought by asserting tliat verification occurs not in action, but in thought: 
“But in so far as a deliberate quest for knowledge constitutes the drive to experiment, we must say tliat it is 
thought which carries out die experiment. Consequently verification should be seen as an integral part of 
reflection and thus be recast to tiie second stage of Macmurray’s basic triad [experience, reflection, 
verification].” Roy, Fomi of the Personal, 77. As before, this ignores MacmmTay’s distinction between 
dieoretical and practical and Macmurray’s critique of the scientific method as an inversion of the proper 
relation between thought and action lU, 80.
lU, 75. Yet, “... when believed any theory should be held provisionally on the dieoretical level, even if it 
is held firmly on the practical level.” Nephew, 131.
XU, 75. Macmurray is adamant tiiat shice action is different tiian sense-perception critiques of tliis 
position built around a Cartesian philosophy do not apply here, they are merely formal. See also SA, 215.
288 7 6 -7 7 . Macmurray claims that this lack of guarantee of tratlifulness does not lead to skepticism
because knowledge is not equated with tiiought. This is similar to fallibilism as held by C. S. Pierce and 
Popper. Nicholas Rescher, “Fallibilism,” OCP, 287-88.
ÏU, 77.
lU, 78. Kirkpatrick makes a distinction between knowledge which is always direct and belief which, may 
be based upon indirect experience. Kirkpatrick, Idea of God, 69-71.
Note the similarity to Wittgenstein’s language games.
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guide to discerning adequacy?®^ Once the level of intentionality is addressed (or to state it 
another way, once it is detennined which language game is being played) then the 
question of conespondence with reality comes into play?^® The truthfulness of a 
statement is the correspondence of the symbolic representation, taken from the 
appropriate level of intention, to the object. Correct thinldng is real thinldng; inconect 
thinldng is unreal thihking.^ '^* Real thinking is based upon the object one is thinldng 
about and the context within which one is thinking.^^®
2.2.3.2 Verification and Pragmatism
Because of the terminology of action in Macmurray’s Form of the Personal, it is
natural that some see comiections between it and pragmatism.^®® These similarities,
however, also raise questions. Langford in liis critique of Macmurray raises concerns tliat
Macmurray adopts a pragmatic understanding of verification.
First, one must carefully evaluate the utilization of a pragmatic criterion of 
meaning and validation. If Macmurray is to resuscitate a pragmatic theory of
Intention is tiie link between coherence (at tiie level of attention) and correspondence with external 
reality. Intention provides the selection of which system is to be tested against the external reality.
While tliere is correspondence in Macmunay’s epistemology tliis does not validate Roy’s judgment that 
Macmurray has a ‘crude correspondence tiieory of truth.’ Roy, Fomi of tiie Personal, 30.
MacmuiTay’s tiiought is similar to Critical Realism, in that he relates tiiought to an external independent 
reality, yet is appreciative of tlie person’s constructive role.
295 ("Y g tiie matter another way, I believe what I know to be true because I believe it truly bears on 
reality and whatever is tme, in turn, bears directly on my quest for tiie real.” Haddox, 186.
^  Roy lists seven similarities between Macmurray and pragmatism: (1) philosophy as tiie reception and 
criticism of common sense beliefs; (2) instrumental view of reflection; (3) humanity as problem solver and 
actor as opposed to spectator; (4) refusal of primacy of theory; (5) verification as coming to terms with the 
resistance and support given by environment; (6) fhtme orientation; (7) valid beliefs make a difference in 
the way people live. Roy, The Form of the Personal, 13.
It is important to note variations between strands of pragmatism, especially between Pierce, James, 
and Dewey. N. Rescher characterizes the differences broadly as Peirce’s “pragmatism of the right” as 
“scientifically elitist” and “objective”; James’s “pragmatism of the left” is “psychologically personalistic” 
and “subjective”; Dewey’s “social inteipersonalism,” “straddles” tiie fence between the two, and is 
“democratically popuhst.” Nicholas Rescher, “Pragmatism,” OCP, 712. According to Rescher it is James 
who holds most dearly to tiie idea that truth is equated witli usefulness (712).
Berry’s subject matter makes him more aware of these nuances and hence makes the following 
comparisons between Macmurray and Dewey: (1) anti-idealism and rejection of dualism; (2) philosophy 
guides action; (3) Marxist influence; (4) captivated by science and teclmology; (5) search for meaning and 
the character of the self; (6) optimistic regarding tiie possibilities of human relationships and progress. 
Berry, 149-52. Fiutliermore, Berry would note that Macmurray’s understanding of verification maldng a 
difference in life (Roy’s #7) is more like Janies’ than Dewey’s. Berry, 239; see also SA, 216.
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meaning or a pragmatic theory of verification, then he must deal with the 
numerous objections that have been made since the time of James and Dewey
Additionally, Langford disputes the priority given to acting over thinking: “Even, 
if thought is m order to action [sic], does not the rational evaluation of action provide the 
criteria for the guidance of action? Wliat is fr ee activity if it is not rationally decided 
activity.” ®^^ Unwilling to surrender the Cartesian priority of thought (note his equation of 
rationality and thought) he suggests considering the person as both thinlcer and doer 
instead of simply the doer?®®
In response one must reply that Macmurray considers criticisms of pragmatism as 
being fonnal and therefore not necessarily applying to the Form of the Personal?®® Even 
discounting the formal argument, Macmunay is fully aware that pragmatism is in no 
position to guarantee truth based upon its method. Instead one must settle for 
probability.®®* And Macmurray believes that this is best determined in action.
Langford, Natural Theology, 17.
Langford, Natural Theology, 18. The language here may hint at a desire to define rationahty in narrowly 
intellectual terms. Also note tiiat he still wants to see a decision—a choice—guiding action, rather than 
Macmurray’s position that action is choice. This also demonstrates that he does not completely grasp 
Personal logic.
“He should emphasize more clearly that tiie tiiinker and actor as man is tiie prius out of which all 
knowmg and doing arise. Such a programme, though genuinely radical, is possible, and may be found 
carried out in the work of Professor Michael Polanyi. It might well achieve Macmurray’s ends more 
effectively than his own approach.” Langford, Natural Theology, 18.
There are three ways to interpret Langford’s comments. The first option is that he is suggesting 
tiiat Macmun ay use tiie category of man as the unity of the tiiinker and the actor. Now, if one substitutes 
Langford’s terms man, thinker, and actor for Macmurray’s person, subject, and agent, then this is precisely 
what Macmurray does: he unites the agent and tiie subject in tiie person/agent. If this is what Langford is 
suggesting, then one has no choice but to decide tiiat Langford has fundamentally misunderstood 
Macmunay. However, this is not a likely interpretation. The second option in interpreting Langford is to 
see him suggesthig that a paradoxical unity between actor and thinker united in the concept of man. This is 
unlikely in light of Langford’s earlier remark tiiat rationality guides action. The tiiird interpretation is to see 
Langford calling for a unity of tiie thinker and actor hi man, but with tiie primacy being given to thinking 
over acting. This is tiie most likely scenario, given (1) Langford’s hesitation at the beghming of the 
previous quotation: “Even i f . ( 2 )  In botii quotations he seems to confuse rationality with thought, 
knowing with thinking. This cannot be done if  one wishes to give action priority. (3) On the previous page 
of the article (17), Langford expresses direct opposition to giving action priority over thought. (4) 
Langford’s statement (18) “That is, even if the agency of tiie self is temporally antecedent, is not tiie mental 
activity still valuationally prior?” In otiier words, Langford wishes for a return to the primacy of tiie 
theoretical approach to philosophy!
Macmurray believes pragmatism rests on the Cartesian dualism of thought and action. See Macmurray, 
New Materialism, 54.
Duncan points out that “Macmurray was not influenced by Dewey’s Gifford Lectures, ‘The Quest for 
Certainty’; his paper to the Aristotelian Society ‘The Function of Experiment in Society’ was given in 1927,
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The truth which gave the victory to science and which justified its triumph lay not 
at all in the results of scientific enquiiy but in the recognition that all knowledge is 
problematical; that all reflective representations of the world are hypothetical and 
require to be verified by reference to action. Science exchanged certainty for an 
increasing probability in knowledge guaranteed by practical achievement. 
Theology demanded certainty, and was prepaied to guarantee certainty by 
authority. In this it revealed its own unreality.®®®
Macmurray is awai e that an experimental appraisal of truth is not entirely
appropriate for the more complex world of persons. In other words, a typical laboratory
approach will not work with persons. For not only is it impossible to isolate all the
variables and to know all the pertinent mfomiation (experiments with animals are
problematic enough),®®® but more importantly, it is because experiment is theoretical and
Macmurray is operating fi om the standpoint of the practical.®®'*
Religious doctrines are as problematic as scientific theories and require like them 
a constant revision and a continual verification in action. Their verification differs 
in this, that it caimot be experimental, since they are not merely pragmatic; they 
can be verified only by persons who are prepaied to commit themselves 
intentionally to the way of life which they prescribe.®®®
Yet to Macmurray’s mind tliis is all that can be asked and all the guaiantee that may be 
sought.
While Macmurray’s understanding of verification shows many similaiities with 
certain pragmatic concepts it differs fundamentally in its starting point outside the cogito 
and in its differentiating between theoretical and practical activity and consequently 
between pragmatic, empirical, experimental miderstandings of verification and the
two years prior to Dewey.” Duiican, 11. For a discussion of probability in Locke see Diogenes Allen, 
Philosophy for Understanding Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), 182.
PR, 216-17. See also SA, 23. Does this mean tliat theology must become natural theology? Or is it 
possible, instead, to consider theology as the second order reflection on tlie principal data of the experience 
of the church?; i.e., it is one’s understanding of tlie experience that is held to be tentative and hypothetical 
imtil it is proven in action.
“The ‘Harvard Law of Neiuophysiology’ states, ‘Under ideal experimental conditions, a well-trained 
laboratory animal subjected to controlled stimulation will do as he damn well pleases.’” Jolin W. Dixon, Jr., 
“Toward a Trinitarian Antliropology.” Anglican Theological Review, 80, no. 2 (1998): 173.
See above §2.2.2.3.
PR, 223.
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verification of living a personal life?®® For Macmurray verification in the personal sphere 
requires commitment in practice?®® Furtheimore, Macmunay would say (more in keeping 
with Pierce than with Dewey or James) tliat something works because it is true, and not it 
is true because it works?®^
2 .2.4 Su m m a r y
Epistemology from the standpoint of the agent reflectively describes and analyzes 
a process of experience, reflection, and verification. Experience, as knowledge-in-action, 
when shown to be inadequate, is clarified and extended by reflective activities which 
create, analyze, and manipulate symbolic representations of reality creating new 
imagmative reconstructions of reality. This symbolic model’s adequacy is then verified in 
action: “For withdrawal into reflection is then for the salce of action and Icnowledge of 
value or of fact is verified in action.”®®® The reflective Icnowledge of fact, value, and 
persons is found in the modes of reflection: science, art, and religion.
2.3 M odes o f  R efl e c t io n :
S c ien c e , A r t , and  Relig io n
Science, ait, and religion are ways ofitliinking about reality—what Macmunay 
christens the modes of reflection. This section will begin with a fiilly relational account of
Jefflco claims tlie primary difference between the Fomi of the Personal and pragmatism is tliat 
pragmatism is an epistemology, while the Form of tlie Personal is a metaphysic, Jeffko, 11, 15.
Macmurray suggested tlie failure of tlie Soviet Union falsified Marxism and Gemiany’s failure falsified 
much of Gemian philosophy. Duncan, 12. According to Berry, tliis commitment in practice is more like 
James tlian Dewey (239; see also SA, 216).
Thanks to Amos Yong for pointing out this difference between Pierce and otiier pragmatists. “Whereas 
tlie pragmatist might argue that a belief in God is true if it makes the believer feel good, and false if it does 
not, Macmurray’s position is that any given belief is eitlier true or false, and if tme will eventually issue in 
results commensurate with those intended by tlie original proposition; if false, the results will be 
unintended. The pragmatist is willing to remain within the closed realm of the mind, but Macmurray 
demands that thought be forced to stand up against reality in tlie belief that such a confrontation is 
possible.” Nephew, 35. This equation of tmtli as usefulness is most pronounced in James (Rescher, 
pragmatism, 712).
RAS, 47.
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the discovery or construction of the modes of reflection®*® and the role that the 
apperceptions play in this formulation. This is followed by a further description of each 
mode of reflection. Finally a schematic overview of Macmun ay’s philosophy is provided 
which emphasizes the importance of the apperceptions for the Form of the Personal.
2.3.1 D e r iv in g  t h e  M o d es  o f  R e fl e c t io n
Macmurray uses the mother-child relation as the fundamental and pervasive 
experience of human relational existence.®** From this he surmises that persons exist 
primarily in a field of personal relationship and not in an organic framework. Humans are 
persons first, animals second. He sees the organic model as the dominant philosophical 
understanding of humanity from the time of the Greeks down to present evolutionary 
imderstandings of humanity.®*® He argues against an organic, teleological comprehension
Macmurray also achieved similar derivations begiimmg with unity-patterns (lU) and witii a 
consideration of action (SA), but tlie fully relational provides the most cogent and complete way of 
understanding the modes of reflection as well as tlie relation of unity-patterns and rationality.
Mother here does not necessarily mean biological mother but radier primary care-giver(s). PR, 50. 
Limpitiaw makes an important observation about this non-biological qualification by Macmurray. It is 
essential that the connection be primarily a personal one, not a biological or organic one, otherwise die 
mother-child is simply a demonstration that the child exists th an organic field instead of a personal one. 
Limpitiaw, 213, n. 101.
Patricia Shipley believes that Macmurray’s luiderstanding of psychology was influenced by the 
work of Melanie Klein, while Paul Gee also mentions the influence of Ian Suttie. Jolm Hands, “Saturday 
Morning Talk: ‘Becoming a Person; Jolin Macmunay and Carl Rogers’ by Paul Gee,” John Macmurray 
Fellowship Newsletter, no. 9 (Autumn 2000), 5.
Two recent considerations by psychologists give generally positive reviews of Macmurray’s 
understanding of die motiier-child relationship. Colwyn Trevartiian, “Proof of Sympatiiy: Scientific 
Evidence on the Personality of the Infant and Macmurray’s ‘Motiier and Child’,” in The Life and Work o f 
John Macmurray Conference Proceedings (University of Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied) and David 
Hay, “Relational Consciousness in Children: Empnical Support for Macmurray’s Perspective,” in The Life 
and Work o f John Macmurray Conference Proceedings (University of Aberdeen, March 1998, 
photocopied). Of die two, Trevarthan is the more critical. Yet his main criticism is that Macmurray did not 
go far enough in his relationality. Trevartiian provides evidence for a much more active and intentional role 
m the relationship by the infant.
PR, 45. This does not mean tiiat Macmurray rejects evolutionary theory. He does not, as long as it is 
applied to the organic level of human existence and not to tiie personal level. Limpitiaw quotes a private 
letter from Macmurray to Reginald Sayers, and rightly concludes, “We see here how Macmurray rejected 
the idea that personal existence as a whole can be understood in evolutionary temis; however, he did allow 
tiiat subordinate aspects of personal existence may yet follow an evolutionary pattern. Limpitiaw, 316, n. 
80. For a recent attempt at an evolutionary explanation of persons from a biological perspective see Jolui 
W. Dixon, Jr., “Toward a Trinitarian Antliropology.” Anglican Theological Review, 80, no. 2 (1998), 169- 
85.
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by referencing humanity’s lack of instinct®*® and the fact that himians must instead learn 
and habituate.®*'* Armed essentially only with “the impulse to communicate” ®*® the child 
gains laiowledge of the Other, which is primarily personal,®*® with subsequent knowledge 
of organisms and things derived by a process of de-personalization or negation.®*®
Macmunay tuither postulates that the mother’s pattern of responding and not 
responding to the child’s calls for attention creates a rhythm o f withdrawal and return that 
is “the universal and necessary pattern of personal development.”®*^ Reaction to 
withdrawal and return produces one of three primaiy motivations: hatred, feai*, or love.®*® 
Each motivation triggers a paiticular behavior, either aggression, submission, or trust.®®® 
Thi'ough the process of habituation, these behaviors lead to three resulting modes of
Macmurray acknowledges the fact tliat in tlie higher animals instinct is an ambiguous term. PR, 48. This 
does not seem to concern him as the activity of depersonalization makes all subsequent properties of a thing 
as a reduction of the personal. PR, 79-85. Yet a recent BBC documentary on cheetahs graphically 
demonstrates instinct’s existence in higher animals. The cheetah has a instinctual reaction to an annual 
mnning away: it chases, trips, and bites to disable its prey. One portion of the documentary shows a cheetah 
revealing itself to a herd of gazelle, but the herd does not spook. Since there is no running there is no 
instinctual reaction and so tlie cheetah just walks among the herd without direction until it slinks off into the 
bush to start all over again.
“All purposive human behavior has to be learned” with tlie exception of our “capacity to express his 
feelings of comfort or discomfort”. PR, 48. This leads to the discussion of how hi humans habit replaces 
instinct (PR, 52-56) and the basis of habit on intention wliich in turn is based upon knowledge which in turn 
is based upon reflection and the basis o f reflection is the imagination (PR, 56) witli tlie conclusion tliat “a 
motivatmg conscious must be present from the beginning” mid this must be feeling. PR, 57. Also, “We 
postulate, therefore, an original feeling consciousness, with a discrhnination between positive and negative 
phases.” PR, 57.
“In the human hifant... tlie impulse to communication is his sole adaptation to the world into which he 
is bom.” PR, 60. “He is, in fact, ‘adapted’, to speak pmadoxically* to being unadapted, ‘adapted’ to a 
complete dependence upon an adult human being. He is made to be cared for. He is bom into a love 
relationsliip which is inherently personal.” PR, 48. “He cannot live at all by any initiative, whether personal 
or organic, of his own. He can live only through otiier people and in dynamic relation with tliem. In virtue 
of this fact he is a person, for tlie personal is constituted by tlie relation of persons. His rationality is aheady 
present, tliough only germinally, in the fact that he lives and can only live by communication.” PR, 51.
The “first knowledge” is “of tlie personal Other.” PR, 76. “What must occur for the consciousness to 
become self-conscious in the sense entailed by agency? The answer to this question is that the child must be 
present to another person. The reason given by Karl Rahner for this necessity is tliat only anotlier person is 
sufficiently ‘other’ for the distinction between self and otiier to appear as an object for consciousness.” 
Augustine Shutte, Wliat Makes Us Persons?, 71, citing K. Rahner, Hearers o f the Word, trans. Michael 
Richards (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), 138.
PR, 79-85. “How Üien is it possible for the Otiier to be known as the non-personal? Only by a reduction 
of the concept o f the Other which excludes part o f its definition', only, tliat is to say, by a partial negation: 
only by down-grading the ‘You’ in tlie ‘You and F to tlie status of ‘It’.” PR, 80.
PR, 90. Notice tliat this was referenced earlier with regard to tlie way in which laiowledge and reflection 
interact. This insight into rhyüim of witlidrawal and return proves fmitfril for questions of spiritual 
development and formation.
PR, 95-101. Berry suggests that what Macmurray calls/ear is something more akin to anxiety (233).
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apperception—the pragmatic, the contemplative, and tlie communal?®* Any action 
implies a stance or orientation towards the Other?®® It (pragmatic), I-It (contemplative), 
oxI~You (communal). See Figiue 2.5.
I-Relation Emotion Behavior Apperception
I-You Love Trust Communal
I-It Fear Submission Contemplation
It Hatred Aggression Pragmatic
Figure 2.5 Relations and Apperceptions
These three primary apperceptions lead to three corresponding modes of 
reflection: religion, art and science.®®® Scientific reflection focuses as much as humanly 
possible on the natm e of the object in isolation (the pragmatic It) while artistic reflection 
appraises the object in its relation to its enviromnent and the observer (the contemplative 
I-It). Religious reflection focuses on the Other as integrating interpersonal relationship 
(the communal /-T om).®®'* Following the normal pattern of Personal logic, religion, being 
the most holistic, is constituted by its negatives, art and science, and each may be derived
PR, 102-05, " '
PR, 112. These apperceptions are also connected by Macmunay to types of morality and hence with 
corresponding social structures. The communal is the highest fonn of morality, where one acte for the sake 
of tlie Other and not for oneself. “Morally right action is an action which intends community.” PR, 119.
SRR, 56. An apperception is not so much what is tiiought as a way of thinking. In the first place tiiese 
apperceptions apply to otiier persons, and then by a process of negation (or depersonalization) to organic 
and substantial levels of reality.
SA, 188. Macmurray notes that in their purely theoretical fomi tliey are modes of reflection, tliey are 
derived from practical experience and tiierefore tliere are inteniiediate forms of practice which are religion, 
art, and science. “We must distinguish three modes of reflection. In their purest expression—by which I 
mean when tliey are determined by a purely reflective intention—they are religion, art and science. All of 
them, however, since they are necessarily derived from practical experience, and refer symbolically to 
action, have intermediate forms in which the reference to practical experience is more specific or more 
limited.” SA, 187-88. Hoffman notes that Macmmray’s practice leads to confusion stemming from tiie use 
of the same terminology for reflective and practical application. John C. Hoffman, “Religion and Religious 
Experience in tiie Thought of Jolm Macmurray: A Critique,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, 4, no. 
1 (1974-1975): 7. On the one hand, this ambiguity is disconcerting, creating the feeling that the author may 
be involved in a philosophical sleight of hand. On the other hand, it is reassuring in tiiat it reinforces the 
inextricable Ihikage between tiiought and action within Macmurray’s philosophy. In this section we are 
strictly dealing with tiie reflective, not tiie practical.
Note tiie absence of direct mention of God. Macmunay is convinced that religion is a human activity and 
he is concerned here with the human reflective activity of religion. Furtiiemiore, since God is at least 
personal, God is involved in religious experience within Macmunay’s system.
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from religion tlnough a process of limiting attention or negation. Each mode of reflection 
has an accompanying unity-pattern, logical form, and rationality which is imique to it. A 
few words of clarification regarding the teims unity-pattem, logical form, and rationality 
are in order here to help prevent misimderstandings later.
The term unity-pattern is unique to Macmurray, invented to avoid the importation 
of intellectual baggage from similar ideas, such as categories or schemas, developed 
under different philosophical forms.®®® Wliile all thought is based upon imagination there 
are certain imiversal frmdamental patterns “dictated by the nature and ftmction of thought 
in general, and by the nature of reality in general, which sets the problems with which 
thought has to deal.”®®® Unity-patterns are imagmative symbolic constmcts providing a 
systemic unity guided by particular practical piuposes. While imaginative, they are based 
on the experience of reality. These constructs may be more or less complete, which does 
not affect their tnithfrilness because the correct measure of these constmcts is their 
adequacy.®®®
Logical forms, as discussed above in section 2.1.3, are the purely fonnal 
relationships which remain when content is removed from tlie unity-pattem. It is difficult 
to draw a clear distinction between logical forms and modes of reflection. Science, as a 
mode of reflection, is reflection on reahty, conceived of according to the substantial 
analogy and employing analytic logical fomi (or graimnar) appropriate to the 
consideration of substances. Science is not, however, the only reflective activity which 
occurs at the substantial level, and therefore, is not the only reflection which utilizes the 
analytic logical form.
lU, 62.
lU, 62. In the plirase “nature of reality in general” Macmurray is including the very real ontological 
aspect that the unity-patterns are reflecting. These are not ideas pulled out of thin air. The fact that 
substantial philosophy used a formal-realist logic and organic philosophy used a dialectical-idealist logic 
botli to great advantage suggests to Macmurray that “If so, it must mean tiiat idealist and fonnal logicians 
are studying tire forms of different tilings.” SA, 93.
8 1
While Macmurray uses the word reason in the traditional philosophical maimer, at 
least as far as it is treated as the distinctive of persons, his understanding differs in that he 
does not equate reason with intellection, hut rather with the capacity to objectify, to 
interact with the Other in terms of the Other?®  ^In short, to be rational in its fullest sense 
is to be self-ti'anscendent?®® For Macmunay, the term reality means objectivity, while 
real primarily pertains to the significance of the Otiier for the person?®® In other words, 
something may have objective existence (reality) apai't from the perceiving person but it 
does not become real for that person until attention is focused upon it, until its existence 
has significance. The air one breathes has objective reality but it does not become real to 
someone until there is a reason to focus upon it—such as the inability to breathe or the 
presence of air pollution. Something may be unreal for someone either if it lacks 
objective existence (reality) or if it has no significance for them. It is possible for persons 
to mistake the objectively imreal for the real, and thus the objectively unreal becomes real 
for them. But ultimately it is false because it does not conespond to the objective reality
lU, 133.
lU, 127-28. Also RAS, 57-58; PR, 61. It is important to remember that Macmurray rejects tiie faculty 
psychology with its separation of the cognitive, affective, and conative. Ratiier he wants to see the intellect, 
emotion, and action all integrated and mutually interpenetrating.
RAS, 18. Rationality is tlie fomi or grammar of the relationship between objects witliin a given unity- 
pattem. Some (e.g., Langford) contend with Macmunay’s application of transcendence to humanity, 
wishing to reserve the word solely for deity.
It is interesting to note an early definition of reality as it relates to deity. In CH Macmurray defines 
reality as that which operates by tiie intention of God (96) and furthemiore defines God as ultimate reality 
(133).
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of the Other?®* This aspect of Macmurray’s philosophy demonstrates a marked similarity 
with critical realism?®®
It should be clear from this discussion of modes of reflection, unity-patterns, 
logical forms, and rationality that there is a great deal of linkage and conceptual overlap 
between tenns and one should avoid the temptation to be overly rigid and doctrinaire in 
separating one off from the other?®®
2.3.2 S c ie n c e  and  t h e  Su b st a n t ia l
U n it y -P a t t e r n : T h e  W o r l d  as M eans
From the standpoint of the Agent, then, intellectual reflection is an activity which 
intends an improvement of our laiowledge of the world as means to our ends. We 
may express this succinctly by saying that intellectual knowledge is laiowledge of 
the World-as-means.®®'*
Science is the pragmatic mode of reflection focusing upon the Other, in as isolated 
a manner as is humanly possible, as the It—as matter of fact. The pragmatic nature of 
science is primarily concerned with the Other for instrumental purposes.®®® Science is
“Now tills is a principle of far-reacliiag importance and I want you to consider it carefully. It is not what 
is real but what we think is real, not reality but what we take for reality, tliat directly determines our 
behaviour and so controls the current of our lives. We live by what we think is real, and if what we think is 
real isn’t real, then so much the worse for us.” FMW, 114. “We shall take tliis as om* first conclusion tlien, 
and try to keep it clearly in our minds. Unreal things can be real for us, because we can think they are real; 
and if  we do we behave as if  they were real.” FMW, 115. “The first conclusion was that ‘unreal things can 
be real for us, because we can tliink tliey are real’. The second is more definite; it is this. '"When we take 
something unreal to be real, we think that something is what it is not. There are lots o f things which seem to 
be what they are not and which tend to deceive us. ’ FMW, 118. “What do we mean when we say that 
sometliing is ‘real’ We mean tliat it is a significant tiling, that it means something to us. That we have to 
take account of it, that it is worth attending to.” FMW, 118-19.
Berry believes that Macmurray never rejected the basic tenets of Scottish Realism as described by 
Sidney Hook: (1) external world independent of perception; (2) self (distinct from organic body) is real 
entity; (3) necessary causal relations; (4) God exists; and simply modified it with Marxist and Kantian 
interpretations (Beny, 155). In large part one can agree witii Berry’s assessment witli two qualifications. 
The one revolves around how he (and Hook) understand the word distinct in the description of the Self as 
distinct from the organic body. If this is taken as one being able to distinguish a body (i.e., a dead body) 
from a person, tlien it is correct. Alternatively, if it means one can eitlier separate tlie body and tlie self or 
distinguish the self from die body (i.e., a disembodied self), tlien Berry is incorrect. Given Berry’s 
questionable understanding of the integrating aspect of Personal logic, the latter is more likely die case. A 
second quibble is how one defmes necessary causal relations. Macmurray sees tiiese occurring at tlie 
substantial level of reality and in all events yet believes other relations beyond the purely causal also exist 
(action).
However, it is wrong to see them all as synonyms, as Nephew does (29).
SA, 193.
RAS, 16.
83
utilitaiian, economic?®® and technical®®® in its orientation, perceiving the World-as-
338means.
In limiting itself to the determination of fact, science is concerned with what has 
aheady been determined®®  ^and hence with a search for patterns and constants.®'*® To 
achieve the determination of fact it is necessary to exclude emotional considerations.®'** In
IU,86.335
^^^RAS, 15.
SA, 193. See also RAS, 21, lU, 87.
RAS, 19. Macmurray’s imderstanding of science is perhaps tlie weakest link in his entire system. It 
appears to be based upon a very Kantian/Newtonian understanding of science which must be updated. From 
the viewpoint of a non-expert, it does not appear to be a modification which would completely destroy the 
system, however, attempting to do so is beyond the scope of tliis paper.
Berry states that Macmurray’s understanding of science is essentially Newtonian/Kantian and 
contrasts that to Dewey’s “more sopliisticated miderstanding of science as a method of correlating patterns 
of change where absolute certainty gives way to degrees of probability characterizing an open and dynamic 
universe.” Beny, 151. Macmurray does mention the role of probability in knowledge (PR, 216-17; SA, 23), 
but this would appeal* to do more with the certainty of knowledge, not dealing with tlie probability of facts.
Roy suggests Lonergan’s solution as superior to Macmurray’s: "Lonergan drives a wedge between 
the classical laws, which are abstract, and actuality, which is concrete. If the classical laws of science are 
abstract, he contends, they cannot ‘determine’ the concrete.... Hence the vision called mechanistic 
determinism, accordmg to which the universe is a large-scale machine completely determinable by 
correlations that would be botli abstract and concrete. The way out of tiiis contradiction, according to 
Lonergan, is to stress the total abstractness of the laws of classical science and to acknowledge tlie 
epistemological role of statistics so as to distinguish three aspects under which reality is scientifically 
approached. Events are thus known §s: possible series, which are abstract and iudetenniiiate and which are 
expressed by classical laws; probable series, which are less abstract but still ideal and which are expressed 
by statistical laws; and actual series, wliich are concrete aiid determinate and which do not systematically 
diverge from the probable series.” Roy, Form of the Personal, 128-29. On the one hand it would seem that 
Macmurray’s concept of science deals with the actual series (determinate), but on the other his focus on 
generalization would seem to indicate a more classical law understanding.
However, one cannot ignore tlie endorsement provided by tlie philosopher of science, Karl Popper. 
“Scientific theories can be tested by their practical consequences. The scientist, in his own field, is 
responsible for what he says; you can know hhn by his fruits. And Üius distinguish him from the false 
prophets. One of the few who have appreciated this aspect of science is the Christian philosopher J. 
Macmimay ....” Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2, The Hide Tide o f Prophecy: 
Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 243. This is not an endorsement 
of all aspects of Macmurray’s philosophy of science, yet it keeps one from completely dismissing it out of 
hand.
“Perhaps tlie best way to express the aim of science is to say that it is the search for constants', tliat is to 
say, for patterns which repeat without change indefinitely.... One should add, for completeness sake, tliat a 
pattern of change may repeat witii modifications, provided tliat the modifications take place according to a 
known pattern; as, for mstance, in tlie case of gravitational acceleration.” RAS, 13.
SA, 192; RAS, 25. The exclusion of practical valuation does not mean tliat there is no valuation witliin 
science, for it exists m the negative or theoretical sense in the choice of metliodology. “If the intention is 
purely theoretical, that is to say, if the reference to action is indetenninate, tlien tlie groimd of valuation 
must itself be negative. It must, tliat is to say, be the continuation of a direction of attention which was 
originally established in action; and which can be expressed in a methodological rale. It is a corollary of 
this that reflective activity of tliis type must issue, not in a single science of the given, but in a set of 
independent sciences, each constituted by the selectivity of its own direction of attention.” SA, 191-92.
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so doing, however, the distinction between means and ends disappears so that in science 
means are valued in themselves without reference to any particular end.^ "^ ^
Therefore, the material miity-pattem is governed by the purpose of representing 
general causal properties so that technical knowledge may be extended. To accomplish 
this science generalizes rather than particularizes.Science is the most general and 
abstract of all the modes of reflection '^ '^  ^and its symbols are designed for the 
consideration of the general causal properties of substances, not particularities.^'^^ The 
symbolic representation of science is the miit,^ "^  ^resulting horn the analytical process of 
breaking a complex entity into its most basic components.^"^  ^These units may then be 
repeated in various contexts and combined in various orders. The belief that an entity can 
be understood as an aggregate of its component units points to the mathematical nature of 
scientific logic; something is understood best by talcing it apart.
Earlier while discussing the parallel phases of science and philosophy (§2.1.2.1), 
tlie existence of three phases of science were mentioned: physical, biological, and 
psychological. These factual modes represent an apperceptive analysis applied to 
science.Scientific rationality is intellectual m natine focusing upon tlie material aspects 
of reality. '^*  ^As such, it is limited; yet according to Macmunay, it is also universal, for
342 «Yhe means is, of course, chosen in action, and this involves valuation. But because the intention passes 
beyond it and does not rest in it, its valuation is derivative from tlie end, and it has no value for the agent m 
itself.” SA, 192. ‘TSlow in an intellectual mode of reflection, because there is a suppression of feeling and an 
abstraction from practical valuation, the distinction between means and end disappears, and only a 
succession of occurrences remains.” SA, 193. “In otlier words, intellectual knowledge, as knowledge of 
matter of fact, becomes in action knowledge of the means of realizing a practical intention. For all that is 
known is in itself valueless; and in action it can be valued only negatively, as means to an end which it does 
not itself determine.” SA, 193.
SA, 178; lU, 87.
lU, 85. Note that science is the most general of tlie modes of reflection (comprising religion, art, and 
science) not all forms of reflection (which also includes history and philosophy).
lU, 87.
lU, 90. This is created by the repetition of identities.
RAS, 33-34.
PR, 176.
349 «'pjjgj.g jg jj great deal of truth to Bergson’s insistence tliat tlie function of tlie intellect is to deal witli 
matter” lU, 101.
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“Eveiything ... is at least material, however much more it may be.”^^® If everything is at 
least material and if  science is the mode of reflection concerned with matter, does it not 
follow that science should be equated with philosophy, the inteipretation of the universe?
Attempting to equate science (or even the pliilosophy of science)^^  ^with 
philosophy as a whole requires the reduction of the universe to only one of its 
dimensions—the material. Doing so results in materialism?^^ Materialism is 
philosophically inadequate primarily because of difficulties wliich exist at its boimdaiies. 
Consider the situation of the mathematical nature of the analytic logical fonn. It is clear 
that mathematics is designed primarily for finite entities and encounters great difficulties 
at its boundaries (such as zero or infinity).^^^ Mathematics also has trouble dealing with 
units as identities. If tins concept is taken to its logical and necessary extreme it becomes 
nonsensical, for no two things can be perfectly identical else they would not be two things 
but the same thing.^ "^^  A material universe cannot account for the need for perspective in 
determining a functional identity for perspective is not inlierent in the material natur e of 
the object itself. There is also the related problem of dualism: Macmunay believes that all 
modem and scientific pliilosophies until Kant are essentially materiahstic^^^ and result in 
an inappropriate mind-matter dualism.^^^
lU, 88. Roy criticizes Macmurray for being too physical and too coinmon-sensical. Roy, Form of tlie 
Personal, 81. “Either God is natural or religion is nonsense. The idea of Nature which excludes God is itself 
tlie product of dualism. God is no more supernatural than Matter. Both are infinites, and lie beyond all tlieir 
finite manifestations. God is infinite personality; and personality dissociated from matter in idea is purely 
ideal—that is to say, non-existent. God is real; and therefore he is the ultimate syiiüiesis of matter and spirit, 
of Nature and Man.” Jolm Macmurray, “Cliristianity and Communism: Towards a Synthesis,” in 
Christianity and the Social Revolution  ^ed. John Lewis, Karl Polanyi, Donald K. Kitcliin (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), 526.
Science is reflection upon the substantial miity-pattem and therefore is factual reflection. It is comprised 
of numerous sciences all of which are fragmented by the nature of their particular objects of investigation 
and tlie development of the various metliodologies necessary to investigate them. Philosophy of science is 
the generalization about the generalizations of fact. The history of science is the particularization of die 
generalizations of fact, 
lU, 98. 
lU, 99. 
lU, 92. 
lU, 99.
101.
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Furtlieimore, MacmuiTay demonstrates that science as a holistic philosophy
cannot account for causality.^^^ The problem witli causality within the scientific mode is
that matter is viewed as essentially passive and therefore notliing exists within the imity-
pattem to account for the change/^^ The source of the change is outside of the complex of
relatively ordered elements and for that reason a deteiministic mechanical understanding
of change is required.^^^ This determinism in scientific thought thus requires an external
referent in order to account for change and consequently it cannot be a proper
symbolization for describing the universe?^° Materialism has need of, but no room for,
non-passive biological and psychological entities.^^^
Finally, the inability for materialism to determine values disqualifies it from
consideration as a holistic philosophy. By eliminating ends and being concerned only
with means, a purely scientific outlook is only able to ask the question: how can we do
this? and can never ask, should we do this?^^^
Macmurray concludes that the substantial unity-pattern, analytic logical form, and
scientific mode of reflection is a valid representation of reality only in so fai* as it is
material.^^^ In other words, science is reflective generalization on one aspect of the
miiverse whereas philosophy is reflective generalization on the universe as a whole. One
may have a philosophy of science but one may not equate science with philosophy.
Scientific reflection is, therefore, a search for a paiticular and limited extension of 
our knowledge. We call it instrumental knowledge; and by this we meant the kind 
of knowledge which can form the basis of a developing techno logy.
lU, 94-95. 
lU, 95.
96.
^  lU, 97.
lU, 100. Macmurray makes a terminological modification when discussing action, distinguishing 
between an action (wliich requires an agent) and an event, which may merely have a cause. This is a later 
development in his tliinking. Yet the lack of a causal agent within materialism still holds for if all matter is 
passive there must still be a first cause which is not.
^*^RAS, 23-25. 
lU, 102.
RAS, 27-28.
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2.3.3 A r t  and  t h e  O r g a n ic  U n it y -P a t t e r n :
T h e  W o r l d  a s  E nds
Consequently we may say of the emotional mode of reflection that it seeks to 
detennine the world as an end in itself, or rather as manifold of ends. As we called 
intellectual knowledge knowledge of the Woiid-as-means, so we may describe 
emotional knowledge as knowledge of World-as-end.^^^
Al t is the contemplative mode of reflection which reflects upon the Other in terms
of its environment as the I-It—as valuation. Wliere science pragmatically considers the
Other merely as something to be used, the contemplative orientation of art sees the Other
as having intrinsic value. Art perceives the World-as-ends.^^^
Rather than analytically breaking down an entity into components, art reflects on
the miity of the Other.
The technique by which this adequacy of the image is achieved is one of selection, 
modification and organization. The image, if  it is to present the object in its 
individuality, must itself be self-contained. This is what is meant by saying that a 
work of art is an organic whole. The elements of which it is composed ai e not 
merely arranged; they are organized. They are fimctionally or purposively related 
to one another, so that they give the impression of necessity. What this secures is 
that the composition of the image is such that the elements refer us to one another, 
and so are seen as constituting a completed whole, which needs nothing beyond 
itself for its apprehension. Its formal characters, therefore, are rhythm, proportion, 
balance and harmony.^^^
Art captures the holistic quality of the, organic unity-pattern. The organic unity- 
pattern addresses one of the most glaring inadequacies of material thought: its inability to 
accuiately represent organic life.^^  ^Since all thought is necessarily anthropomorphic,^^^ 
one is aware of life before one is aware of matter—the knowledge of the organic is at a 
higher level than loiowledge of tlie material and the fomier includes the latter witliin it.^ ^^
SA, 194.
SA, 193. Note Macmimay is following Kant in The Critique o f Practical Reason, 5:87, 131 
RAS, 39-40. 
lU, 103-04.
Yet due to the rational nature of persons, this understanding of tire self is modified by die understanding 
of the Otlier in a feedback loop so that a reductionistic understandmg of the Other may create a 
reductionistic understanding of the self.
lU, 104-06. Macmunay cites Schopenhauer’s entire philosophy as based on the distinction of feelings 
and ideas—which Macmurray sees as die difference between die organic (where unity is felt, not calculated, 
lU, 110) and the material.
Rather than an ontology of substance, the organic needs an imderstanding of process for 
“In fact, life never is at any moment. It is always becoming
Artistic reflection must not only be able to accoimt for process but also the fact 
that organic form is relative to flmction for the imity of an organism is the unity of its 
flmctions and therefore the teleological fomi of the Other is necessary for the proper 
apprehension of the Other.^^  ^Teleology is not an explanation of growth; it is merely its 
symbolic representation or description^^^ and should not be confused with conscious 
purpose, for an organism is not necessarily awai*e of its final stage/^"  ^Instead of purpose 
guiding growth organisms have potentiality—die potential of each developmental stage to 
advance into the next. Pmpose involves explanation, while potentiality does not.^^  ^
Macmmray summarizes the organic unity-pattern:
It is the conception of the organism as a whole, whose miity is maintained by the 
harmony of differences, and in which the differences are finally differences of 
functions in a unitary process in which the potentiality of the beginning is realized 
in the end.^^^
Organic imity is a dialectical unity of difference, not a mathematical summation as in 
scientific thought, but a balance or harmony between differences.^^^ Organic unity is felt 
not calculated; it is emotional.^^* Macmurray-believes that the logical form of the organic 
unity-pattern was laid out most clearly by Hegel and his later systematizers. The 
continuing influence of this logical foim is seen in that modem idealism, realism, and 
even process thought rely upon this organic analogy and its dialectical logic.^^^
lU, 109. Emphasis in the original. 
” ^IU, 110-12.
^^lU, 113.
113.
114.
114-15.
lU, 109-10. Langer sees art as being its own non-discursive symbolic activity (71-78) witli music 
functioning much like maüiematics as tlie “symbolization of emotion” (82) and as tlie “logical expression of 
feeling” (176).
“Since its activity upon die given is an activity of feeling, we may distinguish it from the otiier mode of 
reflection by calling it die emotional mode.” SA, 193. Also lU, 110.
115. SA, 34.
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Just as science has tliree modes of the factual based on the three apperceptive 
stances (physics, biology, and psychology), so too there are tlu ee modes of valuation for 
aj^ t 380 -pjjg pragmatic mode is efficiency, the contemplative mode is aesthetics, and the 
communal mode is m o r a l i t y As one might expect, these modes follow the standard 
inteirelated form of the personal and therefore efficiency is the negative of aesthetics 
which is the negative of morality. All are essential and all are necessary. Because the vast 
majority of Macmurray's exposition deals with the various forais of morality and their 
corresponding social structures, efficiency and aesthetics are often overlooked in 
discussions of artistic reflection.
Morality, dealing as it does with flilly personal interactions, may also be 
considered apperceptively.^^^ Legal morality is the pragmatic foim and considers the 
Other in relative isolation and is technical in foim.^^  ^Contemplative morality is 
traditional and considers persons in their environment.^^"  ^Fraternal morality is the 
communal mode and is based in fiiendship.^^^
Macmurray ties these modes of morality to various social stractmes. The state is 
governed by legal morality, society by tradition, and community by fraternity.^^^ Again, 
followmg Personal logic, one must see the various modes of morality and their 
corresponding social structures as inextricably linlced. For as Macmmray plainly states:
For terminology of valuation and factual see PR, 176.
PR, 113-14.
PR, 121.
PR, 125-26.
PR, 123-24.
PR, 147,158. It is salient at tliis point to make a comment. Macmurray prefers to call these forms of 
morality according to their apperception. For sake of clarity legal, tr aditional, and fraternal have been used. 
All are actual terms Macmurray uses in his discussion of the various modes of morality.
PR, 132-51, Again, Macmurray’s terminology has been modified for the sake of clarity. Macmurray 
actually posits a positive (community) and a negative (society) social structure. He then firrürer delineates 
between the two negatives (pragmatic and contemplative) using various terms such as Hobbesian, 
Leviathan, and die State for the pragmatic and mystical and Rousseau-like for die contemplative. Here die 
common association of tradition and society has led to the designation of die contemplative social structure 
as society, while the pragmatic lends itself most easily to die name of state.
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“But the reality of conumuiity implies society ... as necessaiy to it, in due subordination
In numerous places in MacmuiTay's writings one finds him deciying the
usurpation of Cliristian morality by stoicism.^^® Because morality functions at the level of
die organic, not the material, it is not concerned with following predetennined rules.
Quite the contrary. Law is the death of true morality. Several commentators have noted
that Macmurray fails to positively engage with the role of the Ten Commandments or
Jesus' statement that no portion of the law shall pass away.^^  ^Tliis oversight may lead
some to interpret him as excluding rules from human life. To be fafr to his critics some of
Macmurray's more extreme comments and the tendency to focus upon freedom can easily
be read in this light.^^° Yet in evaluating his statements one must consider Macmurray
within his polemical context. He is fighting a very stoic fonn of Calvhiism focused upon
law and duty, thereby elhninating freedom and choking the very life-blood out of
Christianity. Macmurray's position is similar to Luther’s imderstanding of the third use of
the law where the holy life is achieved spontaneously from the lieaif, while
acknowledging the assistance the law may provide in identifying and dealing with sin.^ ^^
For example, Macmurray states.
The prophetic tradition was one of imier vision and emotional response, not of the 
fixed plan of law and formal obedience. That prophetic tradition culminated and 
completed itself in Jesus, who insisted that the Sabbath was made for man, not 
man for the Sabbath, that legal rationalism must be the seiwant of personal 
fr eedom, that life should be based upon an emotional principle, not on an
PR, 176. Also, “Every community is then a society; but not every society is a community.” PR, 146.
For example see PR, 138; SA, 192; CH, 125-26, 138-45; FMW 75-77; RE, 123-26.
For example see David A. S. Fergusson, John Macmwray, 12. “The Hebraic tradition, which elsewhere 
is richly praised by Macmurray, has at its centre the Ten Commandments which include die prohibition of 
adultery. Like die odier commandments diis rule is given for human well-being and for the ordering of 
society. Yet die validity of such mles in promoting personal fulfihnent seems to be given little 
consideration by Macmurray in his moral philosophy.”
For example see RE, 125-26; PR, 161; FMW, 82, 209-10.
See W.R. Godfrey, “Law and Gospel.” New Dictionary o f Theology, 379-80. However, T.F. Torrance in 
Scottish Theology points to die existence of the “older Scottish tradition” which is more in keeping with 
Calvin (as opposed to Calvinism) and is therefore not judicial but personalistic in its understanding, Scottish 
Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 49-92.
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intellectual one. Thus the morality ofpolicy and plan, o f will and obedience is the 
antithesis o f the morality preached by Christ?^^
One further point must be made about Macmurray’s imderstanding of morality. 
Because of his presentation, which leads from communal morality (fr aternity) tlrrough the 
commimal social structure (community) to the celebration of commimal relationships 
(religion), nmnerous commentators believe he is conflating the personal level of religion 
with morality. This is simply not tlie case.^^^
Art (flie valuational mode of reflection) is constituted by science (the factual mode 
of reflection)^^"  ^since valuation (emotional) necessaiily refers to an object and the object 
must be determined as a matter of fact (in tellectual).It is imperative to note that 
biology functions within the analytic foim of the substantial miity-pattem and not at the 
valuational level of the organic. Biology is a science, not an ait^^^It is also important to 
realize that the sepai ation of knowledge into emotional and intellectual components is 
merely theoretical and cannot occur in reality.^^  ^Both art and science as modes of
FMW, 77, citing Mark 2:27. The derivation of the modes according to the apperceptions marks an 
important development in Macmurray’s thinking. Earlier he had used the ontological analogy of substance, 
organism, and persons instead of the-apperceptions. One still detects the echo of the earlier derivation, but 
in using the apperceptions Macmurray is able to place morality fully on the organic level. See FMW, 171- 
74, 191-98. Note the change: “Biat is not to say tliat tiiere is no place for law in human life. It means simply 
that Üiere is no place for law and obedience in morality. Human life has a material basis and a material 
aspect, and there is the place for law. But in tlie true personal life of human beings, in which alone they 
express then full natine as moral beings, there is no place for mechanism or obedience.” FMW, 188.
“Like Kant, Macmurray found the basis for religion in morality, not vice versa.” Beiry, 242. .. it
would seem tliat tlie form of the personal can be constmed as die form of die moral.” Jeffko, 71.
“Now since action is primary, our primary knowledge of the world contains both of these moments— 
apprehension and valuation—in a unity. The world is known primarily as a system of possibilities of action; 
and without valuation action is impossible; and consequently, knowledge, which is its negative dimension, 
is also impossible. If now we wididraw from die activity of practical valuation. Tlie world is tiien 
apprehended, in terms of this abstraction, as an existent manifold of events. This manifold constitutes die 
given for a mode of reflective activity which seeks to understand the world as a matter of fact, and this 
activity excludes any positive valuation.” SA, 191.
“The positive mode of reflection is an activity of reflective valuation. Since it is an activity of valuation, 
it is primarily an activity of feeling; but since feeling must be referred to an object, and die object must be 
determined as matter of fact, reflective valuation contains widiin it, as its negative aspect, a perceptual 
discrimination of fact.” SA, 193.
SA, 34-35.
397 «Yhese two aspects of knowledge [intellectual and emotional] are of course not separable in fact, but 
only distinguishable by drought. The discrimination of the Odier—as support for and resistance to action— 
is perception; the valnation of alternatives is matter of feeling.” SA, 197. Any emotional state tends to 
express itself in action unless controlled by intention. But the patterns of feelings which one experiences are 
a product of intentional experience and when diese are habituated form a person’s character. “We must not
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reflection are activities of knowing; yet scientific laiowledge seeks to laiow the Other in 
general while artistic knowledge seeks to know the Other in particular.^^^ MacmuiTay 
goes to great length to argue that both are valid forms of reflection and both are rational 
in that they have external referents and therefore may be either rational or irrational based 
upon their objectivity.
In stressmg that the organic imity-pattem is more comprehensive than the material 
unity-pattern the question arises regaining whether art might not be the most adequate 
manner of miderstanding reality—philosophy as an organic inteipretation of the universe. 
Macmunay rejects an organic philosophy due to (1) the problems of finitude inherent in 
the organic analogy, and (2) the problems of individualistic understandings of the person.
First, Macmun ay is critical of the organic model’s need for finitude. Refuting 
idealists, Macmurray notes that if the imiverse is an organism then there can be no 
organic wholes within it, for different elements within an organism cannot themselves be
forget, however, that the patterns of feeling which constitute our motives are themselves the product of 
intentional experience; and drat diey continue responses to the environment which have been deliberately 
estabhshed in the past. Tlie impulsive activities of an agent are therefore normally ‘in character’; diough 
diey are not determined by a presentintention. A person’s character is the persistent system of motives from 
which he acts under normal conditions; and when we predict what he is likely to do in given conditions 
from a knowledge of his character, we abstract from intention, and suppose that his motives will determine 
his actions. Motive, we may then say, is the continuant element in action; it determines the general direction 
of an agent’s behavioin, while the particular intentions he fomis from moment to moment in terms of his 
discrimination and valuation of his situation as he knows it. Nor is there any reason, in principle, why he 
should not act intentionally in complete opposition to his momentary inclmation; for inclination is simply 
die tendency for feeling to realize itself in action, which his nomially subject to intentional control.” SA, 
197-98.
“Bodi these modes of reflection are activities of knowing. This will be accepted widiout question in die 
case of science; but not, perhaps, in die case of art. Yet, if one of die two is to be refused the title of 
knowledge ... it is art diat has die better claim.... Intellectual reflection, as knowledge of die World-as- 
means, aims at laiowing everything in general but nodiing in particular. In diis mode we come to know a 
great deal about things without knowing them. It is only when our interest, and so our valuation, comes to 
rest in somediing for itself, only when something becomes for us an end-in-itself, tiiat we seek to know it 
for itself, instead of making generalizations from it.” SA, 199-200. “No intellectual description of an object, 
however complete and scientific, can ever amount to, or take the place of a contemplative knowledge of the 
thing itself. The intellectual mode of reflection is derivative from the emotional, and is contained within it.” 
SA, 200. “This discrimination of die object in contemplation is not intellectual. For it is not analytical, and 
it does not generalize. The elements discriminated remain essentially widiin the whole and diere is no 
reference beyond the whole. They are not apprehended as instances of a concept. The process of 
contemplation is a discriramatmg valuation; a paiticularizing of the satisfactoriness of die object as a unity 
in itself, and for its own sake. It is, tiierefore, felt, and not analytically understood. Tlie feeling, however, is 
objective, because the interest of the Subject is in the object itself, and in its particularity.” SA, 200-01. See 
also RAS, 39.
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organic wholes.^^^ While agreeing with certain gi’oups of realists that the mathematical 
falls within the biological,M acm urray charges that they fail to aclcnowledge the 
necessity of the final form of an entity for its teleological apprehension—in other words, 
teleology requires finitude/^^
From the critiques of both the realists and idealists Macmun ay sumiises that 
artistic symbolism is limited to the inteipretation of the finite. Yet, a finite organism 
requires an environment.'*^^ The universe, by definition, has no environment'*®  ^and 
therefore philosophy cannot be based upon an inadequate biological analogy.'*®'*
Second, Macmurray does not believe art and the organic unity-pattern can account 
for the fullness of human persons in their relational experience. Persons are more than 
biological entities in synclironization with their environment.'*®  ^Humans do not simply 
react to stimuli, they act. They do not simply exist in an ecological relationship with 
creation; persons are persons-in-relation, mutually interacting with each other.
In addition, because of its contemplative basis, ai t is iiilierently individualistic. 
And as individualistic, art cannot adequately describe the relational experience of 
persons.
118.
118.
“Its use depends upon the representation of a stage at which growth is complete, and unless this stage is 
represented the process of life cannot be defined. The earlier stages are all relative to the stage of maturity. 
Now, our immediate apprehension of life is the apprehension of the infinity of life in finite individuals and, 
tiierefore, die process of life is known as an infinite process, tiiat is to say, as a process which has no final 
stage. It follows from this diat it is mipossible to represent die unity of the world which is given in 
immediate experience in terms of die organic unity-pattern. Just as in the case of mechanical thought, this 
type of symbolism must be limited to die mterpretation of the finite. It can represent the final life-process of 
individual organisms or of species or even of die whole process of evolution up to date, provided we take 
die appearance of rational consciousness in humanity as die final stage. Beyond diis it caimot go, and yet in 
its very nature it demands diat all stages shall be represented as transitions to a more highly developed 
stage.” lU, 119-20. 
lU, 120.
lU, 120. One might argue diat God is the environment of die universe, but tiien one would have to argue 
diat God does not exist, otherwise God would have to be part of the universe, the conclusion of certain 
forms of process theology.
^°^IU, 121. 
lU, 121.
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Contemplation is inlierently a solitary activity. It is the attitude of the spectator. 
One must stand aside to contemplate; one must not be personally [mutually and 
interactively] involved. But a personal involvement is the core of communion.
We have seen that the artistic attitude individualizes hoth the object and 
the subject. Each artist has his own individual vision; and each chooses his own 
object to suit his own way of feeling. For as in science, so in art, there can be no 
universal object. The artist must take a part of experience and represent it as a 
whole. Consequently, the exti eme individualism of the artist and the extreme 
individualization of his object provide no basis for a personal togetherness. Artists 
qua aif ists cannot possibly co-operate; and a coimnunity of artists on the basis of 
artistic experience is unthinkable. The classical example of the attempt to tliink it 
is Plato’s Republic. For Plato’s ideal republic is an artist’s vision of the perfect 
society; and even to imagine it he had to exclude the artist, attack art and devise a 
system of education to eradicate the individualism of the artistic element in human 
nature. There was no room in Plato’s Republic for any artist but Plato .,
Because of the problems of finitude and due to its inlierent individualism one 
cannot accept a completely artistic account of the universe. Therefore, another mode of 
reflection must be developed, in particular one which is able to account for the experience 
of hiunan persons as persons.
2 .3 .4 R e l ig io n  and  t h e  P e r so n a l
UNITY-PATTERN: THE WORLD AS PERSONS
Religion is the commimal mode of reflection focusing upon the Other as the I~
You—as persons constituted by relations. The communal aspect of religion includes 
within it the factual determination of the Other (the It) and the valuation of the Other (tlie 
I-It) while surpassing them both by considering the constituting nature of relations. 
Religion perceives the World-as-persons.
Religion plays an essential and pervasive role in Macmurray’s thought impacting 
not only his thinking on philosophy but also his thinldng on human beings and God. As
RAS, 43. One may challenge this by noting the several art forms which are cooperative; such as a 
symphony. However, in so doing, one is confusing the expression of an aggregate of individual 
contemplations with a truly communal contemplation. Because art is emotional reflection, and groups do 
not have an emotional capacity—only individuals within the group can artistically value tlie object—a 
group cannot experience artistic reflection. Taken as a solitary object (the performance of the symphony) 
the artistic reflection is still by the mdividual listening to it, or perfonning tlieir one small part. Besides, one 
can argue that even a symphony is ultimately the artistic expression of one individual, die conductor— 
reflected in die high acclaim given to conductors. Even Jazz, the most fluid of musical forms, always has a 
band leader settmg the tone.
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such religion will appear not only in tliis current section but also below in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4.
The personal unity-pattern is one which organizes and unifies the conception of
persons and their relationality/®^ It is commonly obseiwed that humans are social beings.
But according to Macmurray tliis must never be associated with some type of organic
herd instinct, for persons singularly lack instinct;'*®^  however, one’s very nature is
constructed socially through thoughts, ideas, culture, and beliefs.'*®^  Without the Other
there can be no self^no person—for, “we need one another m order to be ourselves.”'**®
It is not that persons are merely in relation but that persons are constituted by their
relationality. Personal laiowledge of the Other (as material, biological, and personal) is
united'*** in finite personal experience, a finite experience of infinite person—God, the
personal absolute.'**^
Macmun ay notes that the material unity-pattern is unable to deal with differences
between the You and I, while the organic cannot maintain the individuality of particular
persons who do not exist as complementary elements in a larger organism. '**^
It would seem, therefore, that the unity-pattern of psychological thought must 
somehow succeed in combining the characteristics both of organic and of 
mathematical tliought. It must express at once the independent reality of the
For purposes of comparison, one may say that science is intellectual reflection, art emotional reflection, 
and religion is integral reflection. Or to put it another way, science is reflection in drought, ait is reflection 
in feeling, and religion is reflection in personal interaction.
408 need to commimicate, we should note, is itself a natural characteristic, not, lilce speech, somediing 
that we leani as we grow up. It is, indeed, our only original adaptation to the environment into which we are 
bom. We have no true instincts. What may seem such are no more than physiological automatisms.” RAS, 
51. For die most detailed discussion of diis lack of instinct see PR, 48-60.
RAS, 53; lU, 155.
RAS, 53. See also IÜ, 137; PR, 44-45. Persons are mutually constituted—hence the title of die second 
volume of die Gifford Lectures, Persons in Relation.
lU, 138.
lU, 138. If one maintains die epistemological principle tiiat has been active diroughout Macmurray’s 
philosophy diat the infinite is grasped in die finite and apply diis to persons tiien one sees Macmurray’s 
definition of God as die temi symbolizing infinite person. Furtiiemiore, Macmurray links this to die 
doctrine of the incarnation for die personal infinite can only come through an awareness of finite 
personality, lU, 124. See also Macmurray, “Objectivity in Religion,” in Adventure: The Faith o f Science 
and the Science o f Faith, ed. Burnett H. Streeter, et al. (New York: Macmillan, 1928).
lU, 139-40. Since mathematics deals witii identical units and dialectical moves toward a synthesis 
eliminating the individual elements which created die syndiesis.
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mdividual and the fact that this individuality is constituted by the relationship in 
which he stands to other independent persons who ai e different individuals. To 
put it in the familiar tenns of modem controversy, mathematical relations are 
external to the tenn they relate. Organic relations aie internal to their teims. But 
personal relations are at once internal and external.'**'*
The personal unity-pattern, as conceived by Macmunay, rejects the distinction 
between the natural and the supematural. The concept of the supematui al is only 
necessary when one incorrectly conflates nature and organism. When one collapses 
nature and organism, one must supply a term to describe the super-organic aspect of 
human reality, hence, the coining of the word supernatural. But if one rejects the 
equation of the natural and the organic then the term supernatural is no longer needed.'**  ^
By abandoning the bifurcation of the world into sepai*ate spheres of natural and 
supematural, one is enabled to ascertain the empirical reality of tlie field of personal 
relationships.'**^ This reality involves the interaction of persons, including the problems 
and solutions necessary for interaction. In order to be an agent one must know the Other. 
Yet when knowledge of tlie Other fails, one is forced to reflect on the nature of the Self in
lU, 140 Note Macmuiray’s early use of psychological for the personal unity-pattern. This paper has 
preferred tlie term personal because psychological is often perceived in individualistic mental categories 
which subvert Macmurray’s intention to tliink of this in terms of heterocentricity and agency. In addition, 
SA, 37, refers to scientific psychology and personal philosophy as parallel modes so it would appear that 
tlie Macmurray moved in this direction hhnself.
RAS, 48-49. This is similar to the conclusion of Oman who considers the term supernatiual to cover die 
personal according to Thomas A. Langford, “The Theological Mediodology of John Oman and H. H. 
Farmer.” Religious Studies 1 (April 1966): 233. John S. Morris notes the difficulty which Oman faces when 
he attempts to go from experience to metaphysics. This is because he is still working widiin die Kantian 
tradition which disallows such a move. Macmurray’s philosophy provides the rationale for just such a 
move. John S. Morris, “Oman’s Conception of the Personal God in The Natural and the Supernatural.” 
Journal o f Theological Studies 13, no. 1 (April 1972): 89. Macmurray cites Bardi’s concept of God as 
wholly Other as an example of the continuing effect of the distinction between natural and supematural in 
contemporary theology. “In our own day this supematural concept of religion has been uncompromisingly 
reaffimied by Karl Barth. God is die wholly Other, completely incommensurate with human reason and 
only to be known at all by His own initiative in revealing Himself.” RAS, 48.
RAS, 53. “Eidier God is natural or religion is nonsense. The idea of Nature which excludes God is itself 
the product of dualism. God is no more supematural dian Matter. Both are infinites, and lie beyond all dieir 
finite manifestations. God is infinite personality; and personality dissociated from matter in idea is purely 
ideal—that is to say, non-existent. God is real; and therefore he is the ultimate syndiesis of matter and spirit, 
of Nature and Man.” Macmurray, Christianity and Communism, 526.
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order better to understand the Other.'**^  This creates a consciousness of mutuality which is
the essence of the personal—-it is only known in concrete personal relations.'**^
Practical rationality is simply an understanding of the Other as the Other-than-
self.'**^  To think irrationally is to analyze and describe an object differently than it is (e.g.,
to conceive of a granite block as though it were transparent). To feel irrationally is to
value an object differently than its actual value (e.g., fearing a mouse). To act inationally
is to interact with an object differently than according to its natme (e.g., treating a
concrete block as if it were as fragile as an egg). Personal natur e in its truest expression is
the person acting towards the Other, not in terms of the self, but in terms both of the
Other-in-relatiori-to-self and as the self-in-relation-to-Other.'*^®
If such a complete ‘personal objectivity’ were achieved, it would mean that in the 
personal relation I am for you; that for me, I am notliing, and you are everything.
It would mean a complete self-devotion to the other; a perfect love which is a 
complete fullness of rationality.'*^*
Religion does not require the suppression of valuation (as does science), nor the 
suppression of mutuality (as does art), but involves the totality of the person.'*^  ^Complete 
rationality is the experience of God.'*^  ^This total objectivity is difficult to attain for 
rationality is falsified whenever subjective experience is mistaken for objective
424experience.
Since knowledge of tire self is die negative of the knowledge of die Odier (PR, 76-77; SA, 142).
RAS, 54-56; lU, 124-126; RE, 205,222; PR, 169. Note die similarity witiiRicoeur: '"Oneself as Another 
suggests from the outset that die selfhood of oneself implies odiemess to such an intimate degree that one 
cannot be drought widiout the other.” Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 3.
lU, 128-31. “Thus, an objective consciousness or a rational consciousness—the two pluases have die 
same meaning—is a consciousness of what is recognized hi die consciousness itself as an object 
independent of the subject.” lU, 131.
“Now, since religion has its empirical reference in die relation of persons, the object is always anodier 
person, and self-transcendence must mean the capacity to have one’s mterest in another person.” RAS, 57- 
58.
RAS, 58. The trinitarian implications of diis are apparent, yet Macmurray makes no mention of diis 
application.“*22 »poj. religious reflection is total, involving every aspect of the person, intellectual, emotional and 
practical; unconscious as well as conscious.” RAS, 59.
423 experience of God is the experience of total self-transcendence and so of a total rationality, as 
contrasted widi die partial self-transcendence and rationality of art or of science.” RAS, 59. 
lU, 133.
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It is important to remember, according to MacmuiTay, the rationality of religion 
does not negate that of science or art for it is possible to be partial, or limited, in one’s 
rationale without being in eiTor. A rationality limited to the material leads to science, 
while a rationality limited to the organic results in art, and both are included within 
religion.'*^  ^Rationality, or objectivity, brought to bear upon persons leads to religion'*^^— 
symbolic action concerned with persons, community, and friendship .S ince science 
deals with the least complex unity-pattern (matter) it is easiest to achieve rationality in 
scientific thought. Likewise, because religion deals with the most complex unity-pattern 
(persons) religious objectivity is the most difficult to attain.'*^ ^
Macmurray sees religion as essentially human symbolic reflective action'*^  ^
intending to expand community.'*^® Because Macmurray sees it as empirical (not 
something ephemeral or supernatiiralf^^ it can be described phenomenologically.'*^^ 
Furthermore, religion is not simply one of several expressions of culture; religion is tlie 
matrix from which the rest of culture flows, including naturally the arts and sciences.'*^^
RAS, 59; XU, 133.
It is odd tliat Macmurray clearly refers to science and art in lU, 133. But he delays naming the 
objectification of the personal as religion until lU, 135, possibly to force people to come to grips witli his 
argument before they simply adopt prejudices against religion. In essence he is wanting to define religion as 
a human activity and not in some of die more traditional manners.
lU, 134.
lU, 135. See especially Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion.
^^RAS, 55; PR, 151, 162.
'^ °^RAS, 59; PR, 163.
RAS, 53.
See Roy, Fonn of the Personal, 133-34, for die similarity between Durklieim and Macmunay. “The 
intellectualist dieory, which maintains that religion stems from man’s quest for understanding, is almost 
wholly absent from his [Macmurray’s] philosophy: he talces the pragmatists view diat reflection, whether 
religious or not, does not rest on a desire to know but is geared to solving problems. Instead, he borrows 
from sociological and emotionalist accounts of the phenomenon of religion. His idiosyncratic vision 
mcorporates insights which come from die social andnopologist Durkheim and the psychologist Suttie.” 
Roy, “Form of the Personal,” 133. Costello confirms diat Macmurray studied Durklieim (11).
“... religion is the source from which the various aspects of human culture have been derived; and die 
belief in a radical disparity between philosophy and theology is an exceptional and recent phenomenon.” 
SA, 20. “Historically, religion is the matrix from which the rest of culture has crystallized.” PR, 156. 
Aldiough influenced by Durkheim diere are differences. Durldieim believed religion was die characteristic 
manifestation of sociality, while for Macmurray it would seem to not only be the most characteristic but 
equated widi culture. It would seem that Macmurray took a position more similar to Tillich dian to 
Durklieim (see die interesting discussion of Geertz’ dieory of religion and die integration of biological, 
social, and psychological in Amos Yong, “‘Tongues,’ Theology, and the Social Sciences: A Pentecostal- 
Theological Reading of Geertz’s Interpretive Theory of Religion.” Cyberjournal for Pentecostal-
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Wliile religion contains art and science within it as constituting negatives, it also 
involves other negatives as well.'*^ '* Perhaps the most important of these include histoiy 
and philosophy.M acm urray’s understanding of philosophy was detailed above in 
§2.1.1, so one may simply summarize the discussion there by stating that philosophy is 
the interpretation of the universe. Histoiy is concerned primarily with actions.'*^  ^
Subsidiary attention is paid to events, but only to the extent that these events influence 
action.'*^  ^History, like philosophy, is an inclusive discipline seeking to understand the 
whole.'*^  ^Yet while philosophy generalizes, liistory particulaiizes.'*^^ One may have a 
philosophy of science and a philosophy of art just as one may have a history of science 
and a history of art.'*'*® History is like art in that it particularizes; it is like science in that it 
deals with matters of fact—although it does not seek recurrent patterns for prediction.'*'**
Charismatic Research 1 (Jan 1997) [joumal on-line]; available from http: //www.pctii.org/cybertab; 
accessed 11 Jmie 1999.
For example, just as the apperceptions can be applied to science (physical, biological, and psychological) 
and art (efficiency, aestlietics, morality), so tlie apperceptions can be applied to religion, resulting in magic 
(pragmatic), mysticism (contemplative), and integral (communal) forms. PR, 171. It is also possible to 
consider religion in terms of doctrine, ritual, and commimion (PR, 173-75). Most discussions of Macmurray 
completely neglect the pragmatic form of religion—magical/tecluiical.
SA, 204, 207. For a manuscript-lengüi treatment of die relation of history and religion see CH.
For die connection of action to history and narrative, see Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 113, (116-38 foi- 
narrative in general; also Wallace, 10-15).
SA, 205-06. It is important to note diat diis definition of history de-legitiraizes a number of ways diat 
history has been interpreted: it is not concerned to find replicating patterns (the generalizing deterministic 
tendency of the sciences) nor to discern the natural processes which supposedly govern it (die organic 
tendencies with their teleological foim of determinism). For a very similar contemporary account of history 
see Wilfred M. McClay, “Clio’s Makeshift Laboratory,” First Things 111 (March 2001): 23-27, wliich is an 
adaptation of his book The Student’s Guide to U.S. History (Wilmhigton, DE: Intercollegiate Studies 
Institute, 2000).
“History, therefore, is in this sense all-inclusive. The whole human past, widi all die knowledge that 
informed it, widi all die errors and illusions and misjudgements which distorted it, is matter of liistory; and 
diere is no event, however seemingly remote from our practical interests, which may not turn out to be 
relevant to the historian’s task. The sciences and die arts, philosophy and religion all have dieir histories; 
and the histories are not separate histories but parts of one histoiy which is the story of the doings of man 
on die eartii. It is indeed one of die more important theoretical consequences of the practical standpoint diat 
we should cease to look upon the sciences as independent ‘bodies of trudi’ and learn to think of diem as 
human performances, as things that men do.” SA, 207.
“For pliilosophy, like history, is one, and every new philosophy is a continuation of die one philosophy 
just as every new history of an age is a rewriting of the one history. Tlie difference between the two is that 
while philosophical reflection generalizes, historical reflection particularizes.” SA, 207.
SA, 207. It also follows diat one may have a philosophy of histoiy (the generalization of the 
particularization of action) as well as a history of philosophy (die particularization of die generalization of 
action), although MacmuiTay never makes this extension.
SA, 207.
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Further differentiating history from philosophy, art, and science, is the temporal quality of
history. Philosophy, art, and science all attempt to abstract time outside of attention.'*'*^
History reflects upon the remembrance of action, yet, memory is fr agmentai^,
imaginative, and relative to the perspective of the particular agent.'*'*^
History is, then, essentially personal; and it exhibits the form of the personal: for it 
concentr âtes upon practical activities and treats the reflective achievements of an 
epoch as secondary and derivative; as of interest in so far as they enter into and 
condition the practical doing of the time. And since history is concerned with the 
human past in its pastness, it makes no reference to the future; it does not seek to 
derive from the past anything that can be referred to the future,'*'*'*
Yet, because history is inclusive its goal or ideal is to express itself as the unity of 
all actions, which is difficult in light of the need to unify intentions across time and 
numerous contemporaneous agents.'*'*^  From this Macmunay builds a metaphysics of 
action ultimately leading to the idea of a personal universe.'*'*^
It is helpful to realize that one may also have a philosophy of religion as well as a 
history of religion—the former focusing on the generalities of the symbolic acts of 
community and the latter on particular symbohc acts of commimity. In light of this it is 
possible to see why MacmuiTay states that philosophy as generalized reflection on the 
universe would have its most comprehensive-subject matter as the personal, for it is a 
personal universe. Hence, pliilosophy would be the generalized reflection on persons—■ 
die general aspect of religious reflection and so philosophy is virtually synonymous with 
natiual theology.'*'*’
The relationship of philosophy, history and the modes of reflection are essential if 
one is not to simplistically and incorrectly inteipret MacmiuTay. An instructive example 
of such a misunderstanding is demonstrated in Roy’s analysis of Macmmray’s
211. See also SA, 132.
SA, 207-09.
SA, 211.
SA, 213.
For metaphysics of action see SA, 214-22. For the idea of the personal universe, see PR, 206-24.
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imderstanding of the relationship between generalized personal and impersonal 
knowledge as philosophy and science, respectively.'*'*  ^Roy represents Macmurray’s 
taxonomy of personal attitudes, impersonal attitudes, philosophy, and (human) sciences 
thus:
Experience Reflection
A Personal attitude D Philosophy
B hnpersonal attitude C Human Sciences
Roy suggests Macmmray’s imderstanding is wrong and instead argues it would be proper 
to understand the relationship thus:
Experience Ist-level reflection 2nd-level reflection
A Personal attitude C Human Sciences D Philosophy
B Impersonal attitude
So that “In this new diagram, the hmnan sciences provide a reflection not only on B, but
also on A; wliile philosophy outlines an accoimt of A, B and C.”'*'*^ Furthermore, he
argues that Macmmray cannot malce this adjustment since for Macmmray science can
never take into account the totality of full personal relations.'*^ ®
Roy’s conclusion stems from his inadequate imderstanding of the different forms
of generalization present in thé Fonn of the Personal. It does not take sufficient accoimt
of the relationship between religion, art, and science in conjunction with history and
philosophy. A more accurate representation of these relationships within Macmmray’s
thought, using Roy’s format and ignoring the place of liistory, would look so:
Experience Ist-level reflection 2nd-level reflection
A Personal attitude E Religion D Philosophy of Religion
B Impersonal attitude C Human Sciences F Philosophy of Science
PR, 224. Nephew clearly traces the connection of philosophy and theology in Macmmray’s tliought (12- 
15).
Roy is particularly addressing the passage hi PR, 37. Louis Roy, “Interpersonal Knowledge According to 
Jolm Macmmray,” Modern Theology 5 (July 1989); 359-61, esp. 359; see also Roy, Fomi of tlie Personal, 
124-28.
Roy, The Fomi of tlie Personal, 126.
Roy, The Form of tlie Personal, 126. Roy states that philosophy and scientific knowledge is separate in 
Macmmray’s tliinkhig. Yet in the very section Roy cites Macmurray explicitly states that pliilosophy is 
inclusive of the scientific (PR, 38, 40).
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For MacmuiTay, philosophy in its highest manifestation is synonymous with pliilosophy 
of religion, which because of the form of the personal is constituted by the philosophy of 
art and the philosophy of science. Religion, as the practical mode of reflection, is 
constituted by the generalization of philosophy (of religion) and the particulaiization of 
liistory (of religion) as well as the generalization of science and paificularization of art.
In light of this example, it is clear that a more comprehensive and systematic 
picture of the Form of the Personal, one including history for example, would be most 
beneficial to the understanding of this unique philosophy.
2 .3.5 T h e  F o r m  o f  t h e  P e r so n a l—
A  S c h e m a t ic  Su m m a r y
Macmurray never provided a schematic presentation of his philosophy. Using the 
exposition thus far, in particular the nature of luiity-pattems, Personal logic, tlie 
particularizing and generalizing aspect of reflection, and the triadic grid of pragmatic, 
contemplative, and commimal apperceptions it is possible to sketch out the general 
contours of Macmurray’s Form of the Personal. The following is a greatly simplified and 
condensed overview. It is not meant to be exliaustive or encyclopedic, but should 
demonstr ate both the comprehensive nature of the Form of the Personal as well as the key 
relationships which give it shape.
In presenting this sketch one is awar e of the dangers of distortion, especially 
reductionism, present in any overiy-systematic exposition of Macmurray. However there 
is a need for a proper imderstanding of the relation between various components of 
Macmmray’s system. In addition to Roy’s confusion over the relation of philosophy and 
science a number of common misunderstanding exists. History and biology are often 
placed within the organic imity-pattern. Biology is a science,'*^* History, Macmmray
451 SA, 34-35.
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clearly states, exhibits the fomi of the personal and not the organic Furthermore, the 
pervasive dualistic reading of Macmurray must be refuted. One may argue 'whether 
Macmurray was successful in completely overcoming his dualistic heritage, but that is 
something quite different than being a dualist.
In constructing tliis model certain single terms are used for the salce of clarity 
whereas Macmurray seems to revel in using various terms for the same idea, consistent 
with the exploratory nature of his writing. The guiding intention here is to capture the 
essence of what he was describing with these multiple terms without reductionism.
The apperceptions form the heuristic and interpretative backbone of the Form of 
the Personal. The apperceptions (pragmatic, contemplative, and commimal) function as 
forms of abstraction, according to whether one is generalizing (pragmatic), particularizing 
(contemplative), or integrating (communal). In addition, one must realize that these 
abstractions are abstractions for a particular pmpose. For instance, science is pragmatic 
reflection on the Other as an element in the substantial imity-pattem. Science makes 
factual generalizations about reality in keeping with the analytic logical form which gives 
priority to the units or parts o f  reality Art is contemplative reflection on the Other as 
an element in the organic imity-pattem making valuational particularizations about reality 
in keeping with the dialectical emphasis on the wholeness of the Other in its enviromnent 
as perceived by the Self. Religion is communal reflection on the Other as an element in 
the personal unity-pattern, following the integrating fonn of Personal logic. Religion, art, 
and science as modes of reflection are abstractions with reference to ontology.'* '^*
SA, 211. Altliougli liistory is present at the organic level in tlie guise of tlie history of art.
Science is impersonal in so far as it must treat all otliers as determined units—according to a substantial 
analogy, and can therefore never adequately addiess a fully personal understanding of persons. See PR, 37- 
43.
Remembering that tlie substantial, organic, and personal unity-patterns have an ontological basis.
Jeffko claims that Macmurray has five levels of reality in his personal thought: supra-personal, 
personal, social, organic, and material (60-61). However, tliis is because he does not understand the various 
relations so that he has included a mode of morality (social) along with the other levels of reality. By 
including (correctly) tlie supra-personal and (incorrectly) the social levels of reality, Jeffko misses an
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Similarly religion, histoiy, and pliilosophy are abstractions according to the triadic 
apperceptive grid. Yet, instead of abstracting ontologically, this pattern is an abstraction 
with regard to action—a practical abstraction. Pragmatic reflection on action causes one 
to generalize action as pliilosophy. Contemplative particularization of action is history, 
and commimal reflection is the integration of action in religion. The counter-check to this 
is the fact that when one considers particulaiization and generalization of action (histoiy 
and pliilosophy) one sees that it is time which is being abstiacted. Time, one will recall, is 
the form of action. History is a particularization of time, while philosophy attempts a 
generalize of time.
Since the ontological and practical patterns of reflection both appear to derive 
from religion, it should be possible to relate them to each other. Using a format similar to 
the one employed in the discussion above about the relationship between philosophy and 
science it is possible to demonstrate the relationships between these terms in Figiue 2.6.
Religion Histoiy 
(of Religion)
Philosophy 
(of Religion)
Art Histoiy of Alt Philosophy of Art
Science Histoiy of Science Philosophy of Science
Figme 2.6 Religion, History, Philosophy
This represents the conceptuality of religion abstracted in its ontological and 
practical dimensions. However, history and philosophy are not the only forms of 
religious, artistic, and scientific reflection. In the discussion of the parallel phases of 
philosophy and science, Macmurray distinguishes between the physical sciences, 
biological science, and psychological sciences. One may question how the apperceptions
important clue as to the triadic structur e of Macmim ay’s drought. Later Jeffko claims Macmurray advocates 
four ontological categories: existence, being, reality, and possibility (80). Possibility is indeterminate being 
(i.e., personal), reality is significant or valuational being (i.e., organic), existence is factual, determined, 
actual being (i.e., substantial). Being is a state drat applies equally to all. Yet in including bemg he ignores 
MacmiuTay’s personal word of warning to him about abstract being (n. 25). In so doing, drere are four 
categories, instead of three, which once again causes Jeffko to fail to see the important connection to the 
triadic structure of the Form of the Personal.
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apply to science, because, as mentioned above, science is always generalization. True, but
as was demonstrated in Figure 2.6, there are at least two possible ways to generalize:
science and philosophy. The apperceptive pattern is still integiation, particularization, and
generalization but the question remains—what is being generalized in the factual modes
of science? There are numerous possibilities. To narrow the field of possibilities, one can
take into account the additional data provided by the valuational modes of art. Here
Macmurray considers efficiency (pragmatic-general), aesthetics (contemplative-
particular), and morality (communal-integrative). When these are compared, the common
abstraction becomes clear: the relational Other is being abstracted in various ways. In the
pragmatic apperception any person will do. So if one is judging (valuing) a person solely
on their efficiency, one does not care who thé person is, it can be a generic anyone. But
aesthetic judgment is concerned with the particulaiity of the Other. Who is vitally
important to aesthetics and persons are not interchangeable. To test this consider the
following parallels:
Facts of the Other in General = Physics 
Facts of the Other in Particular = Biology 
Facts of the Other in Integration = Psychology
Valuation of the Other in General = Efficiency 
Valuation of the Other in Particular = Aesthetics 
Valuation of the Other in Integration = Morality
Commimion of the Other in General = Magic/Teclmical 
Communion of the Other in Particular = Mysticism/Escapist 
Communion of the Other in Integration = Integral
It is important to note that the factual, valuational, and commimal modes follow 
the formal rules of the respective unity-pattern. Facts are always analytic (concerned with 
the paits), values are always dialectical (concerned with the whole), and communion is 
always personal (concerned with integration). Just as one is able to construct a grid of the
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The basic axes of this cube (see Figiue 2.9) are the ontological, the practical, and 
the relational (O, P, and R respectively)."^^  ^It is important that one recall the integrative 
nature of personal logic and the graphic representation of it (Figure 2.1) where the totality 
of the area was the positive and was constituted by the negative. The same concept is 
being applied here, but positive is in the direction of the intersection of the thi ee axes. 
Therefore, any label closer to the point of intersection is more positive and therefore 
inclusive of what is more negative (that is, away from the intersection of the O, P, and R
axes). So one may say religion, or one may say the integi ation of science and art in
religion, or the integration of history and philosophy in religion. The result is always to
talk about the totality of religion.
Figui’e 2.9 Principal Axes
These are not the only possible axes, however they are the most general of persons. Narrower attention 
(selectivity) fit best within tiiis overall framework.
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Macmurray provides several examples of frufher negatives within the cube 
(graphically pictured as boxes within the cube in Figure 2.10). For instance, there are 
tln*ee types of morality: legal, traditional, hatemal. Religion can also be conceived of in 
tenns of communion, ritual, and doctrine. The question in each case, of course, is which 
axis provides the positive and negative? For morality, one can see that the abstraction is 
talcing place along the relational axis (R) because the legal generalizes the Other (law is 
supposed to not care about who the person is), tradition particularizes the Other (how one 
acts depends upon who the Other is), and community integrates the Other (full freedom of 
interaction between the self and the Other). As can be seen in Figure 2,10, these 
modifications along the relational axis can be seen to continue along the length of the 
practical axis (P), yet do not interact in any way with aesthetics."^^^
0
Figure 2.10 Morality
That is to say that Üiere is no such thing as “legal aesüietics” like there is legal history and legal 
philosophy. It is not entirely clear whether MacmuiTay’s one-to-one conespondence between types of 
morahty (legal, traditional, fraternal) and types of social stincture (state, society, conmiunity) is 
demonstrated by tiie continuance along the P axis in historical consideration. It is certamly plausible.
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For coimmmion the abstractions take place along the ontological axis (O). 
Macmmray specifically states that doctrine has the fonn of science (i.e., the substantial 
fomi or analytic logic) and ritual the aesthetic fomi (i.e., the organic form or dialectic 
logic) without being either science or art.'^ ^^  The forms (logical grammar* or logical forms) 
ar e always expressive of the ontological dimension. Therefore one sees, as in Figure 2.11, 
the relationsliip arranged along the ontological axis. One sees the integration along the O 
axis affects all arrangement along both the R and P axes. In other words, all religions 
(magical, mystical, and integral) have doctrines, rituals, and communion, as well as the 
history and philosophy of doctrine, ritual, and communion.'^^  ^A further aspect of 
relationships along the ontological axis should be noted. A box from the personal level 
may be regar ded with respect to all three forms (personal, dialectic, analytic). A box from 
the organic level may only have two ontological levels (dialectic and analytic). The 
substantial can only have the one form (analytic). See Figure 2.12 for an example of this. 
This last observation also reinforces the earlier decision regar ding the orientation of the 
types of morality. Since there are thr ee modes of morality and morality is on the organic 
level it cannot be stacked vertically along the ontological axis.
PR, 174.
Again, as was the case with morality, it is unclear if tlie one-to-one conespondence of types of religion 
and the historical religions of Islam (Magical), Buddliism (Mystical), and Cluistianity (Integral) is a 
function of tlie historical dimension.
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Figure 2.11 Religion as Communion, Ritual, and Doctrine
There is no pretense in this presentation that Macmuiray ever conceived of the 
Form of the Personal grapliically in the shape of a cube. However, as an initial 
systemization it clearly presents the major aspects of liis pliilosophy, provides significant 
clarification, and is heuristically suggestive. The apperceptions function as a heuristic 
device but because there is an objective reality wliich is perceived there is a structure 
which emerges tluough their use.
I l l
0Figure 2.12 Religion as Mutuality, Freedom, and Equality
2.4 S u m m a r y
Tliis chapter began with Macmurray’s concept of the nature of philosophy, its 
subject matter and the problems of modem philosophy which Macmurray traces to 
Descartes. Through a careful exploration of K ^ t ’s philosophical system MacmuiTay then 
discerns a way past the Kantian impasse and begins to reformulate philosophy hom tlie 
perspective of the agent. In so doing he detennines the need for a new logical form which 
is appropriate for huinan persons—a grammar which provides the correct mles for talldng 
about persons. The second section presented Macmiurray’s epistemology where 
knowledge is the presupposition of reflection and where the epistemological process 
involves experience (knowledge-in-action), reflection, and verification in action. So that 
reflection is for the sake of action and not an end in itself. The third section was a careâil 
consideration of religion, art, and science as the tliree ways which persons reflect upon 
vaiious levels of reality. Tluough considering the modes of reflection the importance of
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the apperceptions was discovered. The apperceptions applied to various aspects of the 
Other then create a cogent series of relations between a vast number of key concepts 
within Macmurray’s thought. These relations were then represented graphically.
The intention of the chapter was two fold. It was designed as a means for quick 
immersion into the radically different viewpoint of Macmun'ay’s philosophy and it was 
intended to systematize and clarify the Form of the Personal. In the course of the chapter 
a number of obstacles which often contiibute to misreading of Macmurray have been 
cleared. The schematic presentation, in particular, provides a convenient model of the 
broad outlines, themes, and methods of the philosopliical dimension of Macmurray’s 
thought. The apperceptions will also diive the orderly examinations of the 
anthropological and theological dimensions in a manner true to the methodology of 
Macmurray.
Before tuiiiing the focus to these other dimensions several key points from the 
chapter are worth stressing. One is the absolute necessity of Personal logic for one’s 
understanding of Macmurray. If this is misimderstood then everything collapses for there 
is then no integration which maintains particularity. Without Personal logic the 
anthropological and theological dimensions will be misinterpreted.
Also crucial are the epistemological limitations of humanity. One is limited by 
one’s particulai' experience and one’s ability to verify theoretical constructs of the 
imagination. Therefore one’s comprehension is limited to the field of personal 
experience. One is never able to completely verify all possible aspects of a theoiy so one 
must settle for probability and not certainty. Thus all reflection ultimately rests on belief.
Finally, MacmuiTay demonstrates that different aspects of reality are approached 
in different ways which are appropriate to their ontological level. Hiunan persons—as the 
most complete experiential reality available for human reflection—are the upper limit of
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human rationality. Keeping the logical, epistemological, and ontological aspects of 
MacmuiTay’s philosophy in mind one is now properly equipped to accuiately appraise the 
antliropological and theological dimensions of his thought.
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CHAPTERS
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSION:
THE CELEBRATION OF COMMUNION
The thesis we have to expound and to sustain is that the Self is constituted by its 
relation to the Other; that it has its being in relationship; and that this relationslnp 
is necessarily personal/
Macmurray's Form of the Personal is concerned, more than anything else, with a 
relational understanding of persons wliich does justice to the full experience of humanity. 
This chapter will expand upon the basic presentation of Macmurr ay's personalistic 
anthr opology presented in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 by first providing a brief glimpse into 
recent thought on persons in theological anthropology followed by a detailed examination 
of Macmurray's anthropology.
3.1 W ays OF T h in k in g  ABOUT Persons
In order to better understand Macmurray’s anthropology it is helpful to situate him 
relative to several taxonomies describing various approaches to theological anthropology. 
Doing so not only clarifies Macmurray's usage of key terms, but it also enables one to 
identify one’s own presuppositions regarding persons and thus encoruages one to resist 
imposing preconceived ideas and definitions onto Macmirrray's antluqpological 
dimension.
3.1.1 O n t i c  a n d  Q u a l i t a t i v e  D i s t i n c t io n s
In recent discussions of persons Bertocci and Harris, each in their own way, 
perceive a problem of category confusion in the usage and conflation of such terms as
person, personhood, personality, personal identity, self-image, and self-understanding.
Bertocci notes in particular' how Paul Johnson conflates person in its ontological sense
personhood) with person in the qualitative sense personality)? Harris notes a
similar collapse of meaning in the use of the term personal identity. In one sense personal
identity is used of numerical identity with ontological significance, wliile in another it has
a qualitative sense.^ Harris also notes a tendency in the writings of Charles Taylor,
Vincent Briimmer, and Elaine L. Graham to confuse personal identity (in its ontic sense)
with self-image or self understanding.^ She particular ly sees confusion in a nmnber of
examples where social scientific accounts have been influential, for example McFadyen’s
The Call to Personhood.
The underlying problem in all the relational accoimts considered here [McFadyen, 
Graham, and Briirnrner] is failrrre to attend to how notions of personal 
development wliich have been informed by social science should relate to notions 
of personhood what are intended to be normative or ontological.^
In these approaches a person is the amalgamation or sedimentation of their 
personal relations. If personal development is not clearly delineated fiorn personliood, 
hmnan beings may be seen as becoming persons rather than being persons. Once this 
conceptual move is made it is possible to deny others the status of person for any number 
of reasons. Harris responds to this improper imderstanding of person by offering 
Macmurray as a coimter-example.
* PR, 17.
 ^Peter A. Bertocci, “Dynamic Interpersonalism and Personalistic Philosophy,” in Dynamic 
Interpersonalism for Ministry: Essays in Honor ofPaul E. Johnson, ed. Orlo Strunk, Jr. ( Nashville; 
Abingdon, 1973), 32-33; 36-37.
 ^Harriet A. Harris, “Should We Say that Personhood is Relational?” Scottish Journal o f Theology, 51 
(1998): 217. She sees personal identity as one and the same, while qualitative indicates two or more entities 
which are exactly similar. She prefers to use personal identity, or person, as tlie ontological meaning and 
refers to tlie qualitative sense as personality.
Harris, 219-20. She also adds diat Briimmer suffers from the earlier problem of mistaking the ontic and 
tlie qualitative (220). To be fair to McFadyen, he does stipulate an ontological status to persons, yet this 
ontological aspect often seems submerged in die developmental sense. One is also able to see a certain 
terminological conhision in McFadyen’s uses of person, self, soul, and spirit. In most cases self and person 
are synonymous, however at one point he equates soul and self (in opposition to body) which then must be 
mtegrated in spirit and dius is person. McFadyen, 155, n. 2.
 ^Harris, 223.
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It is instiaictive to contrast the sedimentation metaphor with John Macmurray's 
analysis of the mother-child relationship as the basic form of human existence.
The tlnust ofMacmunay's account is not that a being becomes a person tlirough 
relations, but that humans are persons because relationality is central to human 
life. It is not that relations precede persons so much as that personal existence is 
created as relational, or ‘personal relation ... is constitutive of personal existence’
(p. 12).*
Harris is certainly correct in her reading of Macmurray; a hmnan being does not
become a person, a hmnan being is a person. Consider tlie two quotations below, the first
is from Paul Johnson^ and the second is from Jolm Macmurray.^ An initial appraisal will
confirm the similarities in the two positions. However, a careful reading will confirm the
very distinction of which Harris writes.
My own position is dynamic interpersonalism, holding that no person is truly a 
person in himself alone, but only as he enters into mutual relationship with other 
persons.... But the miiqiie person, as I see him attains significance and reality 
through his participation with other persons in the interactive relationships of our 
world.
—Paul Johnson
All this may be surmned up by saying that the unit of personal existence is not the 
individual, but two persons in personal relation; and that we are persons not by 
individual right, but in our relation to one another. The personal is constituted by 
personal relatedness.
—Jolm Macmurray
For Macmun ay it is not the relationships which are the person but rather it is the
state of being related—relationality or mutuality—which is the ontological essence of the
personal. Macmurmy is unequivocal about this point. Immediately preceding the
quotation above he states:
In the human infant... the impulse to communication is his sole adaptation to the 
world into which he is bom .... For this reason the infant is bora a person and not 
an animal.^
® Harris, 225-26, citing PR, 12.
 ^Bertocci, 34, citing Paul Jolmson, “The Trend Toward Dynamic Interpersonalism,” Religion in Life 35 
(1966): 753. Emphasis in Bertocci. Bertocci uses this quotation as an example of die confusion between 
qualitative and ontological understanding of person.
®PR, 61."PR, 60.
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MacmuiTay is aware that the quality of personal relationships do matter to the 
person. However, he separates this qualitative aspect into the non-ontological category of 
personal development, securing the ontological stability of the person in the face of all 
who would degrade anotlier as sub-personal.^^ In his Gifford lectures, Macmunay uses 
person and personhood in the ontological sense, personal identity (and occasionally 
individuality) to designate the uniqueness of the particular person and generally avoids 
the subject of self-understanding, unless one considers this as an aspect of self- 
knowledge. By tlie time of the Giffords, he eschews the term personality because of 
connotations involving it with incoixect notions of self,^  ^yet in earlier writings it is 
present.^^
Bertocci and Hanis provide a valuable service by calling attention to the 
confusion created by collapsing terms and allowing the clarification of Macmun'ay’s use 
ofperson ontologically. However the ontological, qualitative, and self-image meanings of 
person do not exhaust the possible definitions of person.
3.1.2 T h ic k  and  T h in  D e sc r ip t io n s
Adrian Thatcher provides a list of six.common ways in which the term person is 
used in contemporai'y theological discussion: (1) the mystery of God as person; (2) 
ontologically as a person’s identity; (3) psychologically as a person’s character; (4) 
morally as persons being ends in themselves; (5) existentially as what persons malce of 
themselves; and (6) socially as relational persons.
Bertocci and Hanis were mostly concerned with privileging the ontological usage 
over the qualitative due to the inherent dangers of losing the ontological status of persons.
‘®PR, 66-78.
" “His quality as a person is the quality of his personal relations.” PR, 95, 
*^PR,25.
For example, lU, 124; RE, 45.
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However, this does not mean one must settle for a thin description of person. In fact, as 
one considers Thatcher’s list one sees that Macmurmy addresses each of these meanings 
in various ways. Some meanings he places at the sub-personal level wliile others may be 
used as part of the thick description of person.
Macmun ay recognizes the importance of character^ ^  and the intiinsic value of 
persons. Yet both of these ai e not operating at the personal level for values and habits 
both belong to the organic level. Personal development, roughly akin to the existential 
category, is important to liis understanding of persons but is obviously subsidiary to other 
aspects of his model. One immediately discerns Macmurray’s social constmct of person, 
but it is not merely social in the way Thatcher portrays it, for it is a relational ontology.^^ 
The category of mystery is one most would not include in Macmurray’s thought, yet the 
concept is present even if the word is not. One could argue that the indeterminate natur e 
of persons is a measure of mystery in Macmurray’s conceptualization.^^ Instead, 
Macmurray combines the ontological, relational, and mysterious conceptions of persons 
in a thick understanding of persons. With help from Bertocci, Hanis, and now Thatcher, 
one is able to see that for Macmurray person is relational, ontological, and indeteiminate.
Adrian Hiatcher, “Cluistian Theism and the Concept of a Person,” in Persons and Personality: A 
Contemporary Inquiry, ed. Arfliur Peacocke and G. Gillette (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 180.
Character, as noted above, is a form of habituation.
MacmuiTay follows Kant in saying that persons are ends hi themselves.
This aspect is missed by Thatcher, who describes Macmurray as an example of the social understandmg 
of persons and conhasts it with the otlier five types, including ontological, as individualistic.
Macmimay does not typically use the word mystery, possibly due to its potential for being confused with 
mysticism, which he was fiercely opposed to. OÜier aspects of Macmurray’s concept of person which may 
be seen as mysterious are that persons are always much more than the sum of tiieir parts, one cannot fully 
understand another without revelation on the part of tlie Otlier, and that the person is not even entirely 
known to themselves.
This is contr a Haddox, who sees Üie constituting aspect of Personal logic as incompatible with 
Marcel’s existential attainment model of persons—where personliood is achieved not structured. Haddox, 
131-34. In part this is because Haddox is accepting Fox’s overly structural imderstanding of Personal logic. 
There are a number of similarities between Marcel and Macmurray. See Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel 
(London: Carey Kingsgate Press, 1966) where various aspects of Marcel’s Üiought are laid out: persons as 
mystery (not problems), distrust of abstraction, and the use of tlie I-Thoii are detailed.
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3.1.3 L a u r it z e n ’s Q u a d r a n t s
Lauritzen provides another useful paradigm of approaches to anthropology/® 
Lauritzen evaluates the imderstanding of the self by Richard Rorty, Ernest Wallwork, 
Charles Taylor, and Paul Ricoein according to two different axes. The first axis is a 
continuum between conceptions of the self which are centered or de-centered. The 
centered, or imified, self is one which is sovereign for “it defines itself through the ends it 
spontaneously chooses.” ®^ The de-centered, fragmented self is one without a center.^  ^He 
places Rorty and Freud (as read by Rorty) on the de-centered side wliile Wallwork, 
Taylor, and Ricoeur are all seen as imderstanding the self as a unity. The second axis 
opposes views of the self as engaged and as disengaged.^^ The disengaged self is the 
egocentiic self turned in on itself, while the engaged self is turned outwards to the world 
by its commitments to and identifications with others. Wallwork and Rorty would both 
fall within the disengaged category. Lauritzen sees the engaged self, as advocated by 
Taylor, as synonymous with the more developed concept of narrative identity foimd in 
Ricoeur’s work and thus Taylor and Ricoeur both are classified under engaged concepts 
of the self (see Figure 3.1). Lauritzen then extends the conversation further by noting that 
implicit within the idea of narrative is the concept of relationality.^^ However tliis creates 
a problem. Recent French psychoanalysts of the interdividual school demonsti ate the 
narrative self leading towaids a de-centered conception of the self. Radical social 
constitution of the self leads to the possibility of violence between the self and o t h e r T o  
Laiuritzen this suggests a “signal for futui'e research for even a brief juxtaposition of
Paul Lauritzen, “The Self and Its Discontents: Recent Work on Morality and the Self,” Journal of 
Religious Ethics 22 (Spring 1994): 189-210.
Lauritzen, 190.
Lauritzen, 191-93.
^ Lauritzen, 193-98.
Lauritzen, 206-08.
^ “Original identification witli tlie other, if  it is constitutive of die ego ..., is likewise radical violence witii 
respect to the other—a devourhig moutii clamped down on the alterity of others....” Laiuitzen citing Borch- 
Jacobsen, 208. Ellipses in die original.
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‘interdividuar psychology with naiTative views of the self suggests the connection among 
relationality, fragmentation, and individual moral responsibility.”^^
Girard
De-centered < -
Rorty
Engaged
A
Taylor
Ricoeur
Centered
Wallwork
V
Disengaged
Figure 3.1. Lauritzen’s Taxonomy of the Self
Attempting to place Macmurray’s anthropology within Lauritzen’s four quadrants 
is most instructive for it clearly demonsti’atesJiow~-radically different Macmurray’s 
anthropology is compared to the conceptions of the self which ar e still fundamentally 
shaped by the cogito. In attempting to place MacmurTay relative to the first axis, one 
iimnediately encounters difficulty. He clearly does not advocate a sovereign or centered 
self in the sense Lauritzen uses the term. MacmuiTay’s self focuses on the Other and is 
relational. Yet this does not mean the self is de-centered, fr agmented, or schismatic. 
Macmurray defines the person as heterocentric—centered in the Other—so a person is 
centered but not on the self The second axis provides similar difficulties. There is no 
question that Macmurray’s person is relational (the Self~as-agent is inherently relational).
Lauritzen, 208.
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yet in the Form of the Personal the relationally engaged Self-as-agent is constituted by the 
disengaged Self-as-subject. One might see Macmurray occupying all four quadrants of 
Lauritzen’s model. But in another sense, his anthropology transcends the categorizations 
since it does not begin with the Cartesian self as the subject.
Wliile not exhaustive, this brief interaction with contemporary anthmpology has 
enable clarifications regarding Macmurray’s antlnopology and given a rough placement 
of liis thought within (and without) the cuirent anthropological climate.
3.1.4 A p p e r c e p t io n s  a n d  P e r so n s
Methodologically the remainder of this chapter will follow Macmurray’s method 
of applying the apperceptive triad to the consideration of persons-in-relation. This entails 
a pragmatic analysis of persons as equal, a contemplative examination of persons as free, 
and a communal reflection on persons as mutual. Pragmatically to analyze a person in 
relation one must attempt to generalize the person in relation as the It. Furthermore, 
because one is reflecting ontologically, this generalization must follow the analytic 
logical form of the substantial unity-pattem. In so doing one arrives at the understanding 
of persons as equal. Contemplative conceptualization of the person in relation requires a 
particular ization of the person as a whole within liis or her immediate environment, the I- 
It. Just as the pragmatic needed to follow the analytic form, here the dialectic of the 
organic unity-pattem is required. The results of considering the fully relational person in 
this manner is to understand persons as^ree. A coimnunal stance towards persons is one 
where persons in relation are not merely in contact with the Other, but by virtue of the 
logical form of the personal unity-pattern, ai e actually mutually constituting. Thus 
mutuality is the fullest conceptualization of a relational person, the I~You?^
^ It should be noted that once again one term is being used in place of a number of related terms used by 
Macmurray. Mutuality will be used to designate Ûie general concept included in such terms as relationality, 
fellowship, friendship, as well as mutuality (all used by Macmurray interchangeably). Mutuality was
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This apperceptive appraisal of persons in relation in teims of equality, freedom, 
and mutuality confirms the earlier conclusion based upon Thatcher’s article. Macmmi'ay 
imderstands persons as relational (mutual), indeteiminate (free), and ontological (equal).^^ 
Equality, freedom, and mutuality stand in reciprocal relation to each other. Mutuality is 
the positive with freedom and equality as its negatives. Freedom is impossible without 
equality, and mutuality is inconceivable without both equality and freedom; yet both 
exist, according to the rules of Personal logic, for the sake of mutuality.
Such a positive unity of persons is the self-realization of the personal. For, 
firstly, they are then related as equals. This does not mean that they have, as 
matter of fact, equal abilities, equal rights, equal functions of any other kind of de 
facto equality. The equality is intentional: it is an aspect of the mutuality of the 
relation. If it were not an equal relation, the motivation would be negative; a 
relation in which one was using the other as a means to liis own end. Secondly, 
they both realize their freedom as agents, since in the absence of the fear for the 
self there is no constraint on either, and each can be liimself fully; neither is under 
obligation to act a pait. Thus equality and freedom are constitutive of community; 
and the democratic slogan, ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity’, is an adequate definition 
of community—of the self-realization of person in relation.^^
3.2 E q uality
Any form of relation between persons which denies personal equality or which 
obstmcts fellowship is irreligious and iiTational. Indeed, in this field the two terms 
mean precisely the same thing. The irrationality is precisely what it is in any field, 
a failure to behave in terms of the real situation, in terms of the natiue of the 
object.^®
It is no more rational for persons to believe tliey are toasters than it is for persons 
to believe they are not ontologically equal. Neither corresponds to reality and therefore 
both must be consigned to the category of the unreal. Persons, understood as such, are 
equal for all humans are born in a condition of relationality, or as Macmunay states in
specifically chosen because it has a more dynamic and interactive comiotation than relationality, has fewer 
associations than fellowship (wliich in some chcles is synonymous with a particular local institutional 
church body), and fits better witii equality and freedom than friendship. Friendship, however, has an 
iiTepressible personal quality and will occasionally be used in the course of the exposition.
One equates ontological widi equal because tliis is die primary way in which Thatcher understood 
ontological, as employing a substantial ontology.
PR, 158. See also CF, 72-74.
RE, 205.
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one place ‘*The ground o f fellowship is common h u m a n i t y This equality is necessary 
for if  all persons are not created equal, then the possibility of freedom and true friendship 
is sheer fantasy. If persons are not equally personal then one is no more able to befriend 
another person than to befriend a toaster.
3.2.1 E q u a l it y  in  D if f e r e n c e
This equality does not mean all persons are identical—Macmurray does not deny
the very real differences which exist among paificular persons.^^ Quite to the contiary, he
believes one must pay attention in the differences of biology, culture, capability, and
experience. Not only does this make the friendship more interesting, but it reinforces the
fact that one is mutually related to another particular person—one is never a friend with
persons in general. These very real differences, however, all exist at subsidiary
ontological levels, not at the level wliich matters most, the personal level.
In tliis sense all persons are equal; and this is the first law of the personal life. It 
does not mean that there aie not immense differences between one person and 
another; it means that these differences have no bearing upon the possibility of 
personal relationships and have notliing do to [sic] with the structure of the 
constitution of the personal life. On the other hand, it does not mean that these 
differences can be ignored or should be overlooked in the personal life. The 
differences remain, and become the basis of the infinite variety of experience 
wliich can be shared in the life of personal relationship.^^
Because all persons—as persons— are equal, friendship is possible between any two 
persons if they so intend.^^ An excellent example of this equality-in-difference is
CF, 84. Emphasis in the origmal.
“As created in Hie Image of God all men are equal; created as individuals, they are unequal.” Emil 
Bnumer, Dogmatics. Vol. 2, The Christian Doctrine o f Creation and Redemption, trans, Olive Wyon 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), 66.
RE, 104. Even the quahtative development of persons does not alter the ontological equality of the person 
as person.
The full realization of equality, freedom, and mutuality is never attained, but tlie intention towards it is 
crucial as an intention towards reality and overcoming mueality in the personal life. CF, 74. The possibility 
of friendship across great differences does not mean it will be easy: “The greater die fundamental 
differences between two persons are tlie more difficult it is to establish a frilly personal relation between 
diem, but also the more worth while the relation will be if it can be established and maintained.” RE, 105.
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Macmurray’s treatment of gender. Macmurray notes the tendency to either
overemphasize equality or difference to such an extent that one becomes unreal.
We seem imable to regard sex as par t and parcel of Üie normal personal life. We 
are so afraid of it that we try to keep it apart. We do not wish to recognize it. So, 
when a man and a woman meet, they either behave to one another as if  the 
difference of sex was non-existent, or else they are so aware of the difference that 
other considerations ar e crowded out. The only solution is one which breaks down 
this choice between two exclusive attitudes and enables us at once to accept and 
rejoice in the difference, while recognizing it as only one element in the 
relationship of two free and equal persons.^"^
Failing to recognize the equality-in-difference, one inevitably acts unethically 
towards the Other—either idealizing tiiem into something which can only be 
contemplated or functionalizing them into something to be used.^  ^There is a close 
connection in Macmun'ay’s thought between equality and justice. This connection may be 
fur-ther rmderstood by investigating the distinction in the Form of the Personal between 
direct and indirect relationships, as well as, personal and impersonal relationships.^*^
RE, 113-14. Susan Faisons notes several areas of convergence between Macmurray’s pliilosophy and 
feminist tlieology, particularly the emphasis upon mutuality and interdependence (2), the desire for a more 
inclusive concept of the person from an experiential standpoint (3-4), and tlie union of action and passion 
(7). She questions, however, tlie role^of the mother in the explication of the motlier-child relationship, 
seeing the motlier as depersonalized (8-13), She also accepts at face value tlie criticisms of Tretliowan and 
Newbigm regarding Macmurray’s definition of religioh as too antliropocentric (14-15; see below §3.4.3). 
She also has concerns about possible signs of lingering enlightenment thinking hi Macmurray. She sees a 
dualism exhibited in Macmurray’s distinction between the organic and tlie personal realms as well as a 
feeling of the self in isolation in his discussion of touch. In the first case, one must state that Parsons is 
simply wiong. The personal includes the organic, and the pohit that Macmurray makes Üiat humans are 
bom in tlie personal field and not in the organic is not to deny the organic it is to see it as subordinate to the 
personal. In the second case she is not taking mto account the punctiliar nature of the self used hi SA which 
Macmurray then augments witli tlie relational hi PR. She finally is disturbed by the tecluiical and 
manipulative understanding of agency. There is some credence here, as long as one remembers tlie 
instrumental exists witlihi tlie fully communal. Susan Parsons, “The Relevance of John Macmurray for a 
Feminist Theology of Action,” in The Life and Work o f John Macntuiray Conference Proceedings, 
(University of Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied).
^^PR, 158.
Here, again, Macmurray’s choice of termhiology comes under fire. Several commentators prefer 
functional to impersonal (e.g., Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 357), a term Macmurray uses from thne to 
time (e.g., RAS, 54). Yet even this modification is only a partial solution, for one is describing types of 
relations between persons as either personal or functional, resulting hi tlie awkward formulation of 
personal-personal relations and functional-personal relations. To substitute relational does not provide 
much benefit for one is then facing relational-personal relations and functional personal relations. In 
addition, to change from impersonal to ftinctional takes some of tlie sting out of tiie designation dhect 
impersonal-personal relation. Jeffko suggests three categories (1) primary personal, (2) secondary personal, 
(3) absolute impersonal. Jeffko, 110-14. However tliis nomenclature obscures tlie fact Üiat all relations 
between persons are personal (even impersonal ones). Since there is no clear-cut advantage to any changes
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3.2 ,2 T y p e s  o f  R e la t io n s h ip s
A direct relationsMp is one in which two or more persons are in direct 
communication. An indirect relationship is one without direct contact between persons. A 
personal relationship exists when the functional aspects of the relation are subordinated to 
the mutual aspects. An impersonal relationship is one in wliich the fiinction of the person 
is the dominant feature of the relationship. All indirect relationships are by definition 
impersonal since tliere is no direct personal encounter, and hence, no way for the personal 
to dominate the functional or impersonal. Direct relations may be either personal or 
impersonal depending on which aspect is dominant. It is crucial to note, following the 
normal form of Personal logic, the existence of an impersonal (or functional) dimension 
to all personal relations, and it is only tlie order of subordination which determines 
whether the entire relationship is designated as personal or impersonal. Likewise, 
between two persons there is always a personal dimension. The classification of a 
relationship as personal or impersonal alone is not morally significant; it depends on the 
context of the relationship. It becomes morally significant only when an impersonal direct 
relationship exists. Any relationsliip becomes immoral, however, when the minimal 
demands of justice are umnet. Since all persons are equal, all persons—directly or 
indirectly—must be tr eated justly.^^
By way of clarification, it is helpful to consider tlii'ee misunderstandings of 
Macmunay on this subject. These enors involve the question of exclusivity, unifoimity, 
and differentiation.
suggested, and since the majority of die literature uses Macmurray’s categories of personal and impersonal 
these have been retahied.
PR, 190. McFadyen states that spirit (personhood) disallows dealing witii others solely on the basis of 
law, but the minimal requirement is justice. McFadyen, 255. Ricoeur similarly ties equality and justice to 
the institutions necessary for interaction between persons that are not face-to-face. Ricoeur, Oneself as 
Another, 194-97.
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Emmet raises the issue of the natm*e and priority of friendship and its relation to
roles, functions, and purpose/^ In direct reference to one of Macmurray’s examples
involving an hysterical student and a professor of psychology who must switch from a
personal (friendly) attitude to an impersonal (functional) attitude in order to assist the .
student,^® she states:
But surely the relation of teacher to pupil is also a role relation, with some 
restraints as well as spontaneity appropriate to it. Personal and role relations are 
interwoven, and not always cleaiiy separated. We cannot banish the persona from 
the person, even in some of our closest relations, any more than the person from 
the persona. So it is surely important to see how each can survive the other."^ *^
Fergusson concurs with Emmet, stating “A personal relationship is established not 
despite socially determined roles but in terms q/'them.”'^  ^Fergusson also enlists Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s discussion of the social construction of roles to conclude “Friendship 
requires as a necessary condition some shared purpose which structures the 
relationship.”"^  ^Roy builds upon Emmet’s critique of Macmunay with Toulmin’s 
rejection of the dualism of person-talMhing-talk to suggest a spectrum of personal 
relations."^^
In all the criticisms above there exists a common tlrread. Each believes 
Macmurray posits friendship to the exclusion of roles. Tliis is not the case. Instead, using 
Personal logic, he sees friendship (the personal positive) as being constituted by roles and 
functions (the impersonal negative). According to Macmurray it is impossible to 
completely separate the personal fr om the impersonal. It is primarily a question of
For a role is nothing more than a collection and arrangement of certain functions for certain purposes. 
^"PR, 29-37.
Dorothy Emmet, 171. Roy cites Emmet, Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 350, as does Fergusson, John 
Macmurray, 23. Aves cites Emmet provides an almost identical quotation from Emmet from a different 
somce, “Persons and Community: John Macmimay and Reinliold Niebuhr”, a paper given to the HEF 
Conference, Oxford in March 1984. Aves, 131-32.
Fergusson, John Macmurray, 22-23. Roy, dependent upon Emmet, focuses on tliis as the problem of the 
“movement between tlie particular and tlie general.” Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 354.
Fergusson, John Macmurray, 22, citing Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Duckworth: London, 1981), 
220ff.
Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 350.
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subordination which distinguishes a personal relationship from an impersonal
relationship. Even in the case of the impersonal relationship of a slave owner and a slave,
there is no way to remove the personal element."^ "^  Slavery is wrong because it has
subordinated the personal to the frinctional—creating a human tool. According to
Macmun ay the impersonal attitude is only justified when it is adopted for the salce of the
personal. A  truly personal relationship needs no justification, but an impersonal one
always does/^ In the case of indirect relations, which are always impersonal, one must
justify the impersonal attitude with regard to the larger personal context. Therefore one
sees that Macmunay is not attempting to delineate a harsh separation between the two,
but rather their proper integration.
A second misconception may be analyzed under the mbric of uniformity. One
observes this in Aves’ criticism of Macmurray.
It is quite clear that Macmunay has no explanation, for example, of relationsliips 
with tlie friendly milkman or postman. More seriously, it is difficult to see that he 
has much to contribute directly to the moral problems posed by economics and 
international affairs beyond suggesting they are to seiwe the personal."^ *’
It would appear tliat Aves views Macmunay as advocating a uniform connotation 
of personal and that this comiotation is one of extreme intimacy. Contrary to liis claim 
that Macmunay has no explanation for the “fiiendly millanan or postman,” it is clear 
Macmunay does have an explanation. These are direct personal relations. A proper stance 
exists toward the delivery person in Macmunay’s Foim of the Personal. The choice is 
whether to interact with the delivery person as a person who also happens to deliver 
something (the personal) or as a delivery mechanism that happens to be a person (the
PR, 34-35.
PR, 35. McFadyen has a similar conception of personal and impersonal and refers to situations where the 
impersonal needs to dominate, temporarily for the sake of the personal, as asymmetry. McFadyen, 147. Yet 
he is reluctant to privilege direct personal relations over institutional arrangements, even though his 
argument would seem to move him logically in that direction. McFadyen, 257-58.
Aves, 132.
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impersonal). The first is appropriate, the second is not/^ Aves seems to be assuming a 
necessarily deep level of intimacy for personal relations. Similarly, in the paradigmatic 
examples of indirect relations found in economics and international relations, Macmunay 
advocates justice as the minimal acceptable standard of behavior. True, justice is not the 
priority in direct relations, but it is the minimal core of all dealings between persons, 
which in direct relations is more fully realized in mutuality. Justice is a very powerful 
concept for change. Macmunay, nonetheless, would argue that it is not the most powerful 
concept and that the expansion of community is the primary hope. In addition, actions 
should be guided by the hope of maximizing equality, freedom, and mutuality even in the 
indirect relations—for there is an element of the personal in all relations. Tliis means that 
efficiency is no longer the ultimate criterion for judgments about right and wrong action 
in the economic or international spheres,"^^
From this one is able to see that Macmurray’s categories should not be inteipreted 
as inflexible and invariant. There are acceptable and imacceptable ways in which to 
interact (directly and indirectly) with all persons and varying degrees of intensity within 
these acceptable interactions. "
The third mistake in interpreting Macmurray’s categories of personal and 
impersonal is one regarding differentiation. In this error, one believes Macmun'ay’s 
position excludes difference in commimity. Roy is representative of this interpretation 
when he accuses Macmurray of not being able to incorporate the necessary role of 
leadership. In certain respects this enor may be seen as incoiporating the errors of 
exclusivity and unifoimity while going beyond both of them. Because of the importance 
of tliis charge, it is necessary to cite Roy at length.
See also Macmurray illustr ation of a friendly stranger stopping to help as an example of personal 
relations. CF, 71.
See CF, 40-45 for an extended discussion of the international situation.
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Macmurray’s analysis lacks realism in not discussing the phenomena of 
leadership, authority and subtle manipulation that are discernible in such apparent 
nonfunctional activities as conversations and games. Moreover, he states that, in 
the domain of work, personal equality is stifled by any hierarchy of functions:
The alternative is a relation between an inferior and a superior; and such a 
relation excludes friendship. It is a relation of master and servant.
But if personal equality is incompatible with a fimctional relation during the time 
of work, how could they be compatible in leisure, given the fact that people 
cannot provisionally abandon the functional chaiacteristics which define them in 
society (e.g., being a doctor, a student or a pensioner)? Again, if equality is 
incompatible with a functional relationship, is it reduced merely to alternate with 
this functional relationship, as in the case of people who frilfil different jobs in the 
same office but express their fiiendsliip only when work is over? In the fact of 
these questions, the distinction between the spheres of activity and emphases is 
relevant."*®
First, this must clearly be seen as Roy reading Macmurray dualistically. As seen
above, Macmiuxay does not isolate the two spheres. Second, one must challenge Roy’s
chai*acterization of the context of his citation of Macmurray. Adding a few preceding
lines to the citation Roy offers provides the proper context:
Personal equality does not ignore the natur al differences between individuals, nor 
their functional differences of capacity. It overrides them. It means that any two 
human beings, whatever their individual differences, can recognize and treat one 
another as equal, and so be friends. The alternative is a relation between an 
inferior and a superior;.and such a relation excludes friendship. It is a relation of 
master and servant.^®
There is no hint in the quote above or elsewhere in the paragraph that the context of this 
statement is anything but friendship. In the context of friendship, and with the definitive 
acknowledgement of personal differences and functions, this citation is stating the exact 
opposite of what Roy claims—it is showing the integration of the functional into the 
personal. Third, the example of the non-functional activities misses the point that 
MacmiuTay would characterize these manipulations either as non-personal interactions 
(these are not two friends, but rather game-players), or, if  functioning at the personal
Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 356. This ar gument is tlie same as is found in liis tliesis. Form of the 
Personal, 113.
CF, 73.
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level they would be revealed as mireal acts, because they violate the heterocentric nature 
of personal relations. By manipulating the other person, one is placing oneself ahead of 
the Other and thus acting egocentrically.
Therefore, in Macmiuray’s use of personal, impersonal, direct, and indirect 
relations one must not interpret him as advocating separation, uniformity, or anything less 
than equality-in-difference for the person as person. Persons are equal. Yet, as Moltmann 
has noted, to conceive of equality in a non-relational context, one is forced to see the 
Other only as a limit upon one’s own freedom, rather than as that which allows the 
expression of fr eedom.^*
3.3 Fr eedo m
The personal life is the field of freedom.... It means that without freedom there is
and can be no personal life at all.^^
One must not forget that the Form of the Personal was conceived and articulated 
in a world where three global conflicts, largely rmderstood in terms of freedom and 
oppression, were waged. Macmurray is uncomfortable with all of the ideologies involved 
in these conflicts since he perceives that they all stem from sub-personal imderstandings 
of personal relations. He views the first World War as essentially a war- over national 
economic freedom.^^ Fascism exhibits a nationalistic and ethnic mysticism where 
freedom is only gained at the expense of the Other.^ "* Communism and liberal democracy 
both share the evolutionary analogy of progress. They differ primarily hi communism’s 
collective notion of freedom (at the expense of the individual) and liberal democracy’s 
exaltation of individual freedom to the exclusion of the gioup.^^ Freedom is not possible
Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 155. 
"RE, 105.
" CF, 40.
CF, 57-62; CH, 217-29.
PR, 141-45, 152.
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in these anthropologies because they are based in analogies taken from sub-personal 
levels of reality. Freedom fmictions on the personal level.^^
3.3.1 F r e e d o m : A c t io n , P o w e r , and  D e s ir e  
The capacity to act is freedom.^^
If to act is to be free/^ and to act necessitates being in relation with Other, then 
one must ask what the nature of the relationship is between the person and the Other. 
Macmunay rejects all understandings of freedom as either individualistic independence 
or passive dependence.^® Instead, Macmurray advocates a personal interdependence^® 
which views other persons and the world as a whole are natur al and necessary allies in the 
expression of the self in action.^*
Freedom may be understood in a number of ways.®  ^One may consider freedom as 
the absence of consequences. This, for Macmurray, is tantamount to denying a person 
their adulthood; only childr en ar e excused from the consequences of then action. Denial 
of consequences is a denial of action itself. Freedom is irot the rejection of responsibility,
As an example of going beyond mere equality, consider Macmurray’s opinion that communism seeks 
freedom through justice alone and tlierefore subordinates freedom of fellowship to. economics. CF, 68.
The fact that Macmunay rejects liberal democracy and communism because they have organic 
concepts of freedom would seem to indicate that for Macmurray tliis entire structure of equality, freedom, 
and mutuality is functioning at the personal level. In other words freedom is of the organic logical fonn 
(dialectic) but exists at the personal ontological level. Fmlher adding to this conclusion is tlie fact that only 
humans are free because freedom is the capacity to act—action being die sole propriety of persons.
"  PR, 98.
"PR,98;CF, 16.
CF, 24-30; RE, 135; PR, 118-19, 190.
®"PR, 118-19; CF, 27.
“That my end should be good and my chosen means effective are then conditions of my freedom in 
action. But tliey are not sufficient conditions. For I am not alone in tlie world; tliere are other agents, and if 
they will not allow me to do what I desire to do I cannot do it. Moreover, there are few tilings which I can 
desire to do, and none that are of personal significance, which do not depend upon tlie active co-operation 
of other. We need one anotlier to be ourselves.” PR, 211. This last sentence is echoed by Ricoem ’s 
statement: “/« this way lack dwells at the heart o f the most solidfiiendsliip P Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 
187. Emphasis in the original.
" Wright faults Macmurray for using the term freedom in tlie singular preferring a plurality of freedoms. 
However, for Macmurray this primary meaning is the one which all otlier definitions must be tested against. 
David Wright, review of Conditions o f Freedom, by Jolm Macmurray, Philosophical Quarterly 1, no. 3 
(April 1953): 286.
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but its embrace/^ This is why freedom in the personal realm cannot be acliieved thi’ough 
obedience to external rule, even if done fr eely and willingly, because to do so is an 
attempt to deflect responsibility for action onto someone or something else—it is hiding 
behind the rules/"*
Shnilarly, freedom is not the absence of discipline. Since action is movement
integrated with knowledge, all truly free action is disciplined.^^ This is not the discipline
of an imposed or punitive*’^  authority but rather the guidance provided by experiential
interaction witli reality.^^ It is a refining of action to its appropriate sphere so that restraint
is no longer needed.^^
Discipline really involves not subordination but integration. It aims at co­
ordinating all die elements in personality and creating a haimoiiious’ unity in 
which they all co-operate fr eely and without hindrance.^®
Moreover, this integration goes beyond the confines of the individual. It is also applicable 
to the coordination of the Self with the Other.^® And since to be in relation with Other is
" “Freedom and responsibility are, then; aspects of one fact.” PR, 119. Bnumer stresses responsibility in his 
theological antlnropology: “The Christian faith is so utterly simple; it is nothing less than the renewed 
understanding of tiie meaning of responsibility.” Emil Brunner, Man In Revolt; a Christian Anthropology, 
trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1947), 52.
“That is why morality cannot consist in obedience. To obey is to try to tlirow the responsibility for our 
action on someone else; and tiiat is to deny om* own humanity.” FMW, 185. Obvious examples of this 
include tire soldier who claims to just be following orders, or the person who refuses to participate in certain 
activities (smokiug, drinking, etc.), not because it is wrong, but because it is against the rules.
“The free tliought that has unravelled the mysteries of the natural world is not and cannot be 
undisciplined drought, which is never free. Scientific thought is thought set free to discover what is true aird 
to believe the truth tlrat it discovers, however much it may upset existing opinions. It is disciplined by the 
world widr which it deals, by testing its conclusions against fact. The freedom of our emotional life is to be 
achieved oirly on the same conditions; that we set out to discover, through feeling, the real values of our 
world and of our life in tire world. We shall have to submit to the discipline of our feelirrgs, irot by autlrority 
nor by tradition, but by life itself. It will not guarantee us secmity or pleasiue or happiness or comfort: but it 
will give us what is more worth havhrg, a slow gradual realization of tire goodness of tire world and of 
livhrg in it.” FMW, 49.
It should never be confused with punishment. RE, 80.
"  RE, 68.
RE, 72.
RE, 83.
“But we must remember that human activity is essentially a co-operation between individuals and that the 
discipline which will produce a Irimran result must succeed not merely in integrating the various capacities 
of the individual but in integrating individuals themselves in a conrmunity of free co-operation. There are 
not two separate fomrs of discipline.” RE, 84.
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the definition of person, this is simply the desire to be true to our nature as persons/* 
Discipline, therefore, is not the opposite of fr eedom, but rather its skillful actualization.
Just as discipline is the proper incorporation of laiowledge in fr eedom, the 
emotional aspect of action means that freedom is not an escape from the passions. Rather, 
the role of the emotions in perceiving value clearly negates the idea that freedom is 
capriciousness. An arbitrary or random understanding of fr eedom, where all choices are 
essentially equivalent, where all options are equally valid and good, ultimately functions 
to paralyze one’s ability to act. One must believe that some cour ses of action are better 
than others for a properly comprehensive imderstanding of freedom to be developed. 
Freedom is gr eater than mere taste, preference, or impulse.^^
In stating, “The fr ee man is the man whose means are adequate to liis ends,” "^* 
Macmurray is focusing upon two variables in his understanding of freedom. First is the 
technical dimension which is concerned with power and answers the question of 
capability. Second is the moral dimension which focuses upon the desires and asks if it is 
appropriate or fitting.^^ It is important to keep in mind that the use of the word moral in 
this context does not include the comiotations of good and evil, for human persons are 
free to act in ways that are both good and evil and this is not determined by the moral
“The longing for discipline of this kind is simply Hie longing to frilfil one’s own nature. Hie longing for 
sldll and for joy in living.” RE, 85. McGill, using Adler’s classifications of freedom, places Macmurray 
within tlie 1, circumstantial self-realization understanding of freedom, as opposed to 2. self-perfection, 3. 
self-determination, 4. political liberty (sub-category of self-realization), or 5. collective freedom (sub­
category of self-perfection). V. J. McGill, “Conflicting Theories of Freedom,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 20, no. 4 (June 1960): 440.
"  FMW, 23-24. This arbitrary model would ultimately require some external decision mechanism in order 
for any activity to occur, and in addition would require all action to be in response to external stimuli. This 
is not freedom.
“To be oneself freely and spontaneously, to realize oneself—that is to be a good man or woman. And if 
any young listeners think still that tliat is easy, that it is merely a matter of giving a fr ee rein to your 
instincts and hnpulses, I must have expressed myself very badly.” FMW, 205-06.
"'‘ OF, 21.
“We can gain freedom by increasing our power while our ends remain constant, or by limiting our ends to 
tlie means at our disposal. Let us call these two limitation of freedom die tecluiological and the moral 
relativities respectively.” CF, 21.
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relativity of freedom. Moral here is strictly relative to the relation between one’s desire 
and one’s capability: can I do what I want to do?
The technical relativity of freedom deals with the question of means; it is the 
realm of science and is primarily one of instrumentality. The teclmical aspect of freedom 
determmes the maximum degree of freedom possible. To increase power is to increase 
freedom. There is no question that the modem era has witnessed an increase in the power 
available to the modem person, allowing for increased freedom m the realm of travel, 
communication, and additional areas too numerous to name. Macmurray is no Luddite.
He gratefully acknowledges the advances made in the technical arena and the fact that 
this has increased human freedom. Yet, he also recognizes that science has no ability to 
adjudicate between competing uses of this increase in p o w er.In  other words, with so 
much power available how does one decide what to do and when?^^ Wlien one questions 
relative value in order to determine which acts are to be pursued, one must look to desire 
which is the moral relativity of fr eedom.
The crucial concept that one must giasp when considering the moral limitation of 
fr eedom is that tliere is no infringement upon freedom if one camiot do what one does not 
want to do.^  ^For example, the practice of restricting childi en to their room as punishment 
for misbehavior is very effective for children who desire to roam and socialize widely. 
But for children with no such desires, who naturally gravitate toward their rooms, it is no
"f CF, 33.
This is possibly one reason for the mcrease of stress in modem life. As the technical dimension has 
increased Üiere is a greater number of desires which are possible requning die need to judge between 
competing goods—all with the realization that a choice for one means die neglect of a myriad of other 
possible goods. Tlie moral dimension has not developed as quickly as die teclmical dimension.
“When we approach our question in diis attitude, we notice diat die relativity of om* freedom depends, 
clearly, upon our power to do what we desire to do, so that an increase in our power will mean an increase 
in our freedom. But our freedom also depends upon what we want to do. For it is no Ihnitation upon a 
man’s freedom that he has not the power to do somediing diat he has no desire to do. We can increase our 
freedom, therefore, by limiting our desires, widiout any change in die means of action at our disposal.” CF, 
21 .
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punishment whatsoever. Their freedom has not been impinged in the slightest because 
their desires have not been frustrated. To be able to do what one desires is fr eedom.
It may be helpful to tliink of freedom as a mapping function with the technical 
variable being found on the x-axis and the moral variable being on the y-axis. Thus for a 
certain capability x, there is a corresponding desire y determined by the function f(x)=y 
(Figure 3.2). The function is always of a positive slope (because an increase in power is 
always an increase in fr eedom) and freedom exists only along the line of the frmction. 
The function of freedom itself is determined by objective reality. It is reality which 
provides us with the Icnowledge of what is and is not possible.
Moral
Freedom 
f (x)=y
Technical
No desire (M=0),
No Capability (T=0) 
= Freedom
Figure 3.2. Technical and Moral Relativities of Freedom
An increase of technology is an upward movement along the line and therefore a 
straightfoiward increase of freedom (Figure 3.3). Counter-intuitively, a decrease along 
the moral axis results in an increase in fr eedom if cuiTent desire is beyond one’s ability. 
Desire lacking adequate technology is fantasy; it is imaginary (that is, above the line of 
reality) and as imaginary has a value less than zero. By decreasing desire one returns to 
reality and consequently one experiences an increase in freedom (Figine 3.4). One’s 
knowledge of the Other (the objective reality) enables one to coixectly discern the 
difference between fantasy and reality.
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Moral
A Fi ^  Freedom Ti>To therefore Fi>Fo
— '— '— >To Ti 
Technical
Figure 3,3. Increase in Technology is Increase of Freedom
Moral
Freedom
■ max
Technical
F| is imaginary (<0),
Fi>Fi (unless increase in Tmax) 
if M2 <Mi, then F2 <Fi, 
then decrease in Freedom
Figure 3.4. Decrease in Moral Dimension is Increase in Freedom
Since freedom is a function of power and desire, it is clear that the concept of 
freedom as the absence of boimdaries is nonsensical. Freedom has limits and these limits 
aie dictated by reality. As described in Chapter 2, reality is a complex and multifaceted 
term for Macmurray including both creation and ultimate Reality which is the personal 
God.^  ^Since fr eedom is bound by the limits of reality, it is only natural to question how 
reality interacts with fr eedom. In particulai", if one focuses upon what is real, does tliis not 
imply deteiininism, either of a scientific or religious natuie?
3.3 .2  R e a l it y  o f  F r e e d o m : D e t e r m in is m ,
F r e e w il l , a n d  t h e  P e r s o n a l  G o d
When we insist on the primacy of the practical, and adopt the standpoint of the 
Agent, rather than of the Subject, the antinomy between fr eedom and determinism 
vanishes.^®
CH, 133. 
SA, 134.
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Whetlier observed in the conflict between Calvinists and Aiminians, the battle 
among psychologists of the behavioral and psychoanalytical camps, or the questions 
raised by investigation of the human genome, the question of freedom’s possibility is still 
unsettled. For Macmurray it is not whether fr eewill or deteiininism exists in the personal 
life, but rather understanding which is the proper purview of freewill and determinism. 
Macmurray aclcnowledges the existence of each and sees no basic incompatibility 
between fr eedom and determinism. Rather, he sees freedom as pertaining to the reahn of 
the personal, while detenninism applies to the world of objects. MacmuiTay believes that 
there are two types or levels of (generalized reflective) knowledge about persons—that of 
persons as persons which is philosophical in form and that of persons as objects which is 
scientifrc.^^
Starting from the definition of the person as relational agent instead of isolated 
tliinker it becomes a logically formal necessity for fr eedom to exist within Macmurray’s 
system.M acmurray follows Kant in believing that freedom is a necessary belief®^  and 
frirther demonstrates that it is self-defeating to even assert the lack of freedom. '^  ^Yet
“These tentative observation are sufficient for our immediate purpose, which is to distinguish, and in 
distinguishing to relate, tlie two types of knowledge we possess, and may seek systematically to extend, of 
the world of persons. The one is our knowledge of persons as persons; the otlier our knowledge of persons 
as objects.... In tlie first case, when the attitude is personal, tliis reflective activity will be philosophical. In 
the other it will be scientific. The first will yield a philosophy of the personal; the second a science of man, 
or in the wide sense of Hie term, an anthropology. We can no see that the question whether tlie personal 
conception of men as free agents or the scientific conception of man as a detennined being is tlie correct 
one does not arise except tliough a misunderstanding. Both are correct; and tliis is possible because they do 
not refer to the same field.” PR, 37-38. Keeping in mind tliat philosophy is tlie negative of religion in the 
personal unity-pattem.
“This analysis has certain important implications. The first concerns tlie conception traditionally termed 
‘fiee-wiir, and its negation, ‘determinism’. To possess free-will is simply to be able to detemiine the 
indeterminate, tliat is, the friture. We can now see that tliis is implied in tiie very conception of action. The 
Agent is the detemihier. To deny free-will is to deny the possibility of action. We have aheady established, 
as a negative criterion of tmtli, tiiat any tiieory which denies tlie possibility of action is false. That I am free 
is an immediate implication of the T do’; and to deny freedom is to assert that no one ever does anytiiing, 
ftiat no one is capable even of tlihiking or of observing.” SA, 134.
SA, 57.
“Because the T do’ is our primary certainty, it is impossible to think tliat all our actions are merely events 
which happened, and wliich must be ascribed to causes, not to hitention. To tiiink this would be to think that 
the world is a complex process of events in time, which is infomied by no intention and is, therefore, 
completely meaningless. But this process includes ourselves and all our activities, and as parts of the 
process tiiey too must be taken strictly: it must mean tliat we never act; that we camiot form an intention and
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while the person as agent necessitates the existence of freedom, it equally requires the 
fact of a certain sort and level of determination.
If the self is an agent then the self functions as a deteiininer of the future. 
Therefore, once an action occurs in time it has been detemiined. The past is the field of 
the determined while the frituie is the field of freedom; it is only when determinism is 
moved from the past into the future, that it is false.®^  As discussed above, science is 
concerned with the generalization of the determined—with facts. Therefore, one is able to 
see that scientific determinism does not negate personal freedom, although it might 
inform it.^^
While scientific determinism may be understood as functioning at a sub-personal
level, one cannot assign God’s actions to a sub-personal level within the Form of the
Personal. The full discussion of Macmurray’s concept of God is the focus of Chapter 4,
however, it is important to consider certain aspects of it as it relates to human fr eedom. If
MacmuiTay sees God as the ultimate or absolute person, how then does human freedom
square with divine freedom, understood as ultimate or absolute fr eedom?
There can be nothing in the world which is capable of thwarting the purpose of the 
Creator. The will of God must prevail, Thie means that though man can set his 
will against God’s—since God has made him so—he cannot do it successfully. In
seek to realize it; tliat nothing that we do or say or Üiink is, or can be, meaningful. All our freedom, 
theoretical as well as practical, must be an illusion. In tliat case, we cannot know tliat tlie world is a process 
of events, for nothing that we say can be meaningfiil. And this is self-contradictory; for if  it were true we 
could not know that it was true; indeed, we should be creatures who could not even provide an asylum for 
illusions.” PR, 222. “When we return to action we turn to tlie future, away from what exists, from what is 
determined, from what is unalterable. The future is tlie field of freedom, and when we act, we determine the 
future. For to act is to determine, and the agent is the determiner. To assert determination and deny freedom 
is to assert tliat we never act; that no man ever, in very truth, does anytiiing; and tlie assertion tliat om 
actions are determined is itself an exercise of freedom which denies itself.” CF, 17.
SA, 134; PR, 166.
SA, 135; CF, 17.
This is contia Brunner’s more extreme existential position. “Indeed, we may say that to-day the denial of 
human freedom by a naturalistic determinism is far more characteristic of die present ‘spirit of die age’ dian 
die humanistic theory of freedom.... To-day our slogan must be: No detemiinism, on any account! For it 
makes all understanding of man as man impossible.” Brunner, Man in Revolt  ^256-57. This is due, in part, 
to Brunner’s equation of die person with the subject (e.g., Brumier, Man in Revolt  ^411), which then forces 
die dualism of freedom and determinism. See SA, 134.
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the end he must capitulate to ‘that of God in liim’, which is his inmost nature, his 
own reality demanding its realization.^^
In recognizing that reality flows out of the nature of the object, the nature of the 
object that is the human person must be understood. It has aheady been noted in §2.3.4 
that one of the elements of the nature of persons is to act in accordance with the nature of 
the Other. This is true for all persons, both human and divine. But human persons have an 
additional aspect to their nature: human beings are creatines—created by a personal God 
and aie therefore dependent and limited.^^ This dependence and limitation does not 
negate freedom, it enables it. As demonstiated earlier, humans can only act as they are 
interdependent with the world and other persons (the Other); therefore, persons can be 
interdependent without a loss of freedom. Consequently, humans can be dependent and 
yet still able to detennine the futuie in harmony with God who, as the ultimate person, is 
the ultimate determ iner.The goal of God is the realization of a personal coimnunity 
with hum anity.Y et, there is a gap between the ideal of human nature and its 
actualization. This is Macmurray’s definition of sin—human intentions not in haimony 
with God and thus ultimately set against its own self-realization.^^ God responds to sin
SRR, 45.
“Until we recover our sense of proportion, until we recognize our creatiirlmess and our dependence, we 
shall continue to frustrate our freedom by desiring what we cannot attain, and by using our resources for our 
own destruction. Humility is the handmaid of freedom. It is the meek who inlrerit die earth.... Human 
freedom can be realized only as the freedom of individuals in relation; and the freedom of each of us is 
relative to that of the others. Man is dependent upon die world, of which he is a part; but every man is even 
more intimately dependent upon his fellows in the interrelation of men which constitutes human society.” 
CF, 24.
“Tliere is, dien, only one way in which we can think our relation to die world, and that is to diink it as a 
personal relation, through die fonn of the personal. We must think that the world is one action, and diat its 
impersonal aspect is the negative aspect of diis unity of action, contained in it, subordinated within it, and 
necessary to its constitution. To conceive the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, die Creator of 
the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to detemiine the friture, 
which can be realized only on the condition diat our intentions are in hamioiiy witii His intention, and 
which must frustrate itself if they are not.” PR, 222.
“The purpose of God is die establishing of a permanent co-operative fellowship between Man and 
Himself, which must be achieved widi full human consent; and die corollary of diis is die restoration of a 
universal community of mankhid by doing away with die enmity between man and man.” SRR, 45-46.
“At once we face the problem of evil—not die problem of ignorance, as in the drought of Socrates or 
Plato. God made the world and saw diat it was good. But it isn’t. How can diis be? It can be because man, 
made in die image of God, has the freedom to create and seek to realize his one intention. These intentions 
may be incompatible with die divine intention in his creation. Evil dien is sin and sin is a personal conflict
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tlirough ongoing activity in history to achieve liis pmposes interactively with creation in 
spite of and in conjunction with human resistance.^^ One thinks of the interaction between 
a skillM and knowledgeable public speaker who is being heckled by a member of the 
audience. Despite tlie detractor’s best efforts to disrupt and despoil, the speaker co-opts 
the opponent’s words and actions in such a way as to create an even more convincing 
presentation without infringing on the heckler’s freedom.
One must also take into account the fact of personal equality-in-diversity when 
discussing human freedom. Among human persons a diversity of pailicular persons was 
acknowledged. This diversity does not necessarily, although it may, impinge on a 
person’s freedom. Yet among human persons there are those with greater knowledge and 
capability and are thus more able to determine the friture than are those with less 
Icnowledge and capability. The one does not make the other any less fr ee. God, being 
omniscient, has ultimate knowledge, and, being omnipotent has infinite skill; therefore he 
is the ultimate determiner. This does not violate human freedom but it does place it in a 
relative position. Just as human persons exist freely in an interdependent state with 
reality, so persons may exist iiî an interdependent state with Ultimate Reality, the 
personal God, and retain their fr eedom.^^
Freedom, then, is the capacity to determine the future by integrating power and 
desire in conformity to reality. In short, fr eedom is the possibility of participating with 
God in the realization of the universe.
of wills. Since religion is about community, a clash of wills between men and God must express itself in the 
breaking of community—as a clash of wills between man and man. Indeed since the purpose of God for 
man is man’s tme nature, in being at emnity witli God he is at odds with himself.” SRR, 44-45. See also 
SRE, 49.
‘The second part of the answer then is that Hie divine creation is continuing. It goes on. God did not 
become a sleeping partner witli die creation of Man. If Man has set his will against God’s (as he clearly has) 
die purpose of God still stands and must be realized. In the recognition of the Fall there is aheady die 
promise of a redemption. And to see this is to discover history, as die Hebrews did, and widi it a religious 
interpretation of history as die work of God for the salvation of the world, in spite of and even duough die 
opposition of human wills.” SRR, 46.
The question of God’s interdependence will be raised in Chapter 4.
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3.4 M u t u a l i t y
The primary difference in the relation of persons to persons which 
distinguishes it toto caelo from the other types of relationship is mutuality.
Mutuality, that active reciprocating fellowship which exists between friends, 
occupies the center of Macmurray’s concept of the person and acts as an integrating 
whole within which equality and freedom operate and find their meaning. It is the 
essential aspect of personliood. Because mutuality is a personal action, it may be analyzed 
in terms of MacmuiTay’s apperceptive triad, resulting in knowing (pragmatic), loving 
(contemplative), and commiming (commimal).
3.4.1 P e r s o n a l  K n o w in g
All meaningfiil knowledge is for the sake of action, and all action is for the sake 
of friendship.^^
Personal knowledge focuses as much as humanly possible on the objective nature 
of the other person (the It) while minimizing the self (the I). As one attempts to analyze 
the other person, a realization is forced upon the obseiwer. There is a limit to the ability of 
any person to know another person based solely upon observation. It requires revelation 
by the Other to flesh out the external observations. Even if one could distinguish between 
action and event through observation, one must still enquire regaining the rationale for 
the actions. This communication is necessaiy—itself an activity requiring mutuality—in 
order to even know that the Other is personal, in order to determine if the Other acts, and 
if  so, why.^^ Self-knowledge is also dependent upon the revelation of others.^^ Therefore
RE, 205.
“Personality is essentially mutual. It is only in relationships between itself and another person that the self 
can exist at all.” RE, 222. “To complete tins exposition of first principles we must add diat die essential 
condition for realizing fellowship is a mutual reciprocity. CF, 82.
For an extended discussion of friendsliip widi several similarities to Macmurray’s see Ricoeur, 
Oneself as Another, 182-94.
SA, 16 (US edition; SA, 15 British edition).
^ “All knowledge of persons is by revelation.” PR, 169. “But a being who can pretend to be what he is not, 
to diinlc what he does not thinlc, and to feel what he does not feel, cannot be known by generalization from 
his observed behavior, but only as he genuinely reveals himself.” PR, 169. “All diat we mean by it 
[‘revelation’] is that man does not learn without a word from another person. Man does not diink himself
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personal Imowledge is always relational requiring mutuality in order for it to move 
towards finition.^ ®® Knowledge is a frmction of community.
But Icnowledge is not a transcendental construct of the community, somehow 
arbitrary and fantastic. For Macmurray, knowledge is always regulated by the reality of 
the commonly perceived world and leads to a community o f Imowledge or community o f 
truth^^  ^which codifies this Icnowledge into the symbolic language of the community. A 
given community’s Imowledge of the world and themselves may be ti'ue or false, more or 
less real. This of course reflects Macmuiray’s epistemology and his understanding of the 
intentional stance towards the reality of the Other. Knowledge is always a particular 
person’s knowledge (otherwise it is merely information) and particular persons are 
always in one or more communities. Thus personal knowledge is shaped by the 
community, but each person has then own knowledge which is distinct, based upon their 
unique experiences and understandings of those symbols.
Personal Icnowledge is essential to mutuality; without it there can be no 
community. But it is the negative, pragmatic aspect of mutuality, the It of fr iendship. One
into thought, or doubt himself into it. And nature is not self-disclosing.” Leland J. White, “John 
MacmuiTay; Theology as Philosophy,” Scottish Journal o f Theology 26 (Nov. 1973): 460-61.
“For die knowledge of one another, and so of ourselves, can be realized only dirough mutual self­
revelation; and this is possible only when we love one another. If we fear one another we must defend and 
hide ourselves.” PR, 212.
Without getting ahead of the argument, one sees here that revelation is necessary for personal 
knowledge, yet this personal knowledge is not an end in itself for it serves die purposes of communion. See 
Stephen N. Williams, Revelation and Reconciliation: A Window on Modernity, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) who argues modernity’s obsession widi revelation has missed the larger categorical 
importance of reconciliation (i.e., the restoration of community).
“One odier aspect of this self-transcendence in knowledge is important for our purpose. It is die fact diat 
if we are to think truly we have all to diink the same thing. Knowledge is common. There is only one 
common world, and the truth about it is valid for all alike. Though each of us must dihik his own droughts 
for himself, so far as we diink truly we are bound in a community of knowledge, and there is one world for 
all of us. Thought realizes itself in die community of tnidi.” CF, 77.
‘“ PR, 162.
Khkpatrick conmients diat communitarians, such as MacIntyre, have difficulty in providing sufficient 
distance between the individual and die community to allow for such tilings as critique. Frank G. 
Khkpatrick, “Public and Private: The Search for a Political Philosophy diat does Justice to Bodi witiiout , 
Excluding Love,” m The Life and Work o f John Macmurray Conference Proceedings, (University of 
Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied), 8.
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must also consider the contemplative aspect of mutuality, love. “My knowledge of 
another person is a function of my love for him..
3 .4 .2  P e r s o n a l  L o v in g
For the knowledge of one another, and so ourselves, can be realized only through
a mutual self-revelation; and this is possible only when we love one another.
In order to discuss love, it is helpful to consider the general question of the 
emotions in the Form of the Personal. Where art is emotional reflection, the discussion 
here is concentrated upon the emotions themselves.
Emotions are the means by which one values the Other. Emotions are neither 
merely sensory data nor physiological reactions, although they may have physiological 
effects. As previously mentioned in the discussion of withdrawal and retimi in the parent- 
child relationsliip, Macmurray discerns tlnee foundational emotions: love, fear, and hate, 
which correspond with viewing the other person in terms of someone to be in relation 
with (I-You), someone who can affect me (AA), or someone who I can use It is 
fr om this triad that all of the rest of the emotions may be considered, as well, as valuations 
directed at other objects wlrich exist solely at the biological or material level.
PR, 170.
PR, 212.
Tlie discussion of value highlights a pitfall to avoid in interpreting Macmurray. Because emotions are 
valuation, and die reflective activity of art is constituted by modes of valuation, tiiere is great potential for 
confiision in tliis area because die connection is so intimate (see RE, 31,36, 58-59). The primary topic is 
emotion, but since we are reflecting upon emotions we shall naturally be forced into considerations of art, 
which is reflection upon value, and the modes of valuation (morality, aesdietics, and efficiency). Several 
commentators have been confused by the seeming conflation of diese areas. Also it should be noted again 
diat, as is typical widi Macmiurray, he sees die primary issue as the valuation of persons and dien by a 
system of reduction applies the valuation to the non-personal reahiis (organic and substantial).
Earlier writings tended to distinguish between fear, as a motive (or emotion) and animal type reactions. 
CF, 79-80. However it is not clear that diis distinction was maintained by Macmmray in his later writings. 
Berry is correct to understand fear as used by Macmurray to be roughly akin to anxiety. Berry, 233. See 
also Brumier, Man in Revolt, 195.
These emotions change naturally when the self evaluates different objects at different levels of intention. 
Therefore it is possible to evaluate a person as beautiful (aesthetics) or useful (efficiency) but a person must 
not be evaluated ultimately from either the contemplative or pragmatic perspective. Macmurray never 
explicitly states die relation of the three primaiy emotions to die odiers, but it would be consistent with his 
modus operandi to see diem flmctioning as negatives and positives. The question here hinges on die 
understanding of Macmurray’s schematic of consciousness. If one considers the labeling of touch as die 
minimum objective feeling/sensation then it would seem to imply that the emotions, which undergird die
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Because emotions have referents any paiticular emotion may be categorized as 
either real or umeal/^^ Tliis directly conflicts with emotivist and projectionist tlieories 
which assert that feelings are mere creations or preferences of the individual as well as 
those hypotheses which regard emotions as uncontrollable impulses. Under normal 
circumstances, to be afraid of a mouse is an imreal fear—the emotion does not correspond 
to the actuality or reality of the situa tion .T h is  is not to say that fear is inherently 
“wrong” or unreal—there may be incidents when fear* is the most real emotion—only that 
it might be unreal in a given context.^^  ^Wlien, for instance, fear comes characteristically 
to dominate love as a person’s habitual stance toward Others it becomes unreal. Fear* 
should exist only for the sake of the positive emotion of love, enabling the continued 
existence of the person so he or she may continue to love.^^  ^Fear, hatred, and love may 
all be real or unreal depending upon the circumstances of the situation.
It should be noted that the priority MacmuiTay places on love and the importance 
of overcoming fear does not mean that he does not believe in the reality of suffering— 
that one should not fear because there is nothing to fear. Instead he holds that one must 
subsume fear, even legitimate feat*, to the overall motive of love.
senses, are all subjective and hence without external referent. However, tiiis would seem to be contradicted 
by his insistence on the referential nature of love, hate, and fear. This seems to imply that there may be a 
different approach to the idea of objective in his model of consciousness and his discussion of emotions.
RAS, 35-36. Yet tliere is a difference between the subjective motive of I  like and tire objective motive of 
it is good'. “My feeling must really be for the object, and the process must be an effort to know and enjoy 
the object and not to enjoy myself by means of the object. This is the essence of emotional self- 
transcendence, or, if  you will, emotional ‘objectivity’.” RAS, 38. Also: “The dichotomy which governs 
religious experience is one between real and unreal. This is not identical with tlie intellectual distinction 
between true and false; nor with tlie aestlietic distinction between what satisfies or does not satisfy oiu 
emotions, even if it is related to these. For it is possible for us to have a real religious experience coupled 
witli religious beliefs and practices which are fallacious and undesirable; or to hold sincerely and convinced 
to religious belief and practices witii no reality to sustain tiiem.” SRR, 9.
AWiough it must be acknowledged that there might be extraordinary circumstances when one should 
fear a mouse: if it is carrying eitlier a highly infectious disease or a small nuclear device.
CF, 80. The existence of unreal fear is clearly seen in the diagnosis and treatment of phobias. If these 
fears were not unreal there would be no diagnosis; if tliey were unchangeable or uncontiollable there would 
be no successful treatment.
See Roy’s tmly bewildering exposition of Macmuiray’s position where he first claims Macmurray does 
not, then demonstrates tliat he does, in fact subordinate fear to love. Roy, Fonn of tlie Personal, 197-201.
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All religion, as we have seen, is concerned to overcome fear. We can distinguish 
real religion from unreal by contrasting their foiinulae for dealing with negative 
motivation. The maxim of illusory religion runs: ‘Fear not; trust in God and He 
will see that none of the things you fear will happen to you’; that of real religion, 
on the contrary, is ‘Fear not; the things that you are afraid of are quite likely to 
happen to you, but they are nothing to be afraid of.’^^ ^
Although Macmurray does not directly speak to the issue of suffering as such, it is 
possible to see how suffering is contained within the broader construct of love and fear. A 
more explicit discussion of suffering would greatly increase the theological application of 
the Form of the Personal. However, there does not appear to be any impediment to 
augmenting him at this point with treatments such as those foimd in Ricoeur and 
Moltmami.'^ '^
Just as education is necessary in developing intellectual honesty (the 
correspondence of one’s factual representation of the Other), so too the need for 
cultivating emotional smcerity or chastity (the coiTespondence of one’s valuation of the 
Other). Educating the emotions is of vital importance to proper personal maturation, 
yet the academy is traditionally reluctant to addiess the emotions within the standard 
curriculum.^
Emotion is an essential aspect of all action,.. Actions are delimited by an agent’s 
feelings—emotions—of dissatisfaction (negative) and satisfaction (positive). Tliis feeling 
provides the necessary motive for action because mere awaieness provides no groimd for
PR, 171. Notice the close conceptual parallels between tliis and Luke 12.4-5.
"Suffering reaches as far as love itself, and love grows through tlie suffering it experiences—that is the 
signpost tliat points to true life." Moltniann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 52. See also Moltmann, Trinity and 
the Kingdom, 23-25,47-52; Jürgen Moltmann, The Way o f Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic 
Dimensions, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 1990), 172-78. Also see Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 
190-91.
For tlie general discussion see RE, 126-33. Macmurray also refers to emotional sincerity as chastity 
(which he contrasts to romantic sentimentality) and sees two different ways that one can be emotionally 
insincere: eitlier by expressing an emotion one does not feel or by failing to express an emotion that would 
be important to the Other (RE, 129).
Macmurray notes tliat art, which is Hie expression of value, when dealt with in an academic 
environment, typically devolves into facts about art, ratlier tlian the emotional development diat he is 
talking about, e.g., RE, 74. See also McIntosh for an account of Macmurray’s understanding of die 
emotions integrated with Daniel Golenian’s concept of Emotional Intelligence.
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ac ting /F ee ling  referred to an object is valuation and its most general discrimination is
accepting or rejecting the possibility of any paiticular action/H ow ever, emotion or its
reflective counter-part, art, cannot cause action:
Art is concerned, however, with the exhibition of values, and, therefore, m 
relation to action, with the choice of ends. It cannot, however, affect action by the 
provision of rules; if only because the choice of ends is a matter of intuition and 
feeling, not of discursive thought. If ait is to function in the development and 
improvement of primary activity, it must be by its effects upon our capacity for 
sensuous and emotional discrimination. The practical fimction of art is, therefore, 
the refinement of sensibility.^
Emotions, then, are absolutely essential to the person, although they are not the 
totality of the person, and the development of the emotions is a key aspect of personal 
development.
Love, according to Macmurray, is one of the tliree basic emotions along with fear 
and hatred and is “the name we give to the motive which creates and sustains friendship, 
and all the forms of human fellowship.”^^ ° Love is not sexuality (a category mistake of 
applying the biological instead of the personal)^^^ nor is it some “vague affection for 
some imaginary human totality.”^^ ^
SA, 190; RE, 39, 45. The intellect may determine tlie means, but the emotions determine the ends setting 
the course for action. Macmurray is here in agreement with Kierkegaard (“mtellectual reflection alone can 
never motivate action,” C. Stephen Evans, "Kierkegaard, Suren Aabye,” CDP, 468) and Hmne (“Reason is, 
and ought only to be flie slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and 
obey tliem” Treatise II. lii. 3, cited by Justin Broackes, “reason as slave of tlie passions,” OCP, 748). Tliis is 
contra Roy who argues for tlie independent ability of the intellect to determme action. Roy, Form of the 
Personal, 74-77. “But in so far as a deliberate quest for knowledge constitutes tlie drive to experiment, we 
must say tliat it is thought which carries out the experhnent. Consequently verification should be seen as an 
integral part of reflection and thus be recast to the second stage of Macmurray’s basic triad. Furthermore, it 
is not the fact that science and philosophy draw on die resources of everyday life which is questionable, but 
Macmunay’s account of the way in which this happens. In point of fact, as we have tried to show, his 
recourse to action as a panacea hi matters of verification does not escape the whole gamut of 
epistemological problems related to verification.” Roy, Fonn of the Personal, 77. Note that Roy ignores the 
fundamental distinction withm Macmurray’s philosophy between dieoretical and practical; scientific 
experiments are for Macmurray, theoretical because they intend only a modification of the representation of 
tlie Other, not tlie modification of tlie Otlier. SA, 178-79.
“The reflective element hi action has a double function. It discriminates tlie Otlier as a set of possibilities 
of action; and it also selects one of these possibilities for realization in action. SA, 190-91.
RAS, 42.
CF, 78.
CF, 79. Linipitlaw’s comparison of Teilhard’s organic philosophy and Macmunay’s personal philosophy 
provides an excellent discussion on the disthiction between love and organic attraction (231-48).
CF, 85.
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Rather, love is heterocentric, “the complete affirmation of the other by the self.”^^  ^
Love is self-negation^^"  ^or self-transcendence^^^ for the sake of the concrete Other/^^ It is 
bemg ourselves for the Other/^^ Love canied to its ideal heterocentric limit would result 
in the “realization of the self through a complete self-transcendence.”^^ ^
Speidell raises a concern regarding the idea of self-negation found in 
Macmunay’s notion of the heterocentric natine of personal relations. Quoting MacmuiTay 
as saying, “I am nothing and you are everything”^^  ^Speidell sees Macmun*ay 
encouraging a loss of self into some Buddhistic nothingness.^^®
As is often the case, Speidell’s misunderstanding stems from a dualistic 
understanding of Macmunay’s philosophy. In Personal logic negation does not mean 
nothingness, but the negative which gives shape to the positive. There is no loss of 
personal identity in the Foim of the Personal, for to lose the I  eradicates the possibility of 
true heterocentric action towards the Other.
CF, 82. While love is heterocentric, fear and hatred are egocentric. FMW, 55; PR, 122-23. McFadyen 
argues for a centered self, centered in its orientation towards others. McFadyen, 40.
“In ourselves we are nothing; and when we turn our eyes inward in search of ourselves we find a 
vacuum. Being nothmg in ourselves„ we.have no value in ourselves, and are of no importance whatever, 
wholly without meaning or significance. It is only in relation to oüiers drat we exist as persons; we are 
invested widi significance by odiers who have need o f üs; and borrow our reality from those who care for 
us. We live and move and have our being not in ourselves but in one another; and what rights or powers or 
freedom we possess are ours by the grace and favour of our fellows. Here is the basic fact of our human 
condition; which all of us can know if we stop pretending, and do know in moments when the veil of self- 
deception is stripped from us and we are forced to look upon our own nakedness.” PR, 211. Again, compare 
with Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 187.
SA, 96.
“Love, as the positive ground-motive of personal activity, can best be defined as die capacity for self­
transcendence, or the capacity to care for the odier. Love is for the other: fear is for the self. In actual 
experience, of course, both motives are operative togetiier; and either may dominate the odier. Where fear is 
dominant, die self becomes die centre of reference, and all commerce with die external world is for die sake 
of die self. Conversely, when love is dominant, die centre of reference lies outside die self, and the activities 
of die personal life are for the sake of die other.” CF, 80.
*27 202-03. This resonates well with the distinction A. Torrance notes in Barth and Zizioulas between
freedom widi others (biological) and freedom for others (ecclesial in Zizioulas’ terminology). Torrance, 
Persons in Communion, 184. Jeffko observes that Macmurray completely rejects the notion of self-love as 
die basis of love for others—self-love only exists as die negative, derivative, of positive love for others. 
Jeffko, 157-59.
CF, 82.
Todd Speidell, “A Trinitarian Ontology of Persons in Society.” Scottish Journal o f Theology, 47, no. 3 
(1994): 296, citing RAS, 51.
“Christ alone has healed the sinful preoccupation widi selfhood to liberate—not negate—the self for God 
and odiers.” Speidell, 296-97.
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The full realization of the moral intention can only be reached in a relation 
between two persons in which each cares wholly for the other, and for liimself 
only for the sake of the other.... In the relation of the two agents, this means that 
each remains himself and differentiated from the other; there must be no self- 
identification of one with the other, or the reciprocity will be lost and the 
heterocentricity of tlie relation will be only apparent.
In short MacmuiTay’s conception of the heterocentiic person is an ontological 
status of relatedness which involves no loss of personal identity, but which is expressed 
and developed in and through actual relations—ideally a heterocentric reciprocating 
mutual love.^^^
This personal loving is of greater importance than personal knowing, yet neither 
can exist independently of the other, for in order to love others one must know them. 
Love, following the standard foim of Personal logic, is constituted by knowledge; and 
Icnowledge cannot exist apart fiom tlie emotions.
It is one of the traditions of philosophy that the differentia of human nature 
is Reason. We have discovered now that it is Love, as the capacity for self­
transcendence, which is the defining character of the personal. What, then, is the 
relation between the two?... But the essential point, which belongs to the 
substance of the issue, is to realize tliat our capacity for knowledge is a particular 
and limited expression of oui* capacity for self-transcendence. The rationality of 
thought is its objectivity, and the motive which sustains this objectivity in our 
thinking is our interest in tlie object for its own salce, which alone can shape our 
ideas to the nature of the object instead^of to the nature of om* own desires. To 
seek the ti*uth is, in fact, to care for the natui e of the object, within the limits of 
om* intention to know it.^ ^^
PR, 189. Compare with Brunner, “God has created the self for self-existence in community, as a non­
self-sufficient self, which ought not to exist for itself, and cannot exist for itself. Tliis is why God gives us 
such individuality which forces us to depend upon one another that we may complement each odier.” 
Brunner, Man in Revolt, 323.
Khkpatrick states the following in response to this possible misunderstanding of Macmmiay. “Some 
people are apt to read Macmunay as if he wants to merge persons into each other or at least to have them 
relate to each other as if individual differences are either to be overcome or subsumed in what he calls 
heterocentric love for die other. This can lead to a romantic reading of Macmurray, diawing upon images of 
love in which die beloved becomes one with die lover. Macmurray himself may have given rise to this 
misinterpretation of his own work: when he tallcs about the goal of personal community being one in which 
each cares for all the others and no one for himself he seems to be saying that one should literally sacrifice 
his ‘self, his very ‘person’, to die Other. But this is, I think, a misreading and can be corrected only by a 
fuller exploration of how Macmurray understands our relationships not just at die deeply mutual level, but 
at die political, impersonal, or societal level as well, a level he never disparages even while attempting to 
relate it instrumentally to die deeper mutual level.” Kirkpatrick, Public and Private, 5-6. Bahktin’s holds a 
similar belief diat individuation is necessary widiin unity, cited in Dixon, 181-83.
‘^ C F,81.
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However, neither Icnowledge nor love is the apex, the flill realization, of 
mutuality. Personal lovmg has as its positive the interactive dimension of integrated 
personal communing.
3 .4 .3  P e r s o n a l  C o m m u n in g
The relationship between persons constitutes their individual personality, and this 
mutuality of the personal is the basic fact of religion. It is what is expressed by 
religion in the statement that ‘God is Love’. Personality is essentially friendship or 
the communion of persons.
In this statement one sees how love (and therefore Icnowledge) is caught up into 
the fully mutual field of communing between persons^^^ imderstood as religion. One of 
the great strengths of Macmurray’s entire project firom the theological point of view is the 
prominence given to religion and the manner in which it is related to all aspects of human 
life.^^  ^For Macmurray, religion is reflection on the consciousness of the community of 
p e r s o n s ,o r  the celebration of communion,and as such it is a human activity.^^  ^The 
very language used in the definition indicates its a posteriori relationship with personal 
experience in the pre-existing community.^ "*®
RE, 222-23. Biblical reference is 1 John 4.16.
When Brunner uses the term love he has in mind this active mutuality. “Love is the unity of willing, 
knowing and feeling, the sole total act of the person.” Brunner, Man in Revolt, 220. Furthermore, when 
Brunner discards friendsliip as a basis of commmiity, in favor of love, he is discarding the Greek notion of 
friendship with its exclusivity and relative valuation of the Otlier. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 290.
Hoffman believes that a strengtli of Macmurray is “die attempt to set religion within the total context of 
human experience.” Hoffman, 2.
Macmurray includes four main observations widiin his general theory of religion: (1) universality of 
religion in human society; (2) no analogue of religion even in die highest from of animal life; (3) 
historically, religion is the matrix from which the rest of culture has crystallized; (4) its intention is 
inclusive, and depends on active co-operation to constitute it. PR, 156.
“Religion, we shall say, is the reflective activity which expresses the consciousness of community; or 
more tersely, religion is the celebration of communion.” PR, 162. See also CF, 85-86.
“We are concerned, therefore, with religion as a form of reflective activity, and widi its origin in die 
structure of universal human experience. We are not concerned with its particular expressions in this 
religion or diat, but widi religion as such, as somediing people do, as a human activity.” PR, 151. Also 
“Religion in development is man in search of God tliroughout histoiy, building into a hiller religious life die 
experience of die past. But religion is also the consciousness of life in God; tiiat which we seek for is also 
there always and eternally in us. It is this eternal aspect of religion which is expressed in die religious 
recognition of equality in all human life at any stage of its development; in die knowledge that all 
distinctions; and that ultimately all persons and all personal experience are of equal, because of eternal or 
infinite, worth.” RE, 231.
“Religion, as a mode of reflection, is concerned widi die knowledge of die personal Other. The data for 
such reflection are our experiences of personal relationship.” PR, 168. “All religion, I believe, rests on the
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Fellowship, that is a community of persons related as persons, is the expression of 
human natuie/"^^ Therefore the only way one can be real and tme to what one is as a 
person is in friendship,which is a foim of active self-transcendence. Community 
cannot be created by decree, force, or organization. It is not functionally related 
aroimd a task although it can express itself thiough common t a s k s . I t  is not to be 
confused with sub-personal forms of association such as society or the State. Community 
cannot be achieved tlnough politics but only by religion.
Communing, as tlie highest aspect of mutuality, exists at the fully personal level 
and therefore using the niles of Personal logic it may also be viewed by the various 
apperceptions.In Figure 3.5, one sees the apperceptions applied in two different ways. 
Along the top one sees the types or modes of communion—Magical/Teclinical 
representing the pragmatic form of coimmmion, the Mystical/Escapist representing the
experience of tlie presence of God. This experience manifests itself in feelings of awe and in self- 
abasement, but it does not reveal the natme of God, only his majesty and power. This is why there is such 
variety in die conception of God in different religions.” SRR, 53.
“Man camiot be man ‘by himself; he can only be man in commimity. For love can only operate in 
community, and only in diis operation of love is man hiunan.” Brunner, Man in Revolt, 106.
CF, 74. ^
143 «Yhe second constitutive principle of friendship is fi-eedom. This means, in the first place tiiat the unity 
between friends cannot be imposed. It can neitiier be established nor maintained by force. It is entirely, and 
throughout it whole duration, dependent upon die free activity of the persons concerned. It means, in the 
second place, that it provides for a complete self-expression and self-revelation wliich is mutual and 
unconstrained.” CF, 73.
144 follows from this diat a community cannot be brought into existence by organization. It is not 
functional. It is not organic. Its principle of unity is personal. It is constituted by die sharing of a common 
life.” CF, 56.
145 diough the members [of a society] are persons, and die group is an association of persons, die 
members are not associated as persons, but only in virtue of the specific functions diey perform in relation 
to die purpose which constitutes the group; and the society is an organic unity, not a personal one. This 
organic, functional, impersonal character remains even where the common purpose is necessary and 
permanent.... A community, on the odier hand, rests upon a different principle of unity. It is not constituted 
by a common purpose. No doubt its members will share common purposes and co-operate for their 
realization. But diese common purposes merely express, tiiey do not constitute die unity of die association; 
for they can be changed freely without any effect upon the unity of the group. Indeed it is characteristic of 
commmiities that diey create common purposes for die sake of co-operation instead of creating co-operation 
for the sake of common purposes.” CF, 55.
“Freedom, equality and brotherhood are religious ends. To make them political objectives is to make 
sure of disillusion and disaster, The State is incapable of realizing them; its bushiess is only with justice, so 
far as justice can be secured by law.” SRR, 79.
Remembering die basic cube of the Form of the Personal it is unclear whether one should nest these 
various apperceptions withm religion, or simply consider it to be a different abstraction of die same cube. 
One leans towards a nesting, however.
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contemplative form of communion, and the Integi al representing the communal- 
integrating fomi of communion. These, one will recall h orn the graphic of the Form of 
the Personal, ar e the modes of religion abstracted according to the R axis.
R
0
Figure 3.5. Communion, Ritual, Doctrine
Macmurray also abstracts these ontologicaUy and derives doctiine (the pragmatic, 
analytic foiin) and ritual (the contemplative, dialectic form)—both of wlrich must be 
integrated in communal action.
The technical, or magical, mode of religion focuses upon religion’s instrumental 
aspect. It is a form of spiritual technology oriented towards control. It is pragmatic in 
orientation and therefore aggressive in stance. The mystical, or escapist, mode of religion 
is concerned with the spiritual, other-worldly aspects of religion. Since it is contemplative
171-72.
“Religion, tlierefore, lias two aspects, ritual and doctrine. The first is aesthetic in form, the second 
scientific. Of the two aspects, the aesthetic is die positive and primary, since it is valuational, and refers to 
die intention of action; die scientific is secondary and negative, since the means presupposes die end. These
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in method it will tend towards idealism and withdrawal from the matters of this world.
Integi'al religion, alternatively, is the integration of these two in communal action.
The problematic of religion, then, is in terms of the distinction between reality and 
unreality in the relation of persons. For this reason the primaiy demand of religion 
is for a personal integrity. Integiity here is not a general teim for moral goodness: 
it means specifically a way of life which is integral. In particular, an integration of 
the imier life with the outer, a unity of reflection and action, a coincidence of 
motive and intention. If this were complied with, the result would be action which 
is at once moral and spontaneous, and consequently, free.^ ^®
Wliile the magical and mystical are based on the negative emotions and resulting 
apperceptions and are therefore ultimately imreal, the integral religion is based on love 
and is therefore real. Real rehgion functions to enhance and expand community with 
imiversal intention. It cannot be limited by biology or geography. Because it is 
personal, based in action, its reality can only be verified in action, through its 
actualization, not through theoretical proofs or logical deductions.
There are three religions which are universal in intention and have proven their 
ability to create and sustain fellowship: Clnistianity, Islam, and Buddliism. Because of the 
communal nature and universal intention of each they are all more real than tribalistic or 
individualistic religions. Yet of the tliree only Clnistianity is motivated in its expansion
" .  J --by love rather than aggression or withdr awal and is therefore the most real of religions. 
This is not to say that Christianity has not at times acted in either an aggressive or an
aspects are not, of course, science and art; the distinction has reference only to their form.” PR, 174. Again, 
one should remember the form refers to tiie logical form of a particular ontological unity-pattem. 
* °^PR, 172.
“A mature religion, on the contrary, is universal.” SRR, 36. “... we may then define the function of 
religion as bemg to create, maintain and deepen the community of persons and to extend it without limit, by 
the transfonnation of negative motives and by eliminating the dominance of fear in human relations.” PR, 
163.
‘^ ^PR, 173-74.
“Only tlnree of these [imiversal] religions have been permanently effective—Buddliism, Cliristianity and 
Islam—and remain today competitors for the universal allegiance of mankind. They are differentiated by 
the types of motivation which underlie them, and which provide tlie motive force of tlieir expansion. In both 
Buddhism and Islam die negative motive is dominant.... Buddliism seeks a imiversal fellowship dirough 
withdrawal from the enmities and dissensions wliich frustrate personal fellowship in die actual world. Islam 
seeks it through aggression and compulsion. Cliristianity, on die odier hand, is positively motivated. It seeks 
a universal fellowship realized in the actual condition of human life, a brotherhood of maiilcind, a kingdom
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escapist manner, but love exerts a conective force wliich keeps Christianity moving 
towards the goal of a universal fellowship of love/^"  ^Macmurray therefore rejects any 
suggestion of abandoning Cliristianity.
By defining religion as human reflective activity and demonstrating its relation to 
art, science, philosophy, and history, Macmurray places religion at the heart ofliis 
thought. By focusing on its communal motivation he places Clnistianity (or at least liis 
inteipretation of Christianity) at the pinnacle of his religious thinking. But is 
Macmurray’s understanding of religion appropriate? Is it comprehensive enough to 
include the varieties of religions practiced in the world and is it adequate to describe the 
particular aspects of religious activities that ai*e commonly referred to when the word 
“religion” is used?
of heaven on e a r th .CF, 90-91. McFadyen refers to the universal intention of Christianity as non- 
totalitarian imperialism. McFadyen, 200.
“It is, of course, obvious enough tiiat in its long history Christianity has failed to maintain die 
characteristic intention of its foimdation. Fear gets die uppenhand and it falls into negation. But what is 
characteristic is that whether the failure tends, Buddhist fashion, to the escapism of a withdrawal from die 
world into a ‘pure spirituality’ or contrariwise, into die aggressive self-defence which, as in Islam, would 
use power to conquer the world, either of these aberrations is recognized, withm the Cliristian fellowship 
itself, as a denial of its true nature, and produces a protest and a compensation, hi the same way its tendency 
to become, in one or anotiier of its branches, the religion of a limited group—a national religion, for 
example—is compensated for by a missionary movement which protests against exclusiveness. Its 
fundamental positiveness gives it a power of self-renewal which recalls it, after every aberration, to its 
original intention.” CF, 91-92.
This is not only fr om die early writings (e.g., CF, 97), but is reaffirmed in the Gifford lectures. 
“Christianity, in particular, is die exponent and die guardian of die personal, and the function of organized 
Clnistianity in our history has been to foster and maintain the personal life and to bear continuous witness, 
in symbol and doctrine, to die ultimacy of personal values. If diis influence is removed or ceases to be 
effective, die awareness of personal issues will tend to be lost, in the pressure of functional preoccupations, 
by all except those who are by nature specially sensitive to them. The sense of personal dignity as well as of 
personal unwordiiness will atrophy, with the decline in habits of self-examination. Ideals of sanctity or 
liolmess will begin to seem incomprehensible or even comical. Success will tend to become the criterion of 
rightness, and there will spread dirough society a temper which is extraverted, pragmatic and merely 
objective, for which all problems are soluble by better organization. In such conditions the religious 
impulses of men will attach diemselves to die persons who wield political power, and will invest them with 
a personal authority over the life of die conmiunity and of its members. The state is then compelled to 
perforai the functions of a church (for which by its nature it is radically unfitted) and its efforts to do so will 
produce, the more rapidly the more whole-hearted they are, a crisis of die personal. SA, 30-31.
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3.4.3.1 Comprehensiveness:
Categories and Content
Is Macmiirray’s definition of religion capable of handling the variety of religions 
enconntered globally? Within his system Macmnnay references Christianity and 
Jndaism/^^ Islam and Bnddlrism/^^ A n im ism ,M y s t ic i sm ,a n d  Pantheism/^° It also 
allows for religions which do not promote community or are otheiwise imreal thereby 
including the plethora of individualistic religions of the Self. In formulating the religious 
tiiad of communal, idealist, and pragmatic religions Macmurray can account for both the 
tiibal shamans, as well as, the great world religions. Essential for any theory of religions 
operating in a modern Western context, he claims it also accounts for the atheist. In 
spite of this impressive display, or perhaps because of it, Macmurray’s critics believe he 
modifies religion so that it is no longer religion as commonly understood. These 
detractors have identified at least tln*ee different ways in which Macmurray’s definition of 
religion may lack comprehensiveness: (1) the collapsing of religion into a type of 
morality, (2) the conflating of religion with biblical faith, and (3) the fundamental 
reduction achieved by defining religion as a human activity.
3.43. L I  Religion and Morality
One manner in which to challenge Macmuiray’s definition of religion is to accuse 
it of collapsing religion into morality, of using the two terms interchangeably, and in so
RE, 228-29.
SRR, 38-40.
^^®PR,79.
PR, 218.
PR, 223.
Macmurray has several means at his disposal to account for atheism. “Any society of persons, united in a 
common life, has a religious aspect. Atlieism, if it is in action, is an effort to suppress this aspect; if it is 
passive, it is a failure to recognize it. Botli active and passive atheism are normally reactions against unreal 
religion, and even so they are accidental and unusual.” PR, 171. Taking a slightly different tack Macmurray 
also suggests tiiat substitution may occur: “If, on the other hand, any religion falls into unreality by losing 
its reference to tlie real world, that is, tlie world of action, art or science or botli must become substitutes for 
religion.” PR, 175.
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doing, reducing the scope of religion to merely a paiticular type of morality. Hoffinan 
provides an example of this line of thought:
Similar difficulties arise if  one seeks to place morality within the structure 
of thought outlined by MacmuiTay. His basic reflective categories, we have 
already seen, are science, art, and religion. Thus when he writes in the Gifford 
Lectures, “From the point of view of the agent, the validity of his action—its 
reality in action—has tliree aspects,” one would expect him to allude to science, 
art, and religion, hi fact he offers a new triad, science, art, and morality: “The 
means chosen must be efficient, the end to be realized must be satisfactory, and 
the action as a whole must be moral, that is to say, compatible with the 
community of action as a whole. Of these aspects, the moral validity is primary.” 
Religion and morality, it would appear, have become interchangeable. Indeed, a 
more detailed analysis of their relationship turns out to be most instinctive.
Hoffinan tlien gives a description of the thi ee apperceptions (pragmatic, contemplative,
and communal). In the course of this description he states:
In light of tliis triadic form he recognizes thi ee pure types of social organization, 
Hobbes’ Leviathan and Rousseau’s Social Contract corresponding to the 
pragmatic-hate and contemplative-fear apperceptions respectively, and over 
against these the higher morality of community or religion. It is in this context that 
MacmuiTay defines religion as the celebration of commimity. [*] Our basic forms 
of reflection then are actually science, art, and morality, wlnle religion denotes a 
particular foiin of morality wliich is accepted as its highest expression, loving 
community. Once more it emerges as a general category, i.e., not as 
phenomenologically but as theologically characterized.
Hoffinan in his footnote (its placement indicated by the asterisk in the above quote) adds
to the mdictment:
Thus he can write: “The positive morality of love contains and subordinates the 
two negative moralities of good form [the contemplative] and of self-control [the 
pragmatic].” Shortly following we find: “Religion ... intends the synthesis of art 
[contemplation] and science [the pragmatic],
Clearly Hoffman is thoroughly convmced that Macmunay has confused religion 
and morality. Unfortunately his ar gument is based on two eiTors: a type of geographical 
fallacy and a general misunderstanding of Personal Logic.
Hoffman, 3, citing PR, 178.
Hoffinan, 3-4.
Hoffman, 7, n. 15, citing PR, 176. Brackets and contents of brackets in tlie original.
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In the footnote Hoffinan has fallen victim to what may be characterized as a
geographical fallacy: proximity in the text does not guarantee continuity of subject
matter. The paragraph from which the first quotation in the footnote comes is describing
the constitutive nature of science and art for religion. In the midst of the paragraph, the
text states, “The same principle holds in all fields of personal experience”  ^ and then
provides a few examples of other fields where this applies, including social structures and
morality, whence Hoffinan gets the first quotation. Tliis quotation is the last sentence of
the paragraph. Hoffinan’s second quotation begins the next paragraph which fetimis again
to the central question of the last paragraph which was about religion and the derivative
natur e of art and science from it. There is, therefore, no proof in this instance for the
claim that Macmunay confuses morality and religion.
The remainder of Hoffinan’s argument fails because of his lack of careful
attention to terminology, his mismiderstanding of Personal logic, and the relationship
between the elements of the resulting triads. It is true that Macmun ay has delineated the
modes of reflection including religion, science, and art. However, Hoffinan inalces two
mistaken assumptions in interpreting Macmunay’s statement:
The means chosen must be efficient, the end to be realized must be satisfactory, 
and the action as a whole must be moral, that is to say, compatible with the 
community of action as a whole. Of these aspects, the moral validity is primary.
The first assumption is efficient means science and satisfactory means art. The 
second is his belief that Macmurray is talldng about modes o f reflection. Hoffinan cites 
Macmmray at the beginning of the quote, “From the point of view of the agent, the 
validity of his action—its reality in action—has three aspects,” wliich Hoffman interprets 
with regard to reflection and not to valuation. Hoffinan, seems unaware of the presence of
“Consequently there is no reason why both science and art should not be integrated witii religion, as tlie 
two ambivalent forms of the negative which is necessary to its constitution.” PR, 175.
PR, 175.
Hoffinan, 3.
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efficiency, aesthetics, and morality as modes o f valuation, and therefore infers 
Macmurray must be refening to the primary modes of reflection.
When one considers the fact that Kant is repeatedly char ged with reducing 
religion to morality, that Macmurray unashamedly looks to Kant for inspiration, and
the centrality of action to Macmurray’s argument, it is understandable why Hoffinan was 
quick to assume that Macmurray was reducing rehgion to a form of morality. Religion 
contains morality, the judgment of value, necessarily as its negative, but it is not the 
totality of religion or action for Macmurray.
3.4.3.1.2 Religion and Biblical Christianity
Similar in nature to the belief that Macmurray is collapsing religion into morality
is the accusation he is conflating or confusing biblical faith with religion. We can again
look to Hoffinan for an example of tliis line of reasoning.
For example, Macmurray has claimed that “the primary religious assertion is that 
all men are equal, and that fellowship is the only relation between persons which 
is fully rational, or fully appropriate to their nature as persons. In this assertion the 
whole natme of religion is bound up.” Thus religion, he continues, iiievitably 
asserts that reality is personal. Such a view surely restricts the field of religion in a 
questionable manner. Specifically he associates religion with biblical faith and 
community. The Hebrew people stand out as imique in human history because 
they are “the only people whose history is religious through and through.” 
Moreover Judaism reached its culmination in Jesus, who raised the profound 
Hebrew sense of coimnunity and mutual responsibility to its universal dhnension, 
maldng explicit the divine purpose. Clearly Macmurray’s phenomenology is 
theologically conditioned.^*'^
Hoffinan believes that instead of religion being a category, it is in fact, defined by 
its content, namely biblical faith. In so doing he again demonstrates that he does not 
understand Personal Logic and the resulting triadic stnicture of religion. It is not tliat 
Macmurray sees religion as biblical faith, rather when one considers any personal action 
in light of the apperceptions, the positive apperception is the better, and in the case of
For example, see Grenz and Olson, 29, or Stanley Hauerwas, “On Doctrine and Etliics,” in Cambridge 
Companion to Doctiine, ed. Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 30.
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religion, the integrated religion of the community looks a great deal like biblical faith. 
Further adding to Hoffman’s confusion is Macmim*ay’s use of the positive form of the 
category and the name of the category interchangeably. For example, to say religious 
reflection implies the integral understanding of it. It must be stated clearly that this is 
neither a conflation of the category of religion and Christianity nor an example of 
theological preconditioning at the level of religion. If one suspects theological influence, 
it exists not at this level, but back at the point of origin of Macmurray’s Form of the 
Personal.
A strong argument exists for the position that Macmurray’s philosophy is 
theologically preconditioned. It is observable to some extent in Macmunay’s choice of 
the self-as-agent-in-relation and in the preference of the heterocentric self over the 
egocentric self. White argues persuasively for theological preconditioning in 
Macmurray’s Form of the Personal. But whether it is dependent or coixelative is open to 
debate. White concludes that Macmurray’s philosophy is in fact a biblically infoiined 
understandmg of humanity and God and argues for the theological natui e of his stalling 
point. The twin concepts of agency and heterocenti icity create a situation which 
requires the evaluation of trust as the positive motive which then leads to the promotion 
of the communal apperception as the positive. It should not be presumed that the decision 
for heterocentricity is a self-evident given. It is quite possible to create a system where 
self-concern and self-protection are the paramount values.
Therefore, while the starting point may have been influenced by biblical faith and 
the result is an affirmation of (or at least one interpretation oJ  ^biblical faith, this does not 
mean that “religion” has been conflated with biblical Cliristianity. Wliite concludes:
Macmurray would not, of course, wish to be understood as arguing from faith
rather than from reason. He would undoubtedly deny that there might be a
Hoffman, 2-3.
White, 460.
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conclusion theologically valid, pliilosophically invalid. Yet it remains valid to 
consider his philosopliical position as fully understandable only if liis theological 
assumptions are taken into consideration, if it is also realised that more than 
anything else his argument is against the possibility of a real distinction between 
the two reahns.^^^
White is certanily correct. Macmurray would argue against a division between 
religion and pliilosophy. On this score, Hoffinan is coirect; MacmuiTay’s phenomenology 
is theologically preconditioned. Yet, according to Macmun ay’s epistemology, all 
phenomenology has preconditions—one caimot step outside of oneself and consider 
something as completely new. One may have immediate experiences, but the 
understanding will be affected by previous experience, social conventions and the like. 
One would assume that Hoffinan wishes to disqualify Macmunay’s definition of religion 
based upon this preconditioning. However, one must then ask what preconditions 
Hoffman would put in its place?
3.4.3.1.3 Immanence
The third area of criticism includes several different criticisms of Macmunay’s 
definition of religion which share a common concern that it is too antlnopological, too 
immanent—not sufficiently concerned with God and the transcendent.
Langford is typical of those who are concerned with a reductionistic, 
antliropological definition of religion in Macmunay’s Form of the Personal.
As for the question of phenomenological adequacy, Macmunay’s 
definition of religion seems dubious. To put the issue sharply, Macmunay’s use of 
‘religion’ to refer to the relationsliip of persons is most questionable because of its 
limitations. The basic definition of religion that he proposes is that religion is an 
attitude that takes the self-as-agent-in-relation as the primary categoiy. Thus, in a 
maimer again reminiscent of American pragmatism, he uses the adjective 
‘religious’ to describe that dimension of experience which integiates and enriches 
man’s selfliood. But what of the multiple other ways in wliich religion has been 
imderstood and practiced?
... His adoption of a more limited definition is, of course, deliberate, for he 
intends to find a religion that is adequate for the modem scientific mind; but is he
Wliite, 464.
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talking about what has traditionally been described as religion? The answer must 
be negative. To say that a negative answer is requisite is not to deny that religion 
often includes the dimension of interpersonal relations, but it is to claim that the 
reduction of religion to this one area is to redefine its character inadequately.
John Burnaby scathingly attacks MacmuiTay for what he sees as the reduction of religion 
to empiricism.
There is a pathetic naïveté, perhaps sometliing of the heretic’s age-long deficiency 
in sense of humour*, about Macmimay’s ideal of an ‘empirically-minded religion’, 
‘leading the progressive movement with science as its teclmical advisor’. .
Newbigin, while agreeing with much of Macmuiray’s attack on legalism, nevertheless 
believes Macrnurray would do better to understand religion as “the awareness of an 
absolute obligation”, the absence of which reduces God to a sub-personal deity or even 
worse a mere concept.Trethow an admits to a certain confusion regarding Macmurray’s 
definition of religion. He finds himself agr eeing with Macrnurray but then is unable to 
accept or imderstand Macmurray’s fiequent attacks on mysticism. This causes him to 
doubt Macmurray’s entire religious construct.
The common thread discernable in all tliese critiques is the troubling absence of 
God in Macrnurray’s discussion of religion. Ignoring the possible cr*iticism of starting 
from below rather than from above (a distinctiqn seen above to have limited basis in 
reality) one must still recognize Macrnurray is attempting to play by the philosophical and 
theological r*ules of the day and presented his pliilosophy without recorrrse to divine 
revelation. Since Chapter 4 will directly address Macmurray’s doctrine of God, for now
Langford, Natural Tiieology, 18.
Jolui Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study o f the Religion ofSt. Augustine (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938),
7.
Lesslie Newbigin, Christian Freedom in the Modern World (London: Student Christian Movement, 
1937), 63, 64, 68. McFadyen makes a similar argument in positing die need for double contingency: where 
one obligates the self to the oilier; expecting die expectation and the expectation of the expectation of the 
odier. McFadyen, 130-31.
Illtyd Trethowan, Absolute Value: A Study in Christian Theism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), 
230-38.
176 human reason, imaided by revelation, can contribute anything to theology, it is dirough a
philosophical analysis of die personal that we should expect this to be brought to light.” SA, 17. See below 
(§4.2.3) for the difficulty widi this apologetic method.
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suffice it to say that since Macmmray sees God as at least personal, the talk of religion as 
communion of persons does not exclude God from religion as some seem to conclude. 
The more fundamental issue, however, is the belief that Macmurray is creating a 
completely iimnanent religion without transcendence. This is particularly clear in the fact 
that liis critics seems to rally to the defense of mysticism. It is the interpretation of 
mysticism and its relation to religion in general wliich forms the crux of the issue.
In all the discussions critical of Macmurray’s definition of religion, no mention is 
made of the pragmatic mode of religion—the magical-teclmical mode. When one reads 
the attacks on Macmurray’s definition what comes thiough clearly is the concern about 
religion being reduced to a form of this-worldly social activism. But this description fits 
better the depiction of the pragmatic mode of religion, the magical-teclmical.
That this third mode of religion is often overlooked is easily understood. First, 
most commentators have overlooked the importance of the triadic pattern in the Form of 
the Personal and so are not looking for a tliird mode. Second, MacmuiTay rarely spoke 
about it in any detail, since within his context the main threat to integral religion was the 
mystical idealistic mode so comnion in institutional Chiistianity.^^^ Integral religion does 
not deny the value of either magical or mystical religion, it merely recognizes that in 
isolation it is inadequate. Both must be integrated in a fully personal manner in integral 
religion.
One cannot help but wonder if Macmurray had been in another situation, contemporary Pentecostalism 
for example, if he would not have had more to say on the subject.
So in this way one sees agreement between Bnumer and Macmurray. “Feeling accompanies but does not 
determine faith. It is true of course that faith is not only an act of understanding and will but tiiat it is also a 
‘passion,’ and love in particular cannot be drought of apart from feeling. But feeling is not tire distinctive 
element, the domhiant and determining factor; it merely accompanies faith. In mystical religion, on tire 
otiier hand, feeling plays tire decisive part.” Bnmner, Man in Revolt., 252. Lirapitlaw, basing her argument 
on the analysis of Trethowan and otiiers (and tirerefore ignorant of die magical and integral modes of 
religious commmiion) laments die lack of die divine in Macmuixay and argues, based upon her 
luiderstanding of his overall philosophy, that diis is unnecessary (320-29). Her solution (329) is virtually 
identical to what Macmurray actually does with his du ee modes of religious communion.
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3.4.3.2 Adequacy: Doctrine, Ritual, 
and Worship
Wliereas the previous question was one of breadth, the ability to incorporate the 
many different notions of religion, the question here is one of adequacy: does 
Macmurray’s definition of religion describe the actual practices of religion? Here 
Macmurray is vulnerable, for he barely engages those elements most conunonly 
associated with religious practice: doctiine,^^^ ritual, and worship. hi light of the fact
that Macmurray claims to be basing his analysis upon religious experience tins oversight 
must be explained.
Although MacmuiTay does not addiess the subjects of ritual and doctrine in gieat 
detail, it is an integral part of his argument that there cannot be a religion which does not 
attend to ritual and doctiine and by logical necessity the tmthfiilness and satisfactory 
nature ofboth.^^^ Both are required but it is a question of the proper subordination of 
doctrine to ritual, for doctrine gives form to ritual, and then ritual to the reality of 
religious activity. Religious reflection is not complete if it ends with the consideration of 
the facticity of its doctrines. Likewise, religious reflection does not end with satisfaction 
in ritual. Belief is not mere intellectual assent, sbutintellectual assent united with 
emotional satisfaction in creative action.
In Macmmi'ay’s last book, written to a Quaker audience as a Quaker, he chides 
them for paying insufficient attention to both doctrine and ritual, the existence of each 
being obscured or denied in their own self-reflection. He praises the Quakers for avoiding
Fergusson raises die issue that a functionalist approach to religion typically ignores tlie importance of 
tmth claims in religion. Fergusson, John Macmurray^ 9.
Langford is concerned Üiat Macmurray’s definition of religion leaves out traditional forms of religious 
expression; rite, ritual, and worship of die wholly other. Langford, Natural Tiieology, 18.
“For we have now collected all the material necessary to enable us to understand the nature of religious 
experience, and so to define religion as a mode of personal experience. Until we imderstand what religion is 
we are in no position to ask whether it is valid or not, or how, if at all, its claims can be verified. We are 
concerned, therefore, with religion as a form of reflective activity, and with its origin in the structure of 
universal human experience. We are not concerned with its particular expressions in tiiis religion or diat, 
but with religion as such, as something people do, as a human activity." PR, 151.
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doctrinal conformity as a requirement of faith, but he faults them for not exploring
doctrmal possibilities more adequately. And though not requiring adherence to any one
system, he believes the Quakers should work very hai*d on several competing systems so
that their thinldng can mature through discussion and refinement of understanding. In
addition he points out that the minimalist ritual which exists among the Quakers is still a
ritual, and he encourages them to be more attentive in their approach, recognizing it for
what it is and acting accordingly.
While the description given of the place of ritual and doctrine in Macmun*ay’s
pliilosophy is accurate, it would be misleading not to acknowledge that Macmunay gives
relatively scant attention to the area of doctrine and ritual. There may be any number of
mimdane reasons why Macmurray failed to engage in a more thorough discussion of
doctrine and ritual, although concern to counter tendencies within institutional
Christianity towards idealism is the most likely reason. Wliatever the reason, it camiot
entirely erase the fact that this entire topic was given inadequate attention and raises
cautions about defining religion as reflection on coimnunity.
If the inattention given to  doctrine and ritual kindles suspicion, then the virtual
absence of worsliip ignites the fires of skepticism.
Wliere is there any room in this accormt for worship? Is there any room for the 
category of the holy? While a type of transcendence is attributed to God, the same
PR, 173-74.
SRR, 72-75. “I have expressed my conviction tliat tire refusal of doctrinal definition is fundamental, not 
only to our Quaker faitii, but also the recovery, by tire Church, of the reality of the Cluistian religion. I 
should like to add that the same is not true of our rejection of ritual. In tire first place, there is a confusion 
here. All religious activities in tire rrarrow sense—all activities of corporate worship, that is to say—are 
ritual activities. For they are reflective activities, which symbolize and refer to sometirhrg beyond 
themselves. Tire conmrimion which they achieve refers to a corrunorr life in the everyday world.” SRR, 74.
“Any dualistic mode of tlrhrking is incompatible with religion.” PR, 206. “All tlris [monastic 
withdr awal]—and I feel sure you will recognize it—is excellent Platonism. But it is not Clrristian at all. I 
have grave doubts, indeed, whetlrer idealism, in any form, is coirrpatible with religion." SRR, 59. “Religion 
is concerned in its reality witir two things—with actiorr aird witlr community. Idealism seeks to escape from 
action mto meditation; and from the tensiorrs of life in common mto the solitariness of one’s own spirit.” 
SRR, 59. “Macmunay is just as insistent as Marx tlrat the overcoming of alienation and suffermg, and tire 
completiorr of human nature, is a this-worldly affair aird can occur only within tire conditions of tire 
empirical world.” Frank G. Kirkpatrick, “Toward a Metaphysic of Community,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 38, iro. 4 (1985): 574.
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ti*anscendence of activity is found in man’s capacity for self-reflection; thus the 
distinguishing quality of God’s transcendence, wliich is an apotheosis of the 
capacity for reflection, is not at all clear. The problem is that the analogy between 
man as agent and God as Agent is so tightly drawn that the distinctiveness of the 
divine is not adequately indicated. Is the integiity of the other person to be 
identified with the holiness of God? Is there any qualitative distinction between 
the Agent who is God and the agent who is man? Such questions remain. 
Consequently, while the argument may point to a theistic conclusion, it does not 
point towards a worshipping conclusion.
Although White attempts to counter Langford’s blistering critique by noting the
genetic connection to biblical faith, the God who is Otlier, and tlie fact that the
community of persons includes God who is person,^^  ^his defense is ultimately unable to
explain Macmurray’s negligence in accounting for this primary and pervasive rehgious
practice. Wliy has Macmunay failed to sufficiently discuss worship?
While there are scattered references to worship, especially in the earlier writings,
one intriguing reference to worship in Macmurray’s corpus points to a possible solution
to this enigma, hr his last book Macmunay states:
All religion, I believe, rests on the experience of the presence of God. Tliis 
experience manifests itself in feelings of awe and in self-abasement, but it does 
not reveal the nature of God, only his majesty and power. This is why there is 
such variety in the conception of God in different religions. For the Clrristian, in 
his worship of God, there is, however, another, experience, that of the presence of 
Jesus Christ in and amongst the worshippers.^®^
This may be interpreted in the following way. First, all religions stem from the 
experience of God’s presence which results hr awe but contahis no real corrtent about 
God, except that God is awesome. However, in addition to this religious experierrce of 
God’s presence, there is a differerrt experience (“another experience”), worship, which
Langford, Natural Theology, 19. Hoffman, who applauds Macmurray’s starting point agrees, saying “A 
second query one might put to Macmurray concerns his failure to deal adequately with worship. Reference 
is made to it on occasion, but worship is never given tire place it deseiwes. For good reasons he has asserted 
that Iris analysis must start with human experience and not witir God, but to be adequate to the phenomena, 
such description carr hardly igirore the major role of worslrip.” Hoffman, 3.
“It is doubtful whether Langford would firrd the definition [of religiorr to tire social sphere] so limiting 
had he placed it in the context of Macmurray’s descriptive analysis of Hebrew and Clrristiair Community hr 
his ear lier works, for the whole range of social expression and cornmuirion are implied when Macmurxay 
speaks of persons in relation, along with the Personal Agent, whose iirtentioir they are.” Wlrite, 450 n. 1, 
refereircing Langford, Natural Theology.
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relies on Chi'isf s presence in and among the worshippers, and it is Christ who provides 
the content of the worship/®® In other words, religion is a human activity (and therefore 
to be considered in philosophy or natural theology), but worship is an act of God in the 
life of the Christian (and therefore outside the boundaiies of the discussion). If tliis is the 
correct reading of Macmurray’s idea of worship (in distinction to religion) ^®^ then there is 
a gi eat deal of similarity between this concept of worsliip and that of James Torrance.
At the very least, it does not exclude a trmitarian understanding of worship as described 
by Torrance.
On the one hand, Macmurray has a place in his philosophy for religion, his entire 
system appears theologically pre-conditioned and his definitions do not appear to stand 
blatantly opposed to Christian understandings of certain categories (even if there may be 
a need to expand them for theological purposes). On the other hand, even in light of his 
later statements, there is still a nagging concern regarding the place of worship and the 
divine. As Langford notes, there is a definite connection between concepts of God and 
worship. Is MacmuiTay’s model based on too tight an analogy between human and divine 
persons thereby eliminating wôrsliip as Langford suggests? Was worsliip simply outside
SRR, 53. It is possible to note some similarity between Macmunay’s position and Romans 1.18-24.
188 solution also has tlie added benefit of dealing witli Macmmxay’s almost agnostic attitude towards 
die knowledge of God, as will be seen in Chapter 4.
Langford mentions the distinction that Farmer makes between natural theology and natural religion. The 
first is the hypothetical positing of God’s existence, while die second is tlie universal experience of God. 
This is different than the position advanced to explain Macmurray’s understanding of worship, but it speaks 
to the issue that Christian tiieology and religion can have different fields. Langford, Theological Method, 
238. Gunton makes similar distinctions between theology of nature (a gift of biblical revelation), natural 
theology (attempts to prove existence of God through creation), and general revelation (revelation of God 
tluough die medium of created things requiring biblical enablement). Colin E. Gimtoii, A Brief Theology of 
Revelation, Warfield Lectmes 1993 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 40-63.
James Torrance, Worship, Community and the Triune God of Grace (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1996), 19-41. Toixance seems to group Macmurray witii the existential-experience understanding of 
worship (29) wliich Torrance sees as ultimately imitarian because of its anthropocentric notion of worship 
as something humans do. However, if the above interpretation is correct, and Macmurray sees worship as 
an act of God in the believer, diis places him in a position more open to die trinitarian view—although 
Macmurray himself does not articulate a trinitarian tiieology. In short, Macmurray’s position would not 
contradict a trinitarian interpretation of worship.
For a novel alternative to the solution suggested here, see Hoffman who attempts to utilize Macmurray’s 
philosophy and tiieii to surpass it by positing a primal human act of worship which is based upon a
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the parameters of the Gifford lectures and Macminray’s general project as a philosopher 
and not as a theologian?
3.5 C o n c lusio n
Thus equality and freedom are constitutive of community; and the democratic 
slogan, ‘Liberty, equality, fr aternity’, is an adequate definition of community—of 
the self-realization of person in relation/
The relational definition of person as the self-as-agent-in-relation-to-Other 
employed by Macmurray creates an extensive and highly integrated antlrropology. While 
being constituted ontologically by relationality, Macmiuray recognizes that the 
development of the person is reliant upon the manifestation or realization of its 
constituent parts: mutuality, freedom, and equality.. Equality stresses the essential 
commonality between persons without ignoring the vital differences of particular persons. 
Freedom is the capacity to act, the integration of power and desire in conformity to 
reality. Mutuality emphasizes knowledge, love, and commimion with the Other. In their 
complete realization the fullness of relationship between persons is achieved. A person, in 
short, is one who, as an equal, freely knows, loves, and communes with God and Others, 
thus realizing the personal universe. _ ,
Tliis discussion of the anthropological dimension of Macmurray’s thought also 
raises a number of issues. First, it is clear that Macmurray has not successfully 
cormnunicated his understanding of Personal logic. The numerous dualistic readings 
stand as testimony to this fact. Second, and more important from a theological 
perspective, is the perplexing natm e of worsliip within the general schema. Is worship left 
out of Macmurray’s account of religion because it is not a human activity? Is it simply 
ignored because of Macmurray’s discomfort with other-Mforldly and spiritual ideas of
prevenieiit act of God in tlie structuring of personhood. Hoffhian, 4-6. However, one wonders if  Hoffman’s 
formulation is able to escape Toixance’s category of unitarianism.
PR, 158.
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religion? Or does this reveal a basic inadequacy in the antliropology? The third issue is 
the general question of MacmuiTay’s doctiine of God. What is Macmiuray’s 
imderstanding of the nature of the continuity between human and divine person(s) and 
between divine person(s) and the creation? To even begin to answer tliis question the 
focus must now turn towards Macmunay’s personalist natiual theology.
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CHAPTER 4
THE THEOLOGICAL DIMENSION:
THE PERSONAL GOD
Who then is the Other in relation to Wliom all find themselves in a complete self­
transcendence? The Other can only be an infinite person, Wlio is at once the 
Father of men and the Creator of the world. For the Other must be personal— 
since he is one tenn in a personal relationsliip: He must be infinite and eternal— 
because he must be the same for all persons at all times—the same yesterday, 
today, and for ever; and since the ordinary experience of personal relation is 
necessarily a unity in co-operation, directed towards natm*e and upon nature, he 
must unify the natural with the personal.^
Wliat exactly does Macmurray mean when he states that God must be personal? 
How does Jesus fit witliin liis overall concept of God? Is there a difference between 
human and divine persons, or is Macmunay’s God merely a Feuerbachian 
antliropomorphic projection onto the clouds of heaven? In this chapter Macmunay’s 
doctrine of God will be explored answering these questions. This natinal theology^ will 
follow the triadic heuristic pattern of the apperceptions reflecting on the Other in isolation 
(the I t \  in relation to its environment (the I-It), and finally in flilly interactive mutuality 
(the I-You). When applied to reflection upon God this triad translates into the 
consideration of God as mental object or idea (theology proper), God as historical object 
(cliristology), and God as interactive Other (pneumatology).
Although the layout follows a somewhat traditional pattern (theology, cliristology, 
pneumatology) it is important to note at the outset that Macmiuray’s doctrine of God is 
not trinitar ian in any recognizable sense of the word. Yet, as his position is unfolded it
‘ RAS, 59.
 ^In Macmmiay’s understanding, natural theology is essentially philosophy (PR, 224). In this section, 
however, natural theology is being used in a more narrow sense. Theology is here being used to refer to the
will become clear that Macmimay’s theology is not antithetical to trinitarianism. One 
may characterize Macmiuray’s attitude towards the doctrine of the Trinity as one of 
agnosticism. As will be shown, this results in a number of questions being left 
unanswered and unnecessairly limits Macmiuray’s theology.
In light of the previous two chapters’ insistence that religion is a human activity 
open to investigation, questions about the comiection of religion and deity must be 
considered. It will be remembered that according to Macmiuray, religion is reflection 
intending to reconcile and sti*engthen persons in community through symbolic action 
wliich is the celebration of communion. While this definition of religion seems to exclude 
God it does not, for religion is humanity’s search for God, the consciousness of life in 
God, and the expression of the experience of God’s power and majesty.^ The impoitant 
point at this jimcture is the affirmation of the connection of religion and God providing 
epistemological wanant for the consideration of God as an object of reflection because, at 
least in some form, God has been experienced by persons.
4.1 N a tur a l  Th eo lo g y  Pr o pe r :
G od a s  M en ta l  Ob jec t—
THE Un iversal  Per so n a l  O thers
The argiunent which starts from the primacy of the practical moves steadily in the 
direction of a belief in God. To thinlc the world in practical teims is ultimately to 
think die imity of the world as one action, and therefore as informed by a unifying 
intention. It may, indeed, prove possible to tliinlc the process of the world as 
intentional without thinking a supreme Agent whose act the world is. But prima 
facie, at least, it is not possible to do so."^
doctrine of God—theology proper. It is still philosophical or natural in tliat Macmimay avoids recourse to 
divine revelation or argument from authority.
 ^In some respects Macmurray’s view of religion is closer to that expressed by Barth and Brumier who both 
see religion as a human activity, yet he differs especially from Barth in seeing a positive value to religion 
while acknowledging its incompleteness and limitations. See K. G. Howkins, “Religion” in NDT, 575-76. It 
is interesting to note tliat Macmurray may be truer to biblical conceptions of religion tlian are many of his 
opponents who wish to see a greater divine dimension to rehgion (see Paul’s discussion of tlie limitations of 
the piimacle of human religions, Judaism, in Romans) or those who wish to discoiuit it totally (James 1:26- 
27).
‘‘ SA, 221-22.
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Macmurray’s Gifford lectures may be seen as one extended argimient for the 
reasonableness of the idea of God. He begins with empirical observations about the self 
as agent and persons in relation to airive at the necessary idea of God as the supreme 
agent and absolute person. This treats God pragmatically as a functional idea, and hence 
fits into MacmuiTay’s hemistic paradigm of the It? In this section, tliis necessary 
conception of God will be explored, followed by the posing of critical questions about 
revelation, ontological demarcation, and idealism for this theology,
4.1.1 G o d  as Universal Personal Other
It has already been seen in the previous discussions of Macmurray’s philosophy 
that starting from the concept of the self as agent and the unity of history he builds an 
imderstanding of the universe as an action rather than as an event, wliich therefore 
necessitates an original, unlimited, and universal Agent^ to intend the universal action.^ 
Implicit within this understanding of the universe as the action of God, is the notion of 
God as creator. Wliile Macmurray does not address the issue of creation ex nihilo, he 
clearly sees God as the solitary creator of the universe.^ God, as the supreme Agent or 
worker,^ is continually involved in creation in.,an ongoing manner, contiary to any deistic 
concepts of a clockwork universe.However, God is more Üian absolute agent—God is 
person-in-relation and one must therefore consider the relational nature of ultimate 
reality.
 ^This is similar to Kant’s use of the idea of God as necessary for moral obligation to exist. Allen, 217-18.
® For the phrase “original, unlimited, and universal agent” see SRR, 44.
 ^See the final chapter of SA, “The World as One Action”, 203-22, esp. 217, 222.
® For example, PR, 222.
 ^CH, 32-33; see also White, 453-54.
“The second part of the answer [to the question of evil] is that Hie divine creation is continuing. It goes 
on, God did not become a sleeping partner with the creation of Man. If Man has set his will against God’s 
(as clearly he has) the purpose of God still stands and must be realized. In the recognition of the Fall tiiere is 
aheady tlie promise of a redemption. And to see this is to discover history, as the Hebrews did, and with it a 
religious interpretation of history as the work of God for the salvation of the world, in spite of and even 
through the opposition of human wills.” SRR, 46.
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It is axiomatic for Macmiuray that reflection begins witli a problem. Therefore, 
just as the discussion of tmth revolves around the problem of error, religious reflection 
engages the problem of broken relations. Sin and evil exist in human experience, 
destroying community and must therefore be overcome to reestablish fellowsliip.
There is, then, only one way in which we can think om* relation to the 
world, and that is to thinlc it as a personal relation, through the fonn of the 
personal. We must think that the world is one action, and that its impersonal 
aspect is the negative aspect of this unity of actions, contained in it, subordinated 
within it, and necessary to its constitution. To conceive the world thus is to 
conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and oiuselves as created 
agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can 
be realized only on the condition that oui" intentions are in harmony with His 
intention, and which must frristi ate itself if they are not.^^
As supreme Agent, God’s intention will be realized and any hiunan intention 
which rims counter to God’s is ultimately self-frustrating and self-defeatmg. This is not 
tyramiical on God’s pail for it is God’s intention that humanity and all creation realize its 
natiue as created by God.^  ^The divinely created human natme is to be self-transcendent, 
interacting with the Other in terms of the Other. For hiunanity this means living in a state 
of peaceful mutuality and communion. Failure to do so is sin—a sundering of 
relationsliip.. Sin is a question of estrangement, not ignorance. It is caused by fear and
" PR, 222.
“Hie principle through which Jesus achieves tliis unification is fundamentally simple, though its 
application and expressions are manifold. It is that hiunan intentions which are opposed to tlie intention of 
God for man are necessarily self-frustrating. When men set out to realize an intention which is contrary to 
the divhie intention, they do not achieve it. They achieve something tliat they did not intend. If the intention 
is tlie opposite of die divine intention, Üieii diey necessarily achieve, not what they intended, but its 
opposite. This principle is not an ‘act of faith’: it is a discovery of reason. Its necessity is a logical necessity. 
There is no need for an ‘intervention’ of God to frustrate the purposes of men who are in opposition to him, 
since tliey cannot be in opposition to him witliout being in opposition to tliemselves. Tliey themselves are, 
after all, God’s act, and liis intention is embodied in their natiue. To act in defiance of the will of God is to 
intend the impossible. The resulting action cannot tiien achieve what we intend. It will be a failure, from our 
pomt of view. But tliat does not mean that we have achieved nothing. On the contrary, we have achieved 
something which we did not intend. The situation we have produced is not determined by oiu intention. It is 
determined by tlie natiue of reality, by the natiue of oiu own reality, which we are negating as much as by 
tlie natiue of the reality on which we act. And what is Reality but that which operates by the intention of 
God. Thus, whether our intention conforms to the purpose of God or opposes it, we cannot achieve anytliing 
but the purpose of God.” CH, 95-96.
“At once we face the problem of evil—not the problem of ignorance, as in tlie thought of Socrates or 
Plato.... Evil then is sin and shi is a personal conflict of wills. Since religion is about community, a clash of 
will between men and God must express itself in the breaking of community—as a clash of wills between
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hatred directed towards the Other. '^  ^Rather than being real persons characterized by 
heterocentric love, egocentric fear and hatr ed become habituated, controlling persons and 
rendering them unreal.^^ The presence of sin and evil signals the Fall of hiimanity^^ and 
with it the need for reconciliation and redemption.
Because sin and evil are conflict witli God’s imiversal intention, sin will always 
result in the breakdown of commimion within the human dimension; sin is inherently 
social destroying human reciprocity and mutuality. The irony is that while reconciliation 
is needed between persons, it cannot be accomplished because tlie parties are estranged.
mail and man. Indeed since die purpose of God for man is man’s tme natiue, in being at enmity with God 
he is at odds with himself.” SRR, 44-45. See also CH, 68 for sin as estrangement.
M “pjijs mutuality of liahed as the motive of a negative relation of persons is clearly an evil. Hatred itself, 
as an original and necessary motive in the constitution of the personal, is perhaps what is referred to by 
theology as original sin. At any rate, the distinction we have just drawn between a positive and a negative 
relation of persons is the origin of the distinction between good and evil.” PR, 75.
PR, 105. Macmurray sees this happening either gradually or tluough dramatic conversion. Langford 
questions if this habituation of apperception as die expression of sin is strong enough to carry the reality of 
sin. Langford, Natiual Theology, 20.
“Hence, die Fall of man merely describes the conditions under which God now works for die redemption 
of die world. And the inevitability of the redemption is an obvious corollary of the conception of God. The 
Fall of man becomes itself part of die process of die creation of the world, and history the process by which 
the intention of God for human life is being carried out. Where God is conceived as Agent the world is 
conceived as his act, and in that case ... the criterion of reality must be the continuity of intention. And diis 
intention becomes, with die Fall, the intention of reconciliation, and dierefore can only be achieved tiuough 
an operation upon the will of man. By thus doing justice both to die existence of evil and to the goodness of 
God and his creation, the Hebrew consciousness escapes from dualism and retains an integral consciousness 
of the world. This integrity is its complete rationality. If enables it to diink the whole of experience (and not 
merely the whole of reflective experience) as a unity, and a necessary unity. But die necessity is no 
mechanical determinism, which could not even allow for die reahty of growth. Neidier is it a necessary 
process of natural development, which would not account for the reality of evil; but the necessity of a co­
operation between man and God for the realization, in actuality, of die true natiue of man. ‘My father 
worketh hitherto, and I work.’” CH, 37-38.
“If this basic problem of personal life could be resolved, if die negative motive could finally and 
completely be subordinated to die positive, in all personal activity, the redemptive function of religion 
would be complete; and only its central activity would remain. Religion would dien be simply the 
celebration of commimion—of the fellowship of all diings in God; Meanwhile, it sustains the intention to 
achieve this fellowsliip.” PR, 165.
“One aspect of diis is of special importance. If a relation between two persons is broken m diis way, the 
reflective activity which is concerned with its restoration ceases to be mutual. The individuals become 
separated and isolated in their conscious life. Each of diem feels wronged by die odier, die natiual tendency 
of each in reflection is, dierefore, to accuse the other, to fix the blame for die break upon the otiier, and so to 
increase his own isolation and to diwart tendencies to reconciliation. In diat state of alienation reconciliation 
is impossible, and will remain impossible unless it is altered. The paradox of the situation is that the state of 
consciousness which needs die reconciliation, makes die reconciliation impossible. What is required is 
repentance; is that the state of consciousness should be radically altered. But how can a state of 
consciousness alter itself in opposition to its own natiue. Tliat is die somce of die dilemma which expresses 
itself in die religious paradox frat man is helpless to save himself from sin and yet that his salvation can 
only come about tiuough his own free action. How can two isolated individuals act mutually? How can die 
isolation be overcome except by a mutual act? Tins problem must have a solution, because die thing
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Therefore, what is needed is an Other who stands in identical relation with each member 
of the commimity who can function as the agent of reconciliation. The idea of this Other 
is the idea of God.^^
Various religions have various concepts of God based upon their experience of 
relationship: in some societies the community is based upon kinship—resulting in 
ancestor worship as an attempt to unite the tribe tlirough time.^ ® For others, such as the 
cult of the Roman emperor, it is boimd by a living political leader.^ ^ In short, one can see 
that for Macmurray, while God creates humanity in his image, humanity also creates its 
conception of God in its image.^^ This is especially true in its conception of society and 
human relations.^^ Once one moves beyond naiTow conceptions of commimity based 
upon Idnship, geography, or politics and towards a broad conception intending the 
inclusion of all humanity, one requires an Other who (at least potentially) stands in 
relation to all h u m an i ty Y e t  if this Other is to effect reconciliation and overcome fear- 
arid hatred, then he or she must not only stand in relation to all human persons in all 
places at all times, this Other must also overcome humanity’s fear* of (and hence 
estrangement from) nature and must also therefore stand in direct relation to all creation 
throughout the space-time continuum. Therefore, what is needed is a miiversal Other who
happens again and again in our experience. Religion seeks to understand and to make available the means 
for its universal solution.” SRE, 49-50.
It is unclear whether Macmunay considers God as one of the persons who is estranged by the sin, as one 
who stands outside of die division, or bodi at die same time (classical Christological understandings of 
Jesus as die Mediator who is both truly human and truly divine).
PR, 164.
CF, 64.
^  “For though it is truth of fact that God mad Man in Ms own image, it is also true that man makes Ms 
conception of God in his, so that immature man has an immature conception of die Divine.... I should like 
to add one thing more to the analysis, wliich might possibly explain why this religious structure takes die 
form it does. My conjecture is that it is governed by the sense of an unseen presence, of somediing more hi 
our experience which is somehow personal, which transcends our familiar experience of life in common, 
and yet which faces us when we reflect deeply upon oui' everyday activities. In our own terms it is die 
experience of the presence of God.” SRR, 34; see also CH, 33, Here one observes the mutual informing 
aspect of Macmun ay’s epistemology. Community infomis the idea of God, yet God infonns die concept of 
commumty. It is dius not a linear but reciprocal model.
CH, 39-40.
SRE 49, 57.
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stands in direct relation with all creation (hiunan and non-human) at all times. This is the
fullest development of the religious idea of God.^^
MacmuiTay’s contention that God is the completion or fulfillment of human
relations is not without controversy. Langford, for example, is critical for he sees this line
of reasoning leading towards divine dependence upon humanity.
It must be made clear that MacmuiTay intends by ‘religion’ the relationship 
between men in their common unity or community. Since his eaiTy essays he has 
insisted that ‘God,’ or the Personal Other, is laiown through relation with persons. 
Thus he quotes Blake with approval: ‘God only exists and is in existing beings or 
men.’ What he seems to understand by tliis assertion is that there is in the 
community of men a fulhiess, an esprit de corps, a more inclusive dimension of 
experience, which can only be described as ‘Other.’ God, consequently, is defined 
always in terms of the completeness of human relationships.^^
However, expressing Macmunay’s point in more traditional language serves to 
mitigate much of the problem. If community is love in action, then to know God means to 
love one another. Knowledge of God is therefore the completion of human relations.^^ 
Jolm A. T. Robinson conectly makes this comiection, but then accuses Macmunay of 
inverting God is love, to the tlieologically fallacious love is God?^ Yet, as Tonance notes, 
this is to misunderstand Macmun ay’s notion of the rationality of the object.^^ Just as God 
is love does not mean love is God, so too God is human community does not mean hiunan 
community is God.
4.1.2 Limits of Natural Theology
There are a number of advantages, especially fiom a Christian perspective, to 
Macmurray’s natural theology (proper). In its minimalism it affinns several key doctrines 
about God as well as bemg a helpful apologetic for the reasonableness of belief in God. 
However, there are a number of serious questions wliich must be asked of it. These may
RAS, 59. SA 72; PR, 164-69, 212-14.
Langford, Natural Theology, 15 citing RE, 210. See RE, 208-10.
See 1 John 4:7-8.
Jolui A.T. Robinson, Honest to God (London: SCM Press, 1963), 52-53.
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be considered under the rubrics of natural theology and the natme of revelation, 
ontological demarcation, and idealism.
4.1.2.1 Natural Theology and
the Nature of Revelation
Natm-al theology, as it is commonly understood, is intimately connected with the
topic of revelation. The most common distinction is to view natm al theology as
depending solely upon natural (or general) revelation which is available to all, while
dogmatic theology rests upon special revelation—typically grounded in the authority of a
person, an institution, or scriptmre.
There is, however, a certain ambiguity in Macmurray’s use of the categoiy of
revelation which leads to an inconsistency, or at the very least an inadequacy, in his
imderstanding of revelation and therefore functions reductionistically in infoiming his
idea of God. Within his milieu, one can see a common distinction being diawn between
natural and dogmatic theology. No less a theologian tlian Karl Barth can be heard to
embrace tliis distinction and reject the validity of natural theology in favor of dogmatics.^®
Macmurray has a strong apologetic concern and does not want to abandon the field of
natmal theology. Added to tins apologetic concern one must admit that in general
Macmunay is resistant to arguments fiom authority on sheer principle.
Science exchanged certainty for an increasing probability in knowledge, 
guaianteed by practical acliievement. Theology demanded certainty, and was 
prepared to guarantee certainty by authority. In this it revealed its own mneality. 
For the demand for certainty is the reflective aspect of the demand for security; 
and the demand for security is the expression of fear, and betrays the dominance
Thomas F. Tonance, God and Rationality (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 81. See also J.A.B. 
Holland, “The Debate about Honest to GodP Scottish Journal o f Theology 17 (1964): 268-69.
Tins is, no doubt, an oversimplification of Bartli’s position, but in the main it is true—or at least 
commonly accepted, especially in light of the famous Barth-Bnumer debate. For a more careful 
consideration of die totality of the debate see Trevor Hart, “The Capacity for Ambiguity; Revisiting die 
Bardi-Brunner Debate” in (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1999), 139-72. With regard
to Barth’s Wholly-Odier God, see RAS, 48.
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of the negative in our motivation. As we have seen, a negatively motivated 
religion is unreal.^ ^
Forced to choose between a rational and apologetic natuial theology or an 
authoritative and insular dogmatic theology, MacmuiTay opts for natural theology, hi 
light of liis overall philosophy, however, one is surprised that he does not see the 
dichotomy for what it is—yet another instance of modem dualism manifesting itself in 
theology. Besides the integrating nature of the Fonn of the Personal, the natme of 
personal revelation itself should have alerted him to the lacuna in liis system. For he 
affirms that all personal knowledge is by revelation,^^ and therefore loiowledge of God, 
who is personal, requires God to reveal himself. But what exactly is the nature of the 
revelatory act? It is here where Macmurray’s thinking becomes imprecise, for on the one 
hand all true action (as opposed to event) is revelatory, but on the other hand the mere 
observation of action is insufficient to fully actualize revelation.
MacmuiTay recognizes the inlierent difficulty of detennining personal knowledge 
through obseiwation alone, since the intention may not be apparent, deceit may be 
involved, or if it is an accident there may be no intention at all. Because of this, he sees 
the necessity that all revelation must be mutual between two parties, that it is 
simultaneously revelation to the Other and self-revelation, and ultimately revelation is 
bommmiication. While all actions are potentially communicative, some types of action 
aie clearly more able than others—and according to Macmurray “language is the major 
veliicle of human communication.”^^  The wide variety of beliefs about God would seem 
to witness to the ambiguity of nature and natural revelation alone in providing one’s 
knowledge of God.^ "^
PR, 216-17.
See PR, 169-70 and RAS, 56. 
PR, 12.
'^^SRR, 53.
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When one considers the obvious need for more specific foims of communicative 
action to alleviate the problems of misunderstanding (not that misimderstanding can ever 
be completely eliminated), it seems odd indeed that Macmurray limits himself to those 
actions with the least communicative claiity—natural revelation. It is possible to 
recognize the apologetic reasons for this move, but once the point about revelation has 
been made one would expect Macmurray to dispense with the pretense and interact more 
fully with special revelation.^^ Instead of a holistic and integrated system where more 
overtly communicative acts and more ambiguously perceived actions are mutually 
infoiming, one is left with only one side of the revelatoiy continuum.^^
A further issue raised by Macmurray’s treatment of revelation has significance 
theologically. Revelation, as communication, is mutual (as opposed to the monological 
nature of expression). This assumes the desire of both parties to communicate. However, 
if one considers the effects of sin in human life then it is possible for a human to not 
engage in this communicative process. And if self-loiowledge is dependent upon self­
revelation what does this say regarding God’s dependence upon creation and sinful 
hmnanity for God’s self-loiowledge? If God exists as Trinity, then God’s revelation and 
self-discovery are possible without dependence upon creation. If God is not trimie, then 
God’s loiowledge of self is solely dependent upon, and therefore may be fiiistrated by, 
creation, hi particular, humanity’s possible rejection of relationsliip and communication 
of God would seem to jeopardize God’s self-knowledge and place his deity into question. 
Of course, it is also possible to pictme God as triime and yet still deriving certain aspects 
of self-knowledge from lislcy interaction with creation.
Fergusson underlines tlie inadequacy of revelation in Macmimay’s tiieology, particularly as it relates to 
die content (prepositional) dimension. Fergusson, John Macmurray, 22.
Colin Gimton makes an excellent argument for de-coupling natural theology and general revelation, 
seeing general revelation relying upon special revelation. Gunton, Brief Theology o f Revelation, 55-61.
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It should also be noted that MacmuiTay’s concept of revelation witliin the larger 
framework of community allows him to escape the criticisms of dialogical personalism 
which focuses too narrowly on linear communicative models and the naiTowly subjective 
concerns of the enlightenment which often captured his theological contemporaries such 
as Barth and Brunner. Communion is ultimately of more theological significance than 
revelation, yet revelation is essential to communion.^^
4.1.2.2 Ontological Demarcation
Macmun ay’s use of relational tenninology for God causes questions to aiise
about the distinction between God and creation in his thought, both in delineating human
and divine persons as well as the general question of pantheism in his doctrine of God.
One might, for instance, interpret the following passage as eradicating the ontological
distinction between human and divine persons.
It is only in relation to others that we exist as persons; we are invested with 
significance by others who have need of us; and boiTow om* reality from those 
who care for us. We live and move and have our being not in ourselves but in one 
another; and what rights or powers or freedom we possess are ours by the grace 
and favour of oui* fellows.^^
By modifying the words of Acts 17:28 so that humans live in one another (instead of in 
God) it would seem that there is a collapsing of deity and humanity within Macmurray’s 
philosophy that is not commensuiate with Chiistianity.
This obstacle may be overcome, at least in part, by considering Macmurray’s 
understanding of the role of the relationship between the finite and the infuiite. Just as
For revelation existing witliin communal consideration, see A. Torrance, Persons in Communion, 364, 
and Williams, Revelation and Reconciliation. Gunton specifically ascribes Barth’s fixation on revelation as 
a consequence of die influence of the enlightenment. Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology 
(Edmburgh: T & T  Clark, 1991), 4-5. On criticisms of dialogical personalism see Wolfliait Pannenberg, 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1985), 180-83; Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 199; Michael Welker, God the Spirit, trans. Jolm F. 
Hoffimeyer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 43-48,154, n. 60. Because McFadyen bases his 
anthropology so clearly upon the dialogical and commimicative aspects of the I-Thou as used by Buber and 
Bartii, his work suffers from the basic flaws identified witii dialogical personalism.
PR, 211,
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scientists do not study matter as such, but only discrete finite occun ences of Matter, and 
truth is always a particulai* instance of Truth, so too finite persons ai e related to infinite 
Person. One begins to imderstand the infinite by experience and interaction with the 
finite.^^ However, language of the finite in the infinite immediately births concerns 
regarding pantheism.
Macmurray flatly rejects pantheism, seeing it as an outgi'owtli of a sub-personal 
organic mode of reflection."^® He clearly believes in a distinction between God and 
creation. Yet, one wonders how, in light of his understanding of the hiunan person, he can 
maintain this separation. The answer lies, once again, in his employment of Personal 
logic. Just as human persons aie mutually constituting, yet distinct, so too God as 
personal is constituted by his relation to other persons—and by extension creation—and 
yet can be distinct fi'om creation."^  ^God transcends creation, yet is immanent to it,"^  ^Yet, 
Macmunay never explicitly states how God is both transcendent and immanent. This 
leaves his position open to a vaiiety of solutions, including both panentheism and creation 
ex nihilo, depending upon how one understands Deus ad intra. Macmurray, himself, is 
agnostic here and does not speculate on the nature of God ad intra and so one is 
ultimately imable to determine his view, if any, on this issue."^  ^For, if one holds a more 
traditional trinitarian view, then the other persons of the Trinity fiinction as the necessary 
Other and therefore creation may be imderstood not as necessary but as a flee out-flowing 
of God’s love. If God is not triime, tlien creation becomes necessaiy for God’s 
personliood, for a person must have an Other, and that Other must also be personal. And 
since the negative wliich constitutes the positive is distinct, one is left with panentheism.
See for example, Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 193.
“The first is that tlie conception of God at which we have arrived is not pantheistic. Pantheism results 
from tlie attempt to give religious coloiu to an organic conception of the world. A personal conception 
alone is fully theistic and fiilly religious.” PR, 223. See also Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 189. 
Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 190.
PR, 223.
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not pantheism." "^  ^Naturally, it may be the case that one is tiinitarian and still holds to 
panentheism, but the point here is that Macmunay’s position is not antithetical to a 
trinitarian conception of God.
Even if one is convinced that Macmunay’s theology is not pantheistic, one is still 
left with concerns that there may be too close an analogy between human and divine 
persons in Macmurray’s conceptualization. Langford expresses particular concern that 
humans are described as capable of transcendence, a category he would reserve for God 
alone."^  ^Yet one must question Langford here, for it is undisputed that humans have an 
ability to tianscend their situation—an ability to step back and look at things from a 
different perspective. What Langford should defend is God’s ultimate and supreme 
transcendence, God’s ability to interact objectively with all creation and God-self. This is 
precisely what Macmurray means when he refers to God as the unlimited rational being."*® 
Humans, by contrast, ai e only able to be objective within the Imiits of creation and only 
imperfectly tliis side of the eschaton.
Moreover, MacmiuTay guards against too close an analogy between human and 
divine persons through at leastthfee means. First he states categorically that God is 
beyond person:
Demythologizers and searchers for a ‘modem image’ of God may take exception 
to the language of these paragraphs. While welcoming the claim for freedom of 
thought in religion wliich they embody, I believe that there is a danger that they
Macmunay is very comfortable, probably too comfortable, with a minimalist theology. RAS, 77.
Tillich, however, would dispute the distinction, saying that no one, m fact, believes in pantheism as 
commonly defined. What he describes as pantheism demonstrates marked smiilarity to panentlieism as 
defined, for example, by Moltmann. Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant 
Theology, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 94-95. Moltmann, Trinity and the 
Kingdom, 108-14; Expeiiences in Theology, 310-12.
“Wiiile a type of transcendence is attributed to God, the same transcendence of activity is found in man’s 
capacity for self-reflection; thus tlie distinguishing quality of God’s transcendence, which is an apotlieosis 
of the capacity for reflection, is not at all clear.” Langford, Natiual Theology, 19. In this Langford is at least 
bemg consistent, for his primary critique of Macmim ay is that he should really see humanity as essentially 
a tliinker.
“As an ideal limit of personal being [action and thinking], it is the concept of an unlimited rational being, 
in which all the capacities of the Self are in fiill and unrestricted employment. As limited and finite persons, 
such a fulhiess of positive being lies beyond our range.” SA, 87. Recalling that Macmurray defines 
rationality as objectivity in a non-rationalistic sense.
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should go too far. Science cannot provide canons for religious language. Probably 
all religious language, certainly all religious language about God, must contain a 
mythological element, since it must spealc, in terms of our ordinary experience, of 
what lies beyond it. The highest, richest and rarest qualities in our experience of 
hiunan personality, such as tlie creative spontaneity, provide the most adequate 
basis for our characterization of God. Even tliese, of course, ai e inadequate, and 
we have to use them mythologically. God is beyond the personal, of course; but it 
is the personal in our experience which points in the direction of God, and 
provides the most adequate language we possess for references to God."*’
Second, the use of qualifying adjectives (such as ultimate, supreme, absolute, unlimited)
provide a linguistic pointer to distance the normal use of the term person and the
modified usage ofperson when applied to the divine. Third, Macmuiray often uses tlie
adjectival îoxm, personal, thereby implying that God shares characteristics with persons
without limiting God merely to the concept of person. Just as a human being is material
without necessarily being Ihnited to matter, God is personal without necessarily being
limited to personliood.
Kirkpatrick, however, is of the opinion that Macmurray places too much distance
between human and divine persons in this and similar* passages. He constructs an
elaborate ar gument that he intends to utilize in order to justify speaking of God not just as
personal but as a person."*  ^He affirms that one’s idea of the imiversal personal Other
cannot be less than personal, but attacks the idea that it can be beyond the personal."*^
Our reply, which is based upon Macmurray’s principles if not his exphcit 
argument, would be that what is more than personal cannot be an object of 
thought (and hence we could not Imow if the Other* were more than personal). ...
If the person is liiniself not more than personal in any way, then he carmot 
categorize the Other as more than personal, since the Other is determined in 
mutually reciprocal categories.®®
Kirkpatrick admits that God could be more than personal but that “Macmurray’s 
epistemology limits us, however, to talking about and conceiving only what can be
SRR, 45,n.l.
Kirkpatrick, Idea o f God, 158. 
Kirkpatrick, Idea of God, 159. 
Kirkpatrick, Idea o f God, 159-60.
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experienced and thus known.”®* Therefore he views Macmurray’s statement as an 
example of an otherworldly supematui alism which is inconsistent with the Form of the 
Personal and therefore a slip back into modem dualism.®’
There are several errors within Kirlcpatrick’s line of reasoning. The most 
important stems from his interpretation of Macmurray’s epistemology. Tlris critical 
faihne is in seeing that for Macmurray, knowledge is not to be equated with reflection or 
conceptualization. At least as far back as Interpreting the Universe Macrnurr ay has held 
that there is knowledge which is pre-reflective and wliich reflection presupposes. 
Tliroughout his analysis Kirkpatrick slides back and forth between viewing knowledge as 
being reflective or conceptual and being equated with experience. Note carefully 
Kirlqratrick’s line of reasoning in the first quotation: if it carmot be thought, it cannot be 
known. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of Macmurray’s actual epistemology 
where one can have an experience (and thereby loiowledge) which one cannot explain or 
does not imderstand.®®
Furthermore, human experience is full of encoimters between those who are 
gr eater or lesser in one way or‘another. While it is often difficult to understand someone 
who is one’s intellectual or moral superior and the resulting knowledge is often imprecise 
and vague, it is not difficult to recognize and imderstand that they are, in fact, beyond 
oneself. This adjectival modification of the primary category is not then nonsensical, it is
Kirkpatrick, Idea of God, 160. However, when Kirkpatrick established tliis pomt in his consideration of 
Macmunay’s epistemology, he conceded that Macmurray never argued Üiis and tliat diis is his own 
argument "based on my own understanding of the implications of Macmurray’s position witii regaid to this 
question and should not be construed as Macmunay’s own reply.” Kirkpatrick, Idea o f God, 115, n. 18.
Kirkpatrick, Idea o f God, 162-64. Kirkpatrick cites Macmunay’s own admission that he may slip 
unaware back into dualism from time to time (SA, 14).
Tliis shows just how pervasive tiie Cartesian equation of thought and knowledge is. Kirkpatrick spends a 
considerable effort in layhig out tlie relation of experience, knowledge, and thought, recognizing that 
tiiought presupposes knowledge. However a close reading leaves one questioning whetiier he truly 
recognizes tlie distinction between knowledge and thought—although he specifically cites Macmurray 
concerning pre-reflective knowledge. See Kirkpatrick, Idea o f God, 48-57. The second citation by 
Kirkpatrick above is absolutely correct—one cannot talk about that which one has not experienced—but 
tills is not a synunetrical relation.
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simply a recognition of the limitations of conceptuality and language. It is, to use more 
common terms, applying metaphorical or analogical language—what Macmunay would 
call mythological language.®"*
Nor is the idea of beyond inherently dualistic, for as Personal logic is able to 
integrate lower levels into higher levels in a non-dualistic mamier, one may assume that 
which is at least personal would likewise be able to integi ate various levels of reality.
The entire controversy about whether to refer to God as a person or to refer to 
God as at least personal is partly a reflection of the larger issue about trinitarianism and 
the applicability of Macmurray’s philosophy to trinitarian categories.®® If God is a person, 
then how can God be tlrree persons? It would seem that Macmunay wants to avoid the 
entire debate about the nature of God ad intra. Note in the quotation above that tallc about 
God, which is beyond our normal experience (i.e., not God for us, but God for God-self) 
is necessarily mythological.®® Macmurray instead focuses upon God’s interaction with 
himianity and therefore limits himself to the description of God ad extra. This results in a 
position akin to Pannenberg who, as sununarized by Peters, holds: “When God confronts 
the world tluough personal relâtidhship, it will be as Father, as Son, or as Spirit. It will
Mark Johnson argues like Macmurray tliat all thought is at root imaginative and fmtlier Johnson 
convincingly demonstrates tlie basis of reflection upon embodied metaphor. Jolmson’s description of tlie in- 
out and related contaimnent schemata would be applicable to tlie concept of beyond. Mark Johnson, 30-40.
“Schleierniacher, who is sometimes called in Protestant circles the Father of Modem Theology, stated 
explicitly that as a philosopher he could not accept the personality of God, tliough die idea might be useful 
ill religious experience, or even necessary to religious life. The result of tliis view is to concede diat 
religion, in its specifically religious character, is subjective and diat, therefore, any attempt to know reality 
in its objective nature must pass beyond religion and treat it as a phantasy of die child-life of humanity.”
RE, 214-15.
For an interesting discussion of the history of the controversy of referring to God as a person and 
its relation to trinitarian dieology of the diree-personed God, see Ian Ramsey, “A Personal God,” in 
Prospect for Theology: Essays in Honour o f H. H. Farmer, ed. F. G. Healey (Digswell Place: Nisbet, 1966), 
55-71.
Again, Kirkpatrick has an excellent passage on the theoretical basis for diis in Macmurray’s thought {Idea 
o f God, 86-87) but when he analyzes die passage on mythological language (SRR, 45, n. 1), he seems to 
forget diis and attiibutes it to dualism.
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not be in the form of an abstract unity. God is personal only through one or another o f the 
three hypostases, not as a single ineffable entity)'" '^'
One can see that Macmurray is consistent in holding to the loiowledge of God as 
being beyond the personal, and also resists pressure either to limit God to being a singular 
person or to embrace the orthodoxy of triune persons based upon the limitations of human 
understandings of personhood.
4,1.2.3 Idealism and the Idea of God
Both Haddox and Roy accuse Macmurray of being an idealist. Wliile there may be 
several reasons for this incorrect conclusion,®  ^the prommence and hnportance of the idea 
of God must surely be one of the most significant. This misperception is only exaggerated 
further if one focuses upon the Gifford lectures which anive at a theoretical conclusion, 
the idea of God. Although cited above, it is helpful to review that portion of die 
conclusion of Persons in Relation:
There is, then, only one way in which we can think our relation to the 
world, and that is to think it as a personal relation, tluough the form of the 
personal. We must think that the world is one action, and that its impersonal 
aspect is the negative aspect of this imity of actions, contained in it, subordinated 
witliin it, and necessary to its constitution. To conceive the world thus is to 
conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and om selves as created 
agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can 
be realized only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His 
intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not.®^
In this passage the theoretical nature is clear: it is conceptual and to that extent 
ideal. However, Macmurray is quick to point out the need (and inlierent difficulty) of 
verifying this religious construct and therefore the necessity of moving from thought to
Ted Peters, GOD as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville, KY: 
Westininster/Jolin Knox Press, 1993), 138.
Among tliese are the fact tliat most personalists are idealists and tliat a non-standard conception of 
idealism is being used, a conception tliat would seem to designate all philosophy, at least all modem 
philosophy, as idealistic.
PR, 222. Emphasis added.
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action.^® It is absolutely essential when considering Macmurray’s pliilosopliy that one 
remember he is doing pliilosophy—a reflective task—which by its veiy nature is 
conceptual, yet the very tlirust of this theoretical activity is the requirement of completing 
thought in action. Macmurray expresses tins very point when he says,
The proposal to start firom the primacy of the practical does not mean that 
we should aim at a practical rather than a theoretical philosophy. It may indeed 
have the effect of concentrating our attention upon action, as the primacy of the 
theoretical tends to concentrate attention on the problems of knowledge. What it 
does mean is that we should think from the standpoint o f action. Philosophy is 
necessarily theoretical, and must aim at a theoretical strictness. It does not follow 
that we must theorize from the standpoint of theory.^^
Any philosophy will rely on concepts and to that extent is idealististic or theoretical. The 
real definition of idealism, however, rests on the location of reality in the mind. 
Macmiuray is no idealist and ultimately it is not the idea of God which matters most to 
MacmiUTay, but the God who is encountered in action.
4,1.3 Conclusion:
The Idea of God as 
THE Point of Departure
Macmurray'8 treatment of God as mental object focuses upon the conceptual need 
for something to function both as the absolute Agent imiting the universe in one action 
and the universal personal Other reconciling and relating individuals to the rest of reality. 
Macmurray calls this idea God. God’s self-revelation occurs through God’s action, the 
universe, which is distinct from (yet in relation to) God. Macmurray recognizes that God 
is at least personal but resists speculating on the nahire of God ad intra. histead he 
focuses upon the idea of God as experienced. The full force of Macmurray’s concept of 
revelation is muted by his seemingly self-imposed limitation to natural revelation. He
PR, 223-24.
SA, 85. Emphasis in original.
“And moreover, because religious reflection is not primarily expressed in thought but in action, God is 
not primarily apprehended as an idea, but in hfe which is centred in the intention of mutuality, as that 
personal infinite in which our finite human relationships have their ground and then being.” SRE, 54.
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clearly believes a distinction exists between God and humanity. Finally it is recognized 
that Macmuiray did not intend the idea of God to act as the final destination, but as the 
point of departure for human knowledge of God. For God is not apprehended primarily in 
thought but in life. In order to begin to see how God is apprehended in life, one must 
consider the historical dimension of Macmurray’s doctrine of God.
4.2 N atural  C h r isto lo g y :
G od as H isto r ic a l  OBJECT—
Jesus and  Ch r istia n ity
The centrality of Jesus for Christianity is beyond question. Nevertheless, there are 
any number of interpretations of Jesus and Cliristianity and the relationship between the 
two. One cannot exist within the Western tradition without taking some position in this 
regard. For Macmun ay the centrality of Jesus for Chiistianity is affirmed. In pailicular, 
Jesus functions in a dual capacity. Fhst is his essential role in moving from an idea of 
God to the concrete realization of God witliin history tlirough incarnation. Second there is 
the normative nature of the person and teachings of Jesus for real Clnistianity.
4.2.1 Incarnation:
The Humanity of J esus .........
The idea of incarnation, which in one form or another appears in all immediate 
religions, merely expresses the fact that our awareness of the personal infinite 
comes to us, and can only come, in and through our awareness of finite 
personality.^^
Early in Macmmxay’s caieer, he explicitly addressed the incarnation and the
necessity of it for any form of objectivity (or rationality) in religion. In order for any
religion to be objective it must overcome both prophetic subjectivity and the intellectual
reduction of God to merely a useful concept.
The discrepancy between the prophet’s personality and his conception of God 
must disappear, and at the same time the conception of God must recapture its
® lU, 124.
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footing in history and show itself able to unify and explain the world of fact. That 
is the need. How can it be met?^ "^
The answer to this question is the incaiiiation.
If God becomes incarnate in a himian personality, both gulfs aie bridged, and 
religion becomes objective at once. Here we should have a real person—no longer 
the idea of a person—rooted in the actuality of history, who would not merely 
create, but embody a conception of God, and in whom, therefore, the distance that 
separates the prophet’s personality from his vision would have disappeared.^^
It is important to notice that Macmurray views this as a hypothesis to be tested 
and not a dogma to be accepted.^^ This hypothesis is first judged to be reasonable by 
noting Jesus’ persistent conflation of his ministry and the character of God^  ^and then is 
tentatively verified by appealing to the universality of Jesus, for “all life and all natme 
can be understood in the light of his personality.”^^  For Macmurray, Jesus’ universality is 
evident in his social significance,^^ as the clue to history,^® and as the peak of both 
spiritual and natural evolution.^^
One must be aware that in Macmiuray’s use of the incarnation the emphasis is 
primaiily upon the humanity, and not the deity, of Jesus. Tliis is consistent with his
Macmurray, Objectivity in Religio r^, 202. “This means that Jesus may be described as Saviour not 
because he introduces into tire world some ‘beautifiil revelation’, a ‘sublime teachmg’ about the person, but 
‘because he realizes in history the vety reality o f the person %id makes it the basis and “hypostasis” of tire 
person for every man’.” Torrance, Persons in Communion  ^299, citing John Zizioulas, Being in Communion 
(Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 54.
Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 202.
Macmmiay, Objectivity in Religion, 203.
Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 204-05.
^ Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 207. He then lays out tlnee areas of Jesus’ universality. 1.
Spkitually: “It must be shown that the various aspects of the spiritual activity of men, in art and science, in 
metaphysics and morality, in social organisation and political development, as well as religion are held, as it 
were, in solution in the personality of Jesus, and find their spiritual unity in his attitude to life.” (207). 2. 
Historically: “The personality of Jesus must be taken as the focus of himian history. Does it vivify and 
gatlrer into unity the earlier stretches of tlie history of the race? Can Christ be regarded as the clhnax of 
evolution? Can He dominate the future? Does the impact of His personality upon Europe account for the 
fact tliat tire character of its development to the present day? Can we trace back to the work of Jesus tlie 
gradual civilisation and unification of Europe, the creation of modern science, the development of 
democratic institutions and the other great movements of the Christian era? Was tlie spirit of Clirist the 
solvent which enabled Christendom to melt mto one living civilisation the one-sided achievements of 
Greece and of Rome?” (208-09) 3. Natme: “Does Jesus interpret nature as well as humanity, focusing tliem 
botli so tliat tliey blend into a unity of meaning? Can His attitude to life make spiritual values consistent 
witli our scientific knowledge of the material world?” (209).
Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 210.
Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 211. Later the title of his book on history would be The Clue to 
Histoiy.
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overall philosophical and theological concern to defeat idealism in religion. In cliristology
idealism is most typically manifest in an overemphasis upon Christ’s deity at the expense
of his humanity, resulting in an all too common functional docetism.
While Speidell’s accusation tliat Macmurray has a “Hamackian God” is an
overstatement,^^ he does identify certain affinities between Hamack and MacmuiTay,
especially in the area of the historicity of Jesus. MacmuiTay stresses the historical aspects
of Jesus, Jesus’ self-proclaimed relation to God as Father (wiüiout entering into the
debate as to whether this is an inherent claim of divinity), the importance of love, and the
distortion of Jesus’ teaching by Greek metaphysics.^^ What Speidell intends as a blanlcet
rebulce, Macmurray would treat as a partial commendation, for he sees the absolute
necessity of the historicity of Jesus for the reality of God. Downplaying the deity of
Jesus,’"^ Macmurray focuses attention upon Jesus as messiah, prophet, religious genius,
and teacher whose relation to God was so intimate he could refer to God as Father and
himself as SonJ^ Even when titles such as mediator and Word are used of Jesus, one must
be careful to not automatically take it as a sign that Macmurray is attributing divinity to
Jesus, for talcen in context they are applied generically to any religious genius or prophet:
Here lies the task of the religious genius. He is the individual in whom the 
consciousness of the meaning of religion is achieved at any stage in hiunan 
development and thought whom it is mediated and made available to humanity as 
a whole. He is indeed the mediator between God and man. He is the interpreter to 
any society of men and the stage of community which they have achieved. He is 
the Word that expresses, and so realizes in consciousness, for others as well as for 
liimself, the meaning of the religious impulse as it has expressed itself in the 
creation of commimity. That consciousness, that expression in the world of the
Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 212.
Speidell, 287.
These were constants throughout Macmmray’s discourses on Jesus. See for example, SRR, 47-62. See F. 
F. Bruce, “Harnack, Adolf’ in NDT, 286-87.
Accusations that it was denied (which seems to be the thrust of Speidell’s reading of Macmurray) go too 
far. The debate was rarely entered into. See below §4.2.3.
For example, CH, 43; SRR, 48; RE, 240. The smiilarity to Hamack has already been noted, yet here one 
sees general similarities with the entire liberal tradition stemming from Sclileiermacher. See Tillich, 90-114, 
also Grenz and Olson, 49.
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prophet, is the condition of any further advance in the achievement of 
community/^
Wliile Jesus may be the prophet par excellence this does not necessarily malce him divine. 
Langford clearly discerns this point when he suggests Macmurray’s christological locus is 
the Humanity of God/^
4.2.2 Christianity:
The Historical Nature 
OF THE Religion of Jesus
It was in Jesus that the development of Jewish culture was completed, and it was 
through Jesus that the whole development of Hebrew experience became a 
universal force in human history. Jesus is at once the cuhnination of Jewish 
prophecy and the source of Clnistianity.^^
Macmurray’s relation to the institutional church was problematic, yet it is 
absolutely essential tliat one understand that he sees himself as advocating Clnistianity. It 
is a real Clnistianity he seeks, but it is Christianity and none other.^^ Real Chiistianity is 
religious reflection (symbolic action) in continuity with the intentional action of Jesus 
through history.^® It is not principally an institutional or organizational continuity, a 
mistake brought into the Church by acquiescence to tlie Roman worldview. Nor is it 
primarily a continuity of coirect doctrine or opinion, the error of orthodoxy infecting the 
Church from Greek philosophy.Christianity is the flowering of Jewish religious 
consciousness as discovered and realized in its fullness by Jesus Clirist.^^
Macmurray cleaiJy sees Jesus as being a Jew, and goes to gieat lengths to 
emphasize this point in the face of European tendencies to recast Jesus as European or
RE, 240.
Langford, Natui al Theology, 19. Although he laments the virtual absence of the development of tliis 
tlieme in Macmurray’s later works. See also Kail Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. T. Wieser and J.N. 
Hiomas (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1960).
CH, 42.
For example, see FMW, 58-60, 64; RE, 121; SA, 30.
CH, 15; FMW, 76-77. It is important here to see tliat Macmurray is using tlie teim history in a slightly 
different sense than when he is referring to liistorical reflection, although tliere is obvious shnilarity. 
History here would seem to have a connotation of activity witliin the space-time continuum, as opposed to 
the particularizing reflection upon action wliich is historical reflection.
See in particular SRR, 57-58; CH, 152-54.
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Westem.^^ This move helps to distance Jesus from the more Western model of the teacher 
as abstract philosopher and reinforces Macmunay’s placement of him in continuity with 
the Old Testament tradition of the prophets with their emphasis upon the criticism of the 
concrete social practices of their day. '^^  Therefore the prophetic Jesus’ teaching is seen as 
profoundly practical.^^ Rather than portiuying Jesus as a Greek philosopher or mystic 
whose only concern is with a heaven beyond histoiy and this material world, Macmimay 
interprets Jesus as being concerned with “the universal significance of human history” the 
“significance of human life” and “the intention of God in human liistory.”^^  For 
Macmiuray, then, Jesus’ genius was to discover the true nature of God and humanity: 
both are personal, that is to say, characterized by love.^^
Dualism’s effect upon the Church, however, has led to a fimdamental 
misunderstanding of Jesus and his teaching. For example, since Jesus is concerned with 
this world, virtue is not its own abstract reward but shows how human intention should 
line up with God’s intention and therefore result in completely realized action.^^
Similarly, consider the interpretation of Clirist’s temptation. According to Macmurray the 
specific forms of temptation hâve everything to do with the reaffiiination of the reality of 
God at work in history and in the laws of natiue—that Roman domination is in fact part
CH, 42. See also FMW, 77.
This was particularly important in light of developments in Germany during the writing of The Clue to 
History. The last section of the work on current developments in Europe clearly shows an interest in tlie 
developments of botli Fascism and Comraimism and tire relation of each to Macmmray’s understanding of 
Christianity (CH, 167-237).
CH, 44; RE 240.
SRR, 54. Macmurray attempts to diffuse tire potential counter-argument that Jesus said that his kingdom 
was not of tliis world by pointing out that full text “otlierwise my disciples would fight”, which to 
Macmurray indicates tliat tliis refers to tlie world as tlie Roman system of unity through fear and violence, 
not a reference to the miiverse as a whole. SRR, 78.
CH, 55.
CH, 57.
Macmiuray calls this “material success” CH, 50. On the theme of virtue not being its own reward hi the 
teaching of Jesus see Blaine Charette, The Theme of Recompense in the Gospel of Matthew, Journal for die 
Study of die New Testament Supplement Series, no. 79 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992).
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of the work of God, violent revolution is not the solution,and tliat the material basis of 
life (gravity and hunger) aie part of God’s good creation.^ *^
Another example of dualism is the relation of Jesus’ apocalypticism and his 
ethical teaching. Often these have been viewed as existing in tension, since apocalyptic is 
assumed to be the future disjunctive and violent in-breaking of God into the world while 
etliics deal with correct human behavior under current conditions. According to 
Macmurray apocalyptic is nothing more than the inevitability of God’s mtention being 
realized in histoiy—and therefore it is the basis of Chiist’s ethical teaching, not its 
negation or disruption.^^ In other words, Christ’s morality is eschatological in nature.^^ 
The separation and perceived incompatibility is due to the encroachment of dualism, 
especially stoicism, into Clnistianity which has warped the natme of Clnistian morality 
and the understanding of the Idngdom of heaven on earth.^^
One should not assume that this makes MacmiuTay socially passive or conservative, neither of which 
characterizes Macmurray’s life. The point here is that violent revolution is not the answer because the 
means are ultimately counter-productive to the desired ends.
^ CH, 46. Yet it is important to note that Macmunay does not deal at all with how to luiderstand the various 
miracle stories in tlie Gospels.
“It is a religious understanding of the stmcture of reality which reveals die inevitable inter-connexion 
between the element of die process of history. The apocalyptic element in the teaching of Jesus is, indeed, 
the major premiss [sic] upon which the whole of the teaching of Jesus rests....” CH, 53. Tliere is a 
disruptive element because die fear and hatred are overcome and in that sense die world experiences a 
radical disruption, but at the same time shice it is all part of history God’s intentions are being realized even 
through the negative and counter-intentional sins of humanity in history.
The eschatological element is present in Macmiuxay’s focus upon God’s intention being inevitably 
realized. However, one would like to see it more clearly emphasized and developed. See Fergusson, John 
Macmurray, 22.
Macmiuray clearly associates his idea of die positively motivated universal community of real religion 
widi the kingdom of God. It is important to note the potential for ambiguity in Macmurray’s conception of 
the kingdom. Certain passages seem to emphasize the human aspect of the creation of the kingdom. “Christ 
Jesus lives in us and in die world, manifesting die nature of die god we worship and working through us to 
create the fulness of the Kingdom of God on earth.” SRR, 53. Odier passages affirm the cooperative nature 
between God and humanity in die kingdom. “The task of die Church today, I believe, is what it always has 
been—to co-operate with God under die guidance of the Spirit of Cluist in establishing on earth the 
Kingdom of Heaven.” SRR, 76. One must agree, at least in part, widi Limpitlaw’s characterization: “in his 
account of Clnistianity ... he tends to emphasize the human almost at the expense of, radier dian in 
conjunction with, die divine. Thus, for example, while he strongly stressed the need for human persons to 
act responsibly as co-workers with God in the hirtherance of God creative purpose .,. his account of what 
will create die Kingdom focuses ahnost exclusively on human action and does not directly address die issue 
of divine action. He appears to have assumed diat human action alone is sufficient to the establishment of 
die Kingdom.” Limpitlaw, 320-21. Linipitlaw’s last sentence may go too far, but she does underline the fact 
diat Macmunay is more concerned widi die human dimension dian the divine dimension. This is due, at 
least in part, to Macmurray’s tendency to avoid any hints of escapism.
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4.2.3 The Limits OF Natural Christology
While the historical necessity of Jesus is essential for Macmurray to make the leap 
from a conceptual God to a real God, the employment of modem historical method fails 
him at precisely this point, for liistorical method cannot prove or disprove Jesus’ divinity. 
The reductionistic nature of this methodology expresses itself in the manner in which 
Macmunay uses Clnistian scripture, liis reluctance to deal with distinctly religious 
experience, and his failure to expound upon and exploit the divine aspects of the 
incarnation.
4.2.3.1 Scripture and Historical Method
One early essay provides a clue to Macmunay’s approach to scriptuie with broad
methodological ramifications for his later theology. Wliile attempting to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the hypothesis of the incarnation, Macmiuray states:
We will, if  you please, disregard all evidence of positive claims on His part to a 
unique relationsliip with God as suspect because possibly spurious, although the 
concession, to my mind, borders on the ludicrous.^"^
The decision to limit discussion to those points dictated by the modem intellectual 
consensus of the tune meant the adoption of the modem historical method. This 
capitulation was one repeated throughout his career. Wliat initially can be seen as merely 
an apologetic strategy came to delineate the boundaiies of much of Macmurray’s wiiting. 
So much so that one must question whether he himself did not adopt it as his own, not 
recognizing the inlierent limitations and potential for dualism inherent in scientific 
historical method.^^ The influence of historical method is evidenced by Macmurray’s
^ Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 204.
See Martin Kahler, The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ (Philadelphia;
Fortress Press, 1964). According to C. E. Braaten’s introduction, Kahler opposed tlie “hidden ebionitism, 
the obscuration of the trans-human dimensions of the biblical Cluist." (19) He clearly saw that for the Life 
of Jesus movement, “Tire ‘historical Jesus’ is not tlie earthly Jesus as such, but ratlier Jesus msofar as he can 
be made tlie object of historical-critical research.” (20-21) This distorts tlie portrait of Jesus: “The historian 
too often begins by claiming that he conducts his research purely objectively, without presuppositions, and
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reticence to interact in any meaningful manner with the resurrection, claims regarding
Clirist’8 divinity, and the numerous miracle texts of scripture.^^ Macmuiray’s accoimt of
Jesus would seem to fit in Kahler’s category of positive historicism which focuses upon
living Christianity and a moral Christ.^^
Even wiiting for a religious audience, Macmurray is still hesitant about invoking
categories, such as the resurrection in order to “keep stiictly to the historical field.”^^  The
teachings of Jesus are acceptable.^^ Yet they are mainly seen as the culmination of
arguments, and rarely as their basis. Perhaps this is due to Macmunay’s resistance to
ai'gmnents from autliority. This anti-authoritarian stance applies not only to the contents
of scripture, but also to its interpretation.
Within the fr agments that were left [after the Renaissance and Reformation], 
within the separate States and churches, the reign of law, of organization and 
policy, the dominance of reason was re-established. The authority of the Bible 
took the place of the authority of the particular Church, and soon came to mean
ends by surreptitiously introducing a set of presuppositions whose roots lie deeply in an anti-Christian 
Weltanschauung^ (22)
The critique of Macmurray l,s historicism found here is different than the one advanced by Karl 
Popper (269-80). Here the focus is more specifically upon the problems of historical metliod while Popper 
denounces any pretense of a meaning to history—seeing history as an equation of power or success with 
trutli, since the powerful write tlie history. He specifically mentions Macmurray’s Clue to Histoiy and 
interprets him pragmatically: “Such a clue to history implies the worship of success; it implies that the 
meek will be justified because tliey will be on the wimiing side.” Popper, 274. He resists any form of 
“prophecy” in history and demands instead action (280). There is a definite tendency in tlie Form of the 
Personal for epistemological progress, but Popper is pushing tliis too hard in Macmunay’s case. Popper is 
certainly correct to fight the deference to supposed historical fact, because historical facts have no meaning 
until they are given meaning by those who write tlie history. This criticism falls into the similar category as 
accusing Macmunay of being a pragmatist—tmth is whatever works, while Macmurray’s position is it 
works because it is true.
Based upon the discussion above regarding Macmurray’s rejection of tlie distinction between tlie natural 
and tlie superaatuial, some might see Macmunay rejecting the miraculous. However, it all depends upon 
how one conceives of the category of the mii aculous. If it is God acting directly in creation, then the 
rejection of the supernatural does not necessarily include this. The miraculous may be conceived of eitlier in 
terms of significance or unusualness of the type of action on God’s part.
Kahler categorizes tlnee different forms of historicism applied to the life of Jesus: positive, focusing upon 
living Christianity and the moral Christ; negative, focusing upon the mythological dimension and producing 
a mystic Cluist; and speculative, which adopted a philosophy of history resulting in an ideal Christ. Kaliler, 
22-23.
SRR, 52. This can be seen much earlier, for example RE, 263, where redemption (and therefore 
reconciliation) is effected by the death of Jesus, but tliere is no consideration of his resurrection.
Even this has become problematic as ever more radical historical methods have been applied to tlie Bible, 
resulting in discussions such as The Jesus Seminar.
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the authority of the particulai* Chui ch through its official interpretation of the 
Bible.
It is unclear here whether Macmurray sees the authority of the Bible (before it was 
recaptured by institutional interpretation) as a positive or a negative development. Yet, he 
biographically recalls the positive experience of attempting a re-pristined reading of 
Romans utilizing tools from his study of classical literature which would “lay baie their 
meaning.”^^  ^It would seem that Macmurray was extolling scripture when read properly 
without any imposed external authority.
The hermeneutical issue raised by MacmuiTay’s move involves the tiansfer of 
authority from the ti adition of the Church to the canons of the contemporary scientific 
milieu of the reader. Macmurray appears completely unaware of the presuppositions 
accompanying the adoption of such modem historical tools. Wliile rejecting the Church 
as the interpretive community, he essentially adopted a modified contemporaiy milieu as 
the interpretative community—including some of its inherent individualism, which 
elsewhere he so vigorously opposed. This pervasively individualistic hemieneutic is the 
most likely source of Macmurray’s spiritual isolation throughout most of his adult life.^ ®^  
Tills hermeneutic, taken together with Macmunay’s reticence in challenging the 
boundaries of historicism, reinforces the earlier perception that what originally may have 
been a mere concession, became a reductionism within Macmunay’s philosophical 
practice. It is almost as if he confuses historical reflection with personal action witliin the 
historical space-time continuum. Tliis dominance of the historical method makes it very
FMW, 80.
SRR, 13. For general discussion of his reading of Romans and its impact upon his tlieological 
development see SRR, 13-14.
Recognizing that Macmurray himself attributes tliis isolation to his rejection of the churches as State 
religions. Yet tliis isolation goes beyond this simple act and the hony of this historical reality in 
Macmurray’8 biography is of no small concern to anyone who takes Macmurray’s philosophy seriously. For 
some it is only his commitment to the Quakers at the end of his life that keeps from invalidating his enthe 
philosophy as unreal.
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easy to read Macmurray’s comments about historical and religious experience as a new 
dualism.
4.2.3.2 Historical and Religious Experience:
A New Dualism?
Closely related to the foregoing discussion is the distinction Macmunay makes 
between historical and religious experience. This is clearly seen when he clusters together 
the resurrection, the presence of Jesus in Christian worsliip, the deity of Jesus, and the 
post-resunection encounters between Christ and his disciples as religious experiences. 
These religious experiences have their own religious meanings and require the use of 
mythological language because they are expressions of the experience of God who is 
beyond the p e rso n a l.B y  contrasting religious experience with historical experience 
and normal experience Macmimay appears to be establishing a fatal dualism at the heart 
of the Form of the Personal. If this dualism exists, then the entire foundation of the 
system crumbles because it is based upon the phenomenological accessibility of religion. 
If religious experience is out of bounds to investigation, tlien the integrating nature is lost.
While it is possible to interpret Macmurray this way, as Kiricpatrick does and so 
dismisses these statements as reversions to dualism on MacmiuTay’s part, it is also 
possible to understand them in a non-dualistic manner. First consider the opposition of 
religious experience and historical experience. Just as one is able to reflect upon personal 
experience (that is to say, religious experience) reductionistically as art and science, so 
too one may reflect on personal experience (religion) reductionistically as liistory and 
philosophy. Religious experience encompasses and surpasses historical experience. 
Furthermore, one cannot isolate the religious component from the historical, because 
without the historical aspect religious experience is no longer religious experience. It is 
either philosophy, or it is luueal. Religious experience, therefore, is not non-historical.
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rather it is not limited “stiictly to the historical field.” ®^'^  Therefore one may know in 
religions experience, or express in religions reflection, something which is not entirely 
expressible withm the categories and methods of historical reflection.
More perplexing is MacmmTay’s juxtaposing of religious and normal experience. 
It is veiy difficult to determine if he is equating normal with historical. If he is, then this 
would be a clear case of Macmiuxay slipping into dualism, most likely due to his adoption 
of the modem historical method discussed above. Yet this interpretation is not 
necessitated by Macmunay’s words. Instead, one may look at the programmatic fimction 
of this statement within his argument. He states that religious talk in general and God-talk 
in particular is mythological. According to Macmunay there is no way but by metaphor to 
speak about God ad intra. Human knowledge of God can only be based upon our limited 
experience of God ad extra, and even here there is need for analogy or metaphor because 
the experience is with something wliich is, strictly spealcing, beyond the merely personal. 
Therefore, mythological language and adjectival qualifiers are used to express what can 
be expressed in the experience. If all religious experience is to some extent the awareness 
of God, however inadequate of inaccurately understood, then all religious language will 
need to employ metaphor (mythological language) to express the divine aspects wliich aie 
beyond the merely personal. One should see in this particular usage of nonnal and 
religious Macmmray’s attempt to emphasize the distance between human and divine 
aspects in communal religious activity, most likely as an attempt to correct earlier mis­
readings which tended to interpret liim as collapsing the human and divine.
In defending a non-dualistic interpretation of Macmurray, one must aclcnowledge 
tliat his choice of terms, especially mythological language, does very little to clarify the
SRR, 52-53,45 ii. 1. 
SRR, 52.
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issue and in fact introduces substantial confiision. One questions the utility of myth in this 
context, for it tends to obscure the metaphorical natuie of all language and reflection 
based as it is in the imagination; myth is simply a particular type of metaphor. It is a 
question of difference in degree rather than in kind. Metaphor is used in tallc of God, 
religion, art, and even science.
4.2.3.3 History and the Deity of Jesus;
The Missing Link
One of the great missed opportunities of Macmurray’s theology is the failure to 
programmatically expoimd and exploit the incarnation. One can only speculate as to the 
reasons for its virtual disappearance (along with cliristology in general) after the mid- 
1930s in Macmurray’s writings. Perhaps he felt it had been sufficiently covered by 
himself or others? Perhaps he foimd the Western mind so associated Jesus with deity that 
it was impossible to invoke Chiist and not cause idealistic misperceptions? Perhaps he 
simple felt that the theoretical and more conspicuously philosophical issues required more 
attention? Nevertheless, one must conclude that, for whatever reasons, Macmurray failed 
to adequately develop and incorporate his clnistological understanding of the incarnation 
as the necessary bridge from God as a pragmatic theoretical constmct to Emmanuel, God 
with us. Furthermore, he failed to exploit the solution the incarnation provides to the 
problem of the ambiguity of God’s self-revelation in natme. For in Jesus there is the full 
human embodiment of God, whose actions (including the naiTowly linguistic 
commmiicative acts) reveal God to the hiunan race. Just as Barth’s famous focus upon 
God as the “wholly other” was clarified in the wiiting of The Humanity o f God, so too,
In a personal letter to Jeffko, Macmurray denies that tlie Form of tlie Personal may be legitimately 
applied to God’s nature and he believes that any attempt to conceptualize God will result in antinomies. 
Jeffko, 61, n. 150.
Once again one sees tlie important contribution of Mark Jolinson’s Body in the Mind for its emphasis 
upon the embodied metaphor as tlie basis of all thought.
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Macmunay’s focus upon Chiist’s humanity should have been complemented by a work 
entitled The Deity o f Jesus.
4.2.4 Summary
In spite of his later lack of emphasis upon christology, Macmurray recognized the 
crucial nature of the incarnation for the reality of God. His focus upon the humanity of 
God, the historicity of Jesus, and his anti-idealist and anti-docetic positions are all 
positive contiibutions.
One must nonetheless question why he chooses to accommodate the dualistic 
restrictions of modem historical method and thereby is denied the warrant to investigate 
the divine aspects of Jesus, including the resmTection and the miraculous. One cannot 
help but wonder if  the habits of modernism were too much to overcome, resulting in the 
primary utilization of the narrowly historical to the detiiment of the religious. The re- 
emergence of Jesus as a topic within the religious context of The Search for Reality in 
Religion inclines one to accept a strongly apologetic rationale for this methodology, but 
one is nonetheless haunted by the suspicion that in some ways Macmurray is enslaved by 
tlie apologetic tools he chooses. , .
In discussing the mythological aspects of religious discourse an important 
assumption lurks in the backgiound. This is the contemporary experience of God in 
religion. The existence of the historical Jesus (regardless of his divine status) in Palestine 
approximately two millennia ago is insufficient alone to account for current interaction 
between God and human persons. Wlien one speaks of God at work in the present world, 
one enters the field of pneumatology.
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4.3 N atural  Pn e u m a t o l o g y :
G od  as Interactive  Oth er—
G od as Spir it
There is no place at all for spirit in a material universe; nor for matter in a spiritual 
universe. This can only mean that both matter and spirit are misconceptions.
Spirit, and its various cognates, are relatively absent from Macmurray’s 
w ritin g s .A s  happens so often with Macmurray, terms he finds too heavily burdened 
with incoiTect associations and connotations he essentially discards firom his vocabulary. 
Spirit is definitely a teiin he finds overwhelmed by m isconceptions,yet when it is 
positively appropriated it is seen to be an integrating term, for “the spiritual is not other 
than the material, but inclusive of it. Spirit is not other than body but more than body.”^^ ° 
Ordinarily Macmuiray overcomes dualism tlnough integration in action by the 
person, so one would expect to see the integration of body and spirit in the personal. 
Remembering the rules of Personal logic outlined above, this may mean that either matter 
and spirit are both negative poles ofperson or it is also possible tliat the word spirit is 
interchangeable with person. The latter is the more likely of the two possibilities. 
Therefore, by considering the various aspects of God as personal in comparison to the 
contemporaiy discussion of pneumatology on6 should be able to verify their functional 
equivalence.
Before proceeding it is necessary to make a connnent or two regaining 
Macmurray’s doctirne of God and pneumatology. First is the distinction between 
Macmurray’s personalistic concept of God as being pneumatological and the use of 
Macmunay’s philosophical definition of person within a trinitarian doctrine of God. The 
latter, which McIntyre notes on tliree occasions, is how Macmuiray’s understanding of
PR, 213.
Often the word spiritual is used as a virtual synonym for tlie idealistic pole of various dualisms, e.g. PR, 
123, 171,213;RAS, 46-47.
PR, 213 quoted above.
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person is employed in the contemporaiy trinitarian discussion of the Father, Son, and 
Spirit as p e r s o n s What is being argued here, by contrast, is that Macmuiray’s entire 
personalistic thought, insofar as it is concerned with God, may be seen as 
pneumatology.
Second, since Macmurray self-consciously limits himself to natmal tlieology the 
discussion of pneumatology will focus upon those areas commonly associated with the 
way that hmnanity experiences the Spirit, the economic (or opera ad extra) of 
pneumatology. The excellent exposition of pneimiatology provided by Jolm McIntyre’s 
The Shape o f Pneumatology will be used to expedite this pneumatological 
investigation.W ithin McIntyre’s pneumatology there are three major models: the 
definitional/biblical pluralistic model, the trinitarian model, and the dynamic model. 
Witliin each model there exists sub-divisions, which McIntyre refers to as patterns. The 
dynamic model deals with the economic experience of the Spirit. There are two primary 
patterns within the dynamic model, the relational pattern and the ecclesial polarity 
pattern. Each of these shall be considered in turn and the correspondence with 
Macmurray’s doctrine of God Will be demonstrated.
RE, 257. Also “God is real; and tlierefore he is the ultimate synthesis of matter and spirit, of Nature and 
Man.” Macmurray, Christianity and Communism, 526.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 27,169, 208.
Not once does McIntyre directly relate Macmurray’s philosophy to pneumatology proper nor 
Macmmray’s understanding of the person as spirit. He does consider die impact of Buber’s personalism on 
pneumatology and discusses how God conceived of as personality is ultimately pneumatological. See below 
§4.3.1.7.
Furtliermore, McIntyre makes a general conmient about the obvious relation of tlie these terms: 
“Perhaps tlie time has come to issue a warning, a recognition of the difficulties created by being, on tlie one 
hand, too precise in the definition of such concepts as sphit, soul, self, person; and on die other hand, of 
using them widi a certain carelessness, as if they were interchangeable.” McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 
179.
Anodier excellent work on pneimiatology fi'om below is Michael Welker, God the Spirit. However 
McIntyre’s presentation is more concise and lends itself more readily to diis type of use.
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4.3.1 The Dynamic Pneumatological Model:
Relational Pattern
McIntyre examines seven essential loci within the relational pattern of the 
dynamic model of pneumatology. For each loci, Ins definition will be quoted, followed by 
a short commentary on the definition. Based upon this synopsis various comparisons with 
Macmurray’s doctiine of God will be drawn.
4.3.1.1 Spirit Relates to Particular Humans
The Holy Spirit is God himself relating himself to the specific details o f human
existence within the natural process and world history
The first aspect of the relational pattern of pneumatology McIntyre observes is the 
relationality of God to particular humans. According to Mchityre this point aclmowledges 
that while “God stands in a general relationship to the totality of created existence as its 
originator, its sustainer and universal provider”  ^ the Spirit is also the “God [who] relates 
himself in an utterly lovmg, utterly humbling and utterly disturbing way to every jot and 
tittle of each person’s existence.”  ^ It is God relating not to humanity as a whole, in 
general, or in abstiaction but to each as a particular person. Thus it resists the tendency 
toward some vague relationality. In addition, note that McIntyre is not spealcing about a 
purely existential relation, but also includes natural process and history. In other words, 
there is an inherent connection to concrete reality in this relation. It is important to be 
clear here. Mclntyie is not saying the Holy Spirit is the relationship between God and the 
in d iv id u a l,b u t rather God the Holy Spirit enters into tliis relationship with the human 
person.
McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 173. 
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 173.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 174.
Individual will be used in tins section as a convenient short-hand for a particular concrete human person. 
Tliis should not be seen as a reversion into dualism.
“The Holy Spirit is not said to be tlie relation of God to tlie minutiae of human existence witliin its 
natural and historical occurrence. To adopt that view would be to revert to the hypostatising or 
personalizhig of a relationship, a logical miderstanding of tlie nature of a tr initarian person which we have
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In reading McIntyre’s description of the Holy Spirit as God in relation to 
particulai* humans one cannot help but be reminded of MacmuiTay’s discussion of God as 
the universal Other who stands in relation to each individual.
4.3.1.2 Spirit Involved Peiwasively 
in the Human Person
The Holy Spirit is God's involving himself in human volition and action, thought 
and feeling, as they occur in natural and historical process
The second element in the relational pattern is God’s involvement exhaustively 
and pei-vasively in all aspects of the individual human being. This point goes beyond the 
previous point by speaking of the penetration of the human person by the divine Spirit. “It 
seeks to show how God relates himself to the specific, by indicating that he does not 
remain external to that which is related, but becomes internally related to it.”^^®
If MacmuiTay’s God is personal, and persons aie heterocentric and mutually 
constituting, then one must recognize the peneti ation of the human person by the divine 
person. If our interpretation regarding Macmurray’s understanding of worsliip as an act of 
God is accuiate, tliis would provide an excellent example of such an indwelling.
4.3.1.3 Spirit’s Identification with Hunianity
The Holy Spirit is God identifying himself with human thoughts, feelings and 
action, the natural occasions referred to ahoveP^
already firmly eschewed. The distinction between entermg into a relationship and the relationship itself is a 
fine one, but it has to be held, since it is fundamental to what we are saying about die nature of die Trinity 
and die persons within the Godliead.” McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 176.
McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 177.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 177.
McIntyre contends that this involvement by God would produce “no characteristics empirically 
observable (that is, by imbelievers) by which his dynamic presence may be detected” which is not open to 
raisinteipretation or attribution to “natural” causes {Shape o f Pneumatology, 177-78). Macmurray would 
agree with the possibility of mismterpretation, but would disagree widi the emphasis in McIntyre’s 
statement because he would want to underline diat there should be some change in behavior, etc., which 
nonetheless could be misunderstood.
It is an open question as to whether God is constituted by human persons or only by divine 
persons—again Macmunay’s silence on die Trinity provides us with no way to determine a definitive 
answer—however diis is not the central dnnst of diis point by McIntyre who is focusing upon how die 
Spirit relates to humans.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 181.
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MacmuiTay’s tliird element of the relational pattern is God identifying with
humanity in oui* particular condition. McIntyre’s conception of identification is the means
by which one is able to fully relate to the Other without the loss of oneself.
Identification is a process of self-exteriorisation in which the agents involved 
project themselves into the condition or situation of other persons. In the process, 
the agents do not become the other persons; they aie not absorbed into the 
situation, nor do they develop the condition.
McIntyre sees this identification exemplified in its ultimate form in the incarnation as 
Christ identifies with sinful humanity through the power and presence of the Holy 
Spirit.
McIntyre’s notion of identification resonates well with MacmuiTay’s pliilosophy 
in the maintenance of a boundary between persons so there is no loss of self in the 
heterocentricity (or to use McIntyre’s teim self-exteriorisation) of the identification with 
and care for the Other. This is part of the essence of Macmurray’s Personal logic, that the 
constituting elements do not lose their distinctiveness. One can see MacmuiTay’s rejection 
of pantheism as maintaining the distinction between God and creation, while his 
affinnation of tlie finite in the infinite, especially in the incarnation, would fimction as 
identification. ..........
4.3.1.4 Human to Human Relations
The Holy Spirit is God relating his people to one another in fellowship and 
communion}^^
The fourth facet of relational pneumatology is the relating of the particulai* human 
person to other human persons. McIntyre builds on the polysemy found in the pluase “the 
communion of tlie Holy Spirit” (2 Co 13:14) which may be understood in at least thi ee 
ways: (1) communion with the Holy Spirit; (2) the communion between humans created
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 181.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 182. Note carefiilly that Jesus does not identify with humanity—for 
he is human—but diat he identifies widi die plight of sinful humanity.
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and maintained by the Spirit; and (3) the communion is the Holy Spirit. McIntyre 
elaborates on the possible combination of the three.
If we think in horizontal and vertical images, we may say that in this 
pattern of the dynamic model, the Holy Spirit is presented as God liimself uniting 
his people in communion with one another (horizontally) in and thimigh uniting 
them with himself thiough his identification with them (vertically). But both the 
horizontal and the vertical aspects of the communion of God with oui selves and of 
oiu'selves with one another aie themselves ontologically grounded upon that 
communion which is the Holy Spirit,
. When one considers how Macmunay’s understanding of God as the universal 
Other not only functions to relate individuals to God but also thereby individuals to each 
other, one sees clearly the correspondence between McIntyre and Macmunay on tliis 
point. Macmunay’s position, summarized by Langford, is one where God is “the 
completeness of human relation.”^^®
4.3.1.5 Spirit as Prevenient
The Holy Spirit is God himselfpreparing us beforehand for the creative, 
redemptive and sanctifying relationship with himself, which is his purpose for us 
in Jesus Christ
The fifth aspect of the relational pattern is the prevenient and preparatory fimction
of the Spirit. McIntyre, when speaking of prevenient grace, states it is
The response of the human heart to God, the thanksgiving of the whole 
community of believing people in response to the lovingkindness of God, the 
continuing discipleship of Christians—all are due to the prevenient presence of 
the Holy Spirit in the hearts of one and all, enabling in each case the appropriate 
response.
lU, 124.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 183.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 184. This only seems to be rebutting his earlier distinction between 
the Holy Spirit entering relations with humans and being die relation between God and humanity. On closer 
inspection, however, one sees that what is being described in reified or ontological teims is tlie relation 
between humans, not tlie relation between tlie human and the divme. The Holy Spirit is the communion of 
humanity, not the communion of humanity and God.
Langford, Natural Tlieology, 15.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 185.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 185.
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Here it is possible to see MacmuiTay’s concept of Üie celebration of communion. The 
necessity of God first reconciling estranged persons and thus enabling communion, which 
when reflected upon results in celebration.
4.3.1.6 Relating Humans to Nature
The Holy Spirit is God the Creator himself setting us in a right and responsible 
relation to the animal and natural order
The Spirit reconciling humanity to nature is the sixth element of the relational 
pattern. McIntyre aclmowledges that this fimction of the Spirit has tended to be ignored or 
downplayed .He sees thiee related reasons for this oversight: (1) the tendency to tie the 
Holy Spirit narrowly to Cluist in liis redemption of humanity, ignoring the cosmic 
dimensions of Christ’s work; (2) ^Qfilioque tends to link the Spirit to Christ the 
redeemer and not to God the creator; and (3) the lack of development in the doctiine of 
creatio continuaP^
This reconciliation with natme may be seen by some as comiected to a 
sacramental view of creation as “bearing in, with and under itself the presence of God.” 
But McIntyre is wary of the potential for sacramentalism to lead to the opinion that 
creation has an imiate “capacity to arouse in us a sense of the presence of God” and so 
prefers the model of God relating humanity to creation directly thiough himself, 
pneumatologically.
In Macmurray’s argmnent for the characteristics of the universal Other, he notes 
humanity’s fear and hatred of nature and therefore the need for reconciliation between 
humanity and the rest of creation. This requires that the Other not only stand in relation to
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 190.
And when it is addressed it usually is dealt witli imder eüùcs as a part of stewardship. McIntyre, Shape 
o f Pneumatology, 191.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 192. It is important to note diat all tliree are pneumatological 
inadequacies which can be tied to the traditional monarchical “direction” of theology from die Father, to die 
Son, and finally die Spirit. Moltmann, Spirit o f Life, 290-95.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 193.
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all people but to all creation. Hence, Macmurray’s God as universal Other is the same as 
McIntyre’s Spirit relating humanity to natiue.
4.3.1.7 Terms Spirit and Person Applied to God
The Holy Spirit is also the means by which the categories o f personality and spirit 
are made applicable to GodP^
The seventh and final dimension of the relational pattern is that it is Spirit which
allows particular hiunan categories to be applied to God. These categories are God as
personality and God as Spirit (but not tire Holy Spirit). Personality as applied to God as a
whole was a controversial development^^^ but with the rise of Buber’s I-Thou it has
gained wider acceptance.
Now in that modem context [Buber’s understanding of the person as the I-Thou\, 
we are coming to recognize that awareness of personality only emerges when the 
self comes to appreciate the boundaries laid down for it by another self, when it 
realises that beyond itself there is another self making challenging demands and 
marginalising the freedom wliich the self can enjoy, but also finds in that other 
self soiuces of assistance, inspiration, friendsliip and love. So God is for every self 
that ormiipresent personality, at every point of hiunan existence confronting 
human persons with the imperatives of Iris will and liis coimnandments, at every 
point offering the almighty succoiu of liis Gospel.
It is thr ough die work of the Spirit and the Spirit’s capacity for self-transcendence 
and indwelling that the “personality of God is implemented, realised, consummated in the 
work of the Holy Spirit.”^^  ^In other words, to speak of God as personal is to spealc 
pneumatologically. This is precisely how Macmurray spealcs of God—as personal—and 
without recourse to any trinitarian language or construct. Therefore, Macmiuray’s entire 
theology may be seen as pneumatology, God as Spirit (but not necessarily the trmitarian 
Holy Spirit).'^’
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 193.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 194. McIntyre attributes this development to Paley. For a more 
extensive discussion of tliis issue see Ramsey, 55-71.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 194.
Mclntyie, Shape o f Pneumatology, 195. See also 196.
One is able to discern McIntyre’s Athanasian sentiments here in his comfort in referring to God as 
person in die singular.
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4.3.2 The Dynamic Pneumatological Model:
Ecclesial Polarities Pattern
In considering tlie relational pattern of the dynamic model of pneumatology one is
stmck by the strong coimnunal ethos. Mclntyie addresses the issue of ecclesiology and
the Spirit more explicitly witliin a second pattern for the dynamic pneumatological model,
the ecclesial polarities pattern. It should not be surprising to find a similar concern for
ecclesiology within Macnimray’s personalism. This aspect is so strong that one
commentator has remarked that Macmun ay’s entire concept of religion is essentially
ecclesiology.^"^® This ecclesial dimension is somewhat complicated by Macmunay’s
poitrayal of Cliristianity as having universal intention. Therefore his definition of the
Church is those whose actions are in keeping with the intention of God and are thereby in
continuity with the actions of Jesus. Therefore, one should not expect Macmurray to
dwell on issues such as ordination or the sacraments common to some forms of
ecclesiology. Nonetheless, there is a strong ecclesial dimension to Macmurray’s
understanding of God which is essentially pnemnatological.
Before considering the particular contours of the ecclesial polarities pattern a
word of introduction regarding the temiinology and stmctui e of polarities is called for.
Mclntyi e describes polarities as being the ideal foci or opposite limits of a particulai*
relation with the reality existmg in the field somewhere between the two ideal extremes.
Therefore, the two poles are not seen as contradictions but limits.
Theology has many such opposites—infinite and finite, all-righteous and sinful, 
elect and damned, forgiving and unforgiving, and so on. In the case of tlie 
polarity, while the pure forms of the two members of the antithesis seem to be 
opposed and negative to one another, in fact they foim the foci of what in 
magnetics would constitute a ‘field’. So within tliis field will appear members
“Moreover, however much his statement grapples witli the nature of tlie ‘personal’, Macmurray’s 
reformulation [of religion] is profoundly social, and in a veiy fundamental sense, ecclesiological.” White, 
450.
This is not to say tliat the sacraments are excluded by Macmurray, for the very phrase “celebration of 
communion” has an implicit sacramental overtone, as does the entire definition of religion as reflective 
action.
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who veer more to the one pole than the other, showing chai*acteristics which 
favour one pole somewhat more than the other but not exclusively so. Wliat we 
are led to expect, therefore, is perhaps to begin from apparent diametric 
opposition, only to find later that there aie other possibilities which fall between 
the poles but are not totally divergent from either.
He finds these polarities existing particularly here in the ecclesial pattern, yet if 
one inspects the relational pattern one is able to discern implicit polarities in each of the 
seven aspects d iscussed .The point here is polarities should not be viewed as existmg 
only within the ecclesial polarities pattern. Further, one must remember that for 
Macmurray, these polarities do not exist in a paradoxical dialectic, but m the integrating 
hierarchical polarity of Personal logic. Therefore, one should expect Macmurray to be 
aware of the two poles, but giving more emphasis to one pole as the positive mtegmting 
pole which has priority.
4.3.2.1 Location of the Spirit Relative
to the Church: In and Over-Against
The first pole of the discussion views the Holy Spirit as bemg indigenous to the 
Church, where “the Spirit is of the essential being of the Church” being administered 
sacramentally through the hierarchy. The second pole is one that views the Spirit 
standing over-against the Chm*ch, so that the Church is the instnunent of the Spirit.
Macmurray’s suspicion of authority might lead one to believe he would dismiss 
the first pole out of hand, he does recognize the tension expressed by McIntyre at this 
point. The religious commimion is only enabled by the reconciliation of members—which 
means conforming human intention to the free divine intention and in that way God 
stands over-against the Chiuch. Yet, he also recognizes that the coimnunion only exists 
witliin an embodied community united tluough the Spirit. Macmurray would most likely
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 211.
Such as general and particular, witiiin and without, etc.
144 McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 213.
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place the emphasis upon the Spirit over-against the Church which is constituted by the 
embodied gathering.
4.3.2.2 Expression of the Spirit;
Community and Institution
This polarity is related to the previous one, but is of sufficient importance that
McIntyre treats it on its own. The first pole sees the Spirit being expressed by
a group which has been constituted in its community-ness by the vertical descent 
of the Holy Spirit upon it, uniting the members one with another by liis presence 
among them, directing them in their activity in the world and sustaining them in 
their worsliip of God.^ "*^
This first pole stresses the freedom of the Spirit and therefore the flexibility of the 
stmctiues. The second pole, by contrast, stresses consistency and continuity. It is “the 
concept of an institution with a veiy specific shape, with an internal structme which is not 
readily changeable because it is believed to be laid down by tlie Spirit liimself.” "^^  ^While 
McIntyre does not believe that either extreme exists in reality he sees the practical limits 
existmg in the Quakers and some understandings of Catholicism.
Macmurray also sees a relationsliip between the freedom of God (who is absolute 
person) and the Church as an institution concerned with rituals, social cohesion, and 
purpose. The institutional operates at the level of the I-It and serves as the negative pole 
for tme commimity. Community needs society (and hence mstitutions) but one must not 
invert tlie relationsliip or else one creates an unreal religion. Macmurray—who became a 
Quaker late in life—nonetheless chastises the Quakers for not recognizing the 
institutionalization and rituals which exist even within their church and through neglect 
have failed to develop or consider rituals sufficiently within their self-reflection. Still,
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 215. 
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 215.
147 McIntyre believes that the Holy Spirit can be seen existing institutionally in baptism, laying on of hands, 
communion, proclamation, discipline, ministry, and the offices as related to tlie gifts. McIntyre, Shape of 
Pneumatology, 216-17.SRR, 74-75.
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the I-It of the institution must serve the I-You of the communion. Similarly, Macmurray 
distinguishes functions and abilities which people have and their status as persons. 
Macmmxay simply does not want their hmction to overshadow the personal equahty, 
freedom, and mutuality existing between persons. Therefore, Macmuiray, again can be 
seen in general agreement with this understanding of the experience of the Sphit as 
existing, both within the freedom of the personal dimension, and through the rituals of the 
institution which inform die communion.
4.3.23 Location of the Spirit:
Group or Individual
The question here asks, does the Spirit primarily reside in individuals (who then 
comprise a group) or does the Spirit reside in the group?^ "^ ^
MacmiUTay recognizes this in that he focuses upon the self-as-agent-in-relation- 
to-Other. One cannot ignore the particulai' but one must see oneself within the overall 
relational matrix made possible by God as the universal Other. Because God enters into 
personal relation with each individual, it can be said that the Spirit indwells the 
individual. Yet, the primary overarching context is God’s universal relation enabling the 
community. Macmuiiay, in citing I John 4:20, may be seen as giving priority to the 
group, while recognizing the essential relation of the particular person to God.^ ^®
4.3.2.4 Speaking in Tongues and the 
Baptism of the Holy Spirit
With this polarity McIntyre is attempting to get at the role of the Spirit as it relates 
to salvation and Christian practice. He distinguishes between two levels of discourse. The 
first level deals primarily with biblical texts and posits a dialectic between Lukan 
pneumatology with its emphasis upon empowerment portraying believers as praying for
149 McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 217-19.
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the gift of the Spirit, and PauHne pneiimatology’s soteriological focus where faith and
prayer are subsequent to the gift of the Holy Spir i t /Simply put, the dialectic between
Tongues and the Baptism is the polarization of empowemient and salvation. The second
level is more theological and it is here that Mclntyie exerts most of liis effort. McIntyre,
following Dunn,^^  ^attiibutes the pentecostal emphasis upon the Spirit’s free activity to a
reaction against the Western confinement of the Spirit: the Roman Catholic imprisonment
of the Spirit in the ritual of the sacraments, and the Protestant domestication of the Spirit
to doctrinal orthodoxy.
Now the Pentecostalists have reacted sharply to both of these positions, ‘the 
mechanical sacramentalisni of extreme Catholicism; and ‘the dead bibhcist 
orthodoxy of extreme Protestantism’ .., and have concentrated upon the 
experience
This freeing of the Spirit is evidence of an attempt to overcome the mind-body dualism 
through the “introduction to the pneumatological dimension.
Macmiuray is certainly concerned to overcome the dualism which exists if  one 
only acknowledges the doctrinal or ritualistic levels of religion—witliout the integi ating 
experience of true communion. Reflecting upon how Macmurray might react to tlie first 
polarity of the Pauline-Soteriology and Lukan-Empowerment dialectic, he would most 
likely answer that one camiot act successfully (be empowered) without being in harmony 
witli the intention of God (salvation), but that it is the actualization in action which has
SRR, 72. “If any one says, ‘I love God,’ and hates his brother, he is a liar.” 1 John 4:20 (RSV). It should 
be pointed out that Macmurray explicitly rejects individualism in ttie citation of üiis verse.
McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 220-21.
Janies D.G. Dunn, Baptism in the Holy Spirit: A Re-examination o f the New Testament Teaching on the 
Gift o f the Spirit in Relation to Pentecostalism Today (London: SCM Press, 1970). Pentecostals have 
typically rejected Dunn’s work, especially his conversion-initiation tliesis. One work wliich directly 
challenges Dumi is Robert P. Menzies, Empowered for Witness: The Spirit in Luke-Acts (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1994). It should be noted that McIntyre does not entirely agree with Dunn, 
especially in Dunn’s over-systemization of the textual pattern (McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 230). 
Interestingly, one branch of Pentecostalism wliich agrees with Dumi are the anti-trinitarian Oneness 
Pentecostals. One example of tliis, altlioiigh it does not dhectly reference Dumi is J.L. Hall “A Oneness 
Pentecostal Looks at Initial Evidence” in Initial Evidence: Historical and Biblical Perspectives on the 
Pentecostal Doctrine o f Spirit Baptism, ed. Gary B. McGee (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1991), 168-88.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 229. Citing Dumi, 225.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 226.
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primacy. Of course, this is merely speculation, but it is consistent with the Form of the 
Personal.
4.3.2.S Holy Spirit in the Church:
New Testament and Modern
This polarity is raised implicitly in the previous discussion—what is the 
relationship between the New Testament expectancy of the active presence of the Spirit in 
the assembled community and the relative lack of this in the modem church? Various 
traditions emphasize the active presence of the Spirit in various locations (the pastor’s 
study, the ritual of the sacraments, in the gathered community). Speaking from within the 
Reformed tradition, McIntyre would like to see as much expectation regarding the active 
presence of the Spirit in the communicative act of the seimon as in its prepaiation.^^^ 
Pentecostals often are heard to decry the lack of expectation in the study, and at least one 
priest has commented that while Roman Catholics believe in the miracle of the 
sacraments, if “something” actually happened during the sacraments they would tend to 
ignore it.
Since tliis point is closely linked with the previous point, Macmurray’s response is 
also similar. Macmurray would not want to see religious activity prematurely halted at the 
doctrinal or ritual levels yet he would not dismiss the importance of both doctrine and 
ritual for communion. One must not merely apprehend the idea of God or the beauty of 
God, but must also encounter God in life.^^  ^However, in light of his discomfort with tlie 
miraculous one may assume that MacmiuTay would tend to restrict tliis presence of the 
Spirit to the activity of people within the congregation.
McIntyre, Shape o f Pneumatology, 232.
“And moreover, because religious reflection is not primarily expressed in Üiought but in action, God is 
not primarily apprehended as an idea, but in life wliich is centred in die intention of mutuality, as that 
personal infinite m which our finite human relationships have their ground and their being.” SRE, 54.
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From this comparison it should be clear that Macmurray’s concept of God is veiy 
consistent with the general categories of pneumatology from an economic perspective. 
Therefore one is justified in referring to Macmurray’s theology as essentially a natural 
pnemnatology. For MacmuiTay, to experience the personal God is to experience God as 
spirit. Yet in saying this one must immediately qualify these statements for he 
imequivocally declares that all descriptive language of God is mythological, dealing with 
infinite person and absolute spirit. Tliis mythological aspect which is beyond the merely 
human attributes of these words may be represented by capitalizing the words Person and 
Spirit. Therefore to experience the God who is Person is to experience God as Spirit.
4.3,3 Limits of Natural Pneumatology
Since pneumatology is the essence of Macmurray’s theology, all of the limitations 
cited in previous sections apply to the limitations of his natiual pneumatology. There is, 
nonetheless, one principal limitation which comes to the fore particularly in considering 
pneumatology. This is the absence of any discussion of how God as Spirit acts directly. 
There is the argument at the macro level for the imiverse as tlie action of God and human 
beings as the acts of God. There is also the coqtenfion at the subjective level that God acts 
in humans who cooperate with God’s universal intention. Yet there is no discussion of a 
direct act by God in the vast gulf between these two levels, with the possible exception of 
the incarnation. To put the question bluntly, does God as Spirit act directly in the universe 
or not? And if not how can one understand God as absolute Agent and infinite Person? If 
God is unable to directly move this piece of paper, then any human has a superior 
capacity to act in comparison with the supposedly absolute Agent. This is not to say God 
must move this piece of paper or that God may not choose to act in and tlnough human 
agents, but if God cannot directly act this becomes problematic.
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Macmun‘ay’s favorable citation of Blake, “God only exists and is in existing 
beings or men,”^^  ^along with his reticence to discuss the resurrection and biblical 
miracles, leads one to question whether he in fact allows for direct divme action. If God 
as Spirit is not the absentee-landlord of the deists’ clockwork universe and can effect 
reconciliation between people, then is God as Spirit not also able to act concretely? While 
all the indications point to Macmiuray’s discomfort with the miraculous and with direct 
divine intervention, which he sees as unnecessary, he does not appear to rule it out 
entirely. There may be any number of reasons for his reserve. He may be concerned 
about reintroducing the natural-supematuial dualism. He may be concerned that 
aclmowledging the direct action or intervention of God will breed complacency, 
passivity, and escapism. He may think it will encourage magical foims of religion. It may 
be that he simply has not observed such a direct intervention and therefore does not 
believe himself to be empirically justified in taking a definitive position. Yet none of 
these are sufficient to wan ant his virtual silence on this aspect of God as Spirit. If God as 
Spirit is mutual then God must be capable of direct action or God is not free; and if God 
is not free then he is not personal; and if God is not personal, God is not God.
4.4 C onclusio n
In tliis chapter Macmurray’s conception of God has been explored under the 
various apperceptions as the idea of God, the historical realization of God, and the 
mutually interactive and present God. This survey has clearly shown strengths and 
weaknesses to Macmurray’s natiual theology. In particulai* it has shown the limitations of 
natural theology when it is posited to the exclusion of special revelation. Furthermore one 
is able to observe the artificial natiue of this self-imposed philosophical reductionism in 
his discussion of God.
157 RE, 210.
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One must be quite clear regarding what Macmurray is saying about human 
knowledge of God. Because humans experience God humans are able to know God. The 
fullest human knowledge of God comes in the fullest expression of God witliin human 
limitations—the incarnation of God in Jesus Clnist. One may have a minimal loiowledge 
of God or an extensive Icnowledge of God but the upper limit of tliis loiowledge is Jesus 
Clnist. Knowledge is different than luiderstaiiding which is a reflective or theoretical 
activity whereby extensions and clarifications are attempted due to inadequate knowledge 
(that is not to say false knowledge, for one either knows or does not know). If one has 
complete and total knowledge of the Other then there is no need to reflect upon the Other. 
The theoretical understandings of God are imaginative constmcts designed to fill in the 
holes of oiu Icnowledge and must be verified in active relationship. Therefore one may 
possess certain knowledge of God but one must always hold one’s understanding (the 
theoretical extension of that knowledge) tentatively. Because the object of one’s 
reflection is beyond the limits of human experience all talk about God is at least 
somewhat theoretical because it is inherently inadequate. However, this is not a great 
problem for all reflection is metaphorical to some extent.
Given this, one may differentiate between metaphorical talk about God and 
antlnopomoiphic projection onto God by distinguishing intentions. If one says God is a 
rock and intends by this God is in some way like a rock this is appropriate theological 
language. If one says God is a rock and intends by this that God in Iris veiy nature, ad 
intra, is a rock, then this is projection. Projection occurs when one mistakes the model for 
the reality one is seeking to represent.
Jesus, who is fully God and fully hiunan, is able to communicate the reality of 
God in its fullest human terms in the totality of his humanity. So m pointing to Christ one
CH, 95.
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may say in the fullest human way this side of the eschaton this is what God is like and 
this is what God is. One notes the addition of the phrase “what God is like” for humans 
inevitably must reflect upon the person of Jesus and therefore must distinguish between 
their formulations about Jesus from their knowledge of him—just as one must distinguish 
between the reality of any par ticulai' person and one’s tliinking about that person.^^  ^
Projection is to mistake one’s thinking about God with the reality of God. It is to conhise 
partial knowledge with complete loiowledge. As the Apostle Paul states: “Now we see but 
a poor reflection as in a miiTor; then we shall see face to face. Now I loiow in part; then I 
shall loiow frilly, even as I am frilly known.”^^ ^
This is not to argue that loiowledge of God is from below, for Macmurray’s 
episteniology negates any idea offrom above or from below, for knowledge is always 
personal (that is to say someone’s knowledge) and is always rational (that is, in teims of 
tlie nature of the Other) and therefore knowledge is a mutually reciprocating relation 
between the self and the objective Other. This is also not to argue that one cannot or 
should not theorize about God (although Macmurray himself tended in this direction) for 
the necessary gaps in knowledge are always filled out by some theoretical constinct. The 
question is not should one reflect on God, the questions are, rather, (1) does one recognize 
that one’s loiowledge is inadequate and inlierently theoretical, and (2) is one’s theory 
more or less adequate based upon the experiential verification of those aspects which are 
open to corroboration?
The difference between knowledge of human and divine persons is that in principle it is possible 
(although highly improbable) for a human to completely know another human, while in the current 
dispensation it is impossible to completely know God.
1 Corinthians 13:12, NIV.
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CHAPTERS
CRITICAL THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT: 
SOME CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
For though it is tinth of fact that God made Man in his own image, it is also true 
that man makes his conception of God in Ins, so that immatme man has an 
immature conception of the Divine/
The original impetus for this study of Macmurray came from the question of how 
Macmurray’s imderstanding of persons was being used in a tiinitaiian context to describe 
the three persons of the Trinity and what this implied regarding the relationsliip between 
human and divine persons. After a thorough examination of Macmurray’s thought it is 
clear that while he sees a necessaiy correlation of how one conceives of both God and 
hmnanity he draws a strong ontological distinction between the two which functions to 
relativize the conceptual hnkage. Furthennore there is no necessary one-to-one 
coiTespondence, in eitlier direction, between conceptions of God and conceptions of 
persons, for Macmurray’s anthropology supports a variety of trinitarian and non- 
trinitarian conceptions of God. Yet tliis anthropology certainly influences the boundaries 
of acceptable models of Gk)d. How one thinlcs about humanity affects how one tliinks 
about God, but it is theoretical and therefore one is epistemologically engaged in a 
constant reciprocal exchange between the theoretical reflection and the objective reality 
of what is being reflected upon.
In this chapter Macmurray’s thought will critically engage a vaiiety of theologians 
who hold to a relational understanding of God. Each theologian, while having a relational 
concept of God and humanity, differs in their respective understandings of Deus ad intra,
‘ SRR, 34.
The various doctrines of God span the spectrum from thoroughly Unitarian to virtually 
tritheistic. Not only does this selection of theologians indicate the wide variety of 
relational understandings of God and humanity it also serves to demonstrate the wide 
applicability of Macmurray’s thought to the domain of theology. While a monograph- 
length treatment of each theologian in full dialogue with Macmiuray would certainly be 
worthwhile, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead a concise synopsis of a primary 
work by each theologian will be provided followed by a brief critique from the 
perspective of the Form of the Personal. These studies make no pretense to 
comprehensiveness but will focus on several key points illuminated by Macmurray’s 
thought especially as it relates to the particular theologian’s linkage of human and divine 
persons.
5.1 G e o f f r e y  W.H. Lam pe:
G od AS Subjective  Spirit
Lampe in his Bampton lectures, God as Spirit^ calls for nothing less than the 
replacement of the root metaphor of the Cliristian doctrine of God. In place of the 
trinitarian language of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit Lampe seeks a less 
problematic fonnulation based on the idea of God as Spirit.^ His rationale centers upon 
the subjective experience of communion with God and the desire to understand this 
existential reality through a non-dualistic relational model.'  ^To Lampe’s mind, the use of
 ^G.W.H. Lampe, God as Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
 ^“ ‘Spirit’, however, it must be repeated, seems to possess certain important advantages over die other 
models. As we have seen, it lends itself less readily to hypostatization.... It stands for God himself 
experienced as Sphit: tliat is, in his personal activity, not a ‘go-between’ deity, but God himself, the Father 
and Creator, in his personal presence within his creatures. ‘Spirit’, too, seems better able to express tlie truth 
tliat God’s hiteraction with human persons, and tlie integration of human personality witli God, takes place 
at every level, hivolving not only the intellect but the will, emotions, and tlie subconscious.” Lampe, 116. 
See also, 13, 211.
Lampe interprets salvation as commimioii with God and repentance as opeimess to God (16). Relationality 
is a pervasive topic in Lanipe, see 19,44, 50, 143-44, 177, 187, 197. There is some confiision over the 
ontological status of persons. In certahi passages it appears that humans are persons because of tlieir 
creation hi relation to God (e.g.. Lampe, 187). In other passages a more qualitative model of persons is used 
(e.g., 143-44).
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trinitarian fomiiilations inadequately describes this experience and lack the capacity to
communicate to the contemporary milieu/ With the help of a Bultmannian process of
demythologizing various biblical texts, begiiming with the Gospel of John and proceeding
through the Pauline and other biblical writings, he expounds his understanding of God as
Spirit. God as Spirit interacts immanently within the subjective dimension of the human.^
This subjective, immanent experience of God as Spirit was most fully realized in the
human life of Jesus of Nazareth. According to Lampe’s appraisal tlie advantage of his
approach is that it eliminates the requirement of a pre-existent Logos or a post-existence
ascension cluistology.^ In so doing he demythologizes the mediatorial nature of the Son
as well as the resurrection^ in favor of a foiin of Spirit-christology.^ Lampe is extremely
suspicious of the history of the interpretation of Jesus, seeing it as the unloiowmg
projection of the interpreter’s milieu and presuppositions back into the texts which are
then retrieved as divine christological revelation:
The Platonistically conceived Second Person of the Trinity in the classical 
formulations of the fourth and fifth centuries, the Imperial Clirist of Byzantine art, 
the sacrificial victim of much eucharistie doctrine, Karl Baifh’s Jesus Christ in 
whom the universe was created, Chiist as humanistic ideal, Christ as Moltmami’s 
‘crucified God’, are alfread back into, and then out of, the New Testament by an 
often imconscious process of the assimilation of the ancient interpretation to the 
more modem.
Adopting a Spiiit-christology allows Lampe to escape the trap of the historical Jesus.
By adopting the theological position of God as Spirit one is also freed from the 
liistorical particularities of scriptiue. Lampe is comfortable disagreeing not only with the
 ^Lampe believes there are any number of problem areas for trinitarian theology. See Lampe, 72, 158, 197- 
201 .
 ^Lampe, 45. Immanence is a key tlieme for Lampe’s theology.
 ^Lampe, 20, 135, 33, 73, 145.
® Lampe, 146-58. Lampe sees no need for a mediator between humanity and God (144) for God as Sphit is 
mcarnate m every human being (45, 181, 187,196); yet one camiot leave Jesus behind “altogether” (118). 
One of Lampe’s arguments for abandoning die resurrection is that die resurrection appears to make no 
difference to contemporary believers (145).
® Lampe renders various terms as synonyms in order to facilitate diis process. For example incarnation and 
inspiration (Lampe, 12); Clirist, Spirit, Word, and Wisdom (Lampe, 6, 62,37, 92).
Lanipe, 108-09.
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various authors of scripture/^ but even with Jesus liimself/^ One must respect Lampe’s 
bmtal honesty in this regard; he does not hide behind subterhiges or euphemisms. There 
is a definite methodological clarity to Lampe’s exegesis which stands in dramatic contrast 
to MacmuiTay’s handling of scriptme.
There are any number of similarities between Lampe and MacmuiTay. Both are 
concerned to overcome dualism and aie conunitted to relational and personal ideas of 
God.^  ^Both wish to understand the human experiential encounter with God and view 
theological investigation as necessarily a posteriori', each demonsti ates a strong 
apologetic concern regarding the intelligibility of religious discussion. Each similarly 
perceives God present and at work in the human person/'^ is concerned about the 
escapism inherent in certain ideas of heaven, is ambivalent towards miracles, views Jesus 
in continuity with the Jewish prophetic tiadition,^^ and conceives the resurrection 
accounts as visionary in natiue.^® Each also perceives the experience of God as the 
experience of a single person. Yet for all these similarities there are a number of stark 
contiasts.
5.1.1 Person a s  Subject ' •
Philosophically Lampe is clearly operating within a modern paradigm. This 
modernity is most markedly seen in his core understanding of the person as existential 
subject. Lampe defines his modem concept of the personal as “a union of mind and will
" Lampe affirms the prerogative not only to dispute particulars of the text, but also the interpretation of 
events provided. Lampe, 108.
Lampe, 110,112, 113.
Lampe clearly equates Spirit and Person. Lampe, 20.
In fact, witliout Macmmray’s Personal logic, one camiot help but ultimately collapse tliis presence of the 
Spirit into some form of immanentism, a problem which Lampe battles witii at several points. Lanipe, 21, 
45,177,197.
Lampe, 52, 97. Both also give die Gospel of John a fomidational role in their understanding of Jesus. See 
CH, X.
Lanipe, 146-48; see also 97-98. SRR, 52-53.
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and feeling, a coming together of Spirit with sphit.”^^  In fact it is this personal subjective
understanding of Spirit which he finds so helpful in communicating his understanding of
God to his contemporary audience/® By adopting this modem subjective^^ framework
Lampe is then forced, much as Rahner and Barth before liim, to reject the traditional
trinitarian language of three Persons as tritheistic/® Because of the dualism inherent in
modemity Lampe is logically forced to choose between the objective and the subjective.
He chooses subjectivity.^^
The extent of this existential subjectivity is revealed when Lampe discusses the
union of God and humanity.
‘Spirit’, too, seems better able to express the tmth that God’s interaction with 
human persons, and the integration of human personality with God, talces place at 
every level, involving not only the intellect but the will, emotions, and the 
subconscious.^^
Clearly for Lampe “every level” does not include objective or physical levels.^^ 
Therefore, while he is opposed to otheiworldly eschatology,^"  ^he is not ultimately 
concemed with present objective reality but with present subjective existential 
experience. The distinction between Lampe and Macmurray is apparent in a comparison 
of their differing interpretations of Christ’s temptation. Lampe interprets it subjectively 
(and one might add egocentrically) as the temptation for Jesus to doubt or repudiate his 
sonship.^^ MacmuiTay constmes it in temis of the temptation to deny the objectivity of 
reality and Jesus’ proper relationship towaids it. Inherent witliin the notion of Jesus’
Lampe, 24.
Lanipe, 43-44.
It is not an individualistic subjectivity because while it focuses upon the individual subjective experience 
of God Lampe sees this happening primarily witliin human personal relationships. Lampe, 177.
Lampe, 135-36,227.
Lanipe, 106, 156, 205.
^ Lampe, 116.
This almost gnostic attitude towards objective reality is also witnessed by Lampe’s comments regarding 
how the death of Jesus allowed the Spirit to be “released from the particularity of the historical and cultural 
context of bodily existence and set free to be given to his followers ....” Lampe, 92.
Lampe, 156,171.
Lanipe, 128.
222
relationship with reality is found the subjective concerns of Lainpe’s interpretation yet 
these subjective elements are caught up into the larger question of objective reality. 
Macmurray’s position includes and subordinates Lampe’s position and thereby surpasses 
it.
5.1.2 Mutuality and Unitarianism
Theologically Lampe’s subjectivity manifests itself in at least two ways. First, 
Lampe rejects attributing mutuality to God as mere anthropomorphism.^^ God can only be 
manifested subjectively, not in an objective mutual relationsliip. The desire for mutuality 
results from a failure to sufficiently recognize the immanence of God in every human 
being.^^ God’s actions, therefore, are strictly Ihnited to influencing humans subjectively 
fr om within.^® As a result Lampe redefines, or demythologizes, particular notions of 
God’s direct action (such as the kingdom of God, Jesus’ bodily resurrection, and Christ’s 
pai'ousia) in terms of manifestations of God’s will through human action brought into 
conformity with God’s piuposes.^®
Macmurray’s philosophy necessarily includes mutuality in the characteristics of 
personhood and therefore God, who is beyondthe personal, must also be at least mutual. 
Yet his actual discussion of God’s interaction (particularly in his discomfort with the 
direct intervention of God in the world) is har d to distinguish fr om Lampe’s and therefore 
must be challenged and brought into conformity with the rest of his philosophy.
The second theological repercussion of Lampe’s subjectivity is unitarianism. God 
is not only Spirit, God is a Spirit. If one accepts modern individual subjectivity as the 
definition of the person and assrmies a non-dualistic, almost Hegelian, pneumatological 
model then unitarianism is the logical and foregone conclusion. God is experienced as a
Lampe, 139. 
Lanipe, 139. 
Lampe, 205.
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single subject and therefore as a single person—there cannot be tliree persons and only 
one subject.
Lampe’s unitarianism and subjective conceptuality allows him to seriously 
consider the actual shape and foim of the most typical experiences of God—which are 
imitary and subjective. God is normally perceived as a single subject and is most 
commonly discerned in the actions of people. Bracketing off all considerations of triunity 
and direct objective action allows Lampe to fully consider these aspects of the daily 
experience of God which is often passed over by theologians.
Macmunay has been interpreted in a Unitarian manner by Kirkpatiick. In order to 
do so, however, it required Kirkpatrick both to dismiss Macmiuray’s comments about 
God being beyond the personal and to focus naiTowly upon MacmuiTay’s idea of God. 
While not wisliing to adopt Kirlqpatrick’s reductionisms, one sees m it the ability of 
Macmurray’s Form of the Personal to incoiporate the positive insights of subjective 
imitarian discussions of God, while relativizing these insights within the larger context of 
the interactive relational God. For Macmurray God is subject, but he is also more than 
subject—God is absolute Agent and infinite relational Person.
In conclusion one may say that Macmurray’s philosophy is able to incorporate the 
proper theological concerns of the subjective experience of the personal God conceived of 
in terms of God as Spirit while providmg a framework which goes beyond this modem 
subjective reductionism. Just as Macmurray determined the conception of human persons 
as subject was necessary yet inadequate, so too a conception of God as subject is 
necessary yet inadequate. One sees in the example of Lampe a situation where one’s 
partial and inadequate model of the human person is directly applied to the model of God. 
This yields some important insights yet it is ultimately found to be lacking.
29 Lampe, 174, 156, 171.
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5.2 D avid  S. Cu n n in g h a m :
R h eto rical  A u g ustinianism
David Cunninghani’s recent work. These Three are One: The Practice o f  
Trinitarian T h e o lo g y reflects a contemporary effort to rehabilitate the Augustinian- 
Thomistic doctrine of the Trinity and its attendant doctrine of the vestigia trinitatis using 
rhetorical strategies/^ His rhetorical method has several advantages wliich commend it. 
Historically it allows him a certain latitude in employing both Augustine and Aquinas; he 
does not feel constrained by their very words but attempts to convey what they were 
expressing given the restrictions of their time, place, and audience. Rhetorical theory also 
provides him with justification for modifying the root metaphors of trinitaiian theology. 
He seeks to replace the traditional terms of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit with 
terms he believes will be heard by present-day audiences in a functionally similar way as 
these traditional terms were heard by their original audience. To achieve this effect he 
suggests Source, Wellspring, and Living Water as contemporary alternatives.®  ^
Furthermore, the rhetorical sti ategy may be seen as a way of incorporating elements of 
the Barthian discussion of revelation but expanding it fi om a monological model to a 
more complex model which acknowledges tlïeTmportant role of the listener in the 
coimmuiicative process.®®
Macmiuray would certainly applaud Cimningham’s position that all theological 
foiinulations must be held tentatively®"  ^and the correlation of action and belief.®^
David S. Cunningham, These Three are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1998).
For tlie general discussion of the vestigia, see Cumihigham, 90-107. Note Cunningham prefers the term 
hinitarian marks to vestigia tiinitatis. Besides the numerous favorable citations of Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas, one sees such evidence as tlie 1-2-3-4-5 pattern for the doctrine of God: one God, two processions, 
three subsistent relations, four real relations, five characteristics. See, for instance, Cunningham, 58-65. 
Cumiingham defends Augustine and Aquhias against current dieological attacks as mere “historical 
scapegoating” (Cuimingham, 30-45).
Cunningham, 72.
Cuimingham, 101, 108.
Cunningham, 11.
Cuimingham, 44, 304.
225
Nevertheless, one’s attention is drawn to thi'ee major Macmiirrian criticisms of 
Cunningham,
5.2.1 L o g ic a l  F o r m
The first criticism involves Cunningham’s choice of logical forms. Ciuiningham, 
like Macmurray, recognizes the inadequacy of the common analytic form of logic for 
describing these more complex aspects of reality. Looking to Augustine’s De Musica and 
some comments by Bonhoeffer he suggests a musical logic of polyphony where 
numerous notes exist simultaneously, are distinct, yet united.®  ^Cunningham’s aim is 
similar to Macmurray’s: overcome individualism thiough a coimnunal unity without 
losing particularity. While the metaphor of polyphony has much to commend it, 
especially over a merely analytic logical form, one must ultimately deem it inadequate for 
expressing personal reality. Intuitively one associates the idea of a musical logic with art 
which is contemplative reflection upon the organic unity-pattem. This leads one to 
suspect that a musical logic will be appropriate to organic reality, but because it is sub­
personal it will prove inadequate to addi ess the totality of personal life.
This tentative evaluation is confirmed, when one realizes that Cunningham does 
not in fact claim an integration of the two notes but only claims an “apparent unity” of the 
notes.®  ^There is, in fact, no actual unity of the notes until one introduces an external 
listener—the one who imifies the sounds is external to the notes themselves. Yet when 
one intioduces the listener one realizes that this model is none other than the 
contemplation of music—art. But why must one consider artistic contemplation as sub­
personal? It is because there is no ability for interaction or mutuality between the notes. 
While the notes occupy the same auial space there is no interaction between the two 
notes. One note is not altered or changed in any significant way by the addition or
Cunningham, 130, 133.
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subtraction of any other note. What one has internal to the music itself is merely the 
juxtaposition of two discrete elements. As aheady noted, the unity is achieved in the 
hearing of the external listener. Here the particular an angements of notes will tend to 
emphasize or diminish the perception of the notes, but this is an effect, not of the one note 
on the other note, but on the one perceiving the notes. And as anyone who has suffered 
tlirough a child’s piano recital can attest, no amoimt of effort on the part of the listener 
can change a single note. To fiufher illustrate this aspect of contemplation, consider the 
case of a person wearing a blue sliirt that “bring outs” or dr aws attention to the person’s 
blue eyes. There is no actual modification of the eyes themselves merely a change in the 
perception of the eyes by the one appreciatmg them.
If one considers the actual nature of persons and their interactions there tnily is a 
difference introduced by the presence or absence of various persons. When someone’s 
spouse dies, that person remains a person, yet the person is truly affected. This is attested 
to by the common statement that the person “just isn’t the same” since the bereavement. 
There is no way to account for this type of phenomenon in Cunningham’s niusical logic 
yet there is within MacmuiTay^s Personal logic. In Personal logic the negative (in this 
case the constituting personal Other) gives shape to the positive (tlie particular person) 
without losing the distinction between the two. One therefore concludes musical logic is 
simply inadequate to fiilly express personal reality.
5.2.2 Substantial Ontology
A second Macmunian criticism of Cunningham is that he is employing a 
substantial ontology. This is particularly ironic in light of the fact that Cunningham 
clearly states his intention to overcome the limitations of substantial ontology®® and will 
not even deign to name the Trinity with substantives preferring instead the neologism,
Cunningham, 130.
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The Three, for fear of succuinbing to it/® Although Cuimingham seeks to escape its 
confines his thinldng is so peimeated by substantial ontology that he is unable to brealc 
free. This manifests itself in various ways.
One manifestation of the substantial ontology arises in Cmmingham’s discussion 
of relations. He is concemed to elhninate any notion of tlu ee agents in the Godhead"^ ® and 
therefore rejects the plirase “persons in relation” in favor of “relations without 
remainder.”"^  ^He is comfortable describing God as conummaf^ and mutually 
constituted/® but resists using person because it is too individualistic."^ He is even 
skeptical of the teim perichoresis for he is concemed it too readily evokes the idea of 
three agents in God and instead prefers the term coinherence."^  ^The reasoning beliind the 
preference is most telling; he prefers coinlierence because it has a “relatively static 
quality.”"^® So when Cunnhigham says divine persons are relations, he means divine 
persons are substantial relations."*  ^Alone this example may not be sufficient to justify 
labeling Cunningham’s ontology as substantial, but it contributes to the developing 
pattem.
Another manifestation of à substantial ontology arises fr om Cunningham’s 
preference for the temi participation. He hesitates to use the terms relationality and 
fellowship because of what he claims ai e negative associations; yet he does not indicate 
any awareness or concem that participation also carries particular comiotations— 
especially those stemming from Greek pliilosophy which tend towards static and
Cminingham, 35-41, 64, 166-72.
Cunningham, 22, 64, 166-68.
Cunningham, 180-81.
Cumiingham, 189.
As long as this is not understood analogously to a committee. Cunningham, 243.
Cumihigham, 165,181.
Cminingham, 27-28.
Cunningham, 180-81.
Cunningham, 181.
Cunnhigham here is following the Augustinian concem about real and accidental relations and is desirous
to avoid any attributing of accidental relations to tlie Godhead.
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substantial conceptions of participation/® This static tendency is reinforced in the 
preference for the category of space (ostensibly because it focuses attention on 
relationsliip) over time (which he views as disjunctive and linear)/® However, while it is 
possible to map relations in space (and tliis is necessary) Macmun ay would point out that 
there is no actual ability to actively relate or interact in space alone. According to 
Macmurray time is the integration of space and is therefore the form of action and fully 
interactive relationality.^® Space not integrated in time is static and merely substantial.
The third manifestation of a substantial ontology, and one of great significance, is 
the substantial orientation demonstrated in the choice of the new root metaphor for tlie 
Trinity: water. Source, Wellspiing, and Living Water are all sub-personal concepts. 
Granted water fits his desire for a more dynamic tenn, but it is still essentially substantial. 
One may possibly argue that is not purely substantial; that it is a hybrid dynamic- 
substance or mildly organic (“living”) substance, but at its core it is substantial in nature. 
Cunningham’s illustrations of the Trinity only serve to highlight the sub-personal nature 
of his metaphor for he inevitably chooses personal illustrations (such as mother-child- 
placenta) which are actually niOre capable than his chosen root metaphor. Wliile 
attempting to free the Trinity fr om inadequate individualistic teiminology, such as person 
which he views as insufficiently participatory,^^ he substitutes something which cannot in 
any meaningful sense of the words thinlc, feel, or interact.
Macmurray when he does affirm descriptive analogies for God, always insists that 
personal analogies are the most able metaphors. He would vehemently disagree with the
Cuimingham, 25. Ultimately Cunningham uses participation synonymously witli perichoresis, 
coinherence, koinonia, fellowship, and communion, Cminingham, 180,182. Yet even hi the use of these 
terms one still senses the presence of die more static understanding of participation stemming from the 
Greek methexis in comparison to the more interactive notion of koinonia. See Ton ance, Being in 
Communion, 256, 356, n. 104.
Cmniingham, 158.
This is also seen in Cuiinhigham’s appropriation of McFadyeiT definition of persons as sedimented along 
witii die rhetorical definition of the person as a locutionary space (Cunningham, 198-201,214). See also die 
promhience of the spatial metaphor in describmg a person as the center of agency (Cumiingham, 215).
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utilization of sub-personal categories and view Cunningham’s suggestion of Source, 
Wellspring, and Living Water as retrograde.
This failure by Cunningham is particularly glaring because he is aware of the 
difficult nature of successfully changing the root metaphor, evidenced by his discussion 
of the failure of Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier,^^ Yet he is dismissive towards those 
who alert liim to the inherent dangers^® and assmnes that he knows the crucial aspect of 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit which must be restated and therefore he reinterprets the 
Trinity in a manner he confidently presumes is adequate. In so doing, he chooses a 
metaphor which cannot even adequately express the human Jesus, much less the divine 
triune God of the universe. His choice of metaphors is an example of his attempt to 
reinvigorate the doctrine of vestigia triniiatis; for he clearly sees Source, Wellspring, and 
Living Water as such a trinitarian mark. This leads one to be liighly suspicious of his 
entire effort of rehabilitation and his approach to natural theology.
5,2.3 Natural Theology
The third Macmunian critique of Cunningham is that his natm al theology is 
insufficiently aware of its own tendency towards projection. In other words there is 
insufficient awareness of the distinction between the Creator and creation. The defense of 
natural theology in the face of the Bartliian rejection is definitely a component of 
Cuimingham’s rehabilitation of the vestigia tr in ita tis .He carefully places natural 
theology within the context of revealed theology and believes, along with Gunton,^^ that 
diere ai e serious disadvantages to simply attempting natural theology without first 
developing a doctiine of God which informs the imaginative constmction of (or search
Cumiingham, 27-28. 
Cunningham, 73. 
Cumiingham, 73, n. 41. 
Cumiingham, 94-95. 
Cunningham, 86, n. 58.
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for) the trinitarian niaiks/® Wliile one may side with Cumiingham vis-à-vis the need to 
situate natm al theology within the context of revealed theology, one does not necessarily 
have to embrace the employment of trinitaiian marks. As seen above, detecting the 
trinitarian marks is more problematic than Cumiingham might think.
Cminingham’8 discussion of garth’s distinction between interpretation and 
illustration is instructive regaiding the issue of analogy.®  ^Cunningham argues the 
differentiation is unsustainable in practice because the dichotomy cannot be maintained. 
He cites Barth who acknowledges the distinction is not a hard and fast one. However, it is 
one thing to argue that the boimdaries between inteipretation and illustration are not 
clearly delineated and quite another to eliminate all distinction between them as 
Cmniingham does. If Cunningham had employed Somce, Wellspring, and Living Water 
as an illustration of the Trinity it would raise only minor concem. However, since he is 
conceptually restating or reinterpreting the Trinity (wannnted tlnough the anologia entis) 
liis solution must be deemed inadequate and inappropriate. Wliile Cunningham believes 
he is approacliing the doctrine of the Trinity theologically (from above), in actual fact his 
employment of the vestigia trinitatis is one where the earthly image (fr om below) is 
controlling the theological.
In evaluating Cunningham’s tlieology one respects the intention behind it while 
ultimately viewing its execution as deficient. In particular one finds Cunningham’s 
insight into the active participation of the person epistemologically to be a most important 
contribution. However, he decouples this insight fr om the objective natme of the reality 
he is considering. Reality provides the boundaries and limits of the imaginative 
constmctive process and by failing to pay sufficient heed to that objective reality he 
comes to adopt a sub-personal logical fonn and a sub-personal ontology in his discussion
Cunningham, 85-86, 89, 106-07. 
Cuimingham, 102-04.
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of God, Furthennore, tlirough the presupposition of the qnalogia entis he inappropriately 
collapses the Creator-creation bomidaiy in his natural theology. His basic understanding 
of God is the same as his basic understanding of hiunan persons—they are both 
substantial and tliis is reflected in the choice of metaphor. His conception of person (as 
substantial being) is applied unconsciously to his concept of God and is then read back 
into his perception of reality in the trinitarian niaiics. Moreover, this conception is 
practically imitarian in its focus on the common substance or being of God.
5.3 T ho m a s F. T o r r a n c e :
C h risto lo g ic a l  AND P erichoretic  E pistem o lo g y
In The Christian Doctrine o f God, One Being Three Persons^^fhs Scottish 
Barthian Thomas F. Tonance argues for a re-appropriation of certain elements of 
Athanasius’ trinitarian theology. Unity and plmality are both attributed to the Godhead, 
yet the stress is clearly upon the unity of God, exemplified in the order found both in the 
title of the work and in the presentation of the topics—one being comes first, followed by 
the three persons. Tonance does not go as far as Rahner or Barth in suggesting the 
abandomnent of the use of thefeiin person for hypostasis. He does, however, detail the 
ambiguity found in the Greek terms ousia and hypostasis and tends to employ the Greek 
terms rather than the more familiar English or Latin translations—all of which combined 
suggests, if not a discomfort with the word person, at least an express desire to be 
properly understood when he uses person theologically. In this focus upon unity and the 
discomfort with the concept of person there is something of a remnant here of the 
Barthian notion of the singular subjectivity of God. There is within his cliristocentricity a 
remnant of the Barthian singular subject.
Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine o f God, One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1996).
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5.3.1 Epistemology
No doubt due to the direct influence of Macmurray upon Ton ance there is a 
marked similarity between their respective epistemologies/® Both hold strongly to the 
objectivity of the Other and the a posteriori nature of Imowledge/® As a consequence 
Tonance, like Macmunay, holds to the differentiation of reflection and knowledge 
(usually addressed in tenns of Polanyi’s oft quoted “one knows more than one can say”) 
and the need to verify thought. Most importantly this objectivity frees one 
methodologically to approach different objects in the mamier appropriate to the particular 
object under consideration. Therefore science and theology having differing objects will 
also have differing methodologies.®^ For botli thinkers this creates an epistemic hierarchy 
or a hierarchy of knowledge.®^ The lower levels of reflection are contained witliin the 
levels above. Torrance refers to this using Polanyi’s terminology of emergence and 
openness: the lower levels are open to the higher levels and can be explained by the- 
liigher levels, yet lower levels can never explain higher levels.®®
That Torrance was influenced by Macmurray is beyond doubt. Not only did Torrance study philosophy 
under Macmmxay at the University of Edinburgh, but they both held teacliing posts tliere in tiie 1950s. One 
only has to look at liis commendation of Macmurray quoted in tlie Introduction (see above, 1) to see 
Torrance’s evaluation of Macmurray’s influence. Macmurray’s influence is not always visible on the 
surface, but tends to function at deep conceptual levels. Therefore it is not as obvious, say in coriiparison to 
tlie hnpact of M. Polanyi, yet when one comes across a reference to Macmurray one discerns tlie 
importance of tlie concepts involved and one often hears the echoes of Macmurray in various aspects of 
Torrance’s writings. See T.A. Noble, “Torrance, Thomas Forsyth,” hi Dictionary of Scottish Church 
History and Theology, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, et al. (Edüiburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 823-24. 
Theological Science (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), an early programmatic work by Torrance 
demonstrates the formative influence o f Macmurray upon his basic miderstanding of such concepts as 
knowledge (11-12); theory and practice (3, 22, 30-31); science (35,76,123, 301); reality, trutli, objectivity 
(121, 124, 174, 208). His major criticism of Macmunay here is that he believes tiiat Macmurray separates 
failli and reason, although he perceives (conectly) that Macmmray’s philosophy actually holds them 
togeüier.
ToiTance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 44.
Tonance, Christian Doctiine of God, 87. Tonance specifically cites Macmurray on this point in both God 
and Rationality, 81, 199-200; and Christian Frame of Mind (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1985), 34.
Torrance, Christian Doctiine of God, 82-83.
Tonance, Christian Doctiine of God, 86. One may be confused by Tonance’s statement about the 
pyramid shape of this knowledge. This refers to tlie number of salient facts and comiections between 
elements so that as one rises ontologically one perceives the increasingly basic interconnections and 
conceptual categories so tliat an economy of concepts and relations develop. Tonance derives tliis from his 
understandmg of the philosophy of science.
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The differences between ToiTance and MacmuiTay emerge when it come to the 
reflective levels appropriate to human conceptuality. Macmurray focuses upon scientific, 
artistic, and religious reflection which he intimately ties to material, organic, and personal 
ontological levels. He recognizes that there is a reality beyond the human personal unity- 
pattern which encompasses it and gives it meaning, but he believes reflection upon it is 
problematic because it is beyond the human limits of comprehension, it is literally beyond 
the personal. Torrance, by contrast, constmcts a tliree leveled theological epistemology 
wliich begins where Macmurray’s ends.®"^
The first level of Tonance’s theological epistemology is the evangelical and 
doxological level of the human experience of worship and comimmity.®  ^He describes this 
level as the level of incipient theology where empirical and theological (i.e., reflective) 
knowledge are fused together.®® Scripture and tradition are primaiy sources for this level. 
Tonance’s ground level is the highest level considered by Macmuiray’s Form of the 
Personal—the religious experience of personal beings. The second epistemic level is the 
theological level which contemplates tlie economic Trinity in the interaction between 
humanity and deity.®  ^Key to this level are the concepts of homoousia and ousia^^ for in 
the union of the being and action of God present in these ideas®® there is the recognition 
that the Son and the Holy Spirit are God.^ ® The third level of Toraance’s epistemology is 
the higher theological level of the immanent Trinity.^^ Here the concepts of hypostasis^^ 
and perichoresis^^ come into play as the conceptual tools necessary to unify and relate the
^ Torrance, Christian Doctiine of God, 88-111. 
ToiTance, Christian Doctrine of God, 88. 
Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 89. 
Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 91.
^ Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 93. 
Torrance, Christian Doctiine o f God, 95. 
Tonance, Christian Doctiine o f God, 96. 
Tonance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 98-99. 
Tonance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 100. 
Tonance, Christian Doctiine of God, 102,
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economic imderstandings of the Son and the Holy Spirit with die Father in a Communion 
of Persons/"^
The theological and higher theological levels are purely reflective levels and 
Ton ance constantly reminds the reader that these theoretical levels must be tested against 
the experiential reality of the evangelical and doxological level/® Tliis experiential level 
is the ontological level of reality directly open to verification by hiunan persons.
Having said this Macmun ay might inquire exactly how the verification of these 
theoretical models takes place? Tonance says they must be grounded in the experiential 
level of the worshipping community.^® The problem, of course, is that there are different 
practices among various Christian communities and these practices, at least in part, are 
often derived from the very theoretical models which are submitted for examination. 
Tonance is aware that one must constantly be on guard against the usurpation of the 
purely human definition over the theological—and acloiowledges the difficulty of doing 
so due to the theomorphic nature of hum anity.H is theological control, so to speak, is 
the incarnation.
Tonance argues that the Y>^ anant for reflecting upon these admittedly tlieoretical 
levels arises from the incarnation of the Son: the fullness of deity in ftill humanity, truly 
God with us. Thus Tonance seizes the epistemological significance of the incarnation in a 
manner similar to Macmunay’s early suggestion, yet he expands upon it in a way in 
which Macmunay never did. It is due to the incarnation of God in Jesus Clirist that one is 
able to reflect upon (with great humility and tentativeness) the nature of God ad extra and 
ad intra. It is only because of the grace of God in the incarnation that one is able to know
Torrance, Christian Doctiine o f God, 104.
This is not to say tliat tlie immanent and economic ontological levels are not real, but both are beyond 
human capacity to experience and therefore must remain tlieoretical for human beings.
70' Torrance, Christian Doctiine o f God, 109. 
Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 106-07.
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the God who is beyond knowing and imagine the imageless/^ One must be absolutely 
clear on this point—Torrance is addressing ways of thinking, conceptualizing, and 
speaking about God. Thus he is not drawing ontological conclusions at these reflective 
levels, even when he uses ontological terminology within these discussions.^^ To put it 
bluntly Torrance does not want to confrise human words about God with the reality of 
God; neither does he want to remain silent.
The appeal to the incarnation as the revelation of God with its analogia relationis 
ultimately differentiates Torrance’s analysis of the apprehension of human words 
theologically from Cunningham’s analogia entis with the accompanying understanding of 
vestigia trinitatis^^ Rather than basing theology and the doctrine of the Trinity on 
creaturely analogies Torrance sees the incarnation as the authentic revelation of the 
Trinity because the Son moves reciprocally between the various theological levels, acting 
as a epistemic bridge revealing what can be known about God in human terins.^  ^Yet 
wliile there is a reciprocity, there is still a priority given to knowledge from the higher 
theological levels since the lower may be understood in terms of the higher, but the higher 
levels cannot be imderstood in terms of the lower.
From a Macmmrian perspective the problem arises when Torrance asserts that 
these human concepts are caught up and transformed in their theological usage,^^ so that 
an epistemological inversion occurs whereby the theological meaning becomes primary 
and the ordinary (creaturely) application is derived mutatis mutandis fr'orn the
Torrance, Christian Doctiine of God, 158-59, 194.
Even tliough Torrance uses terms like onto-relations in his discussion of the Trinity, tliese are conceptual 
and a means of spealdng about God and are not necessarily the objective reality o f tire immanent Trinity. 
Torrance, Christian Doctf'ine o f God, 156-57.
Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 219-220. See also Alan Torrance’s discussion of tire differentiation 
of die various arralogies in 5emg as Commiiniott, 181, 185, 203-12.
Torrance, Christian Doctiine o f God, 78, 93, 100,107.
Torrance, Christian Doctiine of God, 87.
Torrance, Christian Doctiine o f God, 103.
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theological.^"  ^Consider the example of perichoresis and Personal logic, Tonance defines 
perichoresis as a complete, dynamic, mutual coinlierence (or co-indwelling) of the divine 
hypostases snnultaneously maintaining imity and otherness.®  ^What can be said of one 
can be said of the other, except regarding enhypostatic relationality. This mutually 
constituting coinherence is virtually identical to the description Macmurray gives as the 
ideal limit of heterocentiic and mutually constituting persons in the Form of the Personal, 
grammatically enabled by Personal logic.^^ Perichoresis and Personal logic are clearly 
similar,^^ yet Macmurray is adamant that Personal logic camiot be applied to divine 
Person(s). Torrance, alternatively, would see Personal logic as the creaturely applicable 
form of perichoresis, since he sees all theological concepts as havmg their proper divine 
and creaturely (limited) applications.^^
Yet one must ask what the difference is between the theological meaning of a teim 
and its ideal abstraction? What is risked in Torrance’s epistemic inversion is the clear 
warning regarding the theoretical nature of God-talk. By baptizing certain concepts one 
moves precariously close to the reification of ideals.^^ One understands the desire to 
preserve the special status of certain metaphors, wliich as Cuimingham demonstrates ai e 
not easily translated, but at the same time one’s concern should rest not on the 
teiminology but on the objective reality one is attempting to comprehend. If one is going
^ Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 105.
Torrance, Christian Doctiine o f God, 102,168-73. "... Üie Persons of tlie Holy Trinity reciprocally 
contain one another wliile remaining what tliey are in their oûiemess from one anotlier.” Torrance,
Christian Doctiine of God, 170.
^RA8, 58.
Torrance discovers tlie roots of perichoresis firmly in the Gospel of Jolin. Both Athanasius and Hilary 
conceptually tie perichoresis to John 14. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 168-70. One cannot help but 
wonder if  Macmurray’s imderstanding of the Form of tlie Personal and Personal logic does not stem, at least 
in pail, from his affinity for the Gospel of John (CH, x). See Macmurray’s explicit grounding of friendship 
in words taken from tlie gospel of John (CH, 80) and the empirical grounding of religious experience in 
personal relations, citing John 14:9 (RE, 210). Again, this is not to say tliat Macminray is conflising or 
collapsing philosophy into Christianity. Any number of sources and inspirations'may be factored into tlie 
origin of a philosophical system. But the probable common source fiirther solidifies one’s perception of 
tlieir functional similarity.
Torrance, Christian Doctiine of God, 220-21.
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to employ idealist conceptualities theologically then one needs to anchor these teims 
firmly in reality.
Macmurray’s is a very tight coiTelation between modes of reflection, ontological 
levels, and knowledge. One can only reflect upon what one laiows and one can only know 
the reality one has experienced. Theoiy can only become Imowledge when it is verified in 
action. Ultimately the practical epistemological differences between Tonance and 
Macmurray appear to revolve around the issue of authority and verification. In order to 
pursue Toirance’s method one must have a strong christology and a reasonably strong 
doctrine of scripture, as well as confidence in the practices and traditions of the church. 
Macmmray is certainly more epistemologically skeptical of the practices and traditions of 
the chui'ch, especially as they are manifested through ecclesial authority. Macmurray 
accepts the need for theoretical constructs, including theoretical constructs of God, 
however he is adamant that these theoretical images must not be imposed upon people by 
means of ecclesial authority. Furthermore one must realize that these constructs are 
theoretical and remain so except in those aspects which can be experienced and verified 
in human experience. Therefore Macmurray desires verification situated firnily in the life 
and practices of the church as a community rather than in its primarily institutional form.
5.3.2 Pneumatological Subordination
A second Macmunian criticism arises regaining Torrance’s subordination of 
pneumatology. In light of the perichoretic nature of Torrance’s trinitarian theology this 
may seem a strange accusation, for Tonance admirably refutes the more Cappadocian 
understanding of the Monarchy of the Father and asserts the co-equality of the three 
hypostases, including the Holy Spirit.^® Even so, he betrays a subtle subordinationism of
This tendency is somewhat betrayed in Torrance’s penchant for the original Greek terms (ousia and 
hypostasis) radier than the contemporary equivalents.
90 Torrance, Christian Doctiine of God, 181-85.
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the Holy Spirit in at least thiee ways. First, there is the stated preference for the baptismal 
formula of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit and the references to the first, second, 
and third Persons of the Trinity,^^ even while acloiowledging the various orders of 
presentation found in the New Testament. According to Macmunay, in a tme 
community of persons there is no such thing as a first, second, or third person. All 
persons, as persons, are equal. There may be functional distinctions but these exist at sub­
personal levels. To take any one order—even one as important as the Matthean baptismal 
formula—and to absolutize it betrays a sub-personal train of thought and implies lack of 
equality.
Second, when Torrance argues that the Spirit does not draw attention to itself but 
instead points to the Son and is therefore somehow tiansparent^^ he reveals that he is 
again not thinldng of the various hypostases as fully personal. All persons are 
heterocentiic rather than egocentric, hi Macmun ay’s definition of persons, each person of 
the Trinity should point to the others. In discussions regarding the filioque, the East has 
repeatedly pointed out that if one were to consistently maintain this position then Christ 
would likewise need to be trartsparent for, as Torrance himself notes, Jesus points to the 
Father. This assertion of the transparency of the Spirit is particularly suiprising in 
Torrance’s case because of his involvement with the Reformed-Orthodox dialogue. This 
tendency is further evidenced in Torrance’s own discussion of the îilioque?^ His 
ai'gmnent is certainly valid and strongly emphasizes the perichoretic unity of God’s 
actions. In spite of this he ultimately fails to make similar- perichoretic remarks about the 
Spirit’s role in the incarnation of the Son. He is quite content to speak of the Son as
Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 176. 
Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 72. 
Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 65-66.
^ Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 186-192.
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begotten of the Father alone.^^ Binitariaii discussions of the Father and the Son without 
reference, or only marginal reference, to the Holy Spirit are not infrequent;^^ but 
discussions of the Spirit always involve the Father and the Son.^^
The third way Macmmray reveals a pneumatological subordination occurs in the 
parallel discussions of religious experience. Once one realizes that Macmurray’s 
theological orientation is pneumatological then one grasps tlie relative paucity of 
pneumatology in Toirance’s discussion of the evangelical and doxological level. There 
are several examples of christomonism but only one possible pnemnatomonism.^^ If one 
is going to apply perichoresis or Personal logic to the Persons of the Trinity consistently 
then one must move towards a stronger pnemiiatological awareness, one consistently 
exliibiting a fully trinitaiian discourse.
One clearly detects a great deal of correspondence between Macmmray and 
Toirance, especially epistemologically. Macmmray’s reservation regarding the 
mythological nature of God-talk are in great part assuaged by Ton ance’s constant 
warnings as to the theoretical nature of the epistemic constructs and the need for 
verification in experience. However there are concerns about Torrance’s notion of 
epistemic inversion and the potential for reification that this creates.
In this study very little has been said regarding Torrance’s anthropology and its 
relation to his theology. One may observe the connection, nonetheless, in recognizing that 
the Athanasian-Barthian focus on the unity of God as singular' subjectivity is mirrored in 
Torrance’s emphasis upon the subjective-theoretical activity by the human person, hi 
other words, Torrance focuses so much upon mental activity because it is indicative of his
Toirance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 176.
For instance: “The Father is not properly (D S Î Father apart from hie Son, and the Son is not
properly Son apart from tlie Father, and tlie Holy Sphit is not properly the Holy Spirit apart from the Fatlier 
and die Son.” Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 174. See also 205, 213, 216.
This could be in part due to die historical nature of Torrance’s exposition—the question of the deity of 
die Holy Spirit and the filioque only arose after the deity of the Son was secured.
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understanding of humanity. This understanding of humanity then resonates with an 
imderstanding of God’s unity as a single subjectivity.
5.4 C olin  E. Gu n t o n :
Tr in ita r ia n  Rela tio n a l  B eing
Gunton’s The Promise o f Trinitarian Theology is a collection of essays centered in 
the quest for a trinitarian ontology which will unite soteriology and anthropology against 
the fiagmentary forces of modernity which tear them apart. Gunton believes only an 
ontology based upon the Cappadocian trinitaiian doctiine of God is able to accomplish 
tliis task.^^ This program is carried over into the more integrated and systematic The One, 
Three and the Many}^^ While the continuity of both is striking there is some development 
of Gunton’8 thought which must be taken into accoimt. Arguably one might dispense with 
Promise o f Trinitarian Theology but for the purposes of this study it is important to 
include it because it contains direct interaction with Macmmtay. His argument hi both 
works, essentially, is that one’s doctrine of God has a detenninative influence upon one’s 
ontology, and thus one must properly conceive of God in order to understand reality. 
Gunton, therefore, traces modem individualistic notions of human personhood back to a 
theological cause—Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity. Because Augustine’s doctrine of 
the Trinity places too much emphasis upon the unity of God to the exclusion of God’s 
plurality the natural trajectory of Western theology is imitarianism and Western 
antlii'opology tends toward individualism. The absence of relationality is accompanied by 
a doctrine of divine unknowability, wliich encourages atheism, for either God is 
unknowable and one must become a functional atheist, or one must reject this non­
relational and unknowable God. Either way atheism is the result. To mildly overstate the 
case, Gunton believes Augustine is the cause of Western atheism.
98 Torrance, Christian Doctrine o f God, 88-91.
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The solution to modem individualism and atheism is to reassert the plurality and 
relationality of God by recovering the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity which 
emphasizes the three persons and, by necessity, the relationality among the Tlnee. Once 
this relational model of divine persons is reestablished a relational ontology will be 
embraced and the relationality of all creation will become apparent. Human persons, then, 
will be imderstood not as the individualistic particles of modem conceptuality, but as free 
and mutual persons in relation.
5.4.1 A n t h r o p o l o g ic a l  D e p e n d e n c e
Gunton’s anthropology resonates remarkably with Macmmray’s; yet this creates a
methodological problem for Gunton. According to Gunton’s thesis, theology and
antlnopology exist in a type of causal or derivative relationship.
The point is that because we are established in our being in the Trinity, we are 
enabled to think from, and, with careful qualification, about, the triune being of 
God.... Theology, on this account, is a trinitarian process, from the being of God 
thr ough whom we are, to the articulation of tlie manifold relationships in which 
we have om" created and redeemed being.^ ®^
In order for Macmmray and Gunton to shar e a common anthr opology they should 
share a common doctrine of God, but this is not the case. Whereas Gimton’s doctrine of 
God is trinitarian with a decidedly Cappadocian accent upon the thr ee Persons of the 
Godliead, Macmmray is agnostic regarding the natme of God ad intra and only 
definitively asserts that God is beyond the personal. If Gimton’s argmnent is to survive he 
must show either that Macmmray’s anthropology is dissimilar to Cappadocian 
relationality or that Macmurray’s doctrine of God is somehow drawn from Cappadocian 
trinitarian sources. The first option is not available to Gunton, for he correctly discerns 
the Cappadocian doctrine of divine persons is essentially equivalent to Macmurray’s
Gunton, Promise o f Trinitarian Theology, vii-viii.
Colin E. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
Gunton, Promise o f Trinitarian Theology, 6.
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conceptuality of human persons. This leaves only the option of demonstr ating a
Cappadocian dependence.
To accomplish tliis Gunton begins with the suggestion that a possible sour ce for
Macmurray’s thought comes from the Gospel of Jolm. Then he introduces the tlieology of
Richard of St. Victor and proposes a possible Scottish connection between Macmurray
and Richard of St. Victor by way of Calvin and Sir William Hamilton (a nineteenth-
century Scottish philosopher).^^^ Gimton then speculates:
Could it be that although there is no direct reference to a God conceived as triime 
in Macmunay’s work, in some way there is a measur e of dependence; that in 
some way Macmurray’s thought about the hmnan person derives from Christian 
thought about God?^ °"^
Here one sees that Gunton is intent upon maintaining an epistemic and ontological
priority for theology over anthropology. If one doubts tliis is Gimton’s purpose consider
the following from the very next paragraph:
Towards the end of tlie previous section, I began to advance the second main 
thesis, that Macmmray’s view of the person appears to derive fr om Christian 
thought about God. If this is so, it casts doubt upon the modern thesis that 
theological doctrines are the projections of anthropological theories.... The way 
tlihigs have happened historically suggests that the dependence is otherwise: that 
antliropology stems fr oïii theology, and not the other way round.
Gunton’s argument is deserving of car efril attention and to facilitate this a 
streamlined recapitulation of the line of reasoning is appropriate. He starts with the 
(probably correct) suggestion of biblical influence in Macmurray’s antliropology. He then 
introduces the very tenuous hypothesis of a Scottish historical connection between 
Macmmray and Richard of St. Victor. Talcen together these are construed as possible 
evidence of the influence of Christian thought about God. Finally, this is offered as
Gunton, Promise o f Trinitarian Theology, 97. 
Gunton, Promise o f Trinitarian Theology, 91-92
104 Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 92.
Gunton, Promise o f Trinitarian Theology, 92-93. Gunton later expresses reseivations about 
Macmurray’s antliropology in One, Three and the Many, (169, n. 18). This is based upon the work of Aves. 
Aves’ principal criticisms are (philosophically) that Macmurray is dualistic and (tiieologically) tliat his 
hamartology and soteriology are weak.
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historical proof of the dependent nature of antliropology upon theology. There are several 
logical anomalies in this argument. Consider the evidential chain. Gunton takes a 
suggestion, moves it into the realm of possibility, and then asserts it as historical proof 
without introducing any substantial wairant for these evidentiary moves. Furthermore, 
one notes the conceptual vagary involved. Observe how the Gospel of Jolm becomes 
Cliristian thought about God which then becomes Cappadocian trinitarian theology. 
Gunton never explicitly states the last conceptual jump, but in order for his argument to 
have any coherence it must be understood that when he says Christian he means 
Cappadocian, If anthropology is dependent upon the doctrine of God then identical 
anthropologies must be derived from the same doctrine of God. Of course one only needs 
to consider the theology of Lampe (see above, §5.1) with its Johannine orientation to 
realize that many different doctrines of God are possible from reading the Gospel of John. 
Simply because Macmun ay is probably influenced by the Gospel of John that does not 
malce him Cappadocian.^®  ^Simply because he is Scottish that does not malce him 
Cappadocian. And, one must add, simply because Macmurray’s anthropology is relational 
that does not make him Cappadocian. Even through sheer force of numbers this argument 
is not successful.
Of couise there is in actuality a tliird option open to Gimton to explain 
Macmurray’s antliropology; this is the influence, total or paitial, of non-theological 
concepts upon Macmuiray’s thought. Yet Gunton does not avail liimself of this option, or 
apparently even consider it (in either its strong or weak fonn) in liis interaction with 
Macmmray. This is even more puzzlmg given later statements in the book which appear 
to move in this direction. In the final chapter Gunton’s thesis is presented in a moderated 
foim: “The way we think of God affects the way we think of that which he creates and
106 Yiiis is easily refuted by considering the Joliamiine basis of Lampe’s unitarianism discussed earlier in 
this chapter. See above §5.1.
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redeems.” ®^^ One may argue that tliis is Gunton’s position all along; yet if tliis is the case 
then there is no need for the lengths he goes to in liis radical defense of the Cappadocian 
origins of Macmurray’s anthropology.
The probable solution to this anomaly is found in the nature of the work itself, for 
it is a collection of essays written over a period of time. The final chapter, from which the 
moderated form of the thesis is taken, along witli the chapter on cosmology were wiitten 
well afier the chapter where Gunton interacts directly with Macmunay. The final chapter 
in particular was wiitten in an attempt to synthesize the collection of essays. One assumes 
that in writing the cosmology chapter Gunton found it much more difficult to find direct 
theological influences upon the scientists. In the final chapter he draws attention to the 
fact he did not attribute theological sources to scientific cosmology. ^ ®^ Perhaps this 
assisted Gimton in qualifying his more deteiministic tendencies in the earlier writings 
helping him realize it is unnecessary for liis overall project.^®^
5.4.2 T rin ita rian  O n t o l o g y
It is possible within Gunton’s theological fiamework to account for the correlation 
between these anthropologies tlii’ough the objective natiue of reality. Reality, according to 
Gunton, is open to limited aspects of investigation and within certain boundaiies one may 
laiow ontological reality which is only fully known in its expression within a
Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 165, emphasis added. A more moderate form is also found in 
One, Three and Many, “The logic of tliis claim is important for tlie general theme of tliis book, that the way 
in which we conceive human life in its fulness is closely bound up with die way we conceive its universal 
framework.” Gimton, One, Three and Many, 140.
See specifically Gunton’s statement to this effect, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 173.
While tiiis developmental mteipretation is probably die best explanation, it is still troubling that Gunton 
was still dichotomizing his diinking as late as 1985, especially in light of his earlier cliristological work 
where he manages to overcome a similar cliristological bifurcation between christology from above and 
cliristology from below. Colin E. Gmiton, Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christology 
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983). See particularly Chapter 2, “Christology from Below,” 10-32, 
and Chapter 3 “Clnistology from Above,” 33-55. While the Promise of Trinitarian Theology chapter 
dealing with Macmmray was written in 1985 (viii-ix), this still falls after his Clnistological work published 
in 1983.
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Cappadocian-type trinitarian theology. Gimton holds that the meaning of creation is not
discernable independent of theology, that natural theology is dependent upon revealed
theology, and, therefore, only nanow aspects of reality may be understood without
recomse to theology.^
Gunton, however, does not limit this Imowledge nanowly to creation, for he
states: “If God is God, he is the source of all being, meaning and tiiith. It would seem
reasonable to suppose that all being, meaning and truth is, even as created and distinct
from God, in some way marked by its relatedness to its creator.”  ^ This sounds
remarkably similar to Cunningham’s notion of the trinitarian marks, yet differs in that the
being is in its relation to the creator—not its derived (substantial) being. Gimton is
attempting to create a new form of analogy, a trinitarian analogy o f being.
In distinction from both of these paradigmatic theologians [Barth and Aquinas], 
my concern is to develop a trinitarian analogy of being (and becoming): a concept 
of the structure of the created world in the light of the dynamic of the being of the 
triune creator and redeemer. Hence, this is a similar enteiprise to the Thomistic 
analogy, though with a form that is indebted to Barth. Put negatively, it can be 
said that the programme is unlike Aquinas’ in bemg trinitarian in structure; it is 
unlike Barth’s analogy of faith m being not just an approach to predicating 
qualities of God analogously, but to find a way of speaking of all being.
Gunton’s epistemological method is very comparable to the one employed by 
Torrance similarly deriving knowledge of the inunanent Trinity through the economic 
Trinity. The two diverge in that Tonance’s analogia relationis is primarily 
epistemological wliile Gunton reifies the conclusions of this process attributing 
ontological status to the theoretical model created to explain the natme of God ad intra. 
Gunton believes he has escaped the criticism of the traditional analogia entis because he 
excludes ontological continuity between creator and creation; creation has its being in that
This is similar to ideas about reality as expressed by Tonance. See Thomas F. Torrance, Transformation 
and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1984).
See Gunton, Brief Theology of Revelation, 25-30, 36-37.
Gunton, One, Three and Many, 167.
Gunton, One, Three and Many, 140-41.
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it is in relation to God/^"  ^He replaces the ti aditional substantial understanding of being 
with relational being grounded in the Trinity itself and from this trinitarian basis discerns 
the manifestation of the marks of the Trinity in creation/Creation is marked by its 
relation to God. Gunton clearly sees these trinitarian maiks or open transcendentals as 
being different than the tiaditional vestigia trinitatis}^^ The open tianscendentals, or 
universal marks of being/ai*e perichoresis (chiistologically derived), substantiality 
(pneumatologically derived), and relationality (derived from the triune nature of the 
immanent Trinity).^
One should be very clear on the procedure Gimton employs. First Gunton uses the 
cliristological and pneumatological experiences of God to arrive at the open 
transcendentals of perichoresis and substantiality. Then the consideration of the immanent 
Trinity generates the open transcendental of relationality. These open transcendentals are 
actually one step removed fr om their primary tlieological derivation, for Gunton actually 
finds spirit and sociality as the pneiunatological and immanent tiinitarian conceptions 
wliich are then generalized to accommodate all levels of reality—not just the personal 
l e v e l s . I n  other words, based on the revelation of God one is able to know the being of 
God ad extra and ad intra, and from this one may derive the open transcendentals which 
are the universal marks of being. These niaiics are not m creation because creation is 
derived from God’s being, but because creation has its being in relation to God.
This process is precisely tlie result Macmurray fears from a project like 
Torrance’s. For it is a very small step from Torrance’s epistemic inversion of certain
Gunton, One, Three and Many, 228-29.
Gimton, One, Three and Many, 229-30; see also 167,217. 
Gunton, One, Three and Many, 144, n. 23.
Gunton, One, Three and Many, 188.
Gunton, One, Three and Many, 212-13.
Gunton, One, Three and Many, 188-91; 227-29.
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teims and the reification or ontologizing of these tenns—the claim that one truly knows
or has access to the veiy being of God ad intra,
A Macmunian critique of Gunton is tliree-fold. First Üiere is a reduction in
Gunton’s epistemology. Macmuiray agrees with Gimton that there is a close connection
between epistemology and reality (this coimection was somewhat loosened by Tonance).
Knowledge, if it is real, must be knowledge of reality. So if one Icnows the nature of the
Trinity ad intra then one must posit the ontological reality of the immanent Trinity one
laiows. Yet it is precisely here where Macmunay and Gunton part company for they do
not share the same understanding of knowledge. Gunton states:
By relationality I do not mean what is sometimes taught, that tilings can be known 
only hi so far as they are related to us, but rather the realistic belief that 
particulars, of whatever kind, can be miderstood only in terms of their relatedness 
to each other and the whole.
Macmurray holds both understandings of epistemic relationality; laiowledge must be 
rationally objective and knowledge is always someone’s knowledge. Real laiowledge is 
the personal experience of the Other, otherwise it is only theoretical or else it is false. 
Because Gunton’s understanding is insufficiently personal he falls into the tiap of 
believing he can know something of which he has-no direct experience.
One may counter that in the experience of God ad extra one has this knowledge of 
God. The response to tins is MacmiuTay’s second critique: while one may appeal to 
revelation, revelation is still operating within the conceptual limitations of human 
experience. Jesus Clnist as the full revelation of God was incarnated as a human and 
spoke in human ways. Even if one invokes the Holy Spirit in the life of Jesus and in the 
believer one is still faced with human limitations—imless one is willing to endorse some 
form of overly-realized eschatology. While it is true that in the experience of the Holy 
Spirit one potentially knows more about God, the understanding of this experience is still
120 Gunton, One, Three and Many, 37, n. 53.
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limited by the boundaries of human conceptuality. The determination that tlie Son and the 
Holy Spirit are the very ousia of God is a human conceptual attempt to imderstand the 
experiences of Christ and the Holy Spirit. It may be true, but it is still conceptual. And 
while one may point to biblical sources for these concepts, they are nonetheless primaiily 
conceptual for even in the early church many Cliristians arrived at different 
understandings (conceptualizations or theories) of the reahty of their experience of Jesus 
and the Spirit. The existence of differing positions regarding the nature of God means 
either (1) some people have not authentically experienced God and therefore then 
knowledge is false, or (2) people have experiences of God yet the conceptual models they 
build to explain these experiences differ in their adequacy. Macmurray holds to the 
conceptual and theoretical explanation. It is important to note that Macmurray is not 
saying all theoretical constmcts aie equal. Some models aie more adequate than others.
In reifying the theoretical model of the economic Trinity and tlie immanent Trinity 
Gunton is making an enor similai* to the one made by introductory level chemistry 
students who mistakenly believe that if one could actually see an atom it would look just 
like the “solar-system” model (with electrons orbiting the proton) shown to them in 
lecture. It is to confuse reality for one’s model of that reality. The model is only a visual 
aid and heuristic device wliich is helpflil at their level of comprehension, but which will 
have to be abandoned if  they do advanced studies of the atom because it is only a model. 
While Gimton makes occasional warnings about the danger of anthiopomoiphism, that is 
to mistalce the model or image for the reality, this is cleaily not uppennost in his mind, as 
it tends to be for Torrance. This leads to Macmunay’s third critique.
Third and finally, because it ignores the limitations of human conceptuality—as 
understood by Macmurray—there is a very real danger of anthropomorphic projection in 
Gunton’s approach. Some may argue this is safeguarded by the priority he places on the
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theological over the antliropological. Gimton foiimilates his imderstanding of God before 
he discerns the open transcendentals. However, as Gunton liimself has noted, the one 
implies the other; one cannot operate either purely from above or from below.
Furthermore one must ask how the primary understanding of God was determined in the 
first place. Cunningham was absolutely convinced that one must begin witli the coirect 
doctrine of God and then one would easily observe the vestigia trinitatis, just as Gimton is 
adamant about estabhshing liis doctrine of God before he goes in search of Ins trinitarian 
marks. Nevertheless, one must ask the question, how does one determine the coirect 
doctiine of God? Why does Gunton embrace the Cappadocian model of the Trinity and 
not another? Is it because it is theologically coirect, and if so, how does he know it is 
correct? Or rather, is it not the case that contemporary relational thought in physics and 
antliropology tiiggers the re-appropriation of the Cappadocian doctrine? And if tliis is so, 
then how is this different than projection? Methodologically this is the same mistake that 
Gunton accuses Augustine of making: absolutizing a contemporary ontology. Gunton 
warns of the dangers of choosing the wrong ti anscendentals, but how does one loiow they 
are wrong?^^^
How is it then possible to avoid anthiopomoiplûc projection in human discussion 
of God? According to Macmmray it is by distinguishing between knowledge and 
reflection and recognizing that one is using reductionistic models in expressing the 
qualities of God which are beyond the personal. This does not require silence (although 
Macmunay himself, mifortunately, tended towards this) but it does require humility. One 
must not confuse one’s model of absolute Agent and infinite Person for the reahty of 
God. Without the constant reminder of the theoretical natme of all human ideas of God
121 Gunton, One, Three and Many, 156-57.
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and God’s natme there are no safeguards against projecting one’s understanding of 
human persons onto divine persons.
5.5 JÜRGEN M o l t m a n n :
Contem plative  T r in ita ria n  Theology
Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms o f Christian Theology}^^ is the final 
volume of Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic Contributions to T h e o lo g y Rather than 
having a theological prolegomena to the series Moltmann intends this as something of a 
postlegomena describing liis theological method and concerns after the fact.
Those who ai e expecting a series of theoretical and analytic expositions are sme 
to come away disappointed, for while there are theoretical aspects it is in many ways 
more an introduction to a way of tliinldng tlirough illustration and example. For instance, 
rather than giving a long theoretical discussion of dialog and its purposes, he uses the idea 
of dialog in his discussion of the theologian’s context—who it is that the theologian is 
interacting with in various contexts. Moltmann’s theology is exploratory in nature and 
one might even say opportunistic in that he appropriates ideas, methods, and models on 
an ad hoc basis. He has a certain fearlessness, or recklessness depending upon one’s point 
of view, in feeling free to change his mind on issues and approaches. This malces him an 
exciting dialogue partner but a frustrating person to attempt to smnniarize. One must 
always cai efully interact with Moltmann because of the developmental natme of liis 
theology. There is always a danger when citing a particular passage that he may relativize 
or completely reject it at some later stage, even within the same work.
Jürgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms o f Christian Theology», trans. Margaret 
Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000).
This series includes The Trinity and the Kingdom, God in Creation, The Way ofJesiis Christ, The Spirit 
of Life, The Coming of God, and Experiences in Theology. It is interesting to note that the explicitly 
pneumatological volume, Spirit o f Life, was not originally part of die series.
Moltmami, Experiences in Theology, 3-9. In the preface he emphasizes die importance of dialog and 
biography for dieology but tiiis is not a highly theoretical account. Experiences in Theology, xvii-xviii.
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One of the disadvantages of Moltmann’s form of presentation is that major tliemes 
may be easily overlooked. Based solely upon reading Experiences in Theology one might 
be excused for thinking the theology of the cross is only a minor theme in Moltmann’s 
theology. However, Richard Bauckham correctly identifies the controlling theological 
idea in Moltmann’s theology as a “dialectical inteipretation of the cross and resurrection 
... subsumed into the particular foim of t r i n i t a i i a n i s m . H e  also identifies seven 
general characteristics of Moltmann’s theology: “(1) cliristological, (2) integrative, (3) 
redemptive, (4) processive, (5) theocentric, (6) contextual, (7) politically and pastorally 
responsible.”^^® All these elements aie demonstrated within Experiences in Theology, yet 
ai e only occasionally visible as foci of the discussion. In part this is due to the more 
methodological concerns of the work, but in part it is due to the style of the ai'gument 
itself.
The work itself is organized into four sections with an epilogue. The fust is an 
exploration into the nature of theology. Here Moltmann focuses upon the experiential 
particularity of the theologian and the importance of one’s history and context. In addition 
to modeling the importance o f  dialog and biography an additional methodological feature 
of this chapter is demonstrated but not specifically addressed. This is Moltmann’s method 
of discovery. Rather than beginning with a formal definition of theology he begins with 
an implied definition which is continuously refined tlirough the course of further 
discussion. It is a very experiential and iterative process^—tentative and exploratoiy—as 
Moltmann feels liis way along, and invites the reader to join him in the journey. It is the
Richard Bauckham, The Theology ofJiirgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 4. The trinitarian 
component particularly includes within it an effort to overcome tlie subordination of pneumatology to 
christology (6).
Richard Bauckham, “Eschatology in die Coming o f Godf hi God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of 
Jürgen Moltmann, ed. Richard Bauckham (Edinburgh: T&T Claik, 1999), 2. Moltmami states that 
Bauckham’s accounts of his theology are the best available, and (jokingly?) asserts, “He [Bauckham] 
knows my dieology, with its strengtiis and weaknesses, better dian I do myself.” Jürgen Moltmann, “The 
World in God or God in the World? A Response to Richard Bauckham,” in God Will Be All in All: The 
Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmami, ed. Richard Bauckliam (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 35.
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investigation’s ordo cognoscendi rather than tlie presentation of the conclusions, ordo 
essendi.
The second section addresses hermeneutics in terms of promise, history, scripture, 
and epistemology. Promise is a key concept because it allows the reinterpretation of the 
past in light of the future which creates hope. This then affects one’s understanding of 
history and scripture. He also discusses various epistemological strategies culminating in 
sacramental language which is a true analogy indwelled by the Holy Spirit.
Dialogs with various forms of liberation theology comprise the third section of the 
work. Here Moltmann interacts with Black theology, Latin American liberation theology, 
Minjimg theology, and Feminist theology. Programmatically these function as a means to 
expand Moltmann’s own particular tlieology making it more universal tlirough the 
encounter with differing perspectives arising from differing experiences m differing 
contexts. Moltmann is not afraid to disagree with positions held by these other theologies 
or to state that they are wrong; he is not a pluralist in the relativistic sense of the word,^^  ^
Nonetheless he truly desires to listen and learn fr om diverse sources.
The Trinity is the focus of the fourth section. Moltmann holds to a social doctrine 
of the Trinity which is united perichoretically; or stated in a slightly different way the 
Trinity is a perichoretic unity. Panentheism is also a prominent element within his 
trinitaiian doctrine of God,
The epilogue is a discussion of the difference between science and tlieology. 
Moltmann distinguishes between science as knowledge and theology as wisdom and 
warns of the dangers of knowledge without wisdom.
In many ways Moltmann and Macmurray may be seen as khidr ed spirits. Both 
men are comfortable going against prevailing opinion and charting their own course. Both
See for example his rejection of tlie poor as tlie collective crucified Christ. Experiences in Theology, 
296.
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are working in non-analytic ways, accused of conceptual and methodological confusion, 
and dismissed by some as being less tlian scientific in their approaches. Their relational 
understanding of persons is, prima facie, very similar. Both believe in the contextual 
natme of human understanding and therefore hold particular theoretical formulations in a 
tentative manner. Moltmann, as Macmmray before him, was deeply influenced by 
interaction with Marxism*^® and by his experience of war.^ ^®
Nonetheless there is one major difference between these two and this difference 
has profound ramifications. Moltmann’s theology appears limited to the contemplative 
apperception or conceptualities drawn from contemplative analogies. This is observable 
in the way tliat it forces Moltmann’s hand in his understanding of the relation of persons 
to institutions, science and theology, contemplation and activism, space and tinie.^^^
While contending that he suffers from this reductionism one must also point out that he 
fights against these conceptual limitations; yet in the end Moltmann is not able to escape 
the contemplative tendencies of his thought.
5.5.1 Institutions
Contemplative tendencies are visible in  Moltmami’s discussions of politics, 
economics, and the general place of institutions in human life. In revisiting the political 
theology of the 1960s his diagnosis of its failme is that it improperly tended to totalize the 
political; his prescription is the need to accomit for global economics in theology.
Moltmami, Experiences in Theology, 50.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 8.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 3-4. It is particularly interesting tliat botli men see tlie liberation of 
the fear from deatli as being important to their personal development. Experiences in Theology, 338.
Tliis is not simply an academic dispute over wlietlier there should be two, tliree, or twelve terms in 
someone’s pliilosophy. It is tlie limitations tliat it creates for Moltmann as he attempts to articulate his 
theology tliat is tlie ultimate concern.
Alternatively it is possible to argue tliat Moltmann intentionally collapses tlie personal and the organic so 
that tlie organic commonality between humanity and creation is stressed as well as the commonality 
between human and divine persons. Stated anoüier way, Moltmann may want to collapse divinity into 
humanity and humanity into organism as part of his panentlieisni. This is less likely because of his 
conceptual struggle but it certainly is plausible.
Moltmami, Experiences in Theology, 117.
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Macmurray recognizes the importance of politics and economics, however he would 
argue that fixing either one of these is impossible, or at least ineffective, without the 
proper development of religious communities; hope lies primarily in friendsliip. 
Institutions, economics, politics and all indirect relations exist for the sake of direct 
personal relations and should serve to foster community, histitutions aie sub-personal, not 
supra-personal,^^"  ^existing for the sake of persons and not the other way aiound.
5.5.2 Science and Theology
Another indicator of Moltmann’s struggle with conceptual reductionism is foimd 
in his discussion of the differences between scientific laiowledge and theological 
wisdom.According to Moltmann science is non-reflective and experiential and stems 
from a sense of wonder resulting in discoveiy.^^® Theology, by contrast, is reflection upon 
knowledge (and belief). Wisdom is hmnble in recognizing its own limitations and 
respects and loves the object of its attention for its own salce. Wisdom does not seek to 
dominate the object as does s c i e n c e . -
Like Moltmann, Macmurray believes that knowledge is non-reflective and 
experiential; yet he believes laiowledge is available from all forms of experience 
including religious, artistic, and scientific experience and it is integrated in personal 
knowledge which is synonymous with religious knowledge. Macmurray agr ees that 
theology (philosophy) is reflection on knowledge and belief. But he argues that there is
A position Moltmann seems to hold. Moltmami, Spirit o f Life, 139.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 334-43.
Moltmaim, Experiences in Theology, 335.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 337. Moltmami does not address theology’s relation to belief in the 
section on science and tlieology, but very early in die work he defines tlieology as reflection on belief. 
Moltmami, Experiences in Theology, 11, 13,23-26.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 339-40. This is a very odd discussion in that Moltmann describes 
science in terms of wonder and intuition, only then to transition to an instrumentalist miderstanding. There 
is a leap here from wonder to instrumentalism. Fm tlieimore, he dismisses tlie argument that only applied 
science contains the will to dominate because he disputes tlie distinction between pure research and applied 
science for there is no disinterested knowledge. Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 342. Again there is an 
indicator here tliat Moltmann is functioning with only two levels to his thought, for his argument that there
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also scientific reflection on scientific knowledge and belief—the philosophy of science. 
Furthermore one questions the absence of art from Moltmann’s taxonomy. Where does it 
fit within the dichotomy of knowledge and wisdom? From Moltmann’s descriptions one 
might assume that he would tend to view aif as having more kinship with wisdom than 
with science, yet this collapses the emotional and the interactive aspects of art and 
religion. Of course, if one is forced to choose between a pragmatic approach to reality 
(science) and a contemplative approach (ait) Macmurray would choose art—but neither 
has the proper interactive aspect which religion and the personal understanding of reality 
canies with it.
There are hints that Moltmann senses this limitation and includes relational terms 
such as harmony and peace in the discussion, but even here one has an overwhelming 
sense of distance, disengagement, and non-interference. The overall impression is that of 
an elderly couple sitting quietly across a kitchen table from each other. This is a warm 
and comforting image, but if this is the totahty of tlieir relationship then one of them 
could just as easily be replaced by a painting. A fully personal relation requires personal 
presence and mutuality; the person must be there and interacting (even if only in subtle 
ways). Replacing the image of the old couple across the table with an image of the same 
couple holding hands or talking together produces a picture closer to Macmurray’s model 
of personal community.
5.5 .3  C o n t e m p la t io n  a n d  A c t i o n
The illustration of the elderly couple raises the issue of the relation between 
contemplation and action. Moltmami frames tins discussion in terms of activism and 
contemplation. He is very concerned by the contemporary phenomenon of hyper-activity
is no disinterested research is not that all knowledge is emotional (valuation in terms of interest), but tliat all 
research is motivated by political and economic forces.
Moltmami, Experiences in Theology, 342-43.
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and busyness. He sees this as resulting from a pragmatic attitude which values praxis for 
praxis sake and which sepaiates the contemplative from the active. He desires to integiate 
action in contemplation or participation.^"^® While there is talk here of action, one must 
recognize that Moltmami’s understanding of contemplation and participation are idealistic 
in form. Return for a moment to the example of the elderly couple across the table. 
Moltmann would specifically reject the counter-example of holding hands because he 
ar gues specifically for the priority of vision over touch and views recent moves towards 
emphasizing touch over sight as leading towards activism. He instead calls for a visual- 
contemplative model where there is no interaction between the one contemplating and the 
object of contemplation because he fears the possibility of domination. “The act of 
[visual] perception transforms the perceiver, not what is perceived. Perception confers 
communion. We loiow in order to participate, not in order to dominate.” "^^  ^So while 
calling for an integration of action in contemplation one sees this as a form of action 
which does not interact, participation which does not participate, and coimnunion without 
commimity.
One does not want to misrepresent Moltmaim on this point for he is not wanting to 
banish action outright, but rather wishes action to be controlled by an imderstanding of 
the intrinsic value of the other. He wants action grounded in contemplation. Yet he 
never explains how this integration or balance actually occms. Finthemiore, it is possible 
to interpret the activity of perceiving as his ideal of action as non-interactive activity, in 
which case this represents the complete opposite of Macmmi'ay’s understanding of action.
Macmurray safeguards the dignity and fr eedom of the Other by insisting that all 
frilly rational action is in terms of the nature of the Other. Rather than being forced to
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 118-21; Spirit of Life, 199-202, Trinity and the Kingdom, 9. 
Moltmami, Spirit o f Life, 201.
Moltmann, Spirit o f Life, 200.
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choose between a pragmatic or contemplative integration of action (as Moltmann is 
forced to do by virtue of the contemplative reduction) Macmurray is able to integrate the 
pragmatic and the contemplative in the fully interactive personal. This contemplative 
understanding of participation and connnunion also effects Moltmaim’s use of these 
concepts applied theologically.
5.5.4 P e r i c h o r e s i s  a n d  S p a c e
Moltmaim’s doctiine of God is notoriously difficult to ascertain. It is possible to 
read him as a tritheist or as a type of process theologian (with its connotations of 
monism). The tritheistic tendency of his work is most readily apparent when Moltmaim is 
discussing God in terms of the social Trinity. Talk of the three equal persons miited in 
their common accord lends itself to caricature as a divine committee. The more 
monistic side of Moltmann’s doctrine of God comes in his panentheism with its 
eschatological God as the all-in-all.^ "*® In order to hold these two together without losing 
either particularity or unity he appeals to the concept of perichoresis.*"*  ^Moltmann, as one 
might expect, gives a slightly different spin to his interpretation of perichoresis compared 
with Gunton and Tonance. He places a greater emphasis upon the spatial aspect of
Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 9; Spirit o f Life, 201, where he calls for a balance between action 
and contemplation.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 314. Gunton criticizes the tritheistic tendency of social doctrines of 
the Trinity. See Gunton, One, Three and Many, 214.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 310. See Welker’s criticism of the projection of particular social 
structures (particularly democratic political concepts) onto die Trinity. Michael Welker, “Spirit Topics; 
Trinity, Personhood, Mystery and Tongues,” Journal o f Pentecostal Theology 10 (April 1997): 30. It is of 
note that Moltmann expresses discomfort in using any formulaic description of God, even as three persons; 
“‘The threefold God’ has a modalistic sound, ‘triunity’ a tritiieistic one. To taUc about God ‘one-in-three’ is 
not very helpful, because it brings the one-ness numerically on the same level as die three-ness of die 
Persons. I would also prefer to avoid talkhig about a ‘God in diree Persons’ because the word three is 
related to the one personal God, and suggests die figure of a body widi three heads,” Moltmami, 
Experiences in Theology, 309.
One will also remember that the contemplative social-structure widiin the Form of the Personal 
was society and it was distinguished from community by its unity in goal or purpose. To be fair to 
Moltmami, he talks a great deal about love in die social Trinity which tends to resist a nanowly social 
understanding (in the Macmunian sense of social) yet there is still diis sense, possibly due to the strong 
emphasis upon the economic Trinity, that the social Trinity is bound by purpose (creation?) rather than 
interactive love.
Moltmami, Experiences in Theology, 311.
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perichoresis as room for movement, so that perichoresis is both movement and rest. As a 
result of this, Moltmann actually calls for a revision of the ti aditional trinitaiian formula. 
“Consequently we should not talk only about the three trinitarian Persons, but must at 
the same time speak of the three trinitarian spaces in which they mutually exist.”*"*^ This 
is highly significant for it raises the question of the relation of time and space.
Throughout Moltmami’s discussion of God one sees a clear priority given to 
spatial conceptions. Panentheistic creation as space within God,*"*® the concept of God’s 
Shekinah indwelling presence filling the whole world,*^ ® tlie Sabbath as rest,*^ * and even 
the Trinity itself,*^  ^are all primarily conceived of in spatial terms. Moltmann regards time 
and space as assymetrical because one may experience vaiious times in one space but not 
vice-versa. From this he concludes time must be integrated into space.*^  ^Tliis is 
consistent with Moltmaim’s miderstanding of participation as a non-interactive activity 
whereby one is related yet does not inter-relate and its accompanying preference for 
vision over touch. One should not take tliis to mean that Moltmami’s concept of space­
time causes his conception of participation or the reverse. Rather attention is being di awn 
to tlie fact that both of these points of view are consistent with a primarily contemplative 
apperception. In contemplation vision has priority over touch and time is subordinated to 
space.*®"* This contemplative tendency also explains Moltmann’s defense of m ysticism - 
contemplative religion.*®®
Moltmaim, Experiences in Theology, 317-323.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 319.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 311.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 315.
Moltmami, Experiences in Theology, 314-15.
Moltmami, Experiences in Theology, 330.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 315.
It is helpful at this point to briefly clarify the differences between Cunningham, Gunton, and Moltmann. 
Ciuminghani’s analogia entis relies on a continuum of being and is essentially substantial. Gimton’s 
trinitarian analogy of being does not situate the continuity in substance but in God’s relationality, and then 
posits a correspondence of being based upon tliis relational continuity. Ulthnately his metliodology is barely 
distinguishable from Cmmingham’s except tliat his analogies (open trancendentals) are far superior. Hie 
nature of Moltmaim’s experiential trinitarian tlieology also privileges spatial categories over temporal ones 
just as Cunningham does. The difference is that Moltmaim is integrating time into space whereas
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Macmurray would reject this entire approach because fully personal relations must 
be mutual and reciprocally interactive and space must therefore be integrated into time in 
order for a fully personal understanding of the self-as-agent-in-relation-to-Other to exist. 
Additionally Macmurray argues personal analogies are the best analogies for talk of that 
which is beyond the personal.
One is rightly cautious about making generalizations about Moltmann’s theology. 
However, in the examples provided above one sees the effects of a propensity for 
Moltmann to adopt a contemplative stance towards reality. One could also add to the 
evidence by noting the many dialectical descriptions he uses of reality—dialectic is the 
form of the organic. Alternatively, one could equally point out any number of examples 
where his thinking pushes against these conceptual limitations. Therefore one is hesitant 
to label him as a contemplative or an idealist. However, one might conclude by 
suggesting Macmurray’s thought would serve as a powerflü tool if Moltmann tmly 
desires to break out of the hmitations of tlie contemplative aspects of his imderlying 
philosophy. Of course, Macmurray’s philosophy also has limitations which Moltmann 
would face in attempting to speak theologically, yet one cannot help but think that it 
would contribute overall to his theology because personal language is the most complete 
and comprehensive language available to human persons.
It is miclear how Moltmann views the relationship between anthropology and 
theology because he intentionally avoids constructing a distinct anthropology and instead 
concentrates on anthropology within the doctrine of creation.*®® Certain aspects of the 
hmnan appear to directly reflect the divine, while other aspects appear to be organically 
imderstood. This does not seem to greatly concern Moltmann for one day God will
Cumiingham’s model is concerned primarily wiüi substance and really has no integrating attitude towards 
time.
Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 330; Spirit of Life, 205-13.
Moltmann, God in Creation, xvi.
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indwell creation in a divine way and creation will indwell God in a creaturely way/^^ In 
tliis formulation to speak of the question of projection seem rather moot. However one 
may sp,y that the presence of contemplative pliilosophy tends to create a dialectical model 
which is then resolved in unified synüiesis.
5.6 Su m m a r y  C onclusio n
In Chapter 1 an introduction to the life and thought of Jolm Macmurray was 
provided. An investigation of the secondary literature revealed the need for a better 
understanding of Macmurray’s concept of God in order to properly understand the 
relationship between human and divine persons witliin his thought. In order to do this, 
however, it was determined that a systematic exposition of Macmuixay’s thought was 
needed from a philosophical perspective.
Chapter 2 developed a systematic model of Macmuixay’s philosophy, the Form of 
the Personal, providing a crucial map of the key concepts and relationships within his 
complex and heavily integrated thought. The importance of the pragmatic, contemplative, 
and communal apperceptions was clearly demonstrated and was itself instrumental in the 
organization of the discussion of Macmiuxay’s Form of the Personal.
An extensive examination of Macmmxay’s antluopology was the focus of Chapter 
3. Agahi exploiting the apperceptive triad, hiunan beings were considered in terms of 
equality, freedom, and mutuality. The topic of religion received extensive coverage in this 
chapter and nimierous misunderstandings of Macmurray were coixected using the 
philosophical model developed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 consisted of an exploration of Macmurray’s theology or understanding 
of God. This natural theology was approached through the apperceptive stances of the 
idea of God, the historicity of God, and the mutually interactive God. It became clear as
Moltniann, Experiences in Theology, 311.
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this chapter unfolded that Macmurray was committed to neither a Unitarian nor a 
trinitarian doctrine of God. Equally cleai' was the effort Macmurray exerted to emphasize 
the distinction between human and divine persons, that God was beyond the merely 
personal and was in no way sub-personal. Yet God may only be Imown by humans in 
human terms. Finally, it was deteiinined that one could categorize Macmiuray’s doctrine 
of God as functionally equivalent to pnemnatology: perceiving God as Person is 
synonymous with describing God as Spirit.
Chapter 5 has been a critical investigation of Lampe, Cumiingham, Torrance, 
Gunton, and Moltmann using Macmurray’s Foiin of the Personal. Through applying 
Macmuiray’s thought to the particular theologians one discovered that a theologian’s 
underlying concept of human persons affected their conceptualization of God, and rightly 
so. According to Macmurray this is proper and to be expected and does not imply 
anthropomorphism imless one mistakes one’s theoretical model of God for the reality it is 
attempting to understand.
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